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Chapter 2 of The Concept of Law is an accidental essay on the generality of law. Hart points out ways in which generality is a necessary feature of law. I point out ways in which his account can be made more complete, and I argue that law necessarily involves particularity as well as generality. Then I ask what ‘necessary’ means in all these claims. It is a popular idea that legal theorists should not try to identify necessary features of law; I argue that the popular idea is a mistake. I conclude by arguing that Hart should have been more willing to pass value judgments about law: the elucidation of the necessary features of law depends on an elucidation of the value of law.

ISBN: 978-1849463249

Interpretation is a creative reasoning process of finding grounds for answering a question as to the meaning of some object. Deciding what is to be done according to law sometimes takes interpretation. But no need for interpretation arises, if no question arises as to the meaning of an object. And interpretation will not help to resolve a legal problem that does not depend on a conclusion as to the meaning of some object. Legal reasoning is not generally a matter of interpretation. I argue that each of the following aspects of legal reasoning need not involve interpretation: resolving indeterminacies as to the content of the law, working out the requirements of abstract legal provisions, deciding what is just, equitable interference with legal duties or powers or rights, and understanding the law.

ISBN: 978-0-415-87818-0

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-0375-9

After explaining two respects in which law is reflexive, this chapter points out that vagueness in law is typically extravagant, and that extravagant vagueness is a necessary feature of legal systems. Some philosophers of law and philosophers of language claim that bivalence is a property of statements in the domains that concern them; the chapter argues that the bivalence claim should be rejected. In philosophy of law, the motivation underlying the bivalence claim is an urge to assert the principle that the law must be capable of standing against arbitrary use of political power. The chapter seeks to articulate that principle in a way that is compatible with the possibility of indeterminacy in the application of vague laws.

ISBN: 978-94-007-0374-2

A contribution to a debate with Professor T.R.S.Allan about the rule of law.