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DOI: 10.1093/ojls/gqq028

This review article discusses the relationship between deference and the presumption of constitutionality, as discussed in Brian Foley’s book, Deference and the Presumption of Constitutionality. Foley argues for the rejection of the presumption of constitutionality as it operates in the Irish Constitution, proposing instead a ‘due deference’ approach. This approach would require courts to give varying degrees of weight to the legislature’s conclusions that particular legislative provisions are constitutional. The article praises Foley’s book, particularly its stronger justification of due deference which focuses on its ability to foster a culture of justification which, in turn, facilitates popular sovereignty. The review also provides a criticism of the argument made in the book and discusses its application to the UK constitution. First, the review argues that the focus on constitutional as opposed to institutional factors to determine deference may, in practice, undermine Foley’s justification of due deference. Second it argues that Foley’s justification of deference may be best served in the UK constitution by a theory of democratic dialogue as opposed to the application of due deference.

The doctrine of deference permeates human rights review. It plays a role in de˘ning Convention rights, in determining the nature of the proportionality test applied when analysing non-absolute rights, as well as in deciding the stringency of its application. The role of deference has recently been subjected to both judicial and academic criticism, some of which advocates the demise of the doctrine. This article develops a contextual account of deference that is justi˘ed for epistemic reasons, rather than reasons of relative authority. This conception is able to withstand current criticism and ismodest enough to play a role in a range of diˇerent justi˘cations and understandings of judicial review under theHuman Rights Act.The article then provides amore detailed account of deference, taking account of the relative institutional features of the legislature, executive and judiciary, without running the risk that the court fails to performits constitutional function of protecting individual rights.

Am examination of the different forms ways in which human rights may have horizontal effect and their relationship to the way in which human rights law may have an impact on private law.

ISBN: 9781107009325

The Human Rights Act 1998 is criticised for providing a weak protection of human rights. The principle of parliamentary legislative supremacy prevents entrenchment, meaning that the courts cannot overturn legislation passed after the Act that contradicts Convention rights. This book investigates this assumption, arguing that the principle of parliamentary legislative supremacy is sufficiently flexible to enable a stronger protection of human rights, which can replicate the effect of entrenchment. Nevertheless, it is argued that the current protection should not be strengthened. If correctly interpreted, the Human Rights Act can facilitate democratic dialogue that enables courts to perform their proper correcting function to protect rights from abuse, whilst enabling the legislature to authoritatively determine contestable issues surrounding the extent to which human rights should be protected, alongside other rights, interests and goals in a particular society. This understanding of the Human Rights Act also provides a different justification for the preservation of Dicey's conception of parliamentary sovereignty in the UK Constitution.

ISBN: 978-1-84113-830-5

DOI: 10.1093/icon/mor028

This article is a response to the contributions of Nick Barber and Trevor Allan found in this volume. It argues that an analysis of “sovereignty” does serve a useful purpose in U.K. constitutional law. More specifically, it argues that discussions of “sovereignty” should also include an analysis of constitutive rules, particularly aiming to understand which institutions are “sovereign” in the sense of having the power to define and modify these constitutive rules. When analysed in this manner, an argument can be made that Dicey's traditional theory that Parliament cannot bind its successors is still a valid rule of the English legal system. In addition, this rule is desirable. Its presence is necessary, although not sufficient, to ensure that both Parliament and the courts have a rule in defining and modifying constitutive rules. This dual role is desirable as it helps to maintain the legitimacy of the U.K.’s “political” constitution.