Grant Lamond
University Lecturer in Legal Philosophy
Grant Lamond is University Lecturer in Legal Philosophy and the Felix Frankfurter Fellow in Law, Balliol College. He holds degrees in Philosophy and Law from the University of Sydney and took the BCL at Magdalen College. He was a Junior Research Fellow at St Edmund Hall, where he completed his DPhil. His research interests lie in the philosophy of law and the philosophy of criminal law.
Publications
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G Lamond, 'Persuasive Authority in the Law' (2010) 17 The Harvard Review of Philosophy 16 [...]
This article discusses the nature of persuasive authorities in the common law, and argues that many of them are best understood in terms of their (being regarded) as having theoretical rather than practical authorities for the courts that cite them. The contrast between theoretical and practical authority is examined at length in order to support the view that the treatment of many persuasive authorities by courts is more consistent with this view. Finally, it is argued that if persuasive authorities are best understood as theoretical authorities, this raises difficulties for both positivistic and interpretivist theories of law.
ISBN: 1062-6239
G Lamond, 'The Rule of Law' in Andrei Marmor (ed), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law (Routledge 2012) [...]
The central argument of this paper is that the rule of law is an ideal concerned with the conditions that are necessary for the law to succeed in governing a community. The influential views of Fuller and Raz which ground the ideal in the conditions necessary for the law to exist at all (Fuller) or for the law to be capable of guiding behaviour (Raz) are discussed and criticised. Four conditions are highlighted as part of the rule of law: (1) the law is effective; (2) the state is governed by and governs through law; (3) the individual laws can be jointly and severally obeyed; and finally (4) those other legal and social arrangements whose primary rationale is to serve conditions (1)–(3). Condition (4) accounts for the significance of such arrangements as an independent legal profession. Condition (4) also helps to explain both the attraction of regarding other political ideals such as democracy and human rights as aspects of the rule of law, since their existence helps promote the other conditions, and the reasons for excluding them from the rule of law itself, since their primary rationale is not to ensure that the law succeeds in governing the community. Finally, it is argued that the rationale for the rule of law lies in the value of a law governed community. The rule of law itself, however, is not always morally valuable: not because it is purely of instrumental value, but because it is an inherently mixed-value good.
ISBN: 978-0415878180
G Lamond, 'The Rule of Recognition and the Foundations of a Legal System' in Andrea Dolcetti, Luís Duarte d’Almeida and James Edwards (eds), Reading HLA Hart's 'The Concept of Law' (Hart Publishing 2013) (forthcoming)
