Sandra Fredman

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Despite increasingly sophisticated antidiscrimination laws, dis- crimination and inequality have proved remarkably resilient. This prompts questions about the limits of law’s ability to achieve social change. One way forward is to fashion new legal tools, which impose duties to promote or achieve equality, rather than focusing on individual rights against specific perpetrators. In the past decade in Britain, such fourth generation equality laws have been developed in a distinctive format, requiring the decision-maker to “have due regard” to equality, rather than taking action to achieve such objectives. Thisstandard has triggered a spate of judicial review cases, particularly in response to austerity measures imposing deep budgetary cuts on disadvantaged groups. This Paper’s aims are two-fold. The first is to examine the judicial approach to the due regard standard in the light of recent regulatory theory. Do courts consider the due regard standard as a signal for deference, or can it be understood as an example of “reflexive law,” facilitating deliberative decision-making rather than imposing external standards likely to meet with resistance from the regulated body? The Paper concludes that courts have struggled to deal with the regulatory challenges presented by the “due regard” standard, wavering between appropriate and inappropriate intervention. The second aim is an analysis of whether a deliberative standard is appropriate in the equality context. The record of judicial review cases demonstrates that such a standard risks legitimating or simply reconfiguring existing inequalities.

ISBN: 0002-919x

Equality is an ideal to which we all aspire. Yet the more closely we examineit, the more its meaning shifts. This book examines the differing conceptions of equality in discrimination law, in the accessible yet challenging format of the Clarendon series. It uses a thematic approach to elucidate the major conceptual issues, while at the same time imparting a detailed understanding of the legal provisions, including the Equality Act 2010, human rights law, and EU law. Particularly illuminating is the comparative approach. By examining comparable law in the US, India, Canada, and South Africa, as well as the UK, the book exposes common problems and canvasses differing solutions.

ISBN: 978-0-19-958443-7

The interpretation of human rights inevitably requires value judgements. But if the power of interpretation and limitation of human rights is left to elected legislators on the basis of majority voting, perpetual minorities may be perpetually subordinated. But leaving judges to make the final decision flies in the face of the basic principle that all fundamental decisions in society should be taken by the people themselves. Prisoners’ voting rights throw the dilemma into particularly sharp relief. Should an elected legislature have the final say on removing the fundamental right to vote from a section of the population, particularly one which is deeply unpopular and which politicians have no natural interest in defending? The most promising way out of this dilemma is to move away from a polarisation between courts and legislatures, and instead regard both as contributing to a democratic resolution of human rights disputes. An increasingly influential stream of thought characterises the relationship as one of dialogue. Rather than courts having the final say, judicial decisions provoke a response from the legislature. In this paper, I aim to go beyond a dialogic model and propose one based on deliberative democracy. Drawing on the distinction between interest bargaining and value-based or deliberative decisions, I argue that human rights can only be properly addressed within a democracy through deliberative means. In other words, the power of the principle should constitute the reason for adopting it, rather than the power of those whose interests it serves. Otherwise, those without political power risk perpetual subordination, undermining the raison d’être of human rights protection. It is here that the courts are in a position to make a unique contribution to the democratic resolution of human rights issues. I argue that courts should ensure that human rights decisions are indeed taken deliberatively within the constraints set by the human rights themselves. I call this a ‘bounded deliberative’ approach. The final section applies these principles to prisoners’ voting rights cases in South Africa and the UK.

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272761.001.0001

Human Rights have traditionally been understood as protecting individual freedom against intrusion by the State. This book argues that human rights are based on a far richer view of freedom, going beyond absence of coercion and focussing on the ability to exercise such freedom. This view means that, as well as restraining the State, human rights require the State to act positively to remove barriers and facilitate the exercise of freedom. But because positive duties have for so long been regarded as a question of policy or aspiration, little sustained attention has been given to their role in actualising human rights. The book moves beyond the artificial boundary between socio-economic and civil and political rights and instead focuses on the positive duties to which all human rights give rise. It draws on political theory and social policy to illuminate important legal issues, and uses comparative material from India, South Africa, Canada, the US, the ECHR and the UK.

Despite 33 years of equal pay legislation, the gender pay gap remains stubbornly high. Multiple equal pay claims in the public sector have forcefully exposed the weaknesses, both of the Equal Pay Act and of the complaints-led model of enforcement on which it is based. This article argues that the equal pay apparatus is in need of radical reform. Single Equality legislation, due to be introduced in the autumn, is the ideal forum to do so. Substantively, it is essential to move beyond the current narrow range of comparison, the limited definition of equality and the lack of a collective dimension. So far as enforcement is concerned, the way forward lies in a positive duty to eliminate pay discrimination, which builds on and strengthens the current gender duty. Women's right to equal pay for equal work is often represented as an unreasonable demand on resources, carrying with it an unsustainable cost. In fact, it is a fundamental right recognised by major human rights instruments and the International Labour Organization (ILO). It is to be hoped that the Single Equality Bill will give equal pay reform the serious attention so urgently needed.