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  • S Enchelmaier, 'Commentary on Block Exemption Regulation No. 1218/2010 on Specialisation Agreements [in German]' in Werner Berg, Gerald Mäsch (ed), Deutsches und Europäisches Kartellrecht – Kommentar. (Luchterhand 2021) (forthcoming)
    This contribution analyses the Regulation article by article, drawing on case law and academic literature.
  • AE Ezrachi, Competition and Antitrust Law: A Very Short Introduction (OUP 2021)
    Look around you. You are most likely sitting comfortably on a chair or sofa, in a heated or cooled room, surrounded by your comfort technology – from your smart water-resistant mobile phone, to your new extra thin laptop with its long-life battery. As you read this introduction, you might be interrupted by notices on your phone, video chats from friends and reminders from your digital assistant. You might then step out and go to your favourite shop, where choice is abundant, to buy reasonably priced food and goods. You might later meet friends in your favourite hangout where the service is excellent. Maybe travel around town in your reasonably priced car or ride sharing service, watch a movie, or just explore the market. Your environment is characterized by ample choice, smiling service providers and reasonably priced goods. Sure, things can always improve. No doubt. But pause for a second and appreciate one of the key drivers that make this environment possible – the competitive process. It is the rivalry between businesses and traders that delivers the abundance of choice, the lower prices, the increased innovation, and the better quality of goods and services. It is this process of competition which enables your money to go the extra step: to buy more for less. A process which has generated much of the prosperity of the western world. Without it, you would most likely have been sitting in a somewhat bare room on an uncomfortable chair that was purchased from an unpleasant seller at an inflated price. Your money would buy you less. Less goods, less services, less quality, and less innovation. Not so rosy. And so, as a society, we strive to protect the beneficial dynamics of competition as a means to enhance consumer welfare, deliver efficiencies, and encourage innovation. At times, society has to work hard to maintain the abundance that comes with competition. While competition benefits us, the consumers, it makes the life of producers, sellers and service providers rather difficult. They need to improve to stay in business. They need to invest in new products, new technologies, new processes. They need to offer us goods and services at an attractive price. If they fail to remain competitive, they may find themselves being pushed out of the market. And so, at times, these sellers and service providers may look for ways to dampen the competitive process. Think, for example, of price-fixing cartels or market sharing agreements which result in us paying more and getting less. Think of powerful companies that might abuse their power to distort the market, for example, by stopping their customer from buying from other companies. Or maybe large merger transactions between two giant companies that could leave us dealing with a single dominant seller that benefits from concentrated power. Our antitrust and competition laws are designed to address these risks, remedy possible market failures, and safeguard consumer welfare. Our competition agencies and courts are tasked with enforcing the law. As they do so, they face the challenge of correctly identifying what amounts to an anti-competitive activity, and curtailing it to ensure dynamic and competitive markets. This book is about these market dynamics, their promises and limitations. It is about the laws that are used to safeguard the process of competition, and the way they are enforced. About the delicate and challenging relationship between a free market economy and government intervention. It is about the fascinating forces of competition that influence your wealth and shape our modern society.
  • P P Craig, 'Constitutionality, Convention and Prorogation .' in Daniel Clarry (ed), The UK Supreme Court Yearbook, Volume 10: 2018–2019 Legal Year (Appellate Press 2021)
  • S R Weatherill, 'Did Cassis de Dijon make a difference?' in A Albors-Llorens, C Barnard and B Leucht (eds), Cassis de Dijon: 40 Years On (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2021)
    DOI: 10.5040/
    ISBN: 9781509936632
  • P Eleftheriadis, 'Eleven Types of post-Brexit EU Law ' (2021) Oxford Business Law Blog
    The United Kingdom and the European Union agreed on Christmas Eve a new Trade and Cooperation Agreement. This treaty has replaced the rules of the single market in the UK (with the exception of Northern Ireland and Gibraltar). It is, however, only one part of EU law in the United Kingdom. EU law in the UK is now a matter of a multiple and overlapping legal instruments. Post-Brexit legal arrangements are very complex, perhaps surprisingly so. Although it is not possible to set out these matters here in detail, it would perhaps be worth listing the eleven types of EU law operating in the United Kingdom after Brexit
  • P P Craig, 'English Administrative Law History: Perception and Reality' in S Jhaveri and M Ramsden (eds), Judicial Review of Administrative Action Across the Common Law World, Origins and Adaptation (Hart 2021)
  • N. W. Barber, 'Entrenchment' in R Bellamy and J King (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory (Cambridge University Press 2021) (forthcoming)
  • Elizabeth Fisher, 'Environmental Law, Scholarship, and Epistemic Responsibility' (2021) 33 Journal of Environmental Law 521
  • N. W. Barber, 'Forward (Public Law)' (2021) The Oxford Undergraduate Law Journal
  • P Davies, 'From Free Will to Duties of Vigilance: Corporate Liability for Wrongdoing' in Ronald J. Gilson, Mats Isaksson, Erik Lidman Johan Munck and Erik Sjöman (eds), Festschrift in honour of Rolf Skog (Norstedts Juridik 2021)
    Also available at SSRN:
    This piece examines a number of possible doctrinal approaches to corporate liability for wrongdoing and analyses their functional significance. It starts by identifying a starting point common to many jurisdictions whereby liability for wrongdoing on the part of those in some way connected with the company was attributed to the company itself. Vicarious liability generally worked well in relation to tortious (delictual) liability but proved controversial in many jurisdictions where criminal liability was at issue. Doubts about the appropriateness of vicarious criminal liability led to restricted corporate liability for serious crimes. The article then identifies an increasingly common way of circumventing this problem in the criminal law area by shifting the basis of corporate liability onto an analysis of managerial failings which caused or facilitated the commission of a crime. Crucially, this analysis does not depend upon finding that any particular director, executive or employee of the company is individually criminally liable. It is enough to attribute managerial acts or omissions to the company and then to ask whether those are sufficient to constitute a crime on the part of the company. In a third stage, companies are made liable on an accessory basis, namely, that the company displays a “corporate culture” which encouraged or permitted the commission of crimes by individuals associated with the company. In this stage, the commission of a crime by a connected person underpins the corporate liability, but the company is not liable for the individual crime on a vicarious basis but independently for “permitting” the crime to occur. The corporate culture analysis was most fully developed in Australia, but it has become more widespread, though normally only in relation to particular crimes, under the heading of “failure to prevent” liability. “Failure to prevent” liability can be seen as the beginnings of a fourth stage, since the company now has an incentive to take steps to prevent crimes being committed within the organisation rather than just avoiding the creation of culture which permits infractions. The full development of the fourth stage is to be found, however, in corporate “duties of vigilance”. Pioneered in France but now proposed on a wide scale by the European Commission, the occurrence of a wrong is no longer a necessary element for corporate liability. It is enough that the company has no prepared, put in place and effectively operated a corporate strategy for assessing and reducing the risks of wrongdoing within the organisation. Liability can arise even though no infraction has occurred, on the grounds that the company has not discharge its vigilance duty. Equally important, duties of vigilance are proposed or have been imposed beyond the criminal law so as to embrace breaches of international human rights and environmental standards as well as international economic crimes. It is argued that the implementation of this fourth stage requires much greater precision about how far companies are required to go in discharging their duties, especially when operating in countries which do not accept that a breach has occurred or that the standard is applicable in the jurisdiction. [enter Abstract Body] Keywords: Corporate crime, vicarious liability, managerial failure, corporate culture, failure to prevent, duty of vigilance
  • P Davies, S Worthington and C Hare, Gower Principles of Modern Company Law (11th edn Sweet & Maxwell 2021)
    ISBN: 978-0-414-08812-2
  • P P Craig, 'Institutions, Power and Institutional Balance' in P Craig and G de Burca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford University Press 2021)
  • P P Craig, 'Integration, Democracy and Legitimacy' in P Craig and G de Burca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford University Press 2021)
  • P P Craig and Grainne de Burca, 'Introduction ' in P Craig and G de Burca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford University Press 2021)
  • A Briggs, Law Governing Arbitration Agreements in a Recent Judgment of the UK Supreme Court, paper presented at Italian Society of Private International and Procedural Law: Webinar Series 2021 (9 April 2021)
    Presentation paper on the decision in Enka v Chubb, for discussion in the 2021 webinar series on Private International Law in Europe.
  • Elizabeth Fisher, 'Legal Imagination and Teaching ' in Lavanya Rajamani and Jaqueline Peel (eds), Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (OUP 2021)
    ISBN: 9780198849155
  • P Eleftheriadis, 'Natural Reason and the Ethical Foundations of European Law ' (2021) 2 Revue Européenne du Droit
    Most defences of the European Union are consequentialist. They say that for this or that reason the EU serves interests in prosperity or security. The most common attack on the European Union, however, is not consequentialist but based on a constitutional theory of ‘popular sovereignty’. If you believe that popular sovereignty is the ground of a constitutional order, you may find the European Union’s claims to have a say on domestic government questionable. This criticism is very effective because political institutions are normally justified on the basis of ideas of right and wrong, not on their potential consequences. Nevertheless, the ‘popular sovereignty’ argument against the EU is the result of a serious misconception about the nature of constitutions. I sketch here an alternative argument, which explains the legitimacy of transnational institutions and the European Union on the basis of constitutional justice and equal citizenship. The argument continues a long – and in my view fruitful – tradition of legal scholarship, which defends the constitution and the ideal of the rule of law not merely on the value of procedures but also on the basis of ‘natural reason’.
  • N. W. Barber, 'Peoples, Principles, and Finality' (2021) American Journal of Jurisprudence 145