Most states do not tolerate what they perceive as selective conscientious objection. Yet many states that do not tolerate selective conscientious objection do tolerate (to various degrees) what they perceive as non-selective conscientious objection. In this paper I argue that there are no prevailing justifications for only tolerating non-selective conscientious objections. That is, if a state is willing to tolerate non-selective conscientious objections, it must also tolerate selective conscientious objections to a similar degree (all other things being equal). Specifically, I claim that there is no such thing as ‘selective’ conscientious objection. Moreover, even if the conceptual distinction between selective conscientious objection and non-selective (or absolute) conscientious objection is sustainable, I argue that this distinction has no significant moral or practical implications and that ultimately, all kinds of conscientious objection should be treated equally (all other things being equal). These arguments will be also addressed by describing and scrutinising recent Israel Supreme Court case law that dealt with the issue of selective conscientious objection.