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Competition Law — Overview

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For more detailed information about our work in this area, see also the dedicated Centre for Competition Law and Policy website

Forthcoming Subject Events


October 2014

Centre for Competition Law & Policy
Competition Law & Economics
Speaker: Mark Williams, ECLM Economics Limited
Pembroke College Pichette Auditorium at 15:00

February 2015

Centre for Competition Law & Policy
Article 9 Commitment Decisions
Speaker: Florian Wagner-von Papp, UCL
Centre for Competition Law & Policy at 13:00

March 2015

Centre for Competition Law & Policy
European Cartel Criminalisation
Speaker: Peter Whelan, Centre for Criminal Justice Studies, School of Law, University of Leeds
Centre for Competition Law & Policy at 13:00

News

Journal of Antitrust Enforcement Agency Effectiveness Study

The Oxford Centre for Competition Law and Policy, in collaboration with the Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, launched an empirical study on the effectiveness of competition agencies […]

The Journal of Antitrust Enforcement

The first issue of the Journal of Antitrust Enforcement (JAE) has now been published in hard copy and is also available online […]

Discussion Groups

These self-sustaining groups are an essential part of the life of our graduate school. They are organised in some cases by graduate students and in others by Faculty members and meet regularly during term, typically over a sandwich lunch, when one of the group presents work in progress or introduces a discussion of a particular issue or new case. They may also encompass guest speakers from the faculty and beyond.

Competition Law Discussion Group

Publications

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Showing all 38 Competition Law publications currently held in our database
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Journal Articles

2013

A Ezrachi and J Thanassoulis, 'Upstream Horizontal Mergers and (the Absence of) Retail Price Effects' (2013) Journal of Competition Law and Economics (forthcoming) [...]

The paper explores the retail price effects of upstream and mid stream horizontal mergers. It questions the prevailing assumption in merger review according to which such transactions will have similar effects on retail price as that of downstream horizontal mergers. The analysis illustrates how a sophisticated profit-maximizing merged entity may find it more profitable to enter into efficient contracts which seek to maximise the profit of the distribution channel, and so ensure that retail prices are not raised. The merged entity uses its market power and improved bargaining position to extract as much of that profit as possible from the retailer. We therefore argue that one cannot simply assume a direct link between the creation of market power upstream following a merger transaction, and the subsequent increase in retail prices. An analysis of the effects of upstream mergers on retail prices should call for a more nuanced appraisal which distinguishes the transfer of wealth within the operators in the distribution chain from the possible price impacts on final consumers.


ISBN: 1744-6414

2012

A Ezrachi and H Qaqaya, 'UNCTAD’s Collaborative Information Platform' (2012) 4-2012 Concurrences Journal [...]

The application of competition law in an international setting has long been a challenging area for competition agencies. Legal and practical obstacles often limit an agency’s ability to obtain information on multinational violations and engage in effective enforcement and prosecution. These limitations have been particularly noticeable in the case of developing countries and economies in transition. These regimes are characterised by limited enforcement capacity and tend to focus their attention on domestic violators and on efforts to foster a ‘competition culture’. The challenge of tackling sophisticated cross-border anticompetitive activity and the imposition of effective sanctions on international violators may be beyond their reach. Unfortunately, the limited enforcement capacity of these regimes often results in an increased and disproportionate exposure to multinational anticompetitive activity. This exposure is particularly harmful given the ever growing level of cross-border trade. Indeed, in many instances, unless the cross-border activity is challenged by other, more powerful jurisdictions, developing economies and economies in transition remain exposed to negative transfer of wealth. This reality serves as a powerful incentive for these regimes to enhance their enforcement capacity in order to effectively tackle cross-border infringements. To facilitate these efforts, UNCTAD has recently launched a new initiative that will foster transparent information flow and collaboration between competition agencies. This initiative – known as the Collaborative Information Platform - forms part of UNCTAD’s on-going work on international cooperation and enforcement.


2011

C Hodges, 'A Market-Based Competition Enforcement Policy' (2011) 22 European Business Law Review 261

C Hodges, 'European Competition Enforcement Policy: Integrating Restitution and Behaviour Control' (2011) 34(3) World Competition 383

2010

A Ezrachi and Gilo, 'Excessive Pricing, Entry, Assessment and Investment – Lessons from the Mittal Litigation' (2010) 76:3 Antitrust Law Journal [...]

The role of antitrust in curtailing excessive prices has long been a contentious area. Consequently, the charging of excessive prices has been subjected to diverse levels of enforcement across the world.1 U.S. antitrust law, for example, does not encompass the charging of high prices as such,2 and was held not to “condemn the resultant of those very forces which it is its prime object to foster: finis opus coronat.”3 By contrast, competition laws in other jurisdictions provide for the condemnation of excessive or unfair pricing. Such is the case under EU competition law,4 the competition provisions in the European Member States,5 and in other jurisdictions across the world.6 But even among those competition regimes which do intervene against the charging of excessive prices as such, one may identify different levels of enthusiasm for doing so. In Europe, for example, recent years have witnessed a restrained approach by the European Commission7 but a more proactive approach by some of the competition authorities of the Member States.8 Varying levels of intervention reflect a controversy as to the merit of prohibiting excessive pricing. Three main grounds are often used to justify non-, or limited-, intervention: (1) intervention is not necessary, as high prices would be competed away by new entry, attracted by the ex-cessive price; (2) there are practical difficulties in speculating what a price would have been had there been competition and in determining the excessiveness of the prices actually charged; and (3) enforcement which targets excessive prices may chill innovation and investment.9 To illustrate the difficulties of assessment and to question some of the justifications that are used to rationalize non-intervention, this article reviews the recent litigation in South Africa related to alleged excessive pricing by Mittal Steel.10 We use the decisions of the South African Competition Tribunal and the South African Competition Appeal Court as a case study to highlight both the complexity of, and possible merit in, antitrust intervention against excessive pricing. Our analysis focuses on the three grounds for non-intervention. First, with respect to the self-correcting nature of excessive prices, we illustrate how excessive prices, in and of themselves, do not attract new entry, when potential entrants are either informed or uninformed about their post-entry profits. Referring to our previous work on this subject,11 we question the South African Competition Tribunal’s holding in the Mittal case with respect to the prerequisite conditions for intervention against excessive pricing. Second, we consider how the difficulties of assessing what is an excessive price affected the outcome in the Mittal litigation. Without underestimating these difficulties, we consider how they may be alleviated in certain cases through reasonable methods for inferring what may constitute an excessive price. Third, while acknowledging the possible validity of concerns about chilling ex ante investment, we outline instances in which these concerns should not serve to support nonintervention. It should be stressed that this article does not advocate across-theboard intervention. It does, however, question the validity of a categorical “hands-off” approach, which deems excessive prices to be outside the realm of competition law. We consider separately the weight that should be assigned to each ground for non-intervention. Subsequently, we argue in favor of a case-by-case approach which explores the factual matrix of each case and considers the benefits, costs, and net effects of intervention.


ISBN: 0003-6056

A Ezrachi, 'Form and Effects Based Approaches - A Challenging Duality in the Application of Article 102 TFEU ' (2010) 2 Concurrences Review [...]

In recent years the debate on the soul of Article 102 TFEU and the effects based approach have dominated the competition law landscape. While many would agree on the clear merit of introducing more carefully balanced analysis when establishing abuse, the practicalities of such an approach have been difficult to agree upon. The recent Guidance Paper on Enforcement Priorities in the Application of Article 102 TFEU, which stemmed from the public consultation, has further sparked the public debate in this area. Concerns were raised as to the scope of the effects based variants in the Guidance Paper and the innovation it heralds - for example in the treatment of fidelity rebates and the use of the new proposed efficiency defence. Beyond the substantive and conceptual complexities that an effects based approach carries, its practical application has given rise to an interesting and somewhat disconcerting duality. On one hand, the European Court has not yet warmed to the effects based approach. In its judgements, the Court, has by large, continued to hold that it is not necessary to demonstrate that the abuse in question had a concrete effect on the markets concerned. It has generally ignored the lively debate on the effects based approach and even at times, the opinion of its own Advocate General . On the other hand, the Commission has pushed toward an effects based analysis, not only in its Guidance Paper but also in its decision making. In the Prokent/Tomra decision the Commission noted that it has completed its analysis by considering the actual effects of the dominant company’s practices and did not satisfy itself with the lower formalistic threshold established by the Court. Similarly, in Intel Corporation , the Commission took the decision in line with the orientations set out in its Guidance Paper and considered the effects of the fidelity rebates. The Commission noted, however, that even with the absence of harmful effect, Intel’s behaviour may be condemned under the formalistic analysis of abuse as applied by the Court, thus using a dual benchmark in its decision making. This Form based approach at the European Court and the Effects based approach as applied by the Commission, trigger apparent legal and business uncertainty.


A Ezrachi, 'Unchallenged Market Power? The Tale of Supermarkets, Private labels and Competition Law ' (2010) World Competition [...]

Recent decades have witnessed a distinct increase in the sales and popularity of private labels. The growing market share of private labels has transformed the landscape of retail competition in developed countries. Major retailers are no longer confined to their traditional roles of purchasers and distributors of branded goods. By selling their own label products within their outlet they compete with their upstream brand suppliers on sales and shelf space. This ‘vertical competition’ is not confined solely to ‘value’ categories of products. These days, retailers offer private label goods catering for the value, specialized and premium markets. These developments, and the increasing confidence that consumers have in private labels, have increased the bargaining position and market power of retailers as their labels compete directly with the leading manufacturers’ brand and its ‘value’ alternatives. This unique relationship and the increased role played by private labels raises fundamental questions as to their pro-, and possible anti-, competitive effects. It further highlights the shifting power balance between the producer and distributor and between the private label and branded good. This paper focuses on the effects of private labels, sold in major supermarkets, on retail competition and consumer welfare. In particular, it considers how supermarkets affect competition due to the fact that they retain control over shelving, in-store promotion and the pricing of branded and own label goods in addition to having superior access to consumer data. Furthermore, it reviews the enforcement of competition law in a private label environment and the difficulty in balancing the beneficial short-term effects of private labels and their possible, harmful, long-term effects. It subsequently questions whether these difficulties imply a lack of competitive harm or reflect a gap in regulation, as traditional analysis fails to encompass the increased market power of retailers and the existence of vertical competition.


ISBN: 1011-4548

2009

A Ezrachi and David Gilo, 'Are Excessive Prices Really Self-Correcting?' (2009) Journal of Competition Law & Economics

2008

A Ezrachi, 'Merger Notification Thresholds – Reflections on the degree of exposure to competition law regimes world wide' (2008) 60 ICFAI Reader

A Ezrachi, 'The Interplay between the Economic Approach to Article 82 EC and Private Enforcement' (2008) (3) Global Competition Litigation Review

2007

A Ezrachi, 'Competition Law and the Regulation of Cross Border Mergers and Acquisitions - A Story of Conflict, Cooperation and Convergence' (2007) (2007) 4 (2) ICFAI Journal of Mergers and Acquisitions 57-73

A Ezrachi, 'European Cartel Enforcement and the Possible Implications for Japanese Companies' (2007) Kanto-gakuin Law Review

2006

A Ezrachi, 'Behavioural Remedies in EC Merger Control – Scope and Limitations' (2006) 29(3) World Competition 459

A Ezrachi and D Gilo, 'EC Competition Law and the Regulation of Passive Investments Among Competitors' (2006) 26(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 327

S R Weatherill, 'Anti-doping revisited - the demise of the rule of 'purely sporting interest'?' (2006) 27 European Competition Law Review 645

2005

S R Weatherill, 'Anti-doping rules and EC law' (2005) 26 European Competition Law Review 416

2004

A Ezrachi, 'The Role of Voluntary Frameworks in Multinational Cooperation' (2004) 36 George Washington International Law Review 433

2002

A Ezrachi, 'Globalization of Merger Control – A Look at Bilateral Cooperation Through the GE/Honeywell Case' (2002) 14 Florida Journal of International Law 397

A Ezrachi, 'The Long Arm of European Competition Enforcement' (2002) 143 Michkari Mishpat Law Review

S R Weatherill, 'The Commission's Options for Developing EC Consumer Protection and Contract Law: Assessing the Constitutional Basis' (2002) 13 European Business Law Review 497

2001

A Ezrachi, 'Limitations on the Extraterritorial Reach of the European Merger Regulation' (2001) 4 European Competition Law Rev.137

Books

2011

A Ezrachi and C Beaton-Wells (Editors), Criminalising Cartels: A critical interdisciplinary study of an international regulatory movement (Hart 2011) [...]

This book is inspired by the international movement towards the criminalisation of cartel conduct over the last decade. Led by US enforcers, criminalisation has been supported by a growing number of regulators and governments. It derives its support from the simple yet forceful proposition that criminal sanctions, particularly jail time, are the most effective deterrent to such activity. However, criminalisation is much more complex than that basic proposition suggests. There is complexity both in terms of the various forces that are driving and shaping the movement (economic, political and social) and in the effects on the various actors involved in it (government, enforcement agencies, the business community, judiciary, legal profession and general public). Featuring contributions from authors who have been at the forefront of the debate around the world, this substantial 19-chapter volume captures the richness of the criminalisation phenomenon and considers its implications for building an effective criminal cartel regime, particularly outside of the US. It adopts a range of approaches, including general theoretical perspectives (from criminal theory, economics, political science, regulation and criminology) and case-studies of the experience with the design and enforcement of existing or contemplated criminal cartel regimes in various jurisdictions (including in Australia, Canada, EU, Germany, Ireland and the UK). The book also explores the international dimensions of criminalisation - its specific practical consequences (such as increased potential for extradition) as well as its more general implications for trends of harmonisation or convergence in competition law and enforcement.


A Ezrachi and S Anderman (Editors), Intellectual Property and Competition Law: New Frontiers (OUP 2011)

2010

A Ezrachi, EU Competition Law, An Analytical Guide to the Leading Cases (2nd ed) ( 2010) [...]

This book is designed as a working tool for the study and practice of European Competition Law. It is an enlarged and updated second edition of the highly practical guide to the leading cases of European Competition Law, first published in 2008. This second edition focuses primarily on Article 101 TFEU (Ex Article 81 EC), Article 102 TFEU (Ex Article 82 EC) and the European Merger Regulation. In addition it explores the public and private enforcement of Competition Law, the intersection between Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Law and the application of Competition Law to State action. Each chapter begins with an introduction which outlines the relevant laws, regulations and guidelines for each of the topics, providing the analytical framework for the case entries that follow. The case entries are then set out is summary form, accompanied by analysis and commentary.


ISBN: 1849460477/97818494

2009

A Ezrachi, Article 82 EC – Reflections on its recent evolution (Ed, 2009)

2008

A Ezrachi, EC Competition Law, An Analytical Guide to the Leading Cases (Hart Publishing 2008)

A Ezrachi and Ulf Bernitz (Editors), Own Labels, Branded goods and Competition Policy, The changing landscape of retail competition (OUP 2008)

2006

A Johnston and P.J. Slot, Introduction to Competition Law (Hart Publishing 2006) [...]

Competition law is a subject of central importance. An accessible introduction to this legal field is thus indispensable for students and practitioners alike. This book is intended to serve as a first acquaintance with competition law and is written in particular for students who intend to study a foundation course in competition law. The current competition law in the UK consists of two main levels: EC competition law and UK competition law. In this introduction both levels are covered, along with an abbreviated introduction to the EC rules on state aids. An important function of this book is to provide an insight into the combined system of UK and EC competition law. Therefore, for the three main subjects (the prohibition of cartels, the prohibition of the abuse of a position of dominance and the supervision of concentrations (mergers and acquisitions) extensive examples, drawn from European and UK practice, have been provided. These examples are then used in the explanation of the general principles, taking into account the changes as a result of the recent introduction of Regulation 1/2003. With this approach, the book aims to reach a broad range of readers: students, teachers in further and higher education, officials and practising lawyers who are not usually faced with competition law issues in their everyday working lives. Extra information has also been included in the footnotes, indicating references to the more specialised literature.


ISBN: 9781841134451

Chapters

2010

A Ezrachi, 'Cartels and Criminalisation - The International Dimension' in C Beaton-Wells and A Ezrachi (eds), Criminalising Cartels: A Critical Interdisciplinary Study of an International Regulatory Movement (Hart 2010)

2009

A Ezrachi and David Gilo, 'The Darker Side of the Moon – The assessment of excessive pricing and proposal for a post-entry price-cut benchmark' in Ariel Ezrachi (ed), Article 82 EC – Reflections on its recent evolution ( 2009)

A Ezrachi, 'The Enforceability of Article 82 EC in National Courts' in Ariel Ezrachi (ed), Article 82 EC – Reflections on its recent evolution ( 2009)

2008

A Ezrachi and Jonathan Reynolds, 'Advertising, Brand Competition and Private Labels' in A Ezrachi & U Bernitz (eds), Own Labels, Branded goods and Competition Policy, The changing landscape of retail competition (OUP 2008)

A Ezrachi, 'From Courage v. Crehan to the White Paper –The changing landscape of European private enforcement and the possible implications for Article 82 litigation' in Mackenrodt, Conde Gallego, Enchelmaier (eds), Art. 82 EC: New Interpretation, New Enforcement Mechanisms? (Springer 2008)

A Ezrachi, 'The Tale of Own Labels and Competition Law' in A Ezrachi & U Bernitz (eds), wn Labels, Branded goods and Competition Policy, The changing landscape of retail competition (OUP 2008)

2007

A Ezrachi, 'Merger Control and Cross Border Transactions – A Pragmatic View on Cooperation, Convergence and What\\\'s in Between' in Philip Marsden (ed), Handbook of Research in Trans-Atlantic Antitrust (Edward Elgar Publishing 2007)

Case Notes

2010

A Ezrachi, 'Clearstream' (2010) Journal of European Competition Law and Practice

Reviews

2008

A Johnston, 'Review of: Elizabeth O’Neill and Emma Sanders (with Margaret Bloom and Anneli Howard), UK Competition Procedure: The Modernised Regime' (2008) Cambridge Law Journal 434

Working Papers

2005

A Ezrachi, 'Under (and Over) Prescribing of Behavioural Remedies' (2005) The University of Oxford Centre for Competition Law and Policy

Courses

The courses we offer in this field are:

Undergraduate

FHS - Final Year (Phase III)

The degree is awarded on the basis of nine final examinations at the end of the three-year course (or four years in the case of Law with Law Studies in Europe) and (for students who began the course in October 2011 or later) an essay in Jurisprudence written over the summer vacation at the end of the second year. Note: the Jurisprudence exam at the end of the third year is correspondingly shorter. This phase of the Final Honour School includes the first and second term of the final year; the Final Examinations are taken in the third term of the final year.

Competition Law and Policy

The aim of the course is to enable students to critically reflect upon the basic principles and policies at the heart of competition law. In particular, to understand how the law governs business practices that may restrict competition in economic markets through private and public enforcement and to analyse how competition law can curb anticompetitive activities and facilitate free competition.

At the end of the course, students should be able to: (i) understand how the law controls: a. cartel agreements and concerted practices b. the abuse of monopoly power c. mergers and acquisitions d. enforcement of competition law through private enforcement and via the investigations of the Commission (ii) critically reflect upon the economic principles underpinning the definition and control of anti-competitive practices (iii) apply the law to solve practical problems concerning the control of anti-competitive practices (iv) critically analyse how far the law facilities the promotion of free competition. (v) develop their own critical perspective concerning how law should and could control anti-competitive practices and the role of the European Community in developing this law.

The teaching in this course is done by way of lectures, seminars and tutorial sessions. The lecture series is devoted to examination of the relevant statutory and case law framework and to the discussion of basic economic concepts (no prior knowledge of economics is required). Lectures are held on weeks 1-8 in MT. Each lecture lasts two hours. Two seminar sessions, each lasting two hours, will also be held in MT.

The tutorial series provides practical experience in the application of competition law through problem solving. Tutorials will be arranged centrally by the competition law group. There will be two tutorials in MT and two in HT.

For more information on the course see the Centre for Competition Law and Policy website at: www.competition-law.ox.ac.uk

Diploma in Legal Studies

Competition Law and Policy

The aim of the course is to enable students to critically reflect upon the basic principles and policies at the heart of competition law. In particular, to understand how the law governs business practices that may restrict competition in economic markets through private and public enforcement and to analyse how competition law can curb anticompetitive activities and facilitate free competition.

At the end of the course, students should be able to: (i) understand how the law controls: a. cartel agreements and concerted practices b. the abuse of monopoly power c. mergers and acquisitions d. enforcement of competition law through private enforcement and via the investigations of the Commission (ii) critically reflect upon the economic principles underpinning the definition and control of anti-competitive practices (iii) apply the law to solve practical problems concerning the control of anti-competitive practices (iv) critically analyse how far the law facilities the promotion of free competition. (v) develop their own critical perspective concerning how law should and could control anti-competitive practices and the role of the European Community in developing this law.

The teaching in this course is done by way of lectures, seminars and tutorial sessions. The lecture series is devoted to examination of the relevant statutory and case law framework and to the discussion of basic economic concepts (no prior knowledge of economics is required). Lectures are held on weeks 1-8 in MT. Each lecture lasts two hours. Two seminar sessions, each lasting two hours, will also be held in MT.

The tutorial series provides practical experience in the application of competition law through problem solving. Tutorials will be arranged centrally by the competition law group. There will be two tutorials in MT and two in HT.

For more information on the course see the Centre for Competition Law and Policy website at: www.competition-law.ox.ac.uk

Postgraduate

BCL

Our taught postgraduate programme, designed to serve outstanding law students from common-law backgrounds

Competition Law

The objective of the course is to provide students with an understanding of this area of law, together with the ability to subject it to critical legal and economic analysis. The course aims to cover the main substantive laws relating to competition within the EC, including the control of monopoly and oligopoly; merger control; anti-competitive agreements; and other anti-competitive practices.

The emphasis is placed predominantly on EU competition law to reflect the importance it assumes in practice. UK competition law is also taught in detail, both because of its value in providing a comparative study of two systems of competition law and because of its importance to the UK practitioner. The antitrust laws of the USA and competition laws of other jurisdictions are also referred to by way of comparison.

Lectures and Seminars: Competition law is taught in lectures seminars by Dr Ariel Ezrachi, Slaughter and May Professor of Competition Law, and Mr Aidan Robertson, QC, visiting lecturer and barrister, Brick Court Chambers.

Tutorials: In addition to the lectures and seminars, a course of four tutorials will be given in the Hilary and Trinity terms. Tutorial arrangements will be made in due course. All students taking tutorials will be asked to submit written work before they attend tutorials.
Visiting speakers: There is a programme of visiting speakers details of which are found on the CCLP website.

MJur

Our taught postgraduate programme, designed to serve outstanding law students from civil law backgrounds.

Competition Law

The objective of the course is to provide students with an understanding of this area of law, together with the ability to subject it to critical legal and economic analysis. The course aims to cover the main substantive laws relating to competition within the EC, including the control of monopoly and oligopoly; merger control; anti-competitive agreements; and other anti-competitive practices.

The emphasis is placed predominantly on EU competition law to reflect the importance it assumes in practice. UK competition law is also taught in detail, both because of its value in providing a comparative study of two systems of competition law and because of its importance to the UK practitioner. The antitrust laws of the USA and competition laws of other jurisdictions are also referred to by way of comparison.

Lectures and Seminars: Competition law is taught in lectures seminars by Dr Ariel Ezrachi, Slaughter and May Professor of Competition Law, and Mr Aidan Robertson, QC, visiting lecturer and barrister, Brick Court Chambers.

Tutorials: In addition to the lectures and seminars, a course of four tutorials will be given in the Hilary and Trinity terms. Tutorial arrangements will be made in due course. All students taking tutorials will be asked to submit written work before they attend tutorials.
Visiting speakers: There is a programme of visiting speakers details of which are found on the CCLP website.

MSc (Master's in Law and Finance)

Competition Law

The objective of the course is to provide students with an understanding of this area of law, together with the ability to subject it to critical legal and economic analysis. The course aims to cover the main substantive laws relating to competition within the EC, including the control of monopoly and oligopoly; merger control; anti-competitive agreements; and other anti-competitive practices.

The emphasis is placed predominantly on EU competition law to reflect the importance it assumes in practice. UK competition law is also taught in detail, both because of its value in providing a comparative study of two systems of competition law and because of its importance to the UK practitioner. The antitrust laws of the USA and competition laws of other jurisdictions are also referred to by way of comparison.

Lectures and Seminars: Competition law is taught in lectures seminars by Dr Ariel Ezrachi, Slaughter and May Professor of Competition Law, and Mr Aidan Robertson, QC, visiting lecturer and barrister, Brick Court Chambers.

Tutorials: In addition to the lectures and seminars, a course of four tutorials will be given in the Hilary and Trinity terms. Tutorial arrangements will be made in due course. All students taking tutorials will be asked to submit written work before they attend tutorials.
Visiting speakers: There is a programme of visiting speakers details of which are found on the CCLP website.


People

Competition Law teaching is organized by a Subject Group convened by:

Ariel Ezrachi: Slaughter and May Professor of Competition Law

in conjunction with:

Stefan Enchelmaier: Professor of European and Comparative Law
Angus Johnston: Professor of Law
Aidan Robertson, QC: Visiting Lecturer

assisted by:

Maria Ioannidou: DPhil Law student

Also working in this field, but not involved in its teaching programme:

Graham Child: Retired. Formerly Slaughter and May Visiting Fellow, Lincoln College
Stephen Weatherill: Jacques Delors Professor of European Law

Graduate students working in this field:

Sebastian Castro Quiroz: DPhil Law student
Stephen Daly: DPhil Law student
Dimitrios Sarmas: MPhil Law student
Rahul Singh: DPhil Law student


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