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Interpretation is a creative reasoning process of finding grounds for answering a question as to the meaning of some object. Deciding what is to be done according to law sometimes takes interpretation. But no need for interpretation arises, if no question arises as to the meaning of an object. And interpretation will not help to resolve a legal problem that does not depend on a conclusion as to the meaning of some object. Legal reasoning is not generally a matter of interpretation. I argue that each of the following aspects of legal reasoning need not involve interpretation: resolving indeterminacies as to the content of the law, working out the requirements of abstract legal provisions, deciding what is just, equitable interference with legal duties or powers or rights, and understanding the law.

ISBN: 978-0-415-87818-0

Chapter 2 of The Concept of Law is an accidental essay on the generality of law. Hart points out ways in which generality is a necessary feature of law. I point out ways in which his account can be made more complete, and I argue that law necessarily involves particularity as well as generality. Then I ask what ‘necessary’ means in all these claims. It is a popular idea that legal theorists should not try to identify necessary features of law; I argue that the popular idea is a mistake. I conclude by arguing that Hart should have been more willing to pass value judgments about law: the elucidation of the necessary features of law depends on an elucidation of the value of law.

ISBN: 978-1849463249

A state is sovereign if it has complete power within its political community, and complete external freedom. It may seem that the idea of sovereignty is incoherent, or that sovereignty is objectionable, because of a paradox and two moral principles. The paradox is that a sovereign state must be capable of binding itself and also must not be capable of binding itself. The moral principles are that no state can justly have complete freedom internally, and that a state ought to be bound in international law by rules that it has not agreed to, such as norms of ius cogens. I argue that the paradox is only apparent, and that the moral principles are compatible with state sovereignty. So the idea of sovereignty is a coherent idea, and sovereignty is a potentially valuable feature of states in international law. Sovereignty is to be understood as internal power and external freedom that are complete for the purposes of a good state.

ISBN: 0199208573