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Negative risk-decoupling, otherwise known as empty voting, is a popular strategy amongst hedge funds and other activist investors. In short, it is the attempt to decouple the economic risk from the share’s ownership position, retaining in particular the voting right without risk. This paper uses three perspectives to analyse the problems created by negative risk-decoupling: an agency costs approach, an analysis of information costs, and a perspective from corporate finance. It shows how risk-decoupling is a type of market behaviour that creates significant costs for market participants, in particular existing shareholders and potential investors. The paper then develops regulatory responses, envisaged particularly for EU level lawmaking, but also raises underlying issues on a more general level. Whilst several proposed regulatory tools are rejected, the paper prefers a solution that uses continuous transparency as the cornerstone. In addition, it suggests that in certain individual cases, national regulators should be empowered to suspend activists’ voting rights. The paper concludes by offering a concrete legislative proposal, amending the European Transparency Directive.

In capital markets around the world, calls for greater transparency regarding holdings of cash-settled equity derivatives (in particular Contracts for Difference, CfDs) have arisen due to the increased use of CfDs to gain control or to influence the management of prominent companies on all major European stock exchanges. They have been used in this manner due to an emerging practice that permits a CfD holder to capture the shares to which the CfD arrangement relates (without entering into any further express or implied agreements to do so), thereby acquiring a de facto control position in the target company. The UK was among the first countries to extend its shareholder disclosure regime to cover CfDs. Positions above the trigger threshold of 3 per cent must be disclosed as if they were shares enti-tling the holder to voting rights in the target company. Two alternatives were considered when pre-paring this new regulation: firstly, a general disclosure obligation of all economic long positions and secondly, a safe harbour regulation with exemptions from the requirement to disclose certain CfD transactions. Ultimately, the first option was preferred, yet not on the basis of its own merits but be-cause the safe harbour alternative was considered too complicated and difficult to enforce. This paper evaluates disclosure regulation of cash-settled equity derivatives and assesses the ef-fectiveness and suitability of the disclosure regulation under chapter 5 of Disclosure and Transparency Rules (DTR) in the UK with comparison to the relevant US rules and case law. We argue that the UK made the wrong choice of disclosure regime for CfDs. It fundamentally misunderstood the nature of the underlying problem relating to CfDs. As this article explains, the key problem related to CfDs is not the economic interest which CfDs convey per se, but rather the hedging structures that market participants have developed to facilitate the use of CfDs to acquire control of companies by stealth. This particular mischief would have been better targeted by an intentions-based disclosure regulation requiring disclosure of CfD positions only in cases where the CfD holder intends to launch a takeover or to otherwise influence the target company’s strategy and operations. Instead, the UK market is saddled with a general disclosure obligation with only very limited exceptions. This disclosure obligation is too wide in scope, places an undue burden on market partici-pants and ultimately acts as a deterrent to CfD transactions. This article argues that the UK should move away from the current general disclosure obligation towards intentions-based disclosure to re-move the current fetter on the CfD market, while still tackling the underlying mischief.

ISBN: 1859789781

Delaware’s expert courts are seen as an integral part of the state’s success in attracting incorporation by public companies. However, the benefit that Delaware companies derive from this expertise depends on whether corporate lawsuits against Delaware companies are brought before the Delaware courts. We report evidence that these suits are increasingly brought outside Delaware. We investigate changes in where suits are brought using four hand-collected data sets capturing different types of suits: class action lawsuits filed in (1) large M&A and (2) leveraged buyout transactions over 1994–2010; (3) derivative suits alleging option backdating; and (4) cases against public company directors that generate one or more publicly available opinions between 1995 and 2009. We find a secular increase in litigation rates for all companies in large M&A transactions and for Delaware companies in LBO transactions. We also see trends toward (1) suits being filed outside Delaware in both large M&A and LBO transactions and in cases generating opinions; and (2) suits being filed both in Delaware and elsewhere in large M&A transactions. Overall, Delaware courts are losing market share in lawsuits, and Delaware companies are gaining lawsuits, often filed elsewhere. We find some evidence that the timing of specific Delaware court decisions that affect plaintiffs’ firms coincides with the movement of cases out of Delaware. Our evidence suggests that serious as well as nuisance cases are leaving Delaware. The trends we report potentially present a challenge to Delaware’s competitiveness in the market for incorporations.

ISBN: 1740-1461

DOI: 10.1515/1555-5879.1507

The theoretical literature debates whether debtors should be permitted to contract with lenders over control rights in bankruptcy. Proponents point to coordination benefits from concentrating control rights; detractors point to inter-creditor agency costs. A recent reform of UK bankruptcy law provides an opportunity to test these theories. Until 2003, UK bankruptcy law permitted firms to give complete ex post control to secured creditors, through a procedure known as “receivership.” A bankruptcy reform then required firms to use a different procedure, “administration,” which confers greater control on unsecured creditors. We present empirical findings from a hand-coded sample of 340 bankruptcies from both before and after the change in the law. Whilst gross realizations have increased following the change in the law, these have tended to be eaten up by increased bankruptcy costs. We infer that dispersed and concentrated creditor governance in bankruptcy may be functionally equivalent.

ISBN: 1555-5879