Oxford Business Law Blog

The modern corporate form owes its success as much to the separation of management from shareholders, and the imposition of fiduciary obligations on managers (rather than on shareholders), as it does...

Bank resolution is key to avoiding a repetition of the global financial crisis in which failing financial institutions had to be bailed out with taxpayers’ money. It permits the recapitalisation of...

This post introduces a forthcoming article titled ‘Harmonising Secured Transactions Law in an Emerging Economy (re CBN Collateral Registry Regulations)’ which will appear in the Nottingham Insolvency...

Countries have adopted different approaches or structures to financial regulation. The ‘institutional approach’ focuses on the form of the regulated institution (e.g. a bank, an insurer or a...

In our study, we suggest that bank capital in the range of 15-23 percent of risk-weighted assets would have prevented most past banking crises in advanced economies. The benefits of even higher bank...

Limited liability companies (‘LLCs’) now outnumber corporations and continue to grow at a rapid rate. The form is remarkably flexible, attracting firms ranging from small local businesses to bastions...

In autumn 2015 the EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Cooperation Principles (‘EU JudgeCo Principles’) were published. These 26 (non-binding) principles encompass subjects such as the...

Corporate governance structures interact deeply with the political arena through party systems, political orientations of governments and coalitions, votes of stakeholders (workers, shareholders, etc...

In the United States, the impact of regulatory competition on the evolution of corporate law has generated an intense and long lasting debate opposing the “race to the bottom” and “race to the top”...

Principles of Takeover Regulation (OUP, 2016) explores the nature and optimality of the regulation of the UK’s market for corporate control through the Takeover Code, which is maintained and enforced...

There is a very considerable literature on the internal market. It is sophisticated and diverse, and, as might be expected, there are a plethora of views on most central issues. Our chapter on ‘The...

Every few years over the last several decades, Congress has been faced with the question of how to best regulate corporate financial activities. In the late 1970’s, concern for bribery overseas by...

By influencing the timing of corporate disclosures, corporate insiders trading in the US securities markets may be abusing a rule that protects them from prosecution for insider trading. Although...

In our paper “The Economics of Disclosure and Financial Reporting Regulation: Evidence and Suggestions for Future Research”, Peter Wysocki and I review the empirical literature on the economic...

This post introduces an article by Bernard S. Sharfman (Adjunct Professor of Business Law at the George Mason University School of Business), which is forthcoming in the Journal of Law, Economics...

Accountability operates expressly and implicitly in the field of corporate governance to the point where it is regarded as one of its most critical elements. The accountability of the board of...

In Rethinking Corporate Governance for a Bondholder Financed, Systemically Risky World, available here, I argue that including bondholders in the governance of systemically important firms not only...

Economic elites are thought to exert political pressure over the design of contracting frameworks, seeking arrangements that benefit their interests (see Feijen and Perotti (2006) and Rajan (2006)...

Companies’ earnings conference calls are perceived to be venues for sell-side equity analysts to ask management questions. In this study, we examine another important conference call participant—the...