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Continues the argument developed in 'Unjust Enrichment and Public law' in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in FII. Argues that in Deutsche Morgan Grenfell the House of Lords took a wrong turning on the law of unjust enrichment in a public law context, a decision which has led to unnecessary and avoidable litigation, as evidenced by FII. Suggests that such litigation could in future be avoided by reversing the Deutsche Morgan Grenfell decision and adopting the hybrid public and private approach to cases of unjust enrichment involving public bodies.

Analyses the problematic nature of the current criminal law concerning intoxication

The article argues that there are two key problems with the current law concerning voluntary intoxication. First, the rules applicable so-called crimes of basic intent, contrary to some of the more recent case law, can in fact only apply coherently to reckless result crimes. Second, given the differences between the threshold for liability for sober defendants and the threshold for liability for voluntarily intoxicated defendants, the current rules amount in cases of basic intent to criminalisation of the intoxication itself. If this is to be the case, the article argues that the law should take this approach openly, so that in any case where the defendant lacks mens rea as a result of voluntary intoxication (s)he should be convicted instead of a new statutory offence of 'committing the actus reus of offence X while intoxicated', which could also apply coherently to all offences.

The chapter focuses on cartel criminalisation from the criminal law perspective, charting how the process of criminaliation fits within the current landscape of criminal law, particularly in England and Wales. It examines the compromises necessary if the criminal law is to be used to regulate cartel behaviour without damage to that project or indeed to the criminal law more widely.

Casenote arguing that in two recent decisions, Lady & Kid and Accor, the ECJ has extended its involvement in national causes of action in unjust enrichment still further. But by denying all defences to such claims other than a very literal version of the passing on defence, without hearing proper principled argument on the range of defences which might be available, the ECJ has replaced a loss of competence at national level but not the corresponding loss of principled reasoning. The casenote argues that these decisions thus provide further evidence of the problematic nature of the ECJ's so-called 'remedies jurisprudence'.