The law of trusts has spent the last twenty years rapidly shedding many traditional requirements, forms and restrictions which imposed liability on negligent trustees, protected vulnerable beneficiaries and prevented the use of trusts to avoid the claims of settlors' and beneficiaries' creditors, including their spouses, their children, and their governments. This Article studies the "stripping of the trust", examining both its distributive consequences and whether the resulting stripped-down model coheres with the traditional functionality of trusts. I conclude that at least half of the current reforms have welfare-reducing distributive consequences, in some cases inflicting externalities on all except the parties to a given trust, in others transferring value from settlors and beneficiaries to the trust service providers serving them. That precisely those reforms which are the most distributively harmful cohere well with the traditional functionality of trusts, while those which are the most doctrinally audacious, like the elimination of equity from trust law, have the least harmful consequences, raises doubts as to the legitimacy of current donative private trust practice. My conclusions point to a need for a rethinking of many of the recent reforms, and indeed for a through-going reform of this branch of the law, abridging its radically individualist edge and dismantling the unhealthy race to the bottom between jurisdictions worldwide, each captured by legal and financial service providers, either resident or foreign.