This chapter examines the dynamics of contemporary migration control from two perspectives: a) The progressive intertwining of migration control and crime control (i.e. 'crimmigration', Stumpf, 2006) and b) The Northern / Western nature of the production irregularity and its control. By examining how irregularity / illegality is produced (by whom and for whom), and the concrete dynamics of its control, the chapter suggests that the penal and the Northern are the two central elements in the formation of the Northern penal state. Taking the EU as its primary point of departure, the chapter proposes to deconstruct punishment in relation to citizenship, and examine its role as a tool of contemporary global governance, formed by the unequal North - South relations.

The criminal law is commonly understood as articulating the very limits of the sovereign state's power over its citizens. A criminal law addressed to citizens is said to produce a 'suitably modest criminal law' and restrain recourse to punishment (Duff 2010). Yet to conceive of the criminal law as 'for citizens' raises thorny questions about its application to those who are not, or not yet, or no longer, citizens. This paper explores how the criminal law does, and how it should, apply to those who stand outside citizenship. It suggests that citizenship is increasingly deployed in ways that disadvantage and exclude outsiders, immigrants, and aliens. It explores how invoking citizenship has been implicit in the discriminatory treatment of immigrants, the criminalization of immigration offences, and resulted in disproportionate punishments. The phenomenon of 'crimmigration' has been much debated in the immigration literature (Stumpf 2006). The parallel trend toward the 'immigrationization' of the criminal law has been given less attention (Zedner 2010) and the detention of immigrants outside the penal system, less still (Bosworth forthcoming). This results in differential, often discriminatory, measures and undermines basic criminal process protections for those deemed outside citizenship. Following Cole, the paper suggests that citizenship should not be a predicate for basic rights (Cole 2007) and that in a liberal democracy the protections of the criminal law, criminal process and just punishment should apply to all irrespective of citizenship.

This paper will examine points of intersection between refugee law and criminal law and consider the consequences of their growth over the past decade. The central argument is that criminalization is increasingly important for refugee law, but that this growth is occurring by stealth, and therefore without the procedural protections that are a typical part of the criminal law landscape. There are three principal ways that criminal law intersects with refugee law - within the refugee definition, where some types of criminality may be a basis for exclusion; within article 32 where serious criminal activity may lead to expulsion; and within the related context of extradition proceedings. The paper will build its analysis by drawing on recent leading cases in each of these areas. The work will conclude by considering how criminalization within refugee law flows on to affect the immigration setting more broadly. This paper builds on my earlier work in the 2008 chapter entitled 'Making Asylum Illegal'. The argument here is focused closely on criminality within refugee law, and, as such, is complementary to that analysis which examined criminalization of the entire field of refugee law. These two arguments are, of course, intricately interrelated, as two sides of the same coin.

This chapter will address the question of why governments criminalize immigration-related conduct. U.S. law has classified deportation as a civil sanction, not a criminal penalty. Operating alone, without criminal law as an adjunct, deportation fulfills the formal goal of immigration law by removing unlawfully present noncitizens. What, then, is the benefit of criminalizing the same conduct? Using both the deportation apparatus and the criminal justice system for the same conduct seems redundant. It adds cost, expends the time and energy of government officials, and leads to bad publicity when government agents make mistakes in using force. In the United States at least, it leads to conflict between governments when states seek to expand their traditional criminal powers into the federally controlled immigration realm. Finally, using both the criminal justice and deportation apparatus to process the same conduct seems to interpose a delay in reaching the immigration goal of removing the noncitizen. Nevertheless, the advent of crimmigration law is one of the strongest trends in U.S. immigration law of this century, and it shows no signs of letting up. This chapter will examine the benefits for government of the crimmigration trend. Focusing on the criminalization of immigration-related conduct, it will analyze two potential government motivations. First, criminalization enhances social control of marginalized groups, especially ethnically-identified marginalized populations. It does this by legitimizing greater expenditures of state power to control the liberty of the noncitizen using criminal enforcement tools. Second, drawing on Malcolm Feeley's work on process as punishment, criminalization significantly extends the government processes through which noncitizens pass while undergoing removal. As a result, the process itself becomes part of the penalty that the state exacts. This becomes particularly apparent through a functional examination of crimmigration, which reveals immigration and criminal justice actors cherry-picking processes from immigration law (such as detention), and from criminal law (such as police arrest), to fulfill official goals.

This chapter will consider the rapid expansion and impact of mobility policing in relation to three overlapping populations: non-citizens, the workforce and women. Examining multiple border sites it will draw on empirical research that explores the experiences of border policing and strategies for survival and empowerment during border negotiation. Conceptually it is based on the idea of functional borders and the web of border policing activities that produce and sustain borders both extra and intra territorially as well as at traditional border sites. It will consider the criminological theories of social control (Melossi, Cohen), theoretical developments in citizenship and exclusion (Dauvergne, Zedner) and international relations theory of statecraft (Doty, Devetak) to consider alternative frameworks to understand the diverse functions of mobility policing for individuals, communities and institutions.

For a police officer, the mobile person has always posed a potential threat of criminal behaviour. Laws concerning vagrancy, trespass, assembly and traffic have defined various forms of mobility and movement as criminal. By extension, techniques for controlling mobility, including criminal profiling, the securing of property, areal surveillance and traffic and crowd control have been core components of the way the police deal with crime. Histories of policing and immigration control in Europe and North America (e.g. Lucassen, Tabili), and a range of studies of states of emergency/exception (De Genova etc) have given us examples of this longstanding connection between criminalization and mobility. However, one of the purest expressions of this form of modern policing can be found in Apartheid era South Africa, where the entire criminal justice system was directed towards the policing of populations who were defined as 'out of place'. This paper builds on this observation, by studying how contemporary police in South Africa have taken to the task of policing migration and mobility. In the post-Apartheid period South Africa's police have made the nation one of the most prolific deporters of foreign nationals in the world. This paper explores this phenomenon through an ethnography of the everyday practice of beat police officers, examining how they problematise and police migration and mobility. I then use this data to think more broadly about global trends in immigration law and policy. I pay particular attention to the global shift towards the internal policing of immigration, exemplified by post-Schengen Europe and post-9/11 United States. I ask whether South Africa provides other countries with a dystopic portent of the future of policing.

This chapter examines the treatment of a particular group of rejected asylum seekers: the so-called "unreturnables". It highlights the treatment of the unreturnables in an attempt to argue that the policies regarding irregular migrants represent a certain policy dilemma: forcing the unenforceable. Controlling the borders is one of the core activities of policing which regulate the size and the content of the population. The "unreturnables" are unwelcome; they are wanted out. Controlling them means sending them "home", "back", just "out". However, for different reasons, the "unreturnables" cannot be expelled. Thus the state is limited in its policies regarding the use of force. How then, are the "unreturnables" controlled? The chapter outlines the totality of rights and demands on the unreturnables, what might be called their "control situation". Lacking the opportunity to expel them, control situation represents a structure of incitements designed to force them out 'voluntarily', as well as more coercive forms of policing, thus highlighting the complex intertwining of welfare and penal policies in contemporary migration control.

This chapter examines the characteristics, contradictions and pitfalls of the dominant language of human trafficking as an organised crime and illegal immigration problem and its attendant approaches of trafficking control. By drawing on examples from the UK, USA and Asia, I will outline the dominant 'law and order' framework of trafficking and the migration-crime-security nexus and interrogate the ways in which this has facilitated and justified the energetic pursuit of 'get tough' enforcement-oriented policies and migration control practices. In the process, more and more irregular migrants, non-citizens and 'vagabonds' at the bottom of the global hierarchy of mobility (Bauman) have been caught up in transnational counter-trafficking policing, militarized border surveillance, offshore processing, detention and deportation with significant human costs. A key task for the criminology of mobility is to rethink human trafficking not as a crime problem but as a problem of mobility and, secondly, to conceptualise the violent logic of global trafficking control as one of many manifestations of state power and politics of exclusion and immobilisation at and beyond the border.

This chapter will critically assess the practice of immigration detention in the UK. Drawing on eighteen months of fieldwork and interviews with detainees and staff in five detention centres it will examine the implications of their stories for criminological assumptions about punishment and confinement. How do notions of legitimacy, agency and power play out in these facilities? What can we make of the intersections between prison personnel and ideas and those in the immigration agency? Is it right to fit these centres into a sociology of punishment, or do we need a new vocabulary to understand them?

Deportation is increasingly used as a way in which Western states, like the US and the UK, (informally) punish non-citizens for the commission of certain criminal offences. The deportation of criminals can be understood either as a social control mechanism that acts to discipline non-citizens or as a form of banishment that aims to prevent an offender from any future violation of the norms or security of the community in question. But as it is a power applicable solely to non-citizens, the use of deportation for criminals also acts symbolically and legally to reinscribe the boundaries of membership in Western states. Elaborating on this feature of deportation power, this chapter illustrates how debates over who is (or should be) vulnerable to deportation power reveal the changing conceptualisations of membership in the modern British state over time. In this chapter, I focus on the experience of the UK state and analyse, primarily using parliamentary sources, four "problem cases" for its use of deportation power: Commonwealth citizens, EU nationals, long term resident citizens, and UK citizens suspected of terrorist activity. I argue that debates over the legitimacy of deporting criminals in these groups show that while deportation may appear to offer states a simple way to reinforce the boundaries of membership, it actually exposes the ethical, political and legal complexity of defining who belongs in modern state like Britain.

As the shape and import of the nation-state has shifted over the last thirty years, academic paradigms for understanding punishment have often struggled to follow suit. While criminologists have faithfully documented the Anglo-American 'punitive turn' and the rise of the 'penal state' (Garland 2001; Loader 2010; O'Malley 1999), scholars have given less thought to the new theories of imprisonment that such a 'new' state demands. How does the 'breakdown' of borders affect the 'traditional' prison? Does an 'exclusionary' conception of citizenship alter the actual experience of imprisonment (Zedner 2010)? How, if at all, does globalization change the practice of punishment? This paper considers such questions in the context of the British prison. Drawing on a year of fieldwork in and around five men's prisons, the paper argues that recent trends in migration and crime control have recast the British penal estate around the 'problem' of foreignness. Prisons have become key sites for the construction of citizenship and 'the foreigner' has emerged as a distinct category of prisoner. These developments suggest that globalisation has tangible?and theoretically significant?effects on the purpose of the prison. They also highlight the conceptual limitations of existing prison theories, which stall in the face of a newly 'global' penality.

In an international perspective, the Scandinavian countries have regularly, by scholars such as Wacquant, Lacey and Pratt, been touted as exceptions to the international rule of convergence towards an increasingly punitive (neo-)liberal model characteristic of the Anglophone countries. These commentators have often speculated, however, that Scandinavia may be standing at a crossroads; that Scandinavian exceptionalism may soon be a thing of the past. One of the exceptional qualities at risk is what Pratt describes as a culture of equality shared by a homogeneous Scandinavian population. I will discuss whether this is a valid description, using Norway as my main example. Today, almost one in three inhabitants of Oslo is an immigrant or a child of immigrants. The immigrant population is represented disproportionally in official crime statistics, as well as in prison statistics. In such a situation, where the public feels that welfare policies are made the rights of "outsiders", and where these outsiders seem to be behaving badly, one might say that Pratt is correct: the Scandinavian culture of equality is under pressure. The question, then, is whether and how this situation will impact on the traditional exceptional welfare state with its exceptional welfare oriented prisons. I will argue that Norwegian society is already experiencing a move towards a more punitive political climate and harsher sanctions, and that this development is introducing new optics of state power and employing new categories sensitive to new forms of risk.

Globalization has increased the flow of people across borders. Alongside this increased mobility, the intensification of border control--the regulation of both territory and group membership--has limited the mobility of those perceived to be ?other,? particularly ethnic and religious minorities, subjecting a growing number of people to detention and expulsion for immigration violations and other offenses. Mobility itself has become stratified, segregating those with free movement from those who are increasingly subject to control, containment, and in some cases forced into ?no man?s land.? The forced return of failed asylum seekers, for example, or the compulsory deportation of criminal aliens, puts people into ?no man?s land,? a state of being where migrants? human rights are routinely violated in favor of national interests, where noncitizens are denied recognition of their basic human rights to safety, security, family and freedom of movement (UN Declaration of Human Rights). Extending what Seyla Benhabib (2004) calls the ?paradox of democracy? where universal principles apply only to group members, this paper argues that expulsions can be understood as a state response to the structural contradictions of democracy. European democracies unable or incapable of applying full rights and protections to nonmembers increasingly turn to more coercive measures to resolve this tension. By literally casting out nonmembers, European governments simultaneously reassert the primacy of national belonging and national sovereignty thereby weakening international and transnational claims and protections.

I would like to show a possible path in order to make sense of the connections between penality, migrations and processes of criminalization. This may be found perhaps by adapting to the new era of globalization the concept of "less eligibility", placed by Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer (1939) at the center of their reconstruction of the relationships between punishment and social structure, i.e. trying to think the idea of "less eligibility" in a new transnational context and coupling it with so-called "long cycle" theory (Schumpeter). Such conjunction of long cycles and management of penality, produces a current version of what at the end of the nineteenth century was called "canaille" ? a term strictly related to Foucault's "delinquency" on the one hand and to the obsession of that century with "the crowd", on the other. This peculiar "dialectic of canaille" is reproduced today in the vicissitudes of contemporary migrations. The connections between long cycles and concepts of dignity and right of those who are cyclically defined as a new "canaille", are central to such reconstruction. The emerging picture is particularly useful in order to understand what happened within the last "long cycle", between the 1970s and today, in the United States, Europe, and China.