BSocSc LLB (UCT) BCL (Oxon). Visiting researcher, Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law (2012). Law clerk to Justice Edwin Cameron, Constitutional Court of South Africa (2013-14). Currently editor, Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal, and DPhil candidate working on the philosophical foundations of tort law under the supervision of Prof John Gardner.
- In this article I investigate the problems which arise from the South African law of delict's attempt to hold the state vicariously liable. In part I, I explain the rules of vicarious liability. In part II, I explain the history of state liability in South African law, and its heavy reliance on the vicarious liability paradigm. In part III, I discuss the problems that this has created in cases decided in the last ten years, arguing that vicarious liability cannot coherently accommodate the state's unique duties or the multifaceted failures for which it is being sued. Both difficulties are addressed by holding the state directly liable, but doing so requires our law to address certain conceptual challenges, which I discuss in part IV. Finally, in part V, I discuss a recent Constitutional Court judgment which constitutes the most recent installment in this saga.
Private law and its philosophical foundations; tort law; general jurisprudence; constitutional theory.