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DOI: 10.1111/j.1748-121X.2010.00191.x

Despite the limited exception introduced by statute in 1974, the principle that truth is and ought to be a complete defence to all actions in defamation is typically regarded as self-evident in modern English law. The fact that England stands here against not only the whole of the civilian tradition but also a number of common-law jurisdictions suggests, however, that it is not. This article, after surveying the history of the principle in English law and the debates that it has spurred in the past, argues that English law is right on this question, but needs to understand more cogently why. This, in turn, requires an examination of the interests protected by the cause of action. It is only if we accept that it is, and is solely, reputation founded in character that the defence of veritas will be secured.

ISBN: 1748121X

This paper examines, from a historical and comparative perspective, the role of truth in the South African law of defamation. In order to understand to what extent the law of South Africa might represent a mixture of civilian and common-law thinking, it first sets out the viewpoint of, on the one hand, Roman and Roman-Dutch law and, on the other hand, English law. Against this background, the dominant position of South African law appears avowedly civilian, a stand explained by the fact that the South African law of defamation really is a law of verbal insults, as in Rome, rather than a law of injuries to deserved reputation, as in England. However, an interesting dissident strand in favour of the sufficiency of truth can be seen to exist in the background, which is explored. This dissenting strand is certainly English in substance, but this does not entail that it has English roots.