Few years ago, judicial councils composed primarily of judges were viewed as a panacea to virtually all problems of court administration in Europe. The burgeoning literature on judicial councils has shown that this is not necessarily the case. This paper goes further and argues that it is high time to look beyond judicial councils and to study the role of judges in court administration (judicial self-government) more holistically. To that end, this paper conceptualizes judicial self-government (JSG) and identifies crucial actors within the judiciary who may engage in judicial politics (such as judicial councils, judicial appointment commissions, promotion committees, and court presidents). Subsequently, it shows that both the forms and rationales of JSG have varied across Europe. So have the effects. Finally, this paper argues that the introduction of a new JSG body inevitably leads to political contestation with the existing bodies involved in court administration and may even result in a backlash against the new JSG body as well as against the idea of JSG itself. This, in turn, may put pressure on the new JSG bodies and create new channels of politicization of the judiciary.