This paper is concerned with the coherency of both Leveson's specific proposals for press regulation and the notion of it in more general terms. Amongst other things, Leveson's recommendations are premised on the view that the prospective regulation of privacy-invading expression is compatible with press freedom. However, the notion of press freedom underpinning this view receives little treatment in the report itself. In its brief discussion of it, the report adopts a fairly intuitive view of the scope and purpose of press freedom, essentially confining it to the importance of informing the public and for its role in enabling the public to participate in change. This notion of press freedom, though, is used as a governing standard by which the press may be measured. However, it is argued, that this treatment of press freedom as an imperative (by which the press must conform) is controversial and, moreover, is unsupported by the law's treatment of the term. It is further argued that the law is ill-equipped to realise an imperative model of press freedom with any such precision. All the law may do is impose a model and, in order to avoid or diminish the charge of arbitrariness, the parameters of this freedom must be drawn fairly wide by the judiciary. Consequently, it is argued, this restriction on our ability to define the scope and meaning of press freedom severely limits the prospective capacity of both the judiciary and prospective regulator to hold the press to account for privacy-invading expression whilst remaining faithful to the principle of press freedom.