Talita is a DPhil student in the areas of Public International Law and International Criminal Law. Her doctoral research focusses on the Principle of Legality in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. In particular, she will be looking at the issues raised by the retroactive application of the Rome Statute in situations referred by the UN Security Council and those originating from states’ ah doc declarations.
In 2015, she obtained her Magister Juris (MJur) degree from Oxford with Distinction. She was also awarded the Clifford Chance Prize for Best Overall Performance in the MJur, the Law Faculty Prize for Best Exam Paper in International Law and Armed Conflict, the Principal’s Prize and Archibald Jackson Prize for Academic Excellence, both awarded by Somerville College, Oxford. Her MJur Dissertation has led to the article “‘Interests of justice’: Defining the scope of Prosecutorial discretion in Article 53 (1)(c) and 2(c) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court”, which was published in April 2017 by the Leiden Journal of International Law (https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/leiden-journal-of-international-law/article/interests-of-justice-defining-the-scope-of-prosecutorial-discretion-in-article-531c-and-2c-of-the-rome-statute-of-the-international-criminal-court/0A03F86DF8A7579F7936D06E43F122EF)
In 2015/2016, Talita worked as a legal intern for Judge Olga Herrera Carbuccia at the International Criminal Court, under the sponsorship of the Oxford Global Justice Internship Program and the Planethood Foundation. In 2016, she also worked as a Case Reporter for the Oxford Reports on International Law (ORIL), an online database of law reports in all areas of Public International Law offered by Oxford University Press (OUP).
Talita has previously worked as a Law Clerk in Criminal Law for a High Court Judge in the Courts of Justice of Pernambuco, Brazil, and as a legal intern for a Federal Prosecutor in Brazil. She did her undergraduate studies in Law (Bachelor of Laws) at the Federal University of Pernambuco (UFPE) and a one-year academic exchange program in Public International Law at Sciences Po-Lille (Lille, France) and at the Law Faculty of Université Pierre-Mendès (Grenoble, France).
Talita’s doctoral research is supervised by Professor Dapo Akande and funded by the Law Faculty’s Roy Goode Scholarship, the Graduate Assistance Fund Scholarship, and the Planethood Foundation. For the past three years, Talita has also been involved in the activities of the Oxford Transitional Justice Research group (OTJR). She is now the Student Chairperson of OTJR. Talita is also the co-convenor of the Public International Law Discussion Group.
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S092215651700022XThe International Criminal Court (ICC) was established with the aim of prosecuting individuals for the gravest crimes of concern to the international community. Yet some provisions of its Statute (the Rome Statute) recognize the need for temporarily setting aside criminal investigations or prosecutions in favour of different considerations. Two of these provisions are Article 53(1)(c) and (2)(c) of the Statute. They allow the Prosecutor of the Court to use his or her discretion in deciding not to initiate an investigation or a prosecution in the ‘interests of justice’. Nonetheless, the ambiguity of this phrase, coupled with an absent definition, have given rise to a polarized debate about its meaning and the Prosecutor’s ensuing margin of discretion: some consider matters of peace and security and alternative justice mechanisms as possible ‘interests of justice’, while others exclude them. Among those adopting the latter view is the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), as can be inferred from a 2007 Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice and a 2013 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, which continue to be upheld by the Office. Against this backdrop and amid new developments at the ICC which call into question the OTP’s position, the purpose of this article is to develop a comprehensive interpretation of Article 53(1)(c) and (2)(c) of the Rome Statute, using all the interpretative tools provided by Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Public International Law, International Criminal Law, Private International Law