The integration of the European capital markets makes progress and has led both issuers and investors being active on various markets on both sides of the Atlantic. In times of financial crises, this brings one question into the centre of attention which had not been discussed exhaustively before: In the situation of a securities liability towards investors in an international context, which is the applicable law to the liability claim? The harmonisation of private international law rules in Europe gives rise to new reflections on the problem of international issuer liability. In the United States, on the other hand, the Supreme Court has just granted certiorari in a ‘foreign-cubed’ securi-ties class action case and will thus rule for the first time on matters relating to the inter-national application of the US securities regulation soon. This paper understands the role of issuer liability in a broader context as a ‘corporate governance’ device and, from this starting point, develops a new approach to the legal problem of cross-border securities liability.

In capital markets around the world, calls for greater transparency regarding holdings of cash-settled equity derivatives (in particular Contracts for Difference, CfDs) have arisen due to the increased use of CfDs to gain control or to influence the management of prominent companies on all major European stock exchanges. They have been used in this manner due to an emerging practice that permits a CfD holder to capture the shares to which the CfD arrangement relates (without entering into any further express or implied agreements to do so), thereby acquiring a de facto control position in the target company. The UK was among the first countries to extend its shareholder disclosure regime to cover CfDs. Positions above the trigger threshold of 3 per cent must be disclosed as if they were shares enti-tling the holder to voting rights in the target company. Two alternatives were considered when pre-paring this new regulation: firstly, a general disclosure obligation of all economic long positions and secondly, a safe harbour regulation with exemptions from the requirement to disclose certain CfD transactions. Ultimately, the first option was preferred, yet not on the basis of its own merits but be-cause the safe harbour alternative was considered too complicated and difficult to enforce. This paper evaluates disclosure regulation of cash-settled equity derivatives and assesses the ef-fectiveness and suitability of the disclosure regulation under chapter 5 of Disclosure and Transparency Rules (DTR) in the UK with comparison to the relevant US rules and case law. We argue that the UK made the wrong choice of disclosure regime for CfDs. It fundamentally misunderstood the nature of the underlying problem relating to CfDs. As this article explains, the key problem related to CfDs is not the economic interest which CfDs convey per se, but rather the hedging structures that market participants have developed to facilitate the use of CfDs to acquire control of companies by stealth. This particular mischief would have been better targeted by an intentions-based disclosure regulation requiring disclosure of CfD positions only in cases where the CfD holder intends to launch a takeover or to otherwise influence the target company’s strategy and operations. Instead, the UK market is saddled with a general disclosure obligation with only very limited exceptions. This disclosure obligation is too wide in scope, places an undue burden on market partici-pants and ultimately acts as a deterrent to CfD transactions. This article argues that the UK should move away from the current general disclosure obligation towards intentions-based disclosure to re-move the current fetter on the CfD market, while still tackling the underlying mischief.

European corporate law has enjoyed a renaissance in the past decade. Fifteen years ago, this would have seemed most implausible. In the mid-1990s, the early integration strategy of seeking to harmonise substantive company law seemed to have been stalled by the need to reconcile fundamental differences in approaches to corporate governance. Little was happening, and the grand vision of the early pioneers appeared more dream than ambition. Yet since then, a combination of adventurous decisions by the Court of Justice, innovative approaches to legislation by the Commission, and disastrous crises in capital markets has produced a headlong rush of reform activity. The volume and pace of change has been such that few have had time to digest it: not least policymakers, with the consequence that the developments have not always been well coordinated. The recent 2007/08 financial crisis has yet again thrown many - quite fundamental - issues into question. In this article, we offer an overview that puts the most significant developments of this decade into context, alongside each other and the changing patterns of corporate structure in European countries.

DOI: 10.1017/S0008197310000516

Company law has long been in conflict with European Union law. Whereas the traditional approach of the European Court of Justice was to challenge national company law rules that were applied to foreign companies under the freedom of establishment (Centros and its progeny), recent case-law suggests that the Court might embark on a general assessment of domestic company law rules. This tendency is based on an extended interpretation of the free movement of capital, which became most prominently relevant in the recent Volkswagen case. A systematic analysis of the latter fundamental freedom and its relationship to company law demonstrates that this tendency is not without risk and might well end up in a ‘quality control’ of national company law through the ECJ. However, differentiated outcomes will be found depending on the actor in question (private party or State), and depending on the beneficiary of the measure at stake. It is argued that State measures potentially will always trigger the scope of application of the free movement of capital, irrespective of their nature or objective. Hence, even general statutory company law can be caught by this fundamental freedom. However, the decisive test will be identified as whether the measure has a ‘deterring effect’ on potential investors from other Member States. Special rights for the State are one extreme example which are surely caught by EC law, and purely private arrangements within the articles of association, are the other extreme. This test is recommended to serve the Court as guidance in future cases.

Die weltweite Integration der Kapitalmärkte hat dazu geführt, dass sowohl deutsche Unternehmen als auch Anleger heutzutage auf vielen Märkten dies- und jenseits des Atlantiks aktiv sind. Gerade in Zeiten der Finanzmarktkrise stellt sich oftmals die Frage, nach welchem Haftungs-recht sich die Schadensersatzansprüche etwaig geschädigter Anleger richten. Die Vereinheitlichung des internationalen Privatrechts in Europa bietet Anlass, die Frage nach dem internationalen Kapitalmarkthaftungsrecht neu und umfassend zu behandeln. Der vorliegende Beitrag begreift die Kapitalmarkthaftung im größeren Kontext der Unternehmenssteuerung („Corporate Governance“) und entwickelt daraus einen eigenen Ansatz zur Anknüpfung der Haftungsansprüche. Auf dieser Grundlage ist eine Anknüpfung der kapitalmarkthaftungsrechtlichen Vorschriften an die Rechtsordnung des Gesellschaftsstatuts eine rechtsdogmatisch und -politisch vorzugswürdige Einordnung.

ISBN: 0044-2437

DOI: 10.1017/S156675290800579X

Cross-border forum shopping for the benefit of a different insolvency law regime has become popular within the European Union in recent years. Yet legislators, courts and legal scholarship react with suspicion when debtors cross the border only to profit from a different insolvency law system. The most prominent legal tool, the European Insolvency Regulation, is based on the assumption that forum shopping is bad for the functioning of the European Internal Market. This paper questions the hostile attitude towards the phenomenon of forum shopping. It is argued that forum shopping can have beneficial effects both for the company and for its creditors, and that strong safeguards for creditors who oppose the migration are in place. Furthermore, the validity of the COMI approach of the Regulation under the fundamental freedoms of the Treaty is questioned; it is suggested that the current regime needs to be amended. The proposed new system would enable more corporate mobility within the European Union and create more legal certainty for all constituencies at the same time.

One of the key features of the new Europe-wide legal form "European Company" ("Societas Europaea" or "SE") is the possibility of transferring the company’s seat from one Member State to another without having to be wound up or to re-register. As this possibility does not exist for companies formed under national law, the formation of an SE will often present the only possibility for companies to transfer their incorporation and corporate headquarters between Member States. This is a big advantage and a milestone towards the European Internal Market. However, some doubts remain as to the practicability of the system. The mandatory linkage of the head office to the registered office within the same Member State according to Article 7 of the SE Regulation is very problematic and, in light of recent ECJ decisions such as Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art, may violate EC primary legislation. Why should companies that are formed under national law be allowed to have the head office in a Member State different from their registration state, while an SE—as an instrument of Community law and a symbol of the Internal Market—is not? Furthermore, the detailed procedural rules laid down in the Regulation are sometimes overprotective and may significantly reduce the attractiveness of the SE’s mobility. It is argued that Article 7 of the SE Regulation is secondary law that itself is inconsistent with the (primary) EC Treaty. Furthermore, the Member States also tend to be overprotective when enacting safeguard measures for the benefit of creditors, minority shareholders and employees. Here again, freedom of establishment does not allow protectionist measures that contravene the gist of the SE’s mobility.

ISBN: 1473-5970

article on the Überseering case and international jurisdiction issues

ISBN: 072-06585

Das Werk behandelt - sehr praxisorientiert und zugleich wissenschaftlich fundiert - die im täglichen Rechtsverkehr mit England auftretenden Fragen. Dazu gehören z. B. die Besonderheiten des englischen Vertragsrechts, Warenkauf, Arbeitsrecht, Gesellschaftsrecht, Insolvenzrecht, Wettbewerbsrecht, internationales Zivilprozess- und Privatrecht einschließlich Schiedsverfahrensrecht u.v.m. Das Buch ist nicht nur für Geschäftsverbindungen mit England eine unerlässliche Hilfe. Da englisches (Handels-)Recht in vielen wirtschaftlich bedeutenden Ländern zur Anwendung kommt, genießt es Weltgeltung. Zudem wird im internationalen Handelsverkehr sehr häufig ein englischer Gerichtsstand oder Schiedsort und englisches Recht als "neutrales Recht" vereinbart, wenn sich die Parteien nicht auf das Recht einer der Vertragsparteien einigen können.

ISBN: 978-3-8005-1346-8

The financial crisis has brought about a revival of state protectionism across the globe. Most Western leaders have made a virtue of big government and state intervention; bail-outs and Sovereign Wealth Funds have been among the first responses to the economic contraction. Company law rules are one of the instruments frequently used to restrict or to discourage integration or to deter foreign investment. Examples for the new protectionism can be seen in a wide range of legislative and regulatory measures, for instance state measures preventing foreign takeovers, 'golden shares' or laws on foreign direct investment targeting Sovereign Wealth Funds, mainly from Asia. This book presents timely research by a number of company law and EU law experts into this field of law. The chapters cover a broad range of topics, spanning from takeovers/mergers over the one share-one vote debate through to the foreclosure of markets against Sovereign Wealth Funds.

Recent case-law and legislation in European company and insolvency law have significantly furthered the integration of European business regulation. In particular, the case-law of the European Court of Justice and the introduction of the EU Insolvency Regulation have provided the stimulus for current reforms in various jurisdictions in the fields of insolvency and financial law. The UK, for instance, has adopted the Enterprise Act in 2002, designed, inter alia, to enhance enterprise and to strengthen the UK’s approach to bankruptcy and corporate rescue. In a similar vein, a recent reform in France has modernised French insolvency law and even introduced a tool similar to the successful English ‘company voluntary arrangement’ (CVA). This book provides a collection of studies by some of the leading English and French experts today, analysing current perspectives of insolvency and financial law in Europe, both on the national as well as on the European level.

ISBN: 978-1841139357

With the introduction of the new legal form of the European Company Statute ('Societas Europaea') at the end of 2004, European Community lawmakers have created an instrument which enables large European firms to choose a corporate structure which is based on the same standards in all of the European Community. One special advantage of this new legal form is the simplification of cross-border restructuring, in particular the transfer of the corporation's registered office to another country. However, the statutory provisions for this transfer are relatively restrictive and do take the creditors' and shareholders' request for protection into consideration. The book studies the extent to which these newly-created regulations for the transfer of a European Company’s seat comply with the requirements of an authentic legal form of European Community law, and in particular whether or not they are compatible with the basic freedoms stipulated in the EC Treaty.

ISBN: 978-3-16-149102-3

The case-law of the European Court of Justice in the field of company law has repeatedly touched on the question of abuse, most notably in the situation where a company was set up in a Member State only to do business exclusively in another. Starting with the landmark case of Centros in 1999, the Court has repeatedly stressed that it employs a liberal approach towards abuse in this field. According to the Court, making use of the disparities of different legal standards when setting up a company is not abuse, but explicit use of the freedom of establishment. This paper analyses the Court’s approach towards abusive behaviour in company law and assesses the impact that the leading cases since 1999 have had both on business behaviour in the EU and on the national law-makers who have responded to the opening of the markets. It is shown that the Court has provoked a sizeable entrepreneurial migration from various countries towards the UK. This in turn has led to regulatory competition, in that other Member States in continental Europe have been forced to adapt their company law to make it more attractive for businesses. It is argued that at least so far, the (limited) competition between Member States has been beneficial and has reduced both registration time and costs. Questions remain as to the relevance of any comparison with the United States and the future developments for corporate re-incorporations.

In the wake of the economic crisis of 2008/09 the debate about the desirability of control-enhancing mechanisms that deviate from the traditional one-share-one-vote standard has been reinvigorated. This debate can be seen in the discourse of policy makers and academics that advocate the introduction of multiple voting rights in an attempt to curb the short-termism that is perceived by many to have provided the prevalent business incentive prior to the financial crisis. Alongside such discourse there buds a renaissance in the use of golden shares, in the hope, inter alia, of protecting European industries against Sovereign Wealth Funds from the Middle and Far East. Most of these proposals appear to be ill-advised. In the continental European context, they would reinforce the existing blockholder-dominated share structures to the detriment of minority shareholders. But even in the UK, where the possible introduction of deviations from OSOV has been advanced, these suggestions have to be greeted with reservations. The current discussion seems to leave well-established legal and economic ground actively to support protectionist market forces.

Il existe un conflit entre les objectifs de l’UE visant à établir un marché intérieur intégré et à assurer son bon fonctionnement et les ambitions de (certains) E´ tats membres à stimuler les champions nationaux ou à maintenir le contrôle économique national dans les entreprises (anciennement) publiques. Ces derniers temps, en raison de la crise financière mondiale, les dirigeants européens ont fait une vertu de l’intervention étatique ; sortir d’affaire les fonds souverains fait partie des premières réponses à la contraction économique. La crise a revivifié l’ancien outil protectionniste, qui était censé être surmonté dans l’UE. Le renouveau du protectionnisme peut être vu dans un large éventail de mesures législatives et réglementaires : mesures empêchant les rachats étrangers incluant l’octroi d’aides d’E´tat ou de droits spéciaux dans les sociétés privatisées, les « golden shares », qui conduisent à restreindre le marché européen du contrôle des entreprises privées et des investissements directs. Sans doute, des outils du droit société comme les droits de vote multiples ou d’autres mécanismes de renforcement de contrôle peuvent également être réanimés pour poursuivre les objectifs nationalistes. Cette contribution reprend certains des aspects du débat sur « une action – une voix » (OSOV) à l’aune de la crise financière et ses craintes protectionnistes.

ISBN: 978-2275034676

This report seeks to examine how to avoid distortions of competition which may result from the use of public, rather than private, capital or which may result from differences in Member States’ definitions of public interest goals and in the instruments employed to attain such goals. It aims to discover for what purposes the state may intervene in the market economy and how. In so far as such intervention is by the State investing capital into a commercial enterprise in accordance with national company law, it seeks to ascertain whether the EU Treaty permits, restricts or prevents the same.

Annotated guide on the European Company Statute

In honor of his retirement from the Max-Planck-Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg, this commemorative publication is dedicated by his students to Klaus J Hopt, one of the worldwide leading experts on commercial law and author of many significant pieces of work, especially in the fields of trade, corporate and banking law.

ISBN: 978-3-89949-502-7

The VW case is the latest in the series of "golden shares" cases. Whilst the previous cases concerned special rights the State was granted, the VW law provided provisions that applied equally to all shareholders. The ECJ was therefore tempted to open the assessment of general rules of company law and their compatibility with the free movement of capital. However, the Court ultimately refrained from delivering a clear statement.

ISBN: 0165-0750

Comment on Advocate General Maduro's opinion in case C-210/06 (Cartesio) on the possibility to transfer a company's head office across the border.

ISBN: 0723-9416