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  • P Eleftheriadis, A Union of Peoples: Europe as a Community of Principle (Oxford University Press 2020) (forthcoming)
  • P Eleftheriadis, 'Book Review: EU Legal Acts ' (2020) Common Market Law Review [Review] (forthcoming)
  • Maurice Stucke and A Ezrachi, Competition Overdose - How Free Market Mythology Transformed Us from Citizen Kings to Market Servants (HarperCollins 2020)
    Using dozens of vivid examples to show how society overprescribed competition as a solution and when unbridled rivalry hurts consumers, kills entrepreneurship, and increases economic inequality, two free-market thinkers diagnose the sickness caused by competition overdose and provide remedies that will promote sustainable growth and progress for everyone, not just wealthy shareholders and those at the top. Whatever illness our society suffers, competition is the remedy. Do we want better schools for our children? Cheaper prices for everything? More choices in the marketplace? The answer is always: Increase competition. Yet, many of us are unhappy with the results. We think we’re paying less, but we’re getting much less. Our food has undeclared additives (or worse), our drinking water contains toxic chemicals, our hotel bills reveal surprise additions, our kids’ schools are failing, our activities are tracked so that advertisers can target us with relentless promotions. All will be cured, we are told, by increasing the competitive pressure and defanging the bloated regulatory state. In a captivating exposé, Maurice E. Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi show how we are falling prey to greed, chicanery, and cronyism. Refuting the almost religious belief in rivalry as the vehicle for prosperity, the authors identify the powerful corporations, lobbyists, and lawmakers responsible for pushing this toxic competition—and argue instead for a healthier, even nobler, form of competition. Competition Overdose diagnoses the disease—and provides a cure for it.
  • P Eleftheriadis, 'Cosmopolitan Legitimacy' in Jorge Fabra (ed), Jurisprudence in a Globalized World (Edward Elgar 2020) (forthcoming)
  • N. W. Barber, 'Entrenchment' in R Bellamy and J King (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory (Cambridge University Press 2020) (forthcoming)
  • E Fisher, 'Executive Environmental Law' (2019) 82 Modern Law Review (Currently Early View)
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-2230.12456
    The Draft Environment (Principles and Governance) Bill published by DEFRA in late 2018 is part of a process of reimagining environmental law in light of Brexit. The Draft Bill creates frameworks for policy statements on environmental principles and environmental implementation plans, as well as creating a new enforcement body – the Office for Environmental Protection. This Draft Bill is, at the very least, an ineffectual response to the challenges of environmental law post‐Brexit. More alarmingly, it raises the possibility of a legal future in which the executive dominates how the norms, ambitions, and accountabilities of environmental law are defined. These are matters of concern for environmental and public lawyers alike.
    ISBN: 1468-2230
  • A Briggs, The Conflict of Laws (4th edn Oxford University Press (Clarendon Law Series) 2019)
    Fully updated and rewritten account of the rules of Private International Law as these appear in the ghastly uncertainty of 2019.
    ISBN: 9780198845232
  • P Eleftheriadis, 'Corrective Justice Among States' (2019) 1 Ius Cogens
    The debate concerning solidarity and justice among states has missed the key contribution made to international affairs by corrective justice. Unlike distributive justice, which applies within states, corrective justice applies among states and in particular to cooperative arrangements creating interdependence among them. Corrective justice does not require fairness in outcomes, but only fairness in the risks and opportunities undertaken by the parties to any cooperative agreement. Corrective justice requires redress in cases of loss caused by unfairness. An important illustration of corrective justice at work is the Eurozone’s response to the financial crisis. The assistance offered to the states most burdened by financial turmoil can be best interpreted not as an attempt to arrive at fair shares, but as an attempt to remedy the losses unfairly caused to some states by the mistakes made by all of them, when designing the Eurozone’s architecture.
    ISBN: ISSN: 2524-3977
  • J Armour, 'Derivative Actions: A Framework for Decisions' (2019) 135 Law Quarterly Review 412
  • S Fredman, ' Taxation as a Human Rights Issue: Gender and Substantive Equality' in Alston P and Reisch N (eds), Tax, Inequality and Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2019)
    DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190882228.003.0004
    This chapter suggests a four-dimensional conception of substantive equality to evaluate the gendered impacts of taxation policies from a human rights perspective. The four-dimensional framework of substantive equality in relation to gender regards the right to equality as aiming to, first, redress disadvantage (the redistributive dimension); second, address stigma, stereotyping, prejudice, and hatred (the recognition dimension); third, facilitate participation and voice (the participative dimension); and, fourth, accommodate difference and transform gendered structures in society (the transformative dimension). This multidimensional conception of substantive equality functions as a valuable tool in evaluating taxation systems for their impact on gender. The chapter then looks at two particularly challenging aspects of taxation and gender: the role of care work, and the role of value-added tax (VAT) and other indirect taxes.
  • A Briggs, 'Brexit and Private International Law: an English Perspective' (2019) Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale 261
    Analysis of the effect of Brexit on private international law and litigation in the English courts, taking a more sane and balanced approach to the possible outcomes of that process than that which is usually produced by those with different axes to grind.
  • P P Craig, 'Brexit and the UK Constitution' in J Jowell and C O’Cinneide (eds), The Changing Constitution (Oxford University Press 2019)
  • J Rowbottom, 'Careful what you wish for: press criticism of the legal protection of human rights' in M. Farrell E. Hughes and E. Drywood (eds), Human Rights in the Media: Fear and Fetish (Routledge 2019)
  • A Ezrachi and Viktoria H.S.E. Robertson, 'Competition, Market Power and Third-Party Tracking' (2019) World Competition
    The prevalence of third-party tracking in our modern ecosystem cannot be ignored. Trackers, on our websites and apps, enable multi-sourced data gathering, at distinct volume, velocity, verity and veracity. While operated by numerous operators, the majority of these trackers are controlled by a handful of data giants. In this paper we consider the rise and growth of this industry, the power it has bestowed on a handful of operators, and the possible implications to consumer welfare and competition.
  • P P Craig, 'Constitutional Identity in the UK: An Evolving Concept ' in C Calliess and G van der Schyff (eds), Constitutional Identity in a Europe of Multilevel Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press 2019)
  • P P Craig, 'Constitutional Principle, the Rule of Law and Political Reality: The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 ' (2019) 82 Modern Law Review 319
  • P P Craig, 'Democracy ' in R Masterman and R Schutze (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Constitutional Law (Cambridge University Press 2019)
  • P P Craig, 'Engagement and Disengagement with International Institutions: The UK Perspective' in C Bradley (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Foreign Relations Law (Oxford University Press 2019)
  • E Fisher, Bettina Lange and Eloise Scotford, Environmental Law: Text, Cases and Materials (2nd Ed OUP 2019)
    ISBN: 9780198811077
  • P Davies, 'Financial Stability and the Global Reach of EU Law' in Marise Cremona Joanne Scott (ed), EU Law Beyond EU Borders (OUP 2019)
    This chapter considers the influence of European Union law in the post-crisis regulation of financial institutions. The global nature of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 created incentives for jurisdictions to “export” their legislative solutions globally, in order to promote domestic stability. The chapter begins by using an analysis of the development of the crisis from a domestic US sub-prime lending problem into a global lack of trust in financial institutions, with a consequent credit crunch and state bail-outs of the biggest failing institutions, to illustrate these incentives. However, a crude strategy of export is likely to produce adverse reactions from other jurisdictions. The potential for friction was reduced by two developments. First, a rapid expansion of international standards of financial regulation and, second, using some form of mutual recognition strategy at the level of individual jurisdictions. The chapter argues that the European Union had relatively little influence on the first strategy because representation of “Europe” within international standard-setters is still dominated by the individual Member States rather than by the EU institutions. On the other hand, with the adoption of a Union level common rule book, implementation of the second strategy did fall into the hands of Union institutions. The second part of the chapter consists of a case study of the long drawn-out process whereby the EU and the US achieved recognition of each other’s rules on central counterparties for derivatives clearing. Despite the existence at G20 level of an agreement on the central clearing of derivatives, which both the EU and the US sought to implement, achievement of mutual recognition on this topic was slow, marked by bad-tempered interchanges and initially developed through a process likely to highlight differences rather than commonalities. The chapter concludes by exploring some possible explanations for this history and examines the potential operation of the equivalence regime in a post-Brexit world. Financial crisis; international standards; mutual recognition; central clearing; equivalence.
    ISBN: 978 0 19 884217 0
  • L Enriques and Alessandro Romano, 'Institutional Investor Voting Behavior: A Network Theory Perspective' (2019) University of Illinois Law Review 223
    This Article shows how network theory can improve our understanding of institutional investors’ voting behavior and, more generally, their role in corporate governance. The standard idea is that institutional investors compete against each other on relative performance and hence might not cast informed votes due to rational apathy and rational reticence. In other words, institutional investors have incentives to free ride instead of “cooperating” and casting informed votes. We show that connections of various nature among institutional investors, whether from formal networks, geographical proximity, or common ownership, and among institutional investors and other agents, such as proxy advisors, contribute to shaping institutional investors’ incentives to vote “actively.” They also create intricate competition dynamics: competition takes place not only among institutional investors (and their asset managers), but also at the level of their employees and among “cliques” of institutional investors. Employees, who strive for better jobs, are motivated to obtain more information on portfolio companies than may be strictly justified from their employer institution’s perspective, and to circulate it within their network. Cliques of institutional investors compete against each other. Because there are good reasons to believe that cliques of cooperators outperform cliques of noncooperators, the network-level competition might increase the incentives of institutional investors to collect information. These dynamics can enhance institutional investors’ engagement in portfolio companies and also shed light on some current policy issues such as the antitrust effects of common ownership and mandatory disclosures of institutional investors’ voting.
  • P Davies, 'Investment Chains and Corporate Governance' in Louse Gullifer and Jenny Payne (eds), Intermediation and Beyond (Hart 2019)
    Long chains of intermediaries may constrain the right to vote. Information about the voting opportunity may not reach the persons at the end of the chain in time for them to formulate a considered view, and instructions about how those persons wish to vote may not reach the company in time for the vote to be counted (or, perhaps,at all). These problems will be exacerbated if, as is the case in the UK, the person at the end of the chain of intermediaries and who has the economic incentive to vote, is not treated by the relevant corporate law system as the shareholder for the purpose of the exercise of voting rights. So long as voting was regarded as a private matter, it was possible to take a sanguine view of these problems. Various workarounds were available and those at the end of intermediary chains could make use of them, to the extent that the benefi ts of voting were thought to outweigh the costs of the work-arounds. In the current era of shareholder ‘ engagement ’ , where shareholders, especially institutional ones, are under public pressure to vote and to vote thoughtfully, difficulties in actually voting are much less easy to ignore. This chapter explores the operation of the current voting system where there are chains of intermediaries and some possible reforms.
    ISBN: 9781509919901