This paper examines the popular but poorly developed idea that human rights are rights that, in some important sense, sit at the focus of international agreement. In particular, the paper examines two specific versions of this idea, either of which might be thought to constitute an "agreement theory" of human rights: (i) that human rights just are objects of international agreement and (ii) that human rights are grounded in such objects. After providing an overview of the conceptual variations on these claims, I argue that the case for affirming either of them is weak. The idea of moral consensus is a poor guide to understanding either the nature or grounds of human rights. This remains true even if we consult the primary motivations behind "agreement theory," which are, (a) to remain theoretically faithful to the modern practice of human rights, (b) to theoretically capture the distinctive importance of human rights, and (c) to counter worries about the ethnocentrism or parochialism of human rights.