La autora crítica que España se niegue a extraditar a los acusados de torturas acogiéndose a la Ley de Amnistía. Destaca la paradoja de que fuera la Justicia española la que iniciara el proceso para juzgar a Pinochet
This article considers the limited charges and resulting limited judgment in the Lubanga case at the International Criminal Court. It considers what further steps the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers may have taken to ensure the full 'establishment of the truth', in the absence of new charges, or with a view to encouraging the Prosecutor to amend charges.
The House of Lords? decisions in the Pinochet case placed the United Kingdom at the forefront of developments on universal jurisdiction, particularly in respect of the recognition that there should be no immunity (ratione materiae) for the most egregious crimes under international law. Nonetheless, the practice of the UK ever since, calls into question the commitment of the Government to make any real progress at all. Aside from the important prosecution of Sarwar Zardad for torture and hostage taking, there is very little sign of commitment to universal jurisdiction, both in respect of criminal and civil cases. The continued ability of the Attorney General to disallow prosecutions on public policy grounds is highly problematic. Further, the few opportunities for victims to directly access justice by seeking an arrest warrant have not met with any success; and in fact the recent failure to implement the warrant in the case of Almog suggests outright obfuscation by the Government in order to avoid application of the law. In civil cases, immunities continue to be the principle stumbling blocks for potential claimants. Here too, the UK Government has taken a stance in direct opposition to such claims. Indeed in Ron Jones v. Saudi Arabia, the UK Government has intervened in support of the application of immunities in favor of the Saudi officials said to be responsible for the torture and the Saudi state itself.