The rise of Transnational Regulatory Networks (TRNs, organizations built as polycentric networks of regulators, Black 2008:

137; Slaughter 2004: 15) could be seen as an attempt to solve global transnational problems (Beck 2002; Hülsse 2008) for which individual states no longer have the capacity to provide an effective solution (Nayyar 2002) and they therefore need other mechanisms of transnational cooperation. In general terms, a lack of clear accountability standards and mechanisms in the case of international organizations (Keohane 2003; Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart 2005: 17) and networks of financial regulators (Zaring 2005; Barr and Miller 2006; Hülsse 2008) has been recognized. The organization chosen for empirical study through my DPhil project is the Basle Committee of Banking Supervision. It provides a very salient case study of developing accountability mechanisms because it is a central part of the structure of transnational financial regulation (Marcussen 2006; Davies and Green 2008). The presentation will revolve around some theoretical categories such as 'legitimacy,'

'accountability,' and 'governance' that have influenced the design of the research. I also will present some evidence at the beginning of the field work.

Light refreshments will be provided during each session