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DOI: 10.1093/ojlr/rwr029

This article will argue that although, historically, religious minorities were the primary trigger for the institutionalization of the international framework of minority rights, they have long since been sidelined from its protections. This sidelining is evident in a variety of international human rights norms and mechanisms, the focus below being on the jurisprudence of the UN Human Rights Committee. The article offers a number of explanations for this diversion of religious minorities away from the international minority rights regime. It also argues for a cautious reintegration of religious minorities within the minority rights regime after having sought understanding with regard to some issues of concern.

ISBN: ISSN 2047-0770

Despite increasingly sophisticated antidiscrimination laws, dis- crimination and inequality have proved remarkably resilient. This prompts questions about the limits of law’s ability to achieve social change. One way forward is to fashion new legal tools, which impose duties to promote or achieve equality, rather than focusing on individual rights against specific perpetrators. In the past decade in Britain, such fourth generation equality laws have been developed in a distinctive format, requiring the decision-maker to “have due regard” to equality, rather than taking action to achieve such objectives. Thisstandard has triggered a spate of judicial review cases, particularly in response to austerity measures imposing deep budgetary cuts on disadvantaged groups. This Paper’s aims are two-fold. The first is to examine the judicial approach to the due regard standard in the light of recent regulatory theory. Do courts consider the due regard standard as a signal for deference, or can it be understood as an example of “reflexive law,” facilitating deliberative decision-making rather than imposing external standards likely to meet with resistance from the regulated body? The Paper concludes that courts have struggled to deal with the regulatory challenges presented by the “due regard” standard, wavering between appropriate and inappropriate intervention. The second aim is an analysis of whether a deliberative standard is appropriate in the equality context. The record of judicial review cases demonstrates that such a standard risks legitimating or simply reconfiguring existing inequalities.

ISBN: 0002-919x

DOI: 10.1093/ojls/gqr024

Proponents of dignity see it as a useful tool which solves the most important (if not all) of the practical and theoretical problems in human rights law. Arguing against this sympathetic position on the other side of the debate are the sceptics, who have raised troubling questions about dignity’s alleged indeterminacy, as well as about the illiberal role that it has allegedly played in certain contexts. In this paper, I argue that designing a defensible and useful conception of dignity which is distinguishable from other values such as equality and autonomy may be possible, but not without addressing some genuine infirmities that the critics have pointed out. If there is indeed such a conception of dignity, it is likely to be "expressive" in character. I therefore argue that the legal ideal of dignity is best understood as an expressive norm: whether an act disrespects someone’s dignity depends on the meaning that such act expresses, rather than its consequences or any other attribute of that act.

Equality is an ideal to which we all aspire. Yet the more closely we examineit, the more its meaning shifts. This book examines the differing conceptions of equality in discrimination law, in the accessible yet challenging format of the Clarendon series. It uses a thematic approach to elucidate the major conceptual issues, while at the same time imparting a detailed understanding of the legal provisions, including the Equality Act 2010, human rights law, and EU law. Particularly illuminating is the comparative approach. By examining comparable law in the US, India, Canada, and South Africa, as well as the UK, the book exposes common problems and canvasses differing solutions.

ISBN: 978-0-19-958443-7

The interpretation of human rights inevitably requires value judgements. But if the power of interpretation and limitation of human rights is left to elected legislators on the basis of majority voting, perpetual minorities may be perpetually subordinated. But leaving judges to make the final decision flies in the face of the basic principle that all fundamental decisions in society should be taken by the people themselves. Prisoners’ voting rights throw the dilemma into particularly sharp relief. Should an elected legislature have the final say on removing the fundamental right to vote from a section of the population, particularly one which is deeply unpopular and which politicians have no natural interest in defending? The most promising way out of this dilemma is to move away from a polarisation between courts and legislatures, and instead regard both as contributing to a democratic resolution of human rights disputes. An increasingly influential stream of thought characterises the relationship as one of dialogue. Rather than courts having the final say, judicial decisions provoke a response from the legislature. In this paper, I aim to go beyond a dialogic model and propose one based on deliberative democracy. Drawing on the distinction between interest bargaining and value-based or deliberative decisions, I argue that human rights can only be properly addressed within a democracy through deliberative means. In other words, the power of the principle should constitute the reason for adopting it, rather than the power of those whose interests it serves. Otherwise, those without political power risk perpetual subordination, undermining the raison d’être of human rights protection. It is here that the courts are in a position to make a unique contribution to the democratic resolution of human rights issues. I argue that courts should ensure that human rights decisions are indeed taken deliberatively within the constraints set by the human rights themselves. I call this a ‘bounded deliberative’ approach. The final section applies these principles to prisoners’ voting rights cases in South Africa and the UK.

This Textbook, designed for postgraduates andsenior undergraduates, will provide an accessible but intellectually rigorous text book which addresses how human rights issues are configured and adjudicated in the specific British context, exploring the multiple dimensions of the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Union, international law, and national legislation and common law, and an introduction to human rights theory , integrating this into the legal analysis.

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272761.001.0001

Human Rights have traditionally been understood as protecting individual freedom against intrusion by the State. This book argues that human rights are based on a far richer view of freedom, going beyond absence of coercion and focussing on the ability to exercise such freedom. This view means that, as well as restraining the State, human rights require the State to act positively to remove barriers and facilitate the exercise of freedom. But because positive duties have for so long been regarded as a question of policy or aspiration, little sustained attention has been given to their role in actualising human rights. The book moves beyond the artificial boundary between socio-economic and civil and political rights and instead focuses on the positive duties to which all human rights give rise. It draws on political theory and social policy to illuminate important legal issues, and uses comparative material from India, South Africa, Canada, the US, the ECHR and the UK.

DOI: 10.1163/157181110X512151

The international concern with minorities has benefitted from a range of rationales and gone through a number of permutations over recent decades. Within these are included a wide spectrum of objectives from concern with their very obliteration covered under genocide instruments to soft law instruments concerned with their positive flourishing. This article will address just one aspect of those concerns – those protecting minorities from hate speech.

“Shared ownership” is used to provide an affordable route into home ownership. Yet there is a significant problem with the shared ownership scheme; as Richardson v Midland Heart [2008] L & TR 31 shows, in the event of the home “owner” falling into rent arrears, he or she may lose not simply his or her home, but also the equity in the property. This chapter examines whether there is some way of using existing legal principles to avoid this unjust outcome by either; first, protecting the use value of the home by relying on Convention rights under the Human Rights Act 1998 to prevent termination of the “shared ownership” lease; or, secondly, recouping the investment value of the home by using human rights law to enable the home “owner” to retain the equity even if the home is lost.

ISBN: 1849463212

Human rights advocates internationally, and supporters of socio-economic rights, have battled for many years to get States and courts to accept that human rights give rise to positive obligations upon States and that such obligations ought to be justiciable in principle. Much of the rhetoric deployed in this campaign has focused on the importance of protecting and respecting basic human needs and capabilities, and ensuring that individuals enjoy a basic level of subsistence in order to secure the enjoyment of all rights. In the context of criminal justice and criminal law: positive obligations are very often cast as duties on the State to protect individuals from the criminal acts of others (protective duties). Very little attention is paid however to the potential for such positive obligations to give rise to what I term ‘coercive duties’. In other words, duties upon the State to coerce individuals through the criminal law, or criminal justice mechanisms, in the name of protecting others from their criminal acts. The coercive aspect of positive obligations comes more sharply into focus when we look at the rhetoric around, and judicial enforcement of ,the right to security. But the development of coercive duties are evident in the positive aspect of other rights too. This chapter explores the ambiguity involved in the growing development of positive rights in the field of criminal law and criminal justice. It dwells briefly on the emerging right to security case law and rhetoric internationally, and goes on to examine cases within the UK and ECHR. The thesis of the chapter is that while some protective duties arising from human rights may be a positive development, the extension of coercive duties on the State to coerce others in the name of another individual’s rights is an overseen and more pernicious part of this development of human rights. The chapter will end by exploring how we reconcile coercive duties arising out of human rights with opposing negative rights protections, or even other protective duties.

Despite 33 years of equal pay legislation, the gender pay gap remains stubbornly high. Multiple equal pay claims in the public sector have forcefully exposed the weaknesses, both of the Equal Pay Act and of the complaints-led model of enforcement on which it is based. This article argues that the equal pay apparatus is in need of radical reform. Single Equality legislation, due to be introduced in the autumn, is the ideal forum to do so. Substantively, it is essential to move beyond the current narrow range of comparison, the limited definition of equality and the lack of a collective dimension. So far as enforcement is concerned, the way forward lies in a positive duty to eliminate pay discrimination, which builds on and strengthens the current gender duty. Women's right to equal pay for equal work is often represented as an unreasonable demand on resources, carrying with it an unsustainable cost. In fact, it is a fundamental right recognised by major human rights instruments and the International Labour Organization (ILO). It is to be hoped that the Single Equality Bill will give equal pay reform the serious attention so urgently needed.

This paper considers minorities in English law through the prism of international standards related to both freedom of religion or belief and minority rights. These two sets of international normative standards are brought together in order to emphasize the fact that persons belonging to religious minorities have access not only to general human rights standards including freedom of religion or belief, but also to minority rights. Combining the implications of these applicable rights, the paper will suggest that ‘religious minorities’ should be (i) taken to include persons belonging to minorities on grounds of both religion or belief; (ii) that their religious practice should not only be considered ‘manifestation’ of religion or belief but also the practice of a minority culture; and that (iii) States have a duty to protect the survival and continued development of the identity of religious minorities and allow such persons to enjoy their culture. The paper will then move to considering a few recent cases in English law, in order to examine the extent to which these three implications are realized within them.

ISBN: ISBN 978-90-04-19521

Response to Jeremy Waldron's Amnesty Lecture on Hate Speech.

The Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc Act 2010 came into force on 17 December 2010. The 2010 Act repealed the previous Temporary Provisions Act. This article does not purport to provide comprehensive coverage of the Act; it outlines four main areas of concern that arose in respect of the Draft Terrorist Asset-Freezing Bill and that now arise in respect of the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc Act 2010. In summary, these are as follows: problems of parliamentary scrutiny relating to the scope of the Act; problems relating to the reasonable suspicion test; problems relating to judicial process; problems relating to ECHR rights.

This report examines the human rights protection systems of the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the European Union. It explores the substantive rights, protection mechanisms, modes of engagement within, and the interactions between each system. The report also outlines the protection of minority rights, and the political processes through which human rights and institutions evolve and interact. A series of recommendations are made on how to advance the EU human rights system.

This paper examines the rise of the right to security within human rights discourse and its potential to erode human rights more generally. It argues that political discourse around the apparent conflict between security and rights since 9/11 has been complicated by an emerging notion of the 'right to security' as the meta-right (the right of rights). This claim (and the inherent ambiguity of what the right to security requires) has the potential to lead to a 'securitization' of human rights, a process that threatens to erode the traditional foundations of human rights, and human rights themselves. Operating in tandem with this 'securitization' process, the discourse of the right to security has been used to sanitize, or at least to legitimate, coercive security measures. This is a process I refer to as 'righting' security. These two processes combine in complex ways to give security an effective trump claim over other rights.

This article contests the notion, prevalent in British jurisprudence regarding ECHR Article 6, and recently adopted by the Grand Chamber in Al-Khawaja v UK, that the right to a fair trial involves the 'balancing' of the rights of the defendant against the rights of the prosecution, the complainant and other witnesses, and the community at large. It argues that the whole notion of balancing is fundamentally misconceived, setting up a conflictual trap whereby defence rights are always seen as being in antithesis to those of the prosecution representing the overarching public interest. Instead, I propose a model embodying a sense of objective fairness predicated upon the right to a verdict with integrity; as such this right is not allocated to any one participant in the trial but is a common good, erasing any perceived antitheses within Article 6. The article goes on to explore the concept of "the essence of the right" in Article 6(3) caselaw, and explains why this has been extinguished by the approach to Article 6 of the Grand Chamber in Al-Khawaja, sacrificing principle to juridical, and possibly political, expediency. The consequence is that Article 6 now only serves to protect the right to a 'fair-ish' trial.