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  • TAO Endicott and Michael Spence, 'Vagueness in the Scope of Copyright' (2005) 121 Law Quarterly Review 657
    The extravagant vagueness in the scope of copyright protection is not itself a defect in the law. But it gives appellate courts a responsibility to articulate principles to guide decision-makers in resolving copyright disputes. And it gives rise to a special need for an adjudicative process that will serve the purposes of copyright protection.
    ISBN: 0023-933X
  • C O'Regan, '"Breaking Ground: Some thoughts on the seismic shift in our administrative law"' (2004) 121 South African Law Journal 424
    ISBN: 0258-2503
  • C O'Regan, '"The three R's of the Constitution: Responsibility, Respect and Rights"' (2004) Acta Jurídica 86
    ISBN: 07021 6737 1
  • TAO Endicott, Palabras y reglas: Ensayos en filosofía del derecho (Distribuciones Fontamara 2004)
    ‘Words and Rules: Essays in philosophy of law’; a collection of essays translated into Spanish by Pablo Navarro and Rodrigo Sanchez Brígido
    ISBN: 968-476-483-9
  • Sarah McCosker, Ben Saul, Deborah Sandler and L Lazarus, Privileged Memo for Clive Stafford Smith for US v AL QOSI (Oxford Public Interest Lawyers 2004)
    This report included specific research questions set to OXPIL by Clive Stafford Smith regarding the charges against Mr. Al Qosi in the Guantanamo Bay military tribunal.
  • L Lazarus, 'Delivering Rights: How the Human Rights Act is Working by J Jowell and J Cooper' (2004) Public Law Winter [Review]
  • TAO Endicott, 'Constitutional Logic' (2003) 53 University of Toronto Law Journal 201 [Review]
    Review article on Mark Elliott, The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review (Hart 2001).

    (pre-publication version)

    ISBN: 0042-0220
  • TAO Endicott, 'Raz on Gaps – —The Surprising Part' in Thomas Pogge, Lukas Meyer, and Stanley Paulson (eds), Rights, Culture, and the Law — Essays After Joseph Raz (OUP 2003)
    I address some implications of Joseph Raz’s ‘sources thesis’- the claim that the existence and content of any law ‘can be identified by reference to social facts alone, without resort to any evaluative argument’. By the sources thesis, there is a gap in the law whenever the law appeals to moral considerations. But contrary to Raz’s conclusions, I argue that gaps in the law do not necessarily confer discretion on judges. A legal requirement to apply moral considerations does give courts discretion, but only because (and to the extent that) moral considerations are vague.
    ISBN: 0-19-924825-7
  • TAO Endicott, 'The Reason of the Law' (2003) 48 American Journal of Jurisprudence 83
    A contribution to a symposium on the topic, "Law's Moral Foundations: Has it any?" I argue that it is only possible to identify the content of the ideal of the rule of law by making evaluative judgments as to which aspects of a community's life (and in particular, which aspects of official conduct) ought to be ruled by law. Because all legal systems attain the ideal of the rule of law to some extent, that need for evaluative judgment constitutes a necessary connection between law and morality.
    ISBN: 0065-8995
  • TAO Endicott, 'Significado internacional\': la cortesia en la adjudicacion de derechos fundamentales' (2002) Anuario de Derechos Humanos 81
    Spanish translation of '"International Meaning": Comity in Fundamental Rights Adjudication'.
    ISBN: 0212-0364
  • TAO Endicott, 'Law and Language' in Jules L.Coleman and Scott Shapiro (eds), Handbook of Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy (OUP 2002)
    ISBN: 0198298242
  • TAO Endicott, 'Are There Any Rules?' (2001) 5 Journal of Ethics 199
    Responds to Ronald Dworkin's claim that what he calls the "model of rules" cannot account for controversy over legal rights and duties. I give an account of social rules that explains why such controversy is common, and can be deep. So controversy gives no reason to reject the model of rules. [there is a reply by Ronald Dworkin at p.263 of the issue].
    ISBN: 1382-4554
  • TAO Endicott, 'How to Speak the Truth' (2001) 46 American Journal of Jurisprudence 229
    Argues that some important problems in legal interpretation can be resolved with three techniques that John Finnis used in Natural Law and Natural Rights to address a methodological problem in jurisprudence: (1) The analogy principle: The application of a word such as “friendship” or “law” is not based on a set of features shared by each instance, but is based on similarities of a variety of kinds, seen by the people who use the words as justifying the extension of the word. (2) The paradigm (or central case) principle: You cannot understand a word like “friendship” or “law” without seeing what counts as a good instance of friendship or law. (3) The context principle:What counts as a good instance depends on the context in which the word is to be used, and on the concerns and purposes which justify the use of the word.

    (pre-publication version)

    ISBN: 0065-8995
  • TAO Endicott, 'Law is Necessarily Vague' (2001) 7 Legal Theory 377
    Every legal system needs vague laws, because precision always brings a form of arbitrariness. The arbitrariness of precision sometimes gives lawmakers reason to make vague laws, and gives judges reason to give vague effect to precisely formulated laws. In any case, it is impossible for all the laws of a legal system to be precise.
    ISBN: 1352-3252
  • TAO Endicott, 'Preface' (2001) 7 Legal Theory 377
    Preface to a symposium on vagueness in law.
    ISBN: 1352-3252
  • TAO Endicott, 'Raz sulle lacune: una tesi sorprendente' (2001) 6 Ars Interpretandi 367
    Italian translation (by Aldo Schiavello) of a book chapter that is forthcoming in 'Rights, Culture, and the Law — Essays After Joseph Raz', edited by Thomas Pogge, Lukas Meyer, and Stanley Paulson, Oxford University Press.
    ISBN: 1043-5778
  • TAO Endicott, '\"International Meaning\": Comity in Fundamental Rights Adjudication' (2001) 13 International Journal of Refugee Studies 280
    Discusses requirements of comity between courts of different nations that are party to the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees; argues that comity does not require deference to authorities in other countries. Addresses possible reasons for establishing an international tribunal.

    (pre-publication version)

    ISBN: 0953-8186
  • C O'Regan, 'Cultivating a Constitution: Challenges facing the Constitutional Court' (2000) Dublin University Law Journal 1
    ISBN: 0332-3250
  • TAO Endicott, 'Objectivity, Subjectivity, and Incomplete Agreements' in Jeremy Horder (ed), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, Fourth Series (OUP 2000)
    Abstract: It might seem that the court's role in resolving a contract dispute is just to hold the parties to the resolution that they intended. But the law uses objective tests for the existence and content of a contract. I argue that the content of an agreement is determined by the meaning of the conduct by which the parties agreed. Objective tests are not a departure from the law's central purpose of enforcing agreements. This objective view of agreement might seem to support a different view of contract adjudication: that the task of the court is only to enforce the terms of the agreement (as identified by the objective test). That view of the role of courts is too limited because the terms of agreements, understood on the objective view of agreement, are typically incomplete in significant respects. The conclusion is a view of the role of courts in which they must commonly give an outcome that was not intended by the parties, and that is not determined by their agreement. Courts must do so if they are to give effect to the intentions of the parties, and to their agreements.
  • TAO Endicott, Vagueness in Law (Oxford University Press 2000)
  • C O'Regan, '"Addressing the Legacy of the Past: Equality in the South African Constitution"' in Titia Loenen and Peter Rodrigues (eds), Non-Discrimination Law: Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer Law International 1999)
    ISBN: 90-411-1063-1
  • TAO Endicott, 'Herbert Hart and the Semantic Sting' (1998) 4 Legal Theory 283
    DOI: 10.1017/S1352325200001038
    An invited contribution to a special issue on Hart’s ‘Postscript’ to The Concept of Law

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