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DOI: 10.2838/82208

The aim of this study is to compare and contrast anti-discrimination and equality laws in the US, Canada, South Africa and India, with a view to inform future development of EU anti-discrimination laws. Comparative law is of great value, particularly in the equality field, where there is increasing cross-pollination across different jurisdictions. At the same time, comparative law carries with it important challenges, as the harmonising project of the EU has itself demonstrated. The four jurisdictions to be examined here share English as a common language as well as, in varying degrees, a common law heritage. However, there are significant differences in historical, socio-economic and political contexts as well as in legal institutions. The challenge is therefore to illuminate universalisableconceptions while at the same time recognising context specificity.

ISBN: ISBN 978-92-79-23769

DOI: 10.1080/13642980500350004

This report seeks to analyse the main highlights of this year's session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. The Commission was set up in 1947 and is the UN's principal human rights body. It is currently the subject of major reform proposals stemming primarily from the UN Secretary-General and agreed upon, in general terms by member states at the 14–16 September 2005 World Summit. The review below, focusing on the main country and thematic issues discussed at the March–April 2005 session, will be indicative of how badly and in what ways reform of the Commission on Human Rights is required.

ISBN: ISSN 1364-2987

A series of chapters by experts from a wide range of disciplines on age discrimination, considering the central aims of a policy on age equality, as part of the process of implementing EU requirements for age discrimination legislation and moving beyond it.

ISBN: 1-84113-405-8

DOI: 10.1093/ojlr/rwr029

This article will argue that although, historically, religious minorities were the primary trigger for the institutionalization of the international framework of minority rights, they have long since been sidelined from its protections. This sidelining is evident in a variety of international human rights norms and mechanisms, the focus below being on the jurisprudence of the UN Human Rights Committee. The article offers a number of explanations for this diversion of religious minorities away from the international minority rights regime. It also argues for a cautious reintegration of religious minorities within the minority rights regime after having sought understanding with regard to some issues of concern.

ISBN: ISSN 2047-0770

Despite increasingly sophisticated antidiscrimination laws, dis- crimination and inequality have proved remarkably resilient. This prompts questions about the limits of law’s ability to achieve social change. One way forward is to fashion new legal tools, which impose duties to promote or achieve equality, rather than focusing on individual rights against specific perpetrators. In the past decade in Britain, such fourth generation equality laws have been developed in a distinctive format, requiring the decision-maker to “have due regard” to equality, rather than taking action to achieve such objectives. Thisstandard has triggered a spate of judicial review cases, particularly in response to austerity measures imposing deep budgetary cuts on disadvantaged groups. This Paper’s aims are two-fold. The first is to examine the judicial approach to the due regard standard in the light of recent regulatory theory. Do courts consider the due regard standard as a signal for deference, or can it be understood as an example of “reflexive law,” facilitating deliberative decision-making rather than imposing external standards likely to meet with resistance from the regulated body? The Paper concludes that courts have struggled to deal with the regulatory challenges presented by the “due regard” standard, wavering between appropriate and inappropriate intervention. The second aim is an analysis of whether a deliberative standard is appropriate in the equality context. The record of judicial review cases demonstrates that such a standard risks legitimating or simply reconfiguring existing inequalities.

ISBN: 0002-919x

This paper assesses the emergence of a new proactive model to achieve gender equality, and compares it with the more established complaints led model based on individual rights. While transcending many of the weaknesses of the individual complaints model, the proactive model ains ambiguous in many crucial respects, particularly as to its objectives, its use of participation, and how compliance is to be achieved. The paper aims to shed more light on these key aspects by drawing on the experiences of such models in Canada, Northern Ireland,Britain, and the EU itself. This demonstrates that the location of proactive strategies on the borderline between law and politics makes them highly dependent on political will. The key challenge is therefore to ensure that proactive strategies are based on a ecognition that equality is a fundamental right, not a discretion, without reverting to individualised complaints mechanisms with all their inbuilt weaknesses. I conclude by considering how wemight achieve a fundamental and non-derogable core of rights within a proactive model

ISBN: 1023-263X

This memorandum was prepared for the Legal Resources Centre, South Africa to assist in the preparation of submissions in two hate speech cases to be heard by the Supreme Court of Appeal: Herselman v Geleba and Afriforum v Malema

DOI: 10.1093/ojls/gqr024

Proponents of dignity see it as a useful tool which solves the most important (if not all) of the practical and theoretical problems in human rights law. Arguing against this sympathetic position on the other side of the debate are the sceptics, who have raised troubling questions about dignity’s alleged indeterminacy, as well as about the illiberal role that it has allegedly played in certain contexts. In this paper, I argue that designing a defensible and useful conception of dignity which is distinguishable from other values such as equality and autonomy may be possible, but not without addressing some genuine infirmities that the critics have pointed out. If there is indeed such a conception of dignity, it is likely to be "expressive" in character. I therefore argue that the legal ideal of dignity is best understood as an expressive norm: whether an act disrespects someone’s dignity depends on the meaning that such act expresses, rather than its consequences or any other attribute of that act.

Equality is an ideal to which we all aspire. Yet the more closely we examineit, the more its meaning shifts. This book examines the differing conceptions of equality in discrimination law, in the accessible yet challenging format of the Clarendon series. It uses a thematic approach to elucidate the major conceptual issues, while at the same time imparting a detailed understanding of the legal provisions, including the Equality Act 2010, human rights law, and EU law. Particularly illuminating is the comparative approach. By examining comparable law in the US, India, Canada, and South Africa, as well as the UK, the book exposes common problems and canvasses differing solutions.

ISBN: 978-0-19-958443-7

A comprehensive co-authored text concerning all aspects of discrimination law, employing comparative analysis and legal philosophy where appropriate.

ISBN: 978-0-421-55440-5

Where can religions find sources of legitimacy for human rights? How do, and how should, religious leaders and communities respond to human rights as defined in modern International Law? When religious precepts contradict human rights standards - for example in relation to freedom of expression or in relation to punishments - which should trump the other, and why? Can human rights and religious teachings be interpreted in a manner which brings reconciliation closer? Do the modern concept and system of human rights undermine the very vision of society that religions aim to impart? Is a … read morereference to God in the discussion of human rights misplaced? Do human fallibilities with respect to interpretation, judicial reasoning and the understanding of human oneness and dignity provide the key to the undeniable and sometimes devastating conflicts that have arisen between, and within, religions and the human rights movement? In this volume, academics and lawyers tackle these most difficult questions head-on, with candour and creativity, and the collection is rendered unique by the further contributions of a remarkable range of other professionals, including senior religious leaders and representatives, journalists, diplomats and civil servants, both national and international. Most notably, the contributors do not shy away from the boldest question of all - summed up in the book's title. The thoroughly edited and revised papers which make up this collection were originally prepared for a ground-breaking conference organised by the Clemens Nathan Research Centre, the University of London Institute of Commonwealth Studies and Martinus Nijhoff/Brill.

ISBN: ISBN13:9789004152540

The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has organised, in 2011, a series of expert workshops on the prohibition of incitement to national, racial or religious hatred, as reflected in international human rights law. The objectives of the expert workshops are: •To gain a better understanding of legislative patterns, judicial practices and different types of policies, in countries of the various regions of the world, with regard to prohibiting incitement to national, racial, or religious hatred, while ensuring full respect for freedom of expression as outlined in articles 19 and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; •to arrive at a comprehensive assessment of the state of implementation of this prohibition of incitement in conformity with international human rights law and; •to identify possible actions at all levels.

The interpretation of human rights inevitably requires value judgements. But if the power of interpretation and limitation of human rights is left to elected legislators on the basis of majority voting, perpetual minorities may be perpetually subordinated. But leaving judges to make the final decision flies in the face of the basic principle that all fundamental decisions in society should be taken by the people themselves. Prisoners’ voting rights throw the dilemma into particularly sharp relief. Should an elected legislature have the final say on removing the fundamental right to vote from a section of the population, particularly one which is deeply unpopular and which politicians have no natural interest in defending? The most promising way out of this dilemma is to move away from a polarisation between courts and legislatures, and instead regard both as contributing to a democratic resolution of human rights disputes. An increasingly influential stream of thought characterises the relationship as one of dialogue. Rather than courts having the final say, judicial decisions provoke a response from the legislature. In this paper, I aim to go beyond a dialogic model and propose one based on deliberative democracy. Drawing on the distinction between interest bargaining and value-based or deliberative decisions, I argue that human rights can only be properly addressed within a democracy through deliberative means. In other words, the power of the principle should constitute the reason for adopting it, rather than the power of those whose interests it serves. Otherwise, those without political power risk perpetual subordination, undermining the raison d’être of human rights protection. It is here that the courts are in a position to make a unique contribution to the democratic resolution of human rights issues. I argue that courts should ensure that human rights decisions are indeed taken deliberatively within the constraints set by the human rights themselves. I call this a ‘bounded deliberative’ approach. The final section applies these principles to prisoners’ voting rights cases in South Africa and the UK.