Jurisprudence — Overview

juris microsite logoFor more detailed information about our work in this area, see also the dedicated Legal Philosophy in Oxford website


News

The H.L.A. Hart Memorial Lecture 21 May 2013

Professor Will Kymlicka, Professor of Philosophy, Queen’s University, Canada will give this year's H.L.A [more…]

Celebration of H L A Hart's The Concept of Law

photo of Leslie Green

On Monday, February 25, Professor Leslie Green attended a celebration at Queens University, Canada to mark the recent publication of the third edition of H L A Hart's The Concept of Law (OUP 2012) [more…]

Korsgaard to give Hart Lecture 2012

Christine Korsgaard (Harvard) will deliver the H.L.A. Hart Memorial Lecture 2012 on 8 May at 5pm in the Blue Boar Auditorium at Christ Church [more…]

Discussion Groups

These self-sustaining groups are an essential part of the life of our graduate school. They are organised in some cases by graduate students and in others by Faculty members and meet regularly during term, typically over a sandwich lunch, when one of the group presents work in progress or introduces a discussion of a particular issue or new case. They may also encompass guest speakers from the faculty and beyond.

Jurisprudence Discussion Group

Publications

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Journal Articles

2012

P Eleftheriadis, 'A Right to Health Care' (2012) 40 Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 268

2011

J Dickson, 'On Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Some Comments on Brian Leiter’s View of What Jurisprudence Should Become ' (2011) 30 Law and Philosophy 477

J Gardner, 'What is Tort Law For? Part 1: The Place of Corrective Justice' (2011) 30 Law and Philosophy 1 [...]

DOI: 10.1007/s10982-010-9086-6

In this paper I discuss the proposal that the law of torts exists to do justice, more specifically corrective justice, between the parties to a tort case. My aims include clarifying the proposal and defending it against some objections (as well as saving it from some defences that it could do without). Gradually the paper turns to a discussion of the rationale for doing corrective justice. I defend what I call the ‘continuity thesis’ according to which at least part of the rationale for doing corrective justice is to mitigate one’s wrongs, including one’s torts. I try to show how much of the law of torts this thesis helps to explain, but also what it leaves unexplained. In the process I show (what I will discuss in a later companion paper) that ‘corrective justice’ cannot be a complete answer to the question of what tort law is for.


ISBN: 0167-5249

L Green, 'Sex-Neutral Marriage' (2011) 64 Current Legal Problems 1 [...]

DOI: 10.1093/clp/cur014

A different-sex marriage need not be a marriage between heterosexuals, and a same-sex marriage need not be a marriage between homosexuals. This shows how little the law of marriage cares about the sexuality of parties to a marriage; it does not show that sex-restricted marriage laws do not discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation. They do. Neither does the law care much about sex, let alone possibly procreative sex, within marriage. The voidability of a different-sex marriage on grounds of non-consummation does not show otherwise. The formation of a valid marriage was always a matter of consent, not coitus. But what should happen to the doctrine of non-consummation in a sex-neutral marriage regime? It is an anachronism that should be abolished.


ISBN: 0070-1998

2010

P Eleftheriadis, 'Law and Sovereignty' (2010) 29 Law and Philosophy 535 [...]

How is it possible that the idea of sovereignty still features in law and legal philosophy? Sovereignty is normally taken to refer to absolute power. Yet modern law assumes that power is exercised by officials constrained by legal rules and the rule of law. This essay argues that a closer look at sovereignty and law shows that the first impression is correct: law and sovereignty are mutually exclusive. Philosophically speaking, sovereignty is and has always been incompatible with the rule of law and with constitutional law itself. Sovereignty and constitutional government are mutually exclusive.


ISBN: 0167-5249

P Eleftheriadis, 'Pluralism and Integrity' (2010) Ratio Juris 365 [...]

One of the theoretical developments associated with the law of the European Union has been the flourishing of legal and constitutional theories that extol the virtues of pluralism. Pluralism in constitutional theory is offered in particular as a novel argument for the denial of unity within a framework of constitutional government. This essay argues that pluralism fails to respect the value of integrity. It also shows that at least one pluralist theory seeks to overcome the incoherence of pluralism by implicitly endorsing monism. The coherence of European legal reasoning will be best preserved, if we consider that both the national legal order and the international (or European) such order endorse a sophisticated view of their own limits.


ISBN: 0952-1917

L Green, 'Two Worries about Respect for Persons' (2010) 120 Ethics 212

G Lamond, 'Persuasive Authority in the Law' (2010) 17 The Harvard Review of Philosophy 16 [...]

This article discusses the nature of persuasive authorities in the common law, and argues that many of them are best understood in terms of their (being regarded) as having theoretical rather than practical authorities for the courts that cite them. The contrast between theoretical and practical authority is examined at length in order to support the view that the treatment of many persuasive authorities by courts is more consistent with this view. Finally, it is argued that if persuasive authorities are best understood as theoretical authorities, this raises difficulties for both positivistic and interpretivist theories of law.


ISBN: 1062-6239

2009

N E Stavropoulos, 'The Relevance of Coercion: Some Preliminaries' (2009) 22 Ratio Juris 339 [...]

Many philosophers take the view that, while coercion is a prominent and enduring feature of legal practice, its existence does not reflect a deep, constitutive property of law and therefore coercion plays at best a very limited role in the explanation of law's nature. This view has become more or less the orthodoxy in modern jurisprudence. I argue that an interesting and plausible possible role for coercion in the explanation of law is untouched by the arguments in support of the orthodox view. Since my main purpose is to clear the ground for the alternative, I spell out the orthodox view in some detail. I then briefly sketch the alternative. Finally, I turn to Jules Coleman's discussion of the alternative.


ISBN: 1467-9337

2008

J Dickson, 'How Many Legal Systems? Some Puzzles Regarding the Identity Conditions of, and Relations Between, Legal Systems in the European Union' (2008) 2 Problema 9

L Green, 'Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and Morals' (2008) 83 New York University Law Review 1035 [...]

This article seeks to clarify and assess HLA Hart's famous claim that legal positivism somehow involves a “separation of law and morals.” The paper contends that Hart's “separability thesis” should not be confused with the “social thesis,” with the “sources thesis,” or with a methodological thesis about jurisprudence. In contrast to all of these, Hart's separability thesis denies the existence of any necessary (conceptual) connections between law and morality. But that thesis is false: there are many necessary connections between law and morality, some of them conceptually significant. Among them is an important negative connection: law is of its nature morally fallible and morally risky. Lon Fuller emphasized what he called the “internal morality of law,” the “morality that makes law possible”. Hart’s most important message is that there is also an immorality that law makes possible. Law's nature is seen not only in its internal virtues, in legality, but also in its internal vices, in legalism.


ISBN: 0028-7881

Books

2012

J Gardner, Law as a Leap of Faith: Essays on Law in General (Oxford University Press 2012) [...]

1: Law as a Leap of Faith (first published 2000) 2: Legal Positivism: 5 1/2 Myths (2001) 3: Some Types of Law (2007) 4: Can There be a Written Constitution? (2011) 5: How Law Claims, What Law Claims (2012) 6: Nearly Natural Law (2007) 7: The Legality of Law (2004) 8: On the Supposed Formality of the Rule of Law (previously unpublished) 9: Hart on Legality, Justice, and Morality (2011) 10. The Virtue of Justice and the Character of Law (2000) 11: Law in General (previously unpublished) The eligible chapters for REF2014 are 4, 5, 8, 9, 11.


ISBN: 978-0-19-969555-3

2008

P Eleftheriadis, Legal Rights (Oxford University Press 2008)

Chapters

2013

J Dickson, 'Law and Its Theory: a Question of Priorities' in R P George and J Keown (eds), Reason, Morality and Law: the Jurisprudence of John Finnis (Oxford University Press 2013)

P Eleftheriadis, 'Global Rights and the Sanctity of Life' in Glenn Cohen (ed), The Globalization of Health Care (Oxford University Press 2013) (forthcoming)

J Gardner, 'Criminals in Uniform' in R.A. Duff, Lindsay Farmer, S.E. Marshall, Massimo Renzo, and Victor Tadros (eds), The Constitution of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2013)

T Khaitan, 'Prelude to a Theory of Discrimination Law' in Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Discrimination Law ( 2013) (forthcoming)

G Lamond, 'The Rule of Recognition and the Foundations of a Legal System' in Andrea Dolcetti, Luís Duarte d’Almeida and James Edwards (eds), Reading HLA Hart's 'The Concept of Law' (Hart Publishing 2013) (forthcoming)

2012

J Dickson, 'Towards a Theory of European Union Legal Systems' in J Dickson & P Eleftheriadis (eds), Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law (Oxford University Press 2012)

P Eleftheriadis, 'Citizenship and Obligation' in Julie Dickson and Pavlos Eleftheriadis (eds), Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law (Oxford University Press 2012)

L Green, 'Obscenity without Borders' in F Tanguay-Renaud and J Stribopolous (eds), Rethinking Criminal Law Theory ( 2012)

G Lamond, 'The Rule of Law' in Andrei Marmor (ed), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law (Routledge 2012) [...]

The central argument of this paper is that the rule of law is an ideal concerned with the conditions that are necessary for the law to succeed in governing a community. The influential views of Fuller and Raz which ground the ideal in the conditions necessary for the law to exist at all (Fuller) or for the law to be capable of guiding behaviour (Raz) are discussed and criticised. Four conditions are highlighted as part of the rule of law: (1) the law is effective; (2) the state is governed by and governs through law; (3) the individual laws can be jointly and severally obeyed; and finally (4) those other legal and social arrangements whose primary rationale is to serve conditions (1)–(3). Condition (4) accounts for the significance of such arrangements as an independent legal profession. Condition (4) also helps to explain both the attraction of regarding other political ideals such as democracy and human rights as aspects of the rule of law, since their existence helps promote the other conditions, and the reasons for excluding them from the rule of law itself, since their primary rationale is not to ensure that the law succeeds in governing the community. Finally, it is argued that the rationale for the rule of law lies in the value of a law governed community. The rule of law itself, however, is not always morally valuable: not because it is purely of instrumental value, but because it is an inherently mixed-value good.


ISBN: 978-0415878180

N E Stavropoulos, 'Obligations and the Legal Point of View' in A. Marmor (ed), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law (Routledge 2012) [...]

It's uncontroversial that politics shapes the law. The tough question is how exactly that works: which kinds of political action have a law-shaping effect and how they produce that effect. Consider the enactment of a statute. A. Which precise aspect of the action is relevant to the legal impact of the enactment (the change in legal rights and obligations that obtains without further such action)? B. Why - what gives some aspect of the action its legal relevance? Analogous questions also arise in connection with the explanation of some other phenomena, including making a promise, decision or request - actions or attitudes which are generally understood to result in some distinctive obligations or to have some other distinctive normative significance or impact, or at least to be capable of so doing. The relevant theoretical choices are posed particularly clearly in these domains, so I explore them in some detail in relation to promising.


ISBN: 0415878187

2010

L Green, 'Law as a Means' in P Cane (ed), The Hart-Fuller Debate in the Twenty-First Century (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2010)

2009

J Dickson, 'Is Bad Law Still Law? Is Bad Law Really Law?' in Maksymilian Del Mar and Zenon Bankowski (eds), Law as Institutional Normative Order (Ashgate 2009)

2008

J Gardner, 'Hart and Feinberg on Responsibility' in Matthew Kramer, Claire Grant, Ben Colburn and Antony Hatzistavrou (eds), The Legacy of H.L.A. Hart (Oxford University Press 2008)

J Gardner, 'Introduction' in H L A Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, Second Edition (Oxford University Press 2008)

L Green, 'On Being Tolerated' in M Kramer, C Grant, B Colborn, A Hatzistavrou (eds), The Legacy of HLA Hart: Legal, Political, and Moral Philosophy (Oxford University Press 2008) [...]

Why is it that toleration can be uncomfortable for the tolerated? And how should tolerators respond to that discomfort? This paper argues that properly directed toleration can be deficient in its scope, grounds or spirit. That explains some of the discomfort in being tolerated. Beyond this, the occasions for toleration¿the existence of a power to prevent and of an adverse judgment¿can also make toleration sting. The paper then explores and rejects two familiar suggestions about how one should respond to this discomfort: with acceptance or recognition of the tolerated. It is proposed instead that toleration should be supplemented by understanding. The nature and importance of this attitude are assessed.


ISBN: 978-0-19-954289-5

Courses

The courses we offer in this field are:

Undergraduate

FHS (Phase II)

The degree is awarded on the basis of nine final examinations at the end of the three-year course (or four years in the case of Law with Law Studies in Europe) and (for students who began the course in October 2011 or later) an essay in Jurisprudence written over the summer vacation at the end of the second year. Note: the Jurisprudence exam at the end of the third year is correspondingly shorter. This phase of the Final Honour School includes the third term of the first year, and all three terms of the second year.

Jurisprudence New Syllabus

(applies to those in FHS yr 1 or 2 in 2012-13)

Jurisprudence is one of the compulsory standard subjects within the Final Honour School syllabus. It is, however, taught and examined in a distinctive way (see below).

Jurisprudence, in the sense relevant to this subject, is the philosophy of law. In studying it you will learn to reflect in a disciplined and critical way on the nature, role, and importance, of legal systems, legal reasoning, and legal institutions, often using examples from other parts of your law studies. By choosing a suitable ‘mini-option’ (see below) you could also examine the philosophy of a particular area of law such as criminal law or tort law.

Teaching:

In the second year of the Final Honour School your Jurisprudence teaching will be as follows:

  1. Core topics: . You will have six tutorials covering some core topics in philosophy of law,
    in the traditional way.
  2. Mini option: You will then choose a mini-option from a list that the teaching group will
    provide. The mini-options will be taught in classes and you will not necessarily be taught by the same person who was your tutor for the core topics.

There will be a more restricted range of core topics than in the past. This is to make room for the mini-options. Authoritative guidance on the range of topics in the core will be issued early in MT 2012, together with an indicative list of mini-options. You will choose your mini-option from a finalized list in HT or TT of your second year, when you are studying Jurisprudence (all Jurisprudence tutorials take place in HT and/or TT of the second year).


Assessment:

  1. Core topics: Your Jurisprudence unseen written examination (at the end of your final year) will take a new form. Instead of our traditional finals paper taking three hours and requiring you to answer three out of sixteen questions, your finals paper will take two hours and will require you to answer two out of ten questions. This examination paper will cover only core topics on the tutorial syllabus. Sample examination papers in the new format will be published during MT2012, together with explanatory notes.
  2. Mini option: Your mini-option will be examined by an essay that you must write in your own time during the summer vacation at the end of your second year (this applies to Law with Law Studies in Europe students too). You will be provided near the end of TT with a list of questions arising from your mini-option and you will choose one to answer. The essay writing will be unsupervised. However guidance on what is expected will be given, including one or more classes on how to write an essay for assesssment.

Jurisprudence Old Syllabus

(applies to those in FHS yr 3 or 4 in 2012-13 and to DLS students)

Jurisprudence is one of the compulsory standard subjects within the Final Honour School syllabus. The subject affords an opportunity to reflect in a disciplined and critical way on the structure and functions of law and legal institutions and systems, on the nature of legal reasoning and discourse, and/or on the connections between law and morality and/or between law and other human relationships and characteristics. In some places it would be called theory of law or philosophy of law.

The content of the course is therefore deliberately broad and flexible. College tutors offer widely differing ranges of topics and reading lists, and the examination therefore makes full allowance for the diversity of approaches and materials. (Knowing that the examiners change only incrementally the range of issues from which questions are drawn, and the kinds of questions posed, tutors have an eye to former examination papers in designing their reading lists).

For many years the examination has comprised sixteen questions from which candidates are invited to choose any three. While general, the questions are typically precise and pointed. What is looked for is the ability to bring closely to bear on them the student’s own thought, with appropriate reference both to books or articles within the domain and to other legal subjects studied by the candidate.

Past papers, handouts, suggestions, and other suporting material for the course can be found on the Jurisprudence website

FHS - Final Year (Phase III)

The degree is awarded on the basis of nine final examinations at the end of the three-year course (or four years in the case of Law with Law Studies in Europe) and (for students who began the course in October 2011 or later) an essay in Jurisprudence written over the summer vacation at the end of the second year. Note: the Jurisprudence exam at the end of the third year is correspondingly shorter. This phase of the Final Honour School includes the first and second term of the final year; the Final Examinations are taken in the third term of the final year.

Moral and Political Philosophy

The aim of this course is to provide an introduction to the fundamental questions of moral philosophy and some central issues in political philosophy. The course is divided into two parts: Part A covering the nature of moral philosophy, and Part B dealing with the topics in political philosophy.

Part A takes a philosophical perspective on fundamental questions about the nature of morality. It asks whether moral values are (or can be) ‘objective’, or whether they are simply ‘subjective’ or ‘relative’, and what reason(s) we have (if any) to be moral. Part A also examines three of the most prominent approaches to the nature of morality—-consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics. Finally, it raises questions about our relationship to morality: Do we really have the freedom to choose whether or not to act in the morally right way? Does morality always provide us with a permissible course of action?

Part B examines some central topics in political philosophy, namely, democracy, liberty, equality and justice.

Diploma in Legal Studies

Jurisprudence Old Syllabus

(applies to those in FHS yr 3 or 4 in 2012-13 and to DLS students)

Jurisprudence is one of the compulsory standard subjects within the Final Honour School syllabus. The subject affords an opportunity to reflect in a disciplined and critical way on the structure and functions of law and legal institutions and systems, on the nature of legal reasoning and discourse, and/or on the connections between law and morality and/or between law and other human relationships and characteristics. In some places it would be called theory of law or philosophy of law.

The content of the course is therefore deliberately broad and flexible. College tutors offer widely differing ranges of topics and reading lists, and the examination therefore makes full allowance for the diversity of approaches and materials. (Knowing that the examiners change only incrementally the range of issues from which questions are drawn, and the kinds of questions posed, tutors have an eye to former examination papers in designing their reading lists).

For many years the examination has comprised sixteen questions from which candidates are invited to choose any three. While general, the questions are typically precise and pointed. What is looked for is the ability to bring closely to bear on them the student’s own thought, with appropriate reference both to books or articles within the domain and to other legal subjects studied by the candidate.

Past papers, handouts, suggestions, and other suporting material for the course can be found on the Jurisprudence website

Postgraduate

BCL

Our taught postgraduate programme, designed to serve outstanding law students from common-law backgrounds

Constitutional Theory

Theory of the nature, authority and legitimacy of constitutions. Topics include the historical origins and development of constitutional concepts; methods of separating the powers of governmental agencies; the ideal of the rule of law; institutional consequences of theories of democracy; the structure and function of legislatures and techniques for limiting their powers; the role of courts in review of legislation and executive action; the structure and operation of executive agencies; the framing and interpretation of written constitutions; the role of citizens and institutions in times of constitutional emergency; the nature and appropriate constitutional protection of basic rights; federalism and the constitutional implications of multiculturalism.

Jurisprudence and Political Theory

Students taking Jurisprudence and Political Theory have the opportunity to participate in wide-ranging but analytically precise discussions of the presuppositions and methods of legal, political and therefore also, to some extent, moral philosophy, and of related social theories in their bearing on the institutions, norms and methods of legal systems. The syllabus covers the concepts of law, legal system, legal right and legal obligation; the nature of adjudication and judicial discretion; the range and limits of law as a means of social control; the individual’s moral duty to obey the law; the individual’s moral rights against his or her government; and the justification of political (including judicial) authority. Much of, for example, Dworkin’s Law’s Empire, Raz’s The Morality of Freedom, and Finnis’s Aquinas was earlier presented and discussed in this course’s seminars, which provide a good context for critical testing of advanced work-in-progress. The seminars do not necessarily cover all of the topics mentioned in the syllabus, and of those covered some may be covered in much greater depth than others. Nevertheless the syllabus gives a good general indication of the field to which the seminars and the eventual list of examination essay topics relate.

The course is a philosophy course, and in that sense is a specialist rathar than a generalist pursuit. Through it students may expect to develop some of the skills and dispositions of professional philosophers. An acquaintance with some undergraduate-level jurisprudence is presupposed; those who enter on this course without having formally studied jurisprudence should prepare themselves by a careful reading of at least some of the following (or comparable) works: Hart, The Concept of Law, Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously or Law’s Empire, Raz, The Authority of Law, or Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights. But this list should not lead anyone to think that, in the course itself, the topics to be discussed are narrowly ‘jurisprudential’ or that the authors to be read are narrowly ‘Oxford’. Students with an Oxford Jurisprudence background, and others, could well prepare for the course by careful reading of (for example) Rawls, A Theory of Justice or Political Liberalism, Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Nagel, Equality and Partiality, Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, or Walzer, Spheres of Justice.

Seminars specifically designed for students on this course are convened by Dr J Dickson, Professor T A O Endicott, Dr P Eleftheriadis, Professor J M Finnis, Professor A M Honore, Professor J Gardner, Professor L Green, and Dr N Stavropoulos. However, those taking the paper are also encouraged to participate in seminars taking place elsewhere in the university, particularly in some of those advertised on the Philosophy Lecture List. The same holds for lectures. Those who are not conversant with the basics of political philosophy, in particular, should consider whether to attend lectures on the undergraduate courses in Ethics (see the Philosophy Lecture List) and the Theory of Politics (see the Politics Lecture List). Lectures from the undergraduate Jurisprudence course in the Law Faculty would also help those who need to be more familiar with the basics of legal philosophy.

This course is among those supported with detailed material on the Legal Philosophy in Oxford website

Four tutorials will be provided in HT, usually in groups of two or three. These are arranged by the teaching group and neither students nor college tutors need take any steps to organise them.

Philosophical Foundations of the Common Law

This course explores the principles which may be thought to underlie each of the three areas it is concerned with – contract, tort, and the criminal law – and the relations between them.

Do notions such as causation, intention and foresight, which figure in all three areas, lend them doctrinal unity, or do these branches of the law represent different (complementary or conflicting) principles? For example: can one or other of them be understood as embodying principles of corrective justice, while the others are based on considerations of distributive justice? Does the law, in these areas, reflect moral concerns, or pursue efficiency or some other goal, or is it the case that no underlying principles can be discerned? Does the law make sense only in the light of certain assumptions about the nature of persons (e.g. that they are rational choosers, that they are autonomous beings)? These are some of the issues explored in this course.

The course presupposes knowledge of the basic doctrines of contract, tort, and criminal law. While some philosophical background might be helpful, it is not essential.

The main teaching is by seminars. At least two but not necessarily all three of the areas identified in the syllabus (criminal law, torts, contracts) are covered in depth in any given academic year. Up to four tutorials are also provided, and these are arranged centrally via the seminars. The course is among those supported with detailed material on the Faculty's Jurisprudence website

MJur

Our taught postgraduate programme, designed to serve outstanding law students from civil law backgrounds.

Constitutional Theory

Theory of the nature, authority and legitimacy of constitutions. Topics include the historical origins and development of constitutional concepts; methods of separating the powers of governmental agencies; the ideal of the rule of law; institutional consequences of theories of democracy; the structure and function of legislatures and techniques for limiting their powers; the role of courts in review of legislation and executive action; the structure and operation of executive agencies; the framing and interpretation of written constitutions; the role of citizens and institutions in times of constitutional emergency; the nature and appropriate constitutional protection of basic rights; federalism and the constitutional implications of multiculturalism.

Jurisprudence and Political Theory

Students taking Jurisprudence and Political Theory have the opportunity to participate in wide-ranging but analytically precise discussions of the presuppositions and methods of legal, political and therefore also, to some extent, moral philosophy, and of related social theories in their bearing on the institutions, norms and methods of legal systems. The syllabus covers the concepts of law, legal system, legal right and legal obligation; the nature of adjudication and judicial discretion; the range and limits of law as a means of social control; the individual’s moral duty to obey the law; the individual’s moral rights against his or her government; and the justification of political (including judicial) authority. Much of, for example, Dworkin’s Law’s Empire, Raz’s The Morality of Freedom, and Finnis’s Aquinas was earlier presented and discussed in this course’s seminars, which provide a good context for critical testing of advanced work-in-progress. The seminars do not necessarily cover all of the topics mentioned in the syllabus, and of those covered some may be covered in much greater depth than others. Nevertheless the syllabus gives a good general indication of the field to which the seminars and the eventual list of examination essay topics relate.

The course is a philosophy course, and in that sense is a specialist rathar than a generalist pursuit. Through it students may expect to develop some of the skills and dispositions of professional philosophers. An acquaintance with some undergraduate-level jurisprudence is presupposed; those who enter on this course without having formally studied jurisprudence should prepare themselves by a careful reading of at least some of the following (or comparable) works: Hart, The Concept of Law, Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously or Law’s Empire, Raz, The Authority of Law, or Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights. But this list should not lead anyone to think that, in the course itself, the topics to be discussed are narrowly ‘jurisprudential’ or that the authors to be read are narrowly ‘Oxford’. Students with an Oxford Jurisprudence background, and others, could well prepare for the course by careful reading of (for example) Rawls, A Theory of Justice or Political Liberalism, Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Nagel, Equality and Partiality, Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, or Walzer, Spheres of Justice.

Seminars specifically designed for students on this course are convened by Dr J Dickson, Professor T A O Endicott, Dr P Eleftheriadis, Professor J M Finnis, Professor A M Honore, Professor J Gardner, Professor L Green, and Dr N Stavropoulos. However, those taking the paper are also encouraged to participate in seminars taking place elsewhere in the university, particularly in some of those advertised on the Philosophy Lecture List. The same holds for lectures. Those who are not conversant with the basics of political philosophy, in particular, should consider whether to attend lectures on the undergraduate courses in Ethics (see the Philosophy Lecture List) and the Theory of Politics (see the Politics Lecture List). Lectures from the undergraduate Jurisprudence course in the Law Faculty would also help those who need to be more familiar with the basics of legal philosophy.

This course is among those supported with detailed material on the Legal Philosophy in Oxford website

Four tutorials will be provided in HT, usually in groups of two or three. These are arranged by the teaching group and neither students nor college tutors need take any steps to organise them.

Philosophical Foundations of the Common Law

This course explores the principles which may be thought to underlie each of the three areas it is concerned with – contract, tort, and the criminal law – and the relations between them.

Do notions such as causation, intention and foresight, which figure in all three areas, lend them doctrinal unity, or do these branches of the law represent different (complementary or conflicting) principles? For example: can one or other of them be understood as embodying principles of corrective justice, while the others are based on considerations of distributive justice? Does the law, in these areas, reflect moral concerns, or pursue efficiency or some other goal, or is it the case that no underlying principles can be discerned? Does the law make sense only in the light of certain assumptions about the nature of persons (e.g. that they are rational choosers, that they are autonomous beings)? These are some of the issues explored in this course.

The course presupposes knowledge of the basic doctrines of contract, tort, and criminal law. While some philosophical background might be helpful, it is not essential.

The main teaching is by seminars. At least two but not necessarily all three of the areas identified in the syllabus (criminal law, torts, contracts) are covered in depth in any given academic year. Up to four tutorials are also provided, and these are arranged centrally via the seminars. The course is among those supported with detailed material on the Faculty's Jurisprudence website


People

Philosophy of Law teaching is organized by a Subject Group convened by:

John Gardner: Professor of Jurisprudence

in conjunction with:

Andrew Ashworth, QC: Vinerian Professor of English Law
Nicholas Bamforth: CUF Lecturer
Nicholas Barber: CUF Lecturer
Alan Bogg: Professor of Labour Law
Mindy Chen-Wishart: Reader in Contract Law
Paul Cowie: Stipendiary Lecturer in Law at St Hilda's College
Julie Dickson:
Sionaidh Douglas-Scott: Professor of European and Human Rights Law
Richard Ekins: CUF Lecturer
Pavlos Eleftheriadis: University Lecturer in Law
Timothy Endicott: Dean of the Faculty and Professor of Legal Philosophy
John Finnis: Professor
Denis Galligan: Professor of Socio-Legal Studies
Imogen Goold: CUF Lecturer
James Goudkamp: University Lecturer (CUF)
Leslie Green: Professor of the Philosophy of Law
Noam Gur: Shaw Foundation Fellow in Law, Lincoln College
Aileen Kavanagh: Reader in Law
Tarunabh Khaitan: CUF Lecturer
Dori Kimel: Reader in Legal Philosophy
Maris Köpcke Tinturé: Fellow in Law, Worcester College (Lecturer in Law, Brasenose College)
Grant Lamond: University Lecturer in Legal Philosophy
Peter Mirfield: CUF Lecturer
Guido Rossi: College Lecturer in Law
Edwin Simpson: CUF Lecturer
Nicos Stavropoulos: University Lecturer in Legal Theory
Shlomit Wallerstein: CUF Lecturer
Rebecca Williams: CUF Lecturer
Alison L Young: CUF Lecturer
Paul Yowell: Fellow in Law
Lucia Zedner: Professor of Criminal Justice

assisted by:

Kate Greasley: DPhil Law student
Jesse Wall: DPhil Law student

Also working in this field, but not involved in its teaching programme:

Ambrose Lee: Leverhulme Trust Early Career Fellow
Chris McConnachie: DPhil Law student
Joseph Raz: Emeritus Research Professor


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