While we are commonly thought to have certain general obligations, owed to all people on account of e.g. their being rational agents, it is also commonly believed that we have certain special obligations to specific people or groups on account of our relationship to them. Among e.g. friendship and family, many have counted citizenship as such a relationship, arguing that we owe special consideration to the needs of our fellow citizens. States devote the vast majority of their resources to promoting the interests of their own members rather than those of other states and, it is usually thought, rightly so. In this paper I discuss several serious difficulties with the idea that citizenship includes any special obligations owed to fellow citizens qua fellow citizens. Instead, I argue that the nature of citizenship as a legal status characterised by the legal power to participate in and influence the politics of a state does give rise to some moral constraints in the exercise of that power. Any partiality we do in fact show to the interests of the members of our own state can in part be justified by a principle of responsibility in exercising the powers of citizenship.