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  • MM Jackson, 'Amnesties in Strasbourg' (2018) 38 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 451
    DOI: 10.1093/ojls/gqy017
  • S von Schorlemer and A Tzanakopoulos, 'Article 46' in A Zimmermann and CJ Tams (eds), The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2018) (forthcoming)
    Commentary to Article 46 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
  • S von Schorlemer and A Tzanakopoulos, 'Article 47' in A Zimmermann and CJ Tams (eds), The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2018) (forthcoming)
    Commentary to Article 47 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
  • ABE Bayot, 'Elite Bargains and Political Deals: Case Study on the Philippines' (2018) Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project; Stabilisation Unit, Government of the United Kingdom
    The paper discusses the history of the Bangsamoro peace process in the Philippines, focusing on how the issue of autonomy vis-à-vis centralized government steered the country from the peace table to conflict and back again. The paper shows that while the peace process has benefited from the assistance of various third parties throughout the almost 40-year successive negotiations, it is the party-driven stabilisation interventions, rather than the external actors, that have been crucial in taking the peace process forward. The primacy of local actors is particularly critical as the parties push for congressional implementation of the political settlement. The paper concludes with an assessment of the prospects for full implementation of the CAB in light of the prevailing political climate.
  • E Methymaki and A Tzanakopoulos, 'Freedom With Their Exception: Jurisdiction and Immunity as Rule and Exception' in F Paddeu and L Bartels (eds), Exceptions and Defences in International Law (Oxford University Press 2018) (forthcoming)
    The relationship between the rules on state jurisdiction and sovereign immunity, as well as the rules of sovereign immunity between themselves, has been the subject of long-standing debate among international lawyers, as well as international and domestic courts. Although the starting point of any discussion is the jurisdiction of the territorial state, it is also accepted that domestic courts are barred from exercising such jurisdiction over acts of another sovereign. This latter rule has its own exceptions, namely that a foreign state is not entitled to immunity for acts performed in a commercial capacity and certain other limited circumstances. What are the consequences of such a rule-exception-exception to the exception relationship, and do they affect the waiver of immunity, the burden of proof, or the interpretation of these norms? This chapter argues that the relationship between jurisdiction and immunity as rule and exception has, in the final analysis, no particular normative weight in their application and interpretation by courts and other law-applying actors.
  • M Apostolaki and A Tzanakopoulos, 'Greece' in FM Palombino (ed), Duelling for Supremacy: International Law vs National Fundamental Principles (Cambridge University Press 2018) (forthcoming)
    After decades of avoiding meaningful engagement with international law, Greek courts engaged more seriously in the years of the crises. Under conditions of ‘normality’, cases ‘at the edge’ are few, and domestic courts may be unwilling in such circumstances to openly contest international law. This chapter demonstrates how Greek courts opted for avoidance when they thought that international law somehow left something to be desired when pitted against the Greek Constitution. They avoided international law by mechanistically invoking the Constitution’s normative supremacy even when they did not need to do so. This is undoubtedly resistance, but only formally principled resistance – and certainly not ‘reasonable’ resistance. But when international law is employed by both regulators and challengers as a sword and a shield on matters of high political and legal importance, resistance is no longer cheap, and can no longer be unprincipled. The stakes are too high, but so are the possibilities to influence the content and development of international law. In those circumstances, Greek courts seemed far more comfortable to forget about resisting and fall into line. Resistance here would be costly, not less so in terms of the quality of argument to be put forward. Resistance is not always futile. Sometimes, even if potentially futile, it is direly needed. Unprincipled (unreasonable) resistance is always futile, however, and definitely not useful in preparing one for proper contestation when the circumstances call for it.
  • A Tzanakopoulos, 'Here Comes the Name Again: Treaty Making at the Epicentre of the Greek Debate over the Agreement with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia' (2018) EJIL: Talk!
    A short comment on issues of treaty making, authority to sign international treaties, and the legal effects of signature when treaties require also ratification, against the background of the Prespa Agreement between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with respect to the latter state's name.
  • A Tzanakopoulos and A Ventouratou, 'Nicaragua in the International Court of Justice and the Law of Treaties' in E Sobenes Obregon and B Samson (eds), Nicaragua before the International Court of Justice: Impacts on International Law (Springer 2018)
    This essay assesses the impact of the 'Nicaraguan' cases, ie cases in which Nicaragua has been involved before the International Court of Justice, on the law of treaties. It focuses on two main aspects: the first is the relationship between various principles and (or) maxims of interpretation and the customary rules of interpretation reflected in Articles 31-32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The second is the relationship between treaty and customary law, considered against the background of the quintessential Nicaraguan case, the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua.
    ISBN: 978-3-319-62962-9
  • ABE Bayot, 'The Bangsamoro Peace Process and Hybrid Self-Determination: Reconciling Bangsamoro and Lumad Claims to Self-Determination' (2018) Sui Generis (forthcoming)
  • D Franchini and A Tzanakopoulos, 'The Kosovo Crisis (1999)' in O Corten and T Ruys (eds), International Law and the Use of Force: A Case-based Approach (Oxford University Press 2018)
    This contribution discusses in some detail the forcible intervention by NATO against Serbia in 1999 in response to the situation in Kosovo. It sets out the facts and background of the crisis, along with the legal positions of the main protagonists and the reactions of the international community. It then proceeds to survey the debates surrounding the legality of the intervention and to assess the soundness of the legal justifications put forward by states and authors. Finally, it discusses the precedential value of the intervention, especially in view of claims of existence or emergence of a rule or principle of international law permitting forcible unilateral use of force in response to humanitarian crises. The contribution concludes that the NATO intervention has significant precedential value, despite the claims of even some of the states that took part in it that it should not become a precedent. But its precedential value is precisely that of confirming the unlawfulness of forcible unilateral humanitarian intervention.
    ISBN: 9780198784364
  • D Sarooshi and R. Volterra, 'The resolution of investment disputes by arbitration: risks facing host States' (2018) Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 12
  • D Akande and A Tzanakopoulos, 'Treaty Law and ICC Jurisdiction Over the Crime of Aggression' (2018) 29 European Journal of International Law (forthcoming)
    This article examines the question of who will be subject to ICC jurisdiction with respect to the crime of aggression. One of the most contentious questions in the negotiations regarding the crime of aggression was whether the Court would have jurisdiction over nationals of a state that does not ratify the aggression amendments, but which is alleged to have committed an act of aggression on the territory of a state has accepted the aggression amendments. The question is examined here against the background of the rules in the law of treaties regarding amendments and treaty interpretation. The article considers the legal effect that the resolution of the ICC Assembly of States Parties (ASP), adopted in New York in December 2017 and activating ICC jurisdiction over aggression, will have in determining this jurisdictional question. A resolution of an international conference adopted by consensus can, in principle, be regarded as subsequent practice or a subsequent agreement of the parties to the Rome Statute that establishes the authentic interpretation of the Statute within the meaning of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. It is argued however that this particular resolution does not, in itself, provide the definitive answer as to the correct interpretation of the Rome Statute. Despite being adopted by consensus, and despite being highly relevant for the interpretation of the Rome Statute and Kampala Amendments, this resolution does not necessarily amount to a subsequent agreement or subsequent practice that the Court is legally bound to follow. Nevertheless, it is further argued that the position adopted in New York with regard to the jurisdiction of the Court over nationals of states parties that do not ratify the aggression amendments is the correct legal position and the one that the Court, including the Office of the Prosecutor, ought to adopt. The answer to the question over whom the Court will have jurisdiction with respect to aggression is to be found in Rome rather than in Kampala. We argue that the key to addressing this issue is to understand how the amendment provisions of the Rome Statute work in conjunction with basic principles of the law of treaties.
    ISBN: 0938-5428
  • E Methymaki and A Tzanakopoulos, 'Another Brick in the Wall -- Reflexivity of the Sources and the Enforcement of International Law: Domestic Courts as Sources and Enforcers' in S Besson and J d'Aspremont (eds), The Oxford Handbook on the Sources of International Law (Oxford University Press 2017)
    What is the role of domestic courts in the ideal continuum commencing from sources (where the law begins its life) and ultimately ending at the enforcement of the law in a specific case? Where, if anywhere, do they fit in this continuum? Put differently, are domestic court decisions a cause (source) or an effect (enforcement) of international law? What we argue in this essay is that enforcement of international law is reflexive, rather than reactive. Reflexitvity is defined as a circular relationship between cause and effect, and there is indeed such a circular relationship—a ‘feedback loop’—between the sources of international law and its enforcement: neither of the two can be finally identified as the ultimate cause or the ultimate effect. There is thus no real continuum, with domestic courts occupying this or that position on it. Rather, domestic court decisions are both part of the cause (sources) and of the effect (enforcement) of international law. The enforcement of a rule of law in a specific case constitutes, in accordance with the sources doctrine, yet another brick in the wall of that same ever-changing rule. And given the increasingly important position that domestic courts are assuming in the enforcement of international law, they become ever more important agents of development of that law, reinforcing their position in the doctrine of sources.
    ISBN: 9780198745365
  • Malcolm Evans, Javaid Rehman, Fabio Petito and Alves Pinto, Article 18: From Rhetoric to Reality (All Party Parliamentary Group for International Freedom of Religion or Belief 2017)
  • S-I Lekkas and C Staker, 'Articles 21, 23-30, 32-34 Annex VI' in A Proelss (ed), The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary (CH Beck/Hart/Nomos 2017)
    ISBN: 978-3-406-60324-2