Filter by
  • TAO Endicott, 'Why Proportionality is not a General Ground of Judicial Review' (2020) 1 Keele Law Review 1
    Proportionality is a relation between two things held, metaphorically, in either side of a balance. Proportionality is a ground of judicial review of executive decisions when and only when the law requires judges to hold the scales, and to weigh one set of interests against another. That can be a just and convenient way for the law to give special protection for interests that call for that protection (as the law of the European Convention on Human Rights and European Union law do, and the common law does in some circumstances). Proportionality should not be a ground of judicial review (1) if a claimant can assert no interest that ought to be protected by proportionality reasoning, or (2) if the weighing ought not to be done by a court. As a result, proportionality can never be a general ground of judicial review of administrative action. The grounds of judicial review are various and depend on the nature of an administrative decision. In fact, there is no general common law ground of judicial review of the substance of administrative decisions. Not even Wednesbury unreasonableness. I will explain this view by pointing out the good sense in the famous, albeit flawed, 1948 decision of the Court of Appeal in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation.
    ISBN: 2732-5679
  • S Enchelmaier, '“The Development of the Free Movement Principles over Time”' in S Garben & I Govaere (ed), Internal Market 2.0 (Hart 2020)
    ISBN: ISBN 9781509939053
  • L Enriques and Alessandro Romano, 'Institutional Investor Voting Behavior: A Network Theory Perspective' (2019) University of Illinois Law Review 223
    This Article shows how network theory can improve our understanding of institutional investors’ voting behavior and, more generally, their role in corporate governance. The standard idea is that institutional investors compete against each other on relative performance and hence might not cast informed votes due to rational apathy and rational reticence. In other words, institutional investors have incentives to free ride instead of “cooperating” and casting informed votes. We show that connections of various nature among institutional investors, whether from formal networks, geographical proximity, or common ownership, and among institutional investors and other agents, such as proxy advisors, contribute to shaping institutional investors’ incentives to vote “actively.” They also create intricate competition dynamics: competition takes place not only among institutional investors (and their asset managers), but also at the level of their employees and among “cliques” of institutional investors. Employees, who strive for better jobs, are motivated to obtain more information on portfolio companies than may be strictly justified from their employer institution’s perspective, and to circulate it within their network. Cliques of institutional investors compete against each other. Because there are good reasons to believe that cliques of cooperators outperform cliques of noncooperators, the network-level competition might increase the incentives of institutional investors to collect information. These dynamics can enhance institutional investors’ engagement in portfolio companies and also shed light on some current policy issues such as the antitrust effects of common ownership and mandatory disclosures of institutional investors’ voting.
  • A Briggs, The Conflict of Laws (4th edn Oxford University Press (Clarendon Law Series) 2019)
    Fully updated and rewritten account of the rules of Private International Law as these appear in the ghastly uncertainty of 2019.
    ISBN: 9780198845232
  • L Enriques and T Tröger, 'The Law and (Some) Finance of Related Party Transactions' in L Enriques and T Tröger (eds), The Law and Finance of Related Party Transactions (Cambridge University Press 2019)
    This paper is the introductory chapter of Luca Enriques and Tobias Tröger (eds.), The Law and Finance of Related Party Transactions (Cambridge University Press: forthcoming). Its goal is to sketch out the individual chapters’ contributions to the scholarly and policy debates on the adequate regulation of related party transactions (RPTs). For that purpose, we scope the issue by highlighting the principal costs and benefits of shareholder control, which allows both the implementation of entrepreneurial vision and various forms of rent-seeking. We next proceed by putting the challenges of regulating RPTs into the broader context of conflicts of interest and tunneling techniques. Against this background, we then turn to the main regulatory options available for legislators (independent/disinterested director approval, majority of the minority approval, ex post fairness review, and involvement of supervisory agencies), highlighting some of the key insights on each of them from individual chapters. Finally, we show how the chapters in the book can also inform European legislators who are currently in the process of implementing the revised Shareholder Rights Directive rules on RPTs.
  • JA Armour, 'Derivative Actions: A Framework for Decisions' (2019) 135 Law Quarterly Review 412
  • S Fredman, ' Taxation as a Human Rights Issue: Gender and Substantive Equality' in Alston P and Reisch N (eds), Tax, Inequality and Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2019)
    DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190882228.003.0004
    This chapter suggests a four-dimensional conception of substantive equality to evaluate the gendered impacts of taxation policies from a human rights perspective. The four-dimensional framework of substantive equality in relation to gender regards the right to equality as aiming to, first, redress disadvantage (the redistributive dimension); second, address stigma, stereotyping, prejudice, and hatred (the recognition dimension); third, facilitate participation and voice (the participative dimension); and, fourth, accommodate difference and transform gendered structures in society (the transformative dimension). This multidimensional conception of substantive equality functions as a valuable tool in evaluating taxation systems for their impact on gender. The chapter then looks at two particularly challenging aspects of taxation and gender: the role of care work, and the role of value-added tax (VAT) and other indirect taxes.
  • A Briggs, 'Brexit and Private International Law: an English Perspective' (2019) Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale 261
    Analysis of the effect of Brexit on private international law and litigation in the English courts, taking a more sane and balanced approach to the possible outcomes of that process than that which is usually produced by those with different axes to grind.
  • P P Craig, 'Brexit and the UK Constitution' in J Jowell and C O’Cinneide (eds), The Changing Constitution (Oxford University Press 2019)
  • J Rowbottom, 'Careful what you wish for: press criticism of the legal protection of human rights' in M. Farrell E. Hughes and E. Drywood (eds), Human Rights in the Media: Fear and Fetish (Routledge 2019)
  • H Eidenmüller, L Enriques, G Helleringer and K van Zwieten (eds), 'Centros at 20: Regulatory Arbitrage and Beyond' (2019) 20 European Business Organization Law Review 399
    ISBN: 1566-7529
  • AE Ezrachi and Viktoria H.S.E. Robertson, 'Competition, Market Power and Third-Party Tracking' (2019) World Competition
    The prevalence of third-party tracking in our modern ecosystem cannot be ignored. Trackers, on our websites and apps, enable multi-sourced data gathering, at distinct volume, velocity, verity and veracity. While operated by numerous operators, the majority of these trackers are controlled by a handful of data giants. In this paper we consider the rise and growth of this industry, the power it has bestowed on a handful of operators, and the possible implications to consumer welfare and competition.
  • R Ekins, 'Constitutional Conversations in Britain (in Europe)' in G Sigalet, G Webber and R Dixon (eds), Constitutional Dialogue: Rights, Democracy, Institutions (Cambridge University Press 2019)
    In the Westminster tradition, Parliament stands at the centre of a public conversation about what is to be done. The courts have not been parties to this conversation, but have upheld settled law, which forms part of the framework within which deliberation takes place and is itself the object of public deliberation and decision. This arrangement has been unbalanced by a changing understanding of the judicial role and by the reach of international obligations that subject the UK to the jurisdiction of international courts. In this way, new conversations have been introduced to the British constitution, including exchanges between domestic and European courts, the main significance of which has been to compromise parliamentary democracy. The UK’s decision to leave the EU follows in part from the alienation of citizens from European lawmaking and action and from a corresponding concern to restore self-government. In reaching and implementing that decision to leave, one sees the capacity of parliamentary democracy to enable the political community to reason and act together, but also the risks posed by wayward domestic judicial action.
  • P P Craig, 'Constitutional Identity in the UK: An Evolving Concept ' in C Calliess and G van der Schyff (eds), Constitutional Identity in a Europe of Multilevel Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press 2019)
  • P P Craig, 'Constitutional Principle, the Rule of Law and Political Reality: The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 ' (2019) 82 Modern Law Review 319
  • P P Craig, 'Democracy ' in R Masterman and R Schutze (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Constitutional Law (Cambridge University Press 2019)
  • TAO Endicott, 'Don't Panic' (2019) United Kingdom Constitutional Law Blog