Graeme Dinwoodie is the Professor of Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law at the University of Oxford. He is also Director of the Oxford Intellectual Property Research Centre, and a Professorial Fellow of St. Peter's College. He has held a number of visiting or honorary positions at leading universities, including most recently as the Yong Shook Lin Visiting Professor of Intellectual Property Law at the National University of Singapore, a Global Professor of Law at New York University School of Law, an Honorary Professor of Law at the University of Strasbourg, and the George P. Smith II Distinguished Visiting Chair at Indiana University Maurer School of Law. In 2016, he was appointed a University Professor at Chicago-Kent College of Law, where he had been a faculty member for several years prior to taking up the IP Chair at Oxford in 2009. He has also previously taught at the University of Cincinnati College of Law and University of Pennsylvania School of Law, and from 2005-2009 held a Chair in Intellectual Property Law at Queen Mary College, University of London. He teaches and writes in all aspects of intellectual property law, with an emphasis on the international and comparative aspects of the discipline. He is the author of five casebooks including Trademarks and Unfair Competition: Law and Policy (4th ed 2014) (with Janis), Trade Dress and Design Law (2010) (with Janis), and International Intellectual Property Law and Policy (2d ed. 2008) (with Hennessey, Perlmutter and Austin). Professor Dinwoodie's articles have appeared in several leading law reviews. He received the 2008 Ladas Memorial Award from the International Trademark Association for his article Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law (with Janis). Professor Dinwoodie has served as a consultant to the World Intellectual Property Organization on matters of private international law, as an Adviser to the American Law Institute Project on Principles on Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters, and as a Consultant to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development on the Protection of Traditional Knowledge. He is a past Chair of the Intellectual Property Section of the Association of American Law Schools and was the President of the International Association for the Advancement of Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property (ATRIP) from 2011-2013. Professor Dinwoodie was elected to the American Law Institute (ALI) in 2003, and in 2008 was awarded the Pattishall Medal for Excellence in Teaching Trademark and Trade Identity Law by the International Trademark Association. He currently serves as an Adviser on the ALI's project on the Restatement of Copyright Law. Prior to teaching, Professor Dinwoodie had been an associate with Sullivan and Cromwell in New York. Professor Dinwoodie holds a First Class Honors LL.B. degree from the University of Glasgow, an LL.M. from Harvard Law School, and a J.S.D. from Columbia Law School. He was the Burton Fellow in residence at Columbia Law School for 1988-89, working in the field of intellectual property law, and a John F. Kennedy Scholar at Harvard Law School for 1987-88.
- This chapter contributes to a book on the image of the consumer in EU law by exploring the role of the average consumer in European trade mark law. There is in fact a variable concept of the consumer within European trade mark law and the chapter first sets itself the task of mapping these variations. We suggest that for structural reasons European trade mark law may be compelled to work with a differentiated concept of the consumer. However these variations should be approached relationally, with an awareness of the points of difference and their basis. In particular, we suggest that most efforts by courts to identify or construct consumers and the marketplace they inhabit are blended exercises that are part-empirical and part-normative. Explicitly recognising this blend will, we believe, enable a richer debate about the role played by the consumer in European trade mark law and the evidence or considerations to which courts might have regard. It also allows us to explore whether trade mark law in Europe ought either to achieve its own objectives or to contribute to the broader European project to adopt an approach to the consumer that is more empirically or normatively grounded as required by the legal context and whether different national courts are (despite different methodological traditions that survive European harmonisation) converging on a common approach to the trade mark consumerThis response to Barton Beebe explores whether contemporary experience in Europe supports the central arguments advanced by Beebe in The Supressed Misappropriation Origins of Trademark Antidilution Law. The development of E.U. law is largely consistent with the idea that dilution law is in part an effort to install a misappropriation regime, at least insofar as the objects of protection are trademarks with a reputation (increasingly, a smaller caveat as the scope of potential trademark subject matter expands and the reputation threshold falls). This has important local consequences: if dilution law is in truth is a law against misappropriation, the Court of Justice of the European Union has greater scope to contribute to the creation of a nascent European law of unfair competition. But examining recent European case law also suggests that understanding misappropriation as part of a broader system of unfair competition may moderate the formalist critique of misappropriation as wholly indeterminate and unlimited. Understood in its unfair competition milieu, a misappropriation-based concept of dilution retains some potential for measured delineation of the edges of protection.In U.S. law, the term secondary liability is an umbrella term encompassing a number of different types of trademark infringement claim. Its essence is that liability does not turn on the defendant itself using the plaintiffs mark, but rather on the defendant being held responsible for the infringements occasioned by the use of the plaintiffs mark by a third party infringer. Secondary liability claims might be strategically preferable to trade mark owners over bringing actions against the primary infringer. The advent of the Internet has only enhanced some of these strategic benefits. However, secondary liability also creates the spectre of highly intrusive regulation of the business of intermediaries operating in the online environment. In these cases, we must balance the rights of the mark owner with enabling legitimate development of innovative technologies that allow new ways of trading in goods. The online context of many contemporary uses of marks has also, as in other areas of intellectual property law, prompted a demand for international solutions to the potential liability of online intermediaries for secondary trademark infringement. And indeed most countries have long recognised a cause of action for engaging in conduct that U.S. law would call secondary trade mark infringement. This Article assesses the international treatment of these causes of action, first by looking at international law principles conventionally understood, namely, state to state obligations regarding the content of domestic law. There is little of relevance to the secondary liability question if the international landscape is understood in those terms. Thus, the Article proceeds also to analyse commercial practices that are contributing to soft transnational law and to compare the regimes adopted by the United States and the European Union as leading examples of approaches to the secondary liability question. The Article focuses on parallel fact patterns that have been litigated to appellate level in a number of countries. Thus, the paradigmatic cases considered are (1) claims brought against online auction sites, each essentially alleging that the auction site could have done more to stop the sale of counterfeit and other allegedly infringing items by third parties on its web site; (2) claims brought against search engines alleging that the sale of keyword advertising consisting of the trademarks of parties other than the mark owner resulted in infringement (normally, by causing actionable confusion).ISBN: 978-0-19-966508-2This Chapter analyses one harmonisation project within European intellectual property law, namely, the recent development of trade mark law within the European Union (EU). It highlights several characteristics of trade mark harmonisation within the European Union. First, harmonisation of national trade mark laws in the Union has been tight. In this regard, for reasons that make sense in the European political and legal theatre, it is different from the international model of so-called minimum rights harmonisation that drove convergence of trade mark norms for the preceding century. Second, the Trade Mark Directive (with the aid of the Court of Justice and national courts) has effected almost total harmonisation of substantive trade mark law, belying the claims of limited harmonisation that are found in the recital to that Directive. Third, the Court of Justice has exhibited a tendency to limit any room for member state manoeuvre, for example, finding that even optional provisions of the Directive must be given a single European meaning. The Court has paid little attention to concerns of subsidiarity. Finally, additional pressure to find single European solutions results from the existence of a Trade Mark Regulation that creates a counterpart unitary regional right (the Community Trade Mark, or CTM) and attendant EU institutions to administer and enforce that right. This parallel EU-level regime tends to reinforce the idea that trade mark law has been wholly Europeanised, and exerts pressure on the content of Directive-driven national law because the demands of vertical coherence have trumped the potential benefits of regulatory competition between national and regional regimes. In short, there has over the past twenty years been an extensive and deep Europeanisation of trade mark law. But this in turn raises ongoing questions about how best to develop harmonised European principles, because harmonisation is a dynamic lawmaking process and not a static legislative instrument. In this Chapter, I consider how the process of harmonisation has affected the development of optimal principles of trade mark law, an analysis that is necessarily informed by substantive preferences. It is only by measuring harmonisation by reference to some form of substantive metric that a full assessment of the harmonisation process can be made. I suggest that it important to recognise the important role of national courts in the development of EU trade mark law (in part because of the nature of the field of law), and that paying attention to national legal traditions would assist the Court of Justice in improving the quality of European trade mark law.The TRIPS Agreement (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights), signed on April 15, 1994, introduced intellectual property protection into the World Trade Organization's multilateral trading system, and it remains the most comprehensive international agreement on intellectual property to date. A Neofederalist Vision of TRIPS by Graeme B. Dinwoodie and Rochelle C. Dreyfuss examines its interpretation, its impact on the creative environment, and its effect on national and international lawmaking. It propounds a vision of TRIPS as creating a neofederalist regime, one that will ensure the resilience of the international intellectual property system in time of rapid change. In this vision, WTO members retain considerable flexibility to tailor intellectual property law to their national priorities and to experiment with changes necessary to meet new technological and social challenges, but agree to operate within an international framework. This framework, while less powerful than the central administration of a federal government, comprises a series of substantive and procedural commitments that promote the coordination of both the present intellectual property system as well as future international intellectual property lawmaking. Part I demonstrates the centrality of state autonomy throughout the history of international negotiations over intellectual property. Part II, which looks at the present, analyzes the decisions of the WTO in intellectual property cases. It concludes that the WTO has been inattentive to the benefits of promoting cultural diversity, the values inherent in intellectual property, the rich fabric of its law and lore, the necessary balance between producers and users of knowledge goods, and the relationship between the law and the technological environment in which it must operate. Looking to the future, Part III develops a framework for integrating the increasingly fragmented international system and proposes the recognition of an international intellectual property acquis, a set of longstanding principles that have informed, and should continue to inform intellectual property lawmaking. The acquis would include both express and latent components of the international regime, put access-regarding guarantees such as user rights on a par with proprietary interests and enshrine the fundamental importance of national autonomy in the international system.ISBN: ISBN13: 978019530461These remarks to the 2008 ATRIP Annual Conference addressed the question of whether one size fits all in intellectual property law. Are there sufficient commonalities among the component parts of the field that we could realistically construct a unitary body of intellectual property law? I first set out the different inquiries that might be subsumed by the question of whether one size fits all in intellectual property law, focusing on the possibility of a single form of intellectual property, common treatment of different subject matter within regimes, and uniform intellectual property laws across borders. Focusing on this last aspect of the question, I note that the backwards-looking aspect of the classical international system, which tended to favor national autonomy and keep internationally-mandated levels of protection low, has been somewhat disrupted of late. Although it remains the case that one size does not fit all, there is much to be gained by seeking greater commonality. But if the focus of the current international system requires greater commonality greater attention to a one size fits all approach on certain issues -- it does so both with respect to the rights conferred on IP right holders and with respect to the new rights that might potentially be conferred on users.In 1879, the United States Supreme Court recognized that trade marks are a creature of the common law. Likewise, the English courts had long recognized causes of action that effectively protected marks prior to the enactment of statutes delineating the scope of trademark protection. The characterization of trade mark law as a field of common law may, however, now seem an essentially historical statement. In the United States, the early twentieth century saw the adoption of a series of federal trademark registration statutes, and in 1946 Congress enacted even more comprehensive trademark legislation, namely the Lanham Act. Since then, Congress, has episodically - but with increasing frequency - revised the trademark statute. In light of such increased statutorification of trade mark law, what is the continued role of the common law in developing appropriate protection for trade marks? In this chapter, I recount the development of the common law of trade marks, highlighting the background developments outside trademark law that influenced the allocation of trademark lawmaking authority over the course of the twentieth century. The historical importance of these external influences suggests that trademark law will not be immune to changes in contemporary judicial philosophy that have made some scholars fearful about the room for further common law development. However, a brief review of recent Congressional activity and Supreme Court opinions in the field suggests that, despite substantial legislative intervention, both Congress and the Supreme Court appear content that the development of trademark and unfair competition law in the United States remain a partnership between the two institutions, and thus heavily dependent on common law lawmaking by the courts.ISBN: 9781841139708This chapter comments on a paper by the linguist Alan Durant, who demonstrates that our understanding of the distinction between idea and expression in the context of literary works is far from perfect and could be enriched by drawing on a number of insights from other fields, and in particular from linguistic theory. In this brief response, I consider whether and how a fuller understanding of those features might be accommodated in the adjudication of legal disputes about copyright infringement.In recent years, intellectual property law has paid increasing attention to issues of private international law. The American Law Institute promulgated Intellectual Property: Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judgments in Transnational Dispute in 2008. In Europe, the Max Planck Institutes Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property Conflicts of Law effort is expected in 2010. However, neither of these projects has dealt explicitly with choice of law on contributory liability (or any other form of secondary liability that makes one party liable for the harm caused by another). Yet, actions premised on secondary liability are rapidly becoming the favored route for efficient enforcement on a worldwide basis. Examples include cases that attempt to impose liability on manufacturers of copying technologies for infringements caused by those who use their equipment; on purveyors of peer-to-peer file sharing software for the activities of those who download material without rightholders permissions; on internet service providers for subscriberss infringing postings; and on other intermediaries, such as auction sites. In principle, secondary liability actions can occur in all areas of intellectual property law. However, for purposes of this paper, we concentrate on trademark cases, such as the litigation involving the responsibility of the online auction house, e-Bay, for the sale of counterfeit goods on its website. The problems posed in that area are particularly complex. After offering a stylized fact pattern to illustrate the problems, we consider the different ways in which courts might deal with questions arising in cases where secondary liability claims are asserted. We suggest that the traditional approach to choice of law in trademark cases generates unacceptable uncertainties for intermediaries and that a genuine engagement with conflicts scholarship would help mediate among the diverse interests and policy concerns. In the end, however, we conclude that private international law solutions may not resolve all the complications of multinational secondary liability cases. Thus, we are moved to propose, as an alternative solution, an autonomous (substantive) principle applicable in these cases. We conclude with some thoughts about how the different approaches engage with existing models for the resolution of trans-border intellectual property disputes and with the international intellectual property regime more generally.ISBN: 0028-7873The first student text to offer an integrated treatment of the forms of intellectual property protection available for trade dress and designs.ISBN: 9780735568327ISBN: 978-0-7355-9486-9Trademark law contains important limits that place a range of third party conduct beyond the control of the trademark owner. However, I suggest that trademark law would be better served if several of its limits were explicitly conceptualized as defenses to an action for infringement, that is, as rules permitting unauthorized uses of marks even where such uses implicate the affirmative concerns of trademark law and thus support a prima facie cause of action by the trademark owner. To explore why this distinction between limits and defenses matters, I discuss the different nature of the proscription imposed by copyright and trademark law. And I draw lessons both from case law deriving limits from interpretation of the proscription of trademark law as well as from the development of statutory defenses to dilution. Conceiving of limits as defenses would help ensure that the (often unstated) values underlying socially desirable third party uses are not too readily disregarded if they happen to conflict with confusion-avoidance concerns that are historically powerful drivers of trademark protection. Such an approach would also ameliorate the uncertainties caused by the acceptance of extended (and increasingly amorphous) notions of actionable harm in trademark law. And it would facilitate a more transparent debate about the different forms that limits on trademark rights might take. Some defenses will operate as mechanisms by which to balance competing policy concerns on a case-by-case basis, while others (reflecting more fundamental normative commitments, or driven by more proceduralist concerns) might allow certain values categorically to trump the basic policy concerns supporting liability for trademark infringement. Full development of these defenses will involve courts adopting a conscious understanding of the different jurisprudential nature of defenses and will be made easier by acceptance of the Lanham Act as a delegating statute.ISBN: 1557-6582Although intellectual property law is a relatively recent legal innovation, it has from an early stage in its development possessed an international dimension. As far back as the late nineteenth century, this resulted in the adoption of a group of multinational treaties that remain the foundation of what can be called the public international law of intellectual property. Efforts to develop a private international law of intellectual property are much more recent, and are ongoing in a number of different institutional settings. Yet, the need for attention to this field remains acute. This Article explores the content of a private international law of intellectual property. It does not seek to articulate a comprehensive scheme. Rather, this exploration is intended to facilitate consideration of the core principle of territoriality that informs so much of the existing regime. The Article sketches the basic principles of private international law that apply in transborder intellectual property disputes, examining treaty provisions and developments at the national and regional level. Some of the leading questions are highlighted by discussion of six recent transborder intellectual property disputes. These disputes help to illustrate aspects of cross-border exploitation of intellectual property that need to be taken into account both in critiquing current approaches and in formulating alternatives. The Article then turns to focus on the concept of territoriality. Territoriality is a principle that has always received excessive doctrinal purchase in intellectual property law. Moreover, the normative force of the principle has declined as units of social and commercial organization have come to correspond less neatly with national borders, and as private ordering has weakened the capacity (and perhaps the claim) of the nation-state exclusively to determine the behavior of its citizenry. Finally, many of the same values (for example, diversity of legal regimes, tailoring of intellectual property to local needs, and protecting rights on an international basis) that the public international intellectual property system sought to further through its promulgation of the principle of territoriality can now best (and perhaps only) be achieved by reconfiguring the principle. This Article approaches the task of reconfiguration in two ways. First, it explores some of the different ways in which the principle of territoriality might conceptually inform a private international law of intellectual property. Contemporary multi-territorial intellectual property disputes are characterized by an excess of shared but weaker prescriptive and adjudicatory authority. The Article suggests a restrained concept of territoriality that reflects that reality, drawing in particular from the treatment of extra-territoriality in trademark law. The Article also approaches the question less conceptually and proposes liberalization of a specific principle of private international intellectual property law: limits on consolidated adjudication of infringement claims under domestic and foreign intellectual property laws.ISBN: 0043-5589In recent years, it has become clear that the TRIPS regime is in trouble. Although lawmaking in the World Trade Organization (WTO) has essentially stalled, there is a continuing need to recalibrate the rules applicable to knowledge production. In theory, the problems facing WTO members could be resolved through new lawmaking within that institution. For a variety of reasons, however, this has not materialized. The WTOs adjudicatory system has compensated somewhat for the lack of activity in the Ministerial Conference and the General Council. But for a number of reasons, it is not a substitute for a well-functioning legislative body. Indeed, some of the activity in this field has shifted back from the WTO to the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO). Although this regulatory competition might currently be leading to a suboptimal global regime, the move to WIPO is intriguing. It suggests an institutional design that could make the international intellectual property system more responsive to changing needs. Indeed, the TRIPS Agreement contemplates a formal tie between the WTO and WIPO. Unfortunately, however, the nature of the lawmaking relationship between these two organizations has yet to be fully elucidated. TRIPS incorporates provisions of two WIPO instruments (the Paris and Berne Conventions), and references others. Still, it is not evident whether (or how) the WTO should be taking account of WIPOs view of these commitments. Nor is it clear how (or when) new developments within these conventions should affect WTO obligations. This essay takes up the institutional design question of how to create an intellectual property system responsive to changing circumstances by examining how the WTO can best make use of WIPOs experience and expertise in intellectual property matters. After considering the intellectual property cases decided to date by the WTO dispute settlement body and determining the ways in which they have relied on the text and negotiating histories of, and other materials relevant to, WIPO conventions to elucidate TRIPS obligations, we suggest some revisions to interpretive approaches pursued thus far by dispute settlement panels. We point out methodologies that would leaven and cabin the trade perspective, and thus allow the WTO to capitalize on WIPOs experience and on WIPO developments that cope with the dynamic nature of intellectual property and the changing landscape of knowledge production. Our analysis is also meant for broader application, for developing a design that permits productive input from all the international institutions that have interests touching on intellectual property norm development.This contribution to an inter-disciplinary book on Trademarks and Brands responds to the work of Alan Durant, a linguist who (in his chapter of the book) provides legal scholars with both a rich understanding of how linguists view terms that are part of the basic argot of trademark law and a potentially vital explanation of the different social functions that word marks might serve. The Response explains why linguistics should matter to trademark law, but also why trademark law might on occasion ignore the precise reality of consumer understanding as might be provided by linguistics. I suggest that, while trademark law should not become beholden to linguistics, the lessons of Durant?s linguistic analysis are to some extent already accommodated in the practice of trademark law, and could be important guides in the further development of a number of legal principles. In particular, I explain how trademark law does in large part take into consideration Durant?s observation that legal analysis would comport more with the reality of how words function if it focused on marks as they are used. The Chapter also argues that Durant?s exploration of the concepts of ?distinctiveness? and ?descriptiveness?, as understood by lawyers and linguists, respectively, should reinforce important lessons for legal scholars about the complex policy prescriptions embodied in those concepts. Finally, I argue that particular insights developed by Durant from the field of linguistics may prove valuable in illuminating several points of contention in contemporary trademark law. In particular, Durant stresses that determining whether a defendant?s use has evoked the source-identifying aspect of plaintiff?s mark, as opposed to the descriptive properties of that term, can only be done by analyzing the ?discourse ?setting? in which interpretations are constructed.? Thus, although the type of use should be relevant to assessing infringement, any analysis of use type must be highly contextualized. This insight should inform the choice of doctrinal vehicles by which trademark law establishes limits on the scope of protection.The WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) recognized the need to maintain a balance between the rights of authors and the larger public interest in updating copyright law in light of advances in information and communications technologies. But the translation of this balance into the domestic laws of the United States and European Union has not been fully successful. In the DMCA, Congress achieved a reasonable balance of competing interests in its creation of safe harbors for internet service providers. However, contrary to its apparent intention, Congress failed to achieve a similar balance of interests when establishing new rules forbidding circumvention of technical protection measures (TPMs) used by copyright owners to control access to and use of their works. The EU Copyright Directive spoke of a commitment to ensuring that certain public interest uses can be made of technically protected works but contains limits that seemingly undermine this commitment. As a result, national implementations of the Copyright Directive have not adequately facilitated public interest uses of technically protected content.
We believe that practical judicial and administrative measures can and should be devised to implement the spirit of the WCT in both the U.S. and EU without reopening the contentious debates that engulfed the process leading up to enactment of the DMCA and the EU Copyright Directive. To this end, we propose adoption of a ?reverse notice and takedown? procedure to help achieve some of the balance in anti-circumvention rules that the WCT endorsed, but which implementing legislation has thus far failed to deliver. Under this regime, users would be able to give copyright owners notice of their desire to make public interest uses of technically protected copyrighted works, and rights holders would have the responsibility to take down the TPMs or otherwise enable these lawful uses.
A reverse notice and takedown regime would achieve for the anti-circumvention rules a comparable symmetry with the balance embedded in the ISP safe harbor rules. It would also effectuate the nascent, but not fully realized, legislative intent to permit public interest uses of technically protected digital content, while at the same time protecting copyright owners against circumvention of TPMs that would facilitate or lead to massive infringements. In the U.S., the most likely way to achieve this goal is through judicial interpretation of the anti-circumvention rules through case by case adjudication. In the EU, by contrast, member states could implement a reverse notice and takedown regime in the course of fulfilling their obligations under Article 6(4) of the Copyright Directive, which requires them to ensure that users of technically protected works can exercise certain public interest exceptions. Nations that have yet to implement the WCT may find our proposed reverse notice and takedown regime provides a far more balanced way to comply with the treaty than the approach being promoted by U.S. trade negotiators.National copyright policy, traditionally reflective of domestic cultural and economic priorities, is increasingly shaped by foreign and international influences. In this chapter, I sketch some of the changes in copyright lawmaking that have given rise to this phenomenon. Especially when viewed in historical context, foreign and international influence on the development of copyright law is now quite pervasive ? albeit in ways, and effected through a number of institutions, that might appear surprising.Although part of the political impetus for international intellectual property law making has long come from the economic gains that particular countries could secure in the global market, the recent situation of intellectual property within the institutional apparatus of the trade regime has been an important factor in the transformation of the classical system of international intellectual property law. This chapter analyses various aspects of this transformation. It suggests that viewing intellectual property through the prism of trade alone offers an incomplete explanation of the changes that have occurred in international intellectual property law making. For example, a full account of the contemporary system must reflect the role of both litigation in national courts and private ordering by commercial actors in establishing international intellectual property norms. This chapter stresses that these new contributors to the international system must be subject to no lesser scrutiny than traditional public international instruments such as treaties. The chapter also discusses the increasingly quick resort to international institutions in the field of intellectual property law. To ameliorate the costs associated with the speedy development of international rules, and perhaps to ensure that some international solution is adopted, policy makers have begun more overtly to support the adoption of soft law norms rather than hard law treaty obligations. In response, those skeptical of these trends in international intellectual property law making have sought to slow down the process or bring it to a complete halt. In order to achieve a political climate where public international law imposes fewer constraints on national law makers (particularly law makers in developing countries), skeptics have adopted a number of strategies, including the multiplication of international institutions in which intellectual property is considered, and the concomitant development of a range of rival norms that have massively complicated the political economy of public international intellectual property law. Using examples drawn primarily from copyright and trademark law, I illustrate the pressure to accelerate internationalization, the varying strength of adopted norms, and the changes to the political climate in which public international law making is occurring. To some extent, these changes reflect increased political and popular attention to trade and development. However, regardless of the catalyst, these systemic changes remain crucially important to trade and development because of the entanglement of intellectual property with trade and development policy.This contribution to a symposium on the tenth anniversary of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (now published with a 2010 postscript) suggests that the WIPO Copyright Treaty represented a watershed moment in international copyright law for two reasons. First, it was in the 1996 Diplomatic Conference that one begins to see the most widespread explicit discussion of the concept of balance being integral to international instruments. Second, the WCT was a watershed moment for international copyright law in that the process that led up to the conclusion of the two internet treaties (both the WCT and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty) and the conduct of the diplomatic conference at which they were considered were quite different in several respects from that which had been seen heretofore. In particular, on some of the issues addressed in the treaty, the contracting states relied much less extensively on prior national experimentation than had been the norm in prior copyright agreements. Moreover, the 1996 Diplomatic Conference was populated by a wide range of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in numbers never before seen at international copyright events. And (perhaps because of these first two changes in process), the debates that took place nationally and internationally were substantially assimilated. These features of the process that led to the WCT remain with us today. This brief essay addresses both the concept of balance and these changes to the lawmaking process. On the question of balance, I suggest that balance is a much more complicated concept than we assume. Even in the domestic environment, the phrase is used somewhat too glibly. But in the international context, it becomes even more complex. In particular, we need to take into account the multidimensional nature of balance (or what I call the various vectors of balance) before we try to insert internal substantive balance directly into treaty instruments. This is true whether we are talking about new authors rights or the development of users rights. I am also concerned by some aspects of the changes that occurred to the lawmaking process in 1996. In particular, there is often a failure to appreciate fully the difference between national lawmaking and international lawmaking. To be sure, in a dynamic, integrated lawmaking process, one is a constituent part of the other; that is, national lawmaking contributes to international lawmaking and vice versa. But these processes involve distinct institutions with different functions, and with different democratic and political structures; those urging further reform of international copyright law need to be aware of these differences.This paper tackles an intellectual property theory that many scholars regard as fundamental to future policy debates over the scope of trademark protection: the trademark use theory. We argue that trademark use theory is flawed and should be rejected. The adoption of trademark use theory has immediate practical implications for disputes about the use of trademarks in online advertising, merchandising, and product design, and has long-term consequences for other trademark generally. We critique the theory both descriptively and prescriptively. We argue that trademark use theory over-extends the search costs rationale for the trademark system, and that it unhelpfully elevates formalism over contextual analysis in trademark law rulemaking. The theory seeks determinate trademark rules in order to encourage a climate of certainty for innovators, but the concepts on which it is founded are likely to degenerate. We show that trademark use theorists ignores the multivalence of trademark law, and that adopting trademark use doctrines would result in less transparent trademark decisionmaking. Instead, we propose that trademark law retain its traditional preference for contextual analysis. We show in particular how a contextual analysis would offer an approach to trademark disputes involving online advertising that better captures the potential of trademark law to police new information markets. Our analysis contemplates individualized assessments according to common law standards, but opens up policy space for the development of limited statutory safe harbors for intermediaries such as search engines.This contribution to a symposium on Copyright and The Constitution considers whether the Treaty Clause provides an alternative source of copyright lawmaking authority with respect to enactments impermissible under the Copyright Clause. Existing literature suggests three paradigmatic positions on the question. First, some scholars view the Treaty Clause as conferring a power whose content is wholly subservient to the limits of the Copyright Clause. A second group of scholars sees the Treaty Clause as offering an alternative lawmaking authority, but one that is substantially limited by the internal limits of the Treaty Clause. Finally, some commentators and litigants have read the Treaty Clause as an expansive autonomous lawmaking power that is largely unconstrained by internal limits and wholly unconstrained by the external limits found in the Copyright Clause. This paper adopts none of the three paradigmatic positions. I argue that those seeking to make the Treaty Clause subservient to the Copyright Clause both overstate the constitutional weight of the Copyright Clause and underestimate the autonomous role of the Treaty Clause in the American governmental structure. By the same token, however, the argument that the Treaty Clause should operate wholly unaffected by the limits in the Copyright Clause rests on a vision of the Treaty Clause that fails to acknowledge the multitude of ways through which international law and policy influences and informs domestic American copyright law. Support for autonomous lawmaking authority under the Treaty Clause must be tempered by the contemporary political reality that international processes may simply be an inappropriate end-run around the limits of Copyright Clause authority rather than occasional operation of an independent and different political process. And because of the entanglement between domestic and international lawmaking that now characterizes the copyright lawmaking process, reliance upon the traditional internal limits of the Treaty Clause will prove largely unavailing. The only way to make the restrictions on the Treaty Clause real is to develop a jurisprudence of judicial policing that reflects both the policy values that support the autonomy of the Treaty Clause and the realities of the contemporary copyright lawmaking process. Thus, I suggest that courts faced with reviewing copyright laws reliant upon the Treaty Clause for their constitutional legitimacy examine a matrix of at least three variables: (1) the strength of the international obligation with which domestic actors seek to comply; (2) the political process by which international norms are adopted and expressed in U.S. law; and (3) the limits in the Copyright Clause that the challenged law allegedly violates.Although the technological community was once fairly united in its needs from the patent system, the recent debate over patent reform has made it clear that this is no longer the case. Rather, it has become increasingly difficult to believe that a one?size?fits?all approach to patent law can survive. In this brief contribution to a symposium tackling Diversity in Innovation Policy, we consider the ways in which intellectual property obligations, most notably the TRIPS Agreement, circumscribe the ability of national lawmakers to tailor patent protection to reflect the concerns of different industries. In particular, we propose that TRIPS art. 27, which is cast in terms of nondiscrimination, should be interpreted to permit ?differential treatment.? First, we argue that in other areas, treating different cases differently is not always invidious discrimination. Second, we note that many of the proposals for tailoring are not aimed at the nominal legal rights created by patent law, but rather at the economic effects of these patents, a distinction of significance in the WTO?s Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents case. Finally, we suggest that member states claiming de facto discrimination should be required to demonstrate some element over and above those required to establish de iure discrimination, and that member states defending an exclusion should be permitted to rebut a showing of disparate treatment by demonstrating a legitimate purpose. While decision makers will need to evaluate the relation between the stated purpose and the means chosen, this analysis would permit members to adopt most of the tailoring initiatives discussed during the Symposium. We give weight to the normative claims of the TRIPS Agreement to facilitate and enhance free trade. But we think that industry?specific patent laws are fully consistent with the language and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement as well as the comparative advantage philosophy that undergirds the modern trade regime.In their response to our article Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, Professors Dogan and Lemley discard more all-encompassing versions of the trademark use requirement. Instead, they seek to delineate and defend a ?more surgical form? of trademark use doctrine. In this reply, we demonstrate that the language of the Lanham Act does not impose a trademark use requirement even when that requirement is defined ?surgically? and sections 32 and 43(a) are read ?fluidly,? as Dogan and Lemley suggest. Moreover, their interpretation still renders section 33(b)(4) redundant and unduly limits appropriate common law development of trademark law. We also address Dogan and Lemley?s additional normative arguments for deploying trademark use to shield defendants from even potential liability for various commercial uses of marks, especially in connection with online contextual advertising. We disagree that contributory infringement doctrine necessarily provides sufficient oversight of the presentation of search results or advertising sales practices; that marginalizing trademark law will best encourage intermediaries to structure their business arrangements in ways that promote reliable information flow; and that offline analogies should necessarily direct the outcomes of trademark disputes over online practices. Our disagreements with Dogan and Lemley on these points also highlight broader differences about methodological approaches to trademark law. In particular, our distaste for limiting the potential scope of the Lanham Act reveals our greater willingness to see trademark and unfair competition law as a market regulator. Relatedly, we are more firmly committed to judicial development of both potential liability and potential defenses; Dogan and Lemley want courts to focus only on the latter.In this book chapter, we look at the effect of commodification on scientific and technological, as opposed to cultural, activity. After discussing the nature of the commodification debate and the constraints unique to scientific and technological production, we explore ways in which the domain of accessible knowledge could be reconstituted. In our discussion of these strategies, we draw on previous work in which we analyzed (1) various substantive methods for curbing perceived encroachments on the public domain to see how each would fare if challenged under the TRIPS Agreement, and (2) the relationship between the dynamics of domestic legislative procedures and TRIPS dispute resolution outcomes. In this piece, we continue our examination of the domestic efficacy and TRIPS compatibility of substantive alterations to the patent system: strengthening the nonobviousness (inventive step) requirement; narrowing the scope of patent claims; and recognizing new occasions in which the government may use patented inventions without authorization (but with payment).
As in our other pieces, our purpose is not to predict the outcome of future disputes - there are far too few WTO precedents for that. Rather, our goal is to explore how the interpretive approaches pursued at the international level affect the ability of TRIPS members to keep their laws attuned to the developments and needs of science.
We argue that under certain interpretations of TRIPS, a variety of prophylactic substantive steps to protect the domain of accessible scientific knowledge could be taken, that each has a different pay-off as a matter of domestic policy, but that the there is little relationship between the strength of the obstacle posed by TRIPS and the impact of the approach on innovation. Furthermore, we see reason to worry that the analytical tools utilized to date carry a strong potential for altering the political economies of member states in ways that create a one-way ratchet in favor of increased commodification.
We conclude that a map of the public domain of the type charted by Pam Samuelson must do more than consider the effects of various domestic laws and policies because the international system (as currently administered) shapes the legal landscape on which individual nations are operating. To alter that landscape, patent strategists should consider a variety of approaches. But we suggest that it may be particularly fruitful to adapt the rhetoric of scholars seeking to promote the public domain in domestic copyright law. The differences we see in the commodification debate may not, after all, reflect genuine differences between cultural and technological production. Rather, it may be that copyright scholars better appreciate the value in framing the public's interest as a right to access.At a seminar organized by UNCTAD and the Government of India in 2002, participants considered how evolving national systems for the protection of traditional knowledge could be supported or augmented by international measures adopted at the regional or global level. The need for solutions on the international level has been discussed in a number of fora. Yet, the effective protection of the holders of traditional knowledge requires that these discussions move in some way toward implementation of working systems of protection.
This short paper, commissioned by UNCTAD for a conference in February 2004, and to be republished in a book on traditional knowledge, focuses on framework, or structural, issues, rather than on the substantive elements of sui generis systems for the protection of traditional knowledge. It considers the extent to which proponents must articulate the need for a completely new paradigm, or whether instead they can point to historical antecedents in the intellectual property system.
The principal impetus for the paper is the proposal of the Indian government that international law require the disclosure of the country of origin of genetic resources and related traditional knowledge in patent applications (and require compliance with the laws of the country of origin). This proposal is essentially an attempt to derogate from the principle of territoriality that pervades and is at the root of, international intellectual property law. That principle is most resolutely advocated and enforced in the patent context. In contrast, international trademark (and geographical indications) law - while firmly based upon the same general principle - has in several respects developed exceptions to that principle. These exceptions might provide the source for a range of options that countries might consider as the model for a system of traditional knowledge protection that likewise moves away from the principle of territoriality. An historical analysis of where resistance to such developments has been most acute in the field of trademark and geographical indications might also provide guidance to those seeking to construct an approach to traditional knowledge that encounters less resistance.
The paper conceptualizes the different departures from territoriality in trademark law and thus suggests analogous devices for the protection of traditional knowledge that could be developed along the lines suggested by the Indian government. This helps to identify the structural variables that countries should consider in fashioning a traditional knowledge regime that eschews a rigid commitment to territoriality.International intellectual property norms are now being developed by a wide range of institutions - some national, some international, and some that do not fit neatly into either category; by bodies designed to address intellectual property; by trade and other bodies; and by actors public, private, and indeterminate. This new wave of international norm creation not only augments a growing body of substantive norms but also raises difficult structural questions about the future development of the international intellectual property system. This essay, a lecture delivered to the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law in 2004, is being reprinted as part of a symposium on ?TRIPS after ten years.?Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co. may be the Supreme Court's most versatile and influential trademark decision. Justice Brandeis' opinion contained language that is now at the core of the statutory test for whether a term should be unprotected because consumers understand the term as the generic name for the product on which it is used. That same language guides courts seeking to determine whether a mark has acquired the degree of secondary meaning necessary to support trademark protection. Plaintiffs seeking to establish trademark rights in a product shape must demonstrate that the shape in question is not "functional" according to a standard that has its roots in Kellogg. And defendants seeking to parry claims that the design of their product is confusingly similar to the design of a once-patented product habitually invoke Kellogg to support a competitor's right to copy the subject matter of an expired patent.
The scope of Kellogg's influence might, at first blush, seem surprising. The Court was confronted by a relatively narrow issue of trademark and unfair competition law, and to a large extent was revisiting an issue it had decided forty years earlier. The Court's opinion was also quite short. To understand its significance, one must be aware of the full range of philosophical reasons that motivated Justice Brandeis, including opposition for broad intellectual property rights, a concern for competition, and support for a misrepresentation-based model of unfair competition law. And one must also delve into the intense commercial rivalry in the cereal industry - a rivalry conducted by an odd mix of evangelists armed with even odder theories about nutrition and health.
Ultimately, because a variety of rationales were offered by the Court for a conclusion upon which most would agree, the precise scope of the opinion has never been fully clear. These (perhaps purposeful) ambiguities might have prevented the opinion contributing to the clear development of areas of law that were directly addressed by the Kellogg Court. This partially explains the irony that the current Supreme Court has cited Kellogg in a number of trademark cases for a series of different propositions, but did not cite the case in the most recent effort to tackle the very question at issue in Kellogg (the scope of trademark protection for a product covered by an expired patent).
By the same token, however, Justice Brandeis' quiet efforts to supply a more fundamental (and long-term) statement about the philosophy of trademark and unfair competition law may have allowed the opinion to achieve significance, both judicially and legislatively, well beyond the narrow context of the type of case the Court was deciding. And those efforts to articulate a philosophy for trademark and unfair competition law, which do not spring as obviously from the text of the Kellogg opinion, but instead are more readily apparent from historical context, may also be important in the years ahead as scholars and policymakers consider whether trademark law has inappropriately become a law against misappropriation.The TRIPS Agreement can be read to reflect a static view of the structure of intellectual property law. In this paper, we address whether - and how - the TRIPS Agreement can be interpreted to give it more fluidity, and thus to allow adjustments in national intellectual property regimes designed to reflect the dynamic nature of information production. To focus that inquiry, we concentrate on efforts to ensure a broader public domain for "upstream" inventions by modifying various elements of US patent law. The paper considers three stylized examples and asks whether each approach could be adopted by the United States without falling afoul of the TRIPS Agreement, as it is currently understood. Our purpose is to identify interpretive approaches that allow member states to keep their laws attuned to the developments and needs of science. In so doing, we also raise broader questions regarding the level of formalism generated by the WTO dispute settlement system, and the extent to which the TRIPS Agreement allocates power between supranational and national institutions, and between international and national laws.International intellectual property norms are now being developed by a wide range of institutions - some national, some international, and some that do not fit neatly into either category; by bodies designed to address intellectual property; by trade and other bodies; and by actors public, private, and indeterminate. This new wave of international norm creation not only augments a growing body of substantive norms but also raises difficult structural questions about the future development of the international intellectual property system. This essay, a lecture delivered to the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law in 2004, is being reprinted as part of a symposium on ?TRIPS after ten years.?The TRIPS Agreement can be read to reflect a static view of the structure of intellectual property law. In this paper, we address wither - and how - the TRIPS Agreement can, on the other hand, be read with more fluidity, and thus to allow adjustments in national intellectual property regimes designed to reflect the the dynamic nature of information production. To focus that inquiry, we concentrate on efforts to ensure a broader public domain for 'upstream' inventions by modifying various elements of US patent law. The paper considers three stylized examples and asks whether each approach could be adopted by the United States without falling afoul of the TRIPS Agreement as it is currently understood. Our purpose is to identify interpretive approaches that allow member states to keep their laws attuned to the development and needs of science. But in so doing, we also raise broader questions regarding the level of formalism generated by the WTO dispute settlement system, and the extent to which the TRIPS Agreement allocates power between supranational and national institutions, and between international and national laws.International copyright law must be based on an assessment of what types and levels of protection best further the purposes of copyright law. But constructing the international copyright regime is difficult as the international system must wrestle with copyright dilemmas that exist at the national level as well as broader challenges facing international law. This paper delineates the connection between international copyright law and the generation and distribution of knowledge by discussing two recent examples of (possible) unconventional international copyright rulemaking, namely, norms generated by Internet Service Providers in responding to infringement claims, and norms arising out of digital rights management systems (JEL: K 29).It is an axiomatic principle of domestic and international trademark law that trademarks and trademark law are territorial. This paper critiques the principle of territoriality in four ways. First, I suggest that statements about trademark territoriality mask a variety of related propositions. In disaggregating the "principle of territoriality" into its component parts, it becomes apparent that different rules of trademark law possess a territorial character for different reasons. For example, common law trademark rights are territorial because the intrinsic purpose of trademark law suggests extending (and limiting) rights to the geographic reach of goodwill. In contrast, registration systems designed to promote economic expansion derive their territorial character from their grounding in economic policymaking, effected by institutions that focus on the regulation or development of discrete economic regions. And rules regarding the enforcement of trademark rights assume their territorial quality because of their connection to political institutions with territorially defined sovereignty. Thus, some aspects of territoriality are rooted in social and commercial practices that dictate the reach of a brand, while other aspects are a function of political or policymaking authority. In an era of global trade and digital communication, social and commercial practices are less territorially confined and less commensurate with the nation-state. But economic policymaking and political institutions may prove more resistant to change than social or commercial behavior.
Second, I argue that although the principle of trademark territoriality has nominally remained constant since the conclusion of the Paris Convention, recent developments at both the national and international level suggest that the principle may have a different intensity today. Third, the paper begins an investigation of the ways in which the principle of territoriality should be revisited in light of the globalization of markets and concomitant changes in modern marketing practices. Although the multidimensional nature of the territoriality principle suggests that an overarching reconfiguration would be unwise and perhaps impossible, some shared dilemmas can be derived from analysis of discrete rules. If the territorial character of a rule reflects the intrinsic purpose of trademark law and is thus rooted in social practices that are already in flux, the character of these doctrines will almost inevitably mutate as the notion of territoriality evolves in line with social change. Such revisions will swim with the current of socially constructed territoriality. If, however, the territoriality of a doctrine instead mirrors the national nature of economic and political institutions, then efforts to revise the doctrines will first require altering the underlying institutional and policymaking apparatus. Moreover, in deciding whether particular territorial aspects of trademark law warrant reassessment, it is important to consider whether trademark law should be structured reactively to protect whatever consumer understandings or producer goodwill develops, or should it instead proactively seek to shape the ways in which consumers shop and producers sell or seek to acquire rights, thus shaping how the economy functions?
Finally, the paper briefly highlights the extent to which there is, or should be, an assimilation of the "territorial" and the "national." Analysis of the choices facing trademark law might be better achieved by consciously separating nationality and territoriality. Recognition of the territoriality of goodwill is linked to the basic purposes of trademark law, while nationality-grounded doctrines are more likely driven by economic policy and by institutional issues such as the practical demands of current political structures. Recognizing this distinction would assist in highlighting where reform is likely to be evolutionary and where modification of political structures - whether judicial or administrative - must first occur.
In prior work, we took up the question of the TRIPs Agreement's resilience to changes in domestic law. We argued that such resilience is necessary because information production is a dynamic enterprise. As new industries emerge and mature, nations must have the flexibility to modify their intellectual property rules to readjust the balance between public and private rights. In the course of that study, we examined approaches to TRIPs dispute resolution that could cabin the choices of legislation available to deal with emergent substantive problems, and which could distort the legal environment in which creative enterprises are conducted. In this piece, we continue our consideration of the resilience of the Agreement and its commitment to neo-federalism. Here, however, we move from a focus on outcomes to the dynamics of the legislative process, examining the extent to which TRIPs dispute resolution adequately accommodates the operation of each member's political economy as it relates to intellectual property lawmaking.
Frequently, as intellectual property lawmaking becomes fiercely contested, reforms can only occur when a balanced package of rules can be reached. We ask whether such deals (or perhaps which of such deals, depending upon the connection between the reforms) should be taken into account by WTO panels. We argue that when legislation represents offsetting benefits and detriments, respect for domestic political dynamics requires panels to consider constituent pieces of such legislation in the context of the package in which they were enacted.
In previous work, we questioned whether the jurisprudence that has developed with regard to the GATT's trade provisions should apply equally to intellectual property, noting that differences between trade and intellectual property policy mandated different approaches. Here we reiterate that position, but make something of a converse argument as well: there are commonalities between the problems that nations experience in executing their trade commitments and their intellectual property commitments. Thus, it is significant that in its early years, the GATT incorporated strategies that created flexibility and permitted nations to deal autonomously with matters of domestic trade; we argue that similar mechanisms are required in TRIPs jurisprudence, especially in the Agreement?s formative stage.
We also focus on the effect that TRIPs, as currently understood, has on domestic lawmaking. If WTO panel decisions intrude more into national law, might lawmakers begin to enact legislation in reliance on international invalidation of whole or parts of the enactment? Should formulation of domestic policy take this into account? Further, would the formalistic approach that has been taken to TRIPs jurisprudence benefit domestic lawmaking by reducing the effect of lobbying? Or would it simply induce more nuanced log-rolling, or the enactment of laws aimed at influencing intellectual property production but under a different legislative rubric (such as food and drug regulation or consumer law)? Indeed, answers to these questions might affect not only lawmaking at the national level but, in turn, the form of WTO dispute settlement. We go so far as to suggest that there may be a role for the (much-feared) nonviolation complaints in navigating these complexities.The article critically assesses the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) as a potential model for solving the immense legal challenges presented by transborder activity. Inaugurated in late 1999 by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the UDRP creates a fast, inexpensive online mechanism for trademark owners to recapture domain names held by persons who, in bad faith, register and use domain names that are confusingly similar to those marks. At present, the UDRP applies only to a narrow segment of disputes between trademark owners and domain name registrants. But the UDRP has been heralded by some as the model for a new non-national approach to lawmaking and dispute settlement applicable to a broader set of legal issues that transcend national borders.
In this article, we describe the conditions that led to the UDRP's formation and consider whether the UDRP can and should be replicated elsewhere. The process by which the UDRP was created, and the way in which it is structured, departs significantly from preexisting approaches to international lawmaking and dispute settlement. The UDRP is the product not of national legislation nor an international treaty, but rather of a web of contractual obligations imposed by a private, non-profit corporation with a monopoly over a valuable resource. Through its agreements with the U.S. Department of Commerce, ICANN serves as the gatekeeper for anyone seeking to acquire the most commercially valuable internet addresses. Exclusive control of access to the root server enables ICANN to dictate the terms and conditions for domain name ownership. This technological control also facilitates enforcement of UDRP panel decisions compelling domain name registrars to cancel ownership of contested domain names or transfer them from registrants to trademark owners.
The UDRP deviates from preexisting lawmaking and dispute settlement paradigms in other ways that make its advantages considerable (and which may make it attractive for replication). For example, the UDRP is a hybrid dispute settlement system. It contains an amalgam of elements from three distinct decision making paradigms - judicial, arbitral and ministerial - and it draws inspiration from international, supranational, and national legal systems. The UDRP thus reveals how dispute settlement structures can be tailored to the needs of new technologies and new types of legal conflicts. The UDRP is also non-national. Neither its substantive content nor its prescriptive force necessarily depends upon the laws, institutions, and enforcement mechanisms of any single nation-state or treaty regime. It thus suggests ways to bypass the often slow and cumbersome mechanisms of national and international lawmaking and to fulfil the demand for effective dispute settlement mechanisms that, like so much current social activity, transcend national borders.
Even assuming the UDRP can be applied to other situations where the conditions of monopolistic technological control do not subsist, however, we do not believe that it should be uncritically extended to other contexts without first questioning how non-national systems ought to be structured. In particular, while we applaud the effort to construct a non-national model that draws upon but is not constrained by existing paradigms, the current iteration of that model fails to incorporate appropriate checking mechanisms to control the scope and pace of lawmaking and the limited powers granted to dispute settlement decisionmakers. Moreover, the tensions between national and non-national values may be more difficult to reconcile in other settings; cybersquatting, in contrast, was universally condemned, and thus competing national values were less frequently implicated. We seek to identify these and other variables that should guide the authors of new checking mechanisms for new non-national structures.The means by which international norms are developed and incorporated in the formation of copyright law have changed dramatically in recent years. In this article, Professor Dinwoodie explores the nature of those changes. The classical model of international copyright law afforded countries significant latitude to implement international standards in ways tailored to their own economic and cultural priorities. The lack of an effective method of enforcing international standards consolidated that deference to national autonomy. And international treaties tended merely to codify existing commonly accepted national standards. This model has undergone changes of late, most notably (but not exclusively) in the context of the TRIPS Agreement, which subsumed the principal international copyright obligations within the WTO Dispute Settlement system. This change to the classical model is potentially significant in many ways. Most directly, failure to fulfill international copyright obligations may be met by the imposition of trade sanctions. More broadly, however, the interpretation of international copyright obligations by WTO panels may alter the degree of national autonomy afforded member states and may make international copyright law more forward looking in nature. International copyright lawmaking by activist WTO panels thus may generate costs as well as gains. Professor Dinwoodie considers these issues through an analysis of the first (and, thus far, the only) report of a WTO dispute settlement panel regarding violation of a copyright provision contained in the TRIPS Agreement. This report, handed down in June 2000, found that an exemption introduced into section 11 (5) of the U.S. Copyright Act in 1998 violated the rights of owners of copyright in musical works guaranteed by the Berne Convention and incorporated within the TRIPS Agreement. Professor Dinwoodie concludes that the panel report is a good beginning to the new era of international copyright. The panel report is a strong and appropriate endorsement of the need to protect the rights of copyright owners and to hold WTO members to agreed-upon minimum standards. In addition, the report contains hints that WTO panels will accord some continuing respect to the value of national autonomy, will seek to interpret the TRIPS Agreement in a dynamic fashion responsive to changing social and economic conditions, will examine contentious issues of copyright law through other than a pure trade lens, will move cautiously before finding violations of international obligations, and will encourage the involvement of interested third parties in the resolution of WTO disputes. Despite this balanced beginning, the article concludes that private international lawmaking might further forwardlooking international copyright lawmaking in ways that do not incur the costs associated with activist WTO lawmaking. To facilitate this process, Professor Dinwoodie suggests that national courts consider resolving international copyright litigation by formulating substantive rules rather than localizing such disputes in a single country through traditional choice of law rules. Such a substantive law approach to choice of law fits well with the objectives of private international law. But this broader approach will also establish a means of incorporating international norms in the formation of copyright law without jeopardizing values appropriately furthered by the classical method of public international copyright lawmaking.In recent years, U.S. courts have recognized that a wide (and potentially limitless) range of subject matter may act as a trademark. These developments arguably comport both with a contemporary (global) consumer who is less reliant on linguistic forms of communication and with postmodern scholarship regarding the varied sources and development of meaning. This article addresses how trademark law should adapt to the reality that consumers identify and distinguish products using a range of symbols other than the traditional forms of words and pictorial images. I contend that, in order to regulate effectively the present-day marketplace, trademark law must recognize the limitless sources of meaning. But while nontraditional subject-matter may equally identify a product?s source, protecting that nontraditional matter as a trademark may give rise to very different consequences than protecting traditional trademark subject-matter such as words. If ontological restrictions upon trademark subject-matter are removed, a new set of limits must prudently be established if trademark protection is not to spawn adverse competitive effects from overprotection. I suggest that such limits can be found by tethering trademark law directly to its limited purposes, and by grounding protection not in over-generalized assumptions about classes of subject matter, but rather in the real present-day impact of particular symbols in society. The Article explores this (teleological model) through the vehicle of the nontraditional subject-matter generating the most trademark litigation and the most critical thinking, namely, product design features. The article systematizes the growing body of trade dress case law and scholarship and highlights the different premises that I detect underlying divergent schools of thought. I argue that the Supreme Court is cautiously moving, albeit without any express recognition, toward a postmodern vision of marketplace symbols, and that its recent opinions represent an incipient version of the teleological model that I espouse. Finally, I exemplify the operation of the teleological model by applying its lessons to the issue of functionality. Applying the teleological model to various hotly-debated aspects of the functionality doctrine leads me to endorse adoption of a transparent, purposive analysis of "competitive need" as the measure of functionality rather than any single doctrinal formulation. That inquiry, I argue, should be particularized and applied without categorical differentiation between aesthetic and utilitarian features. I also reject the prevailing view that a finding of functionality should foreclose the grant of any relief to a plaintiff producer, finding it insufficiently cognizant of the costs of confusingly similar source-identifying designs in an increasingly visual society. Instead, I propose that courts should explore the possibility of conditioning a defendant's right to copy a functional design on compliance with labeling or other requirements that minimize consumer confusion. Moderating the consequence for plaintiffs of a finding of functionality should embolden courts to apply a rigorous functionality analysis to a greater range of design features. An ontologically unlimited approach to trademark subject-matter sits well with our postmodern condition; but, in order to avoid over-protection, it must be accompanied by a heightened regard for the policy concerns embodied in the functionality doctrine.
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