Oppression is the subordination of one group by another. It may be deliberate, but it may also be the unintended and systematic outcome of social arrangements. It may be widely recognised for what it is or it may go unrecognised, even by the oppressed themselves. Given what oppression is surely law is altogether different? Perhaps the law is just that kind of thing to stand against oppression, to furnish a bulwark against it. Alas things are not so simple. Hart sounds a 'sobering truth' about the connection of law with oppression. Law, he (1997: 201) says, may be used 'to subdue and maintain, in a position of permanent inferiority, a subject group...' This view seems dispiriting, after all Hart writes of the helplessness of the oppressed as victims of the system. What then of law's prospects as an instrument of resistance to oppression? Only when we have an idea of what 'oppression' means can we tackle the question of what connections there may be between law and oppression. Accordingly in what follows I first consider what oppression is. I then clarify Hart's argument on law and oppression and I raise some questions regarding practical attitudes toward law under oppression. Thinking about those practical attitudes brings the role of law in resistance to oppression into view.