Alison L Young is a Fellow at Hertford College and teaches Constitutional law, Administrative law, Media law and Comparative Public law.
She studied Law and French at the University of Birmingham, before coming to Hertford College, obtaining the BCL and a DPhil. She was a tutor in law and a Fellow of Balliol College from 1997 to 2000, before returning to Hertford as a Fellow and Tutor in law in October 2000.
She researches in applied constitutional theory, public law and human rights. She is the author of Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act (Hart, 2009). She held a Leverhulme Research Fellowship from 2013-2015, using this to enable her to work part-time whilst writing her second book Citizen Engaged?: Democratic Dialogue and the Consitution (forthcoming: OUP 2016).
- The Chapter examines Lord Hoffmann's contribution to public law, arguing that his main contribution was the way in which he approached public law purposively and specifically, as opposed to applying axiomatic and general rules. The chapter then evalutes this approach to public law, arguing that, although generally this is a favourable approach for public law, this may be problematic when applied to key constitutional foundational priniciples of public law.ISBN: 9781849465915Case Comment on HS2.DOI: 10.1093/ojls/gqu004ISBN: 9781849461245ISBN: 9780199670024This chapter investigates whether Parliament should be able to bind its successors as to the manner and form in which it enacts legislation. First, it evaluates the argument of Jeffrey Goldsworthy that this should be so, provided that these restrictions do not restrict the substantive law-making powers of Parliament. It argues that Goldsworthys theory may be difficult to implement in practice, and that his aim of empowering Parliament to enact long-standing commitments could be achieved more clearly without creating practical difficulties, or requiring a change in the conception of sovereignty. Second, it provides a normative justification against empowering Parliament to bind its successors. Goldsworthys theory can be understood as an argument in favour of maximising the sovereignty of Parliament, where sovereignty is understood as unlimited law-making power. The chapter adopts a different focus, looking at the extent to which sovereignty entails the ability to determine the sphere of ones own competences. It argues that, when understood in this light, it is more descriptively accurate and normatively justifiable to regard sovereignty as shared between Parliament and the courts. To empower Parliament to bind its successors is normatively undesirable as it could upset the delicate balance of powers in the UK constitution, where acceptance by Parliament and the courts is required to enable a change in the rules regarding the definition of Parliament and the manner in which legislation is enacted. This requirement facilitates legitimacy, ensuring that the long-standing commitments that Parliament wishes to preserve reflect the long-standing commitments shared by the people and the courts.ISBN: 9780199684069ISBN: 9780199684069DOI: 10.1093/icon/mor028This article is a response to the contributions of Nick Barber and Trevor Allan found in this volume. It argues that an analysis of sovereignty does serve a useful purpose in U.K. constitutional law. More specifically, it argues that discussions of sovereignty should also include an analysis of constitutive rules, particularly aiming to understand which institutions are sovereign in the sense of having the power to define and modify these constitutive rules. When analysed in this manner, an argument can be made that Dicey's traditional theory that Parliament cannot bind its successors is still a valid rule of the English legal system. In addition, this rule is desirable. Its presence is necessary, although not sufficient, to ensure that both Parliament and the courts have a rule in defining and modifying constitutive rules. This dual role is desirable as it helps to maintain the legitimacy of the U.K.s political constitution.Am examination of the different forms ways in which human rights may have horizontal effect and their relationship to the way in which human rights law may have an impact on private law.ISBN: 9781107009325Introduction to a book on the impact of the HRA on private law. The book sets out the main issues of discussion and themes running through this area of the law.ISBN: 9781107009325The chapter explains and evaluates the different ways in which courts are bound to follow decisions of the ECtHR. It evaluates the role of section 2(1) HRA 1998, as well as analysing the extent to which courts should follow decisions of the ECtHR as opposed to a binding precedent from a concurrent or higher court.ISBN: 9781107009325DOI: 10.1093/ojls/gqq028This review article discusses the relationship between deference and the presumption of constitutionality, as discussed in Brian Foleys book, Deference and the Presumption of Constitutionality. Foley argues for the rejection of the presumption of constitutionality as it operates in the Irish Constitution, proposing instead a due deference approach. This approach would require courts to give varying degrees of weight to the legislatures conclusions that particular legislative provisions are constitutional. The article praises Foleys book, particularly its stronger justification of due deference which focuses on its ability to foster a culture of justification which, in turn, facilitates popular sovereignty. The review also provides a criticism of the argument made in the book and discusses its application to the UK constitution. First, the review argues that the focus on constitutional as opposed to institutional factors to determine deference may, in practice, undermine Foleys justification of due deference. Second it argues that Foleys justification of deference may be best served in the UK constitution by a theory of democratic dialogue as opposed to the application of due deference.The doctrine of deference permeates human rights review. It plays a role in de¢ning Convention rights, in determining the nature of the proportionality test applied when analysing non-absolute rights, as well as in deciding the stringency of its application. The role of deference has recently been subjected to both judicial and academic criticism, some of which advocates the demise of the doctrine. This article develops a contextual account of deference that is justi¢ed for epistemic reasons, rather than reasons of relative authority. This conception is able to withstand current criticism and ismodest enough to play a role in a range of di¡erent justi¢cations and understandings of judicial review under theHuman Rights Act.The article then provides amore detailed account of deference, taking account of the relative institutional features of the legislature, executive and judiciary, without running the risk that the court fails to performits constitutional function of protecting individual rights.The Human Rights Act 1998 is criticised for providing a weak protection of human rights. The principle of parliamentary legislative supremacy prevents entrenchment, meaning that the courts cannot overturn legislation passed after the Act that contradicts Convention rights. This book investigates this assumption, arguing that the principle of parliamentary legislative supremacy is sufficiently flexible to enable a stronger protection of human rights, which can replicate the effect of entrenchment. Nevertheless, it is argued that the current protection should not be strengthened. If correctly interpreted, the Human Rights Act can facilitate democratic dialogue that enables courts to perform their proper correcting function to protect rights from abuse, whilst enabling the legislature to authoritatively determine contestable issues surrounding the extent to which human rights should be protected, alongside other rights, interests and goals in a particular society. This understanding of the Human Rights Act also provides a different justification for the preservation of Dicey's conception of parliamentary sovereignty in the UK Constitution.ISBN: 978-1-84113-830-5
She teaches Constitutional law, Administrative law, European Community law and European Community Competition law (and has previously taught Jurisprudence, Introduction to law and Land law).
Constitutional Theory, Human Rights, Public law and European Union law.
Options taughtAdministrative Law, Jurisprudence, European Union Law, Constitutional Law (Senior Status), Comparative Human Rights, Comparative Public Law