Filter by
  • E Fisher, 'Imagining Technology and Environmental Law' in Roger Brownsword, Eloise Scotford, and Karen Yeung (eds), Oxford Handbook of Law, Regulation and Technology (OUP 2017)
    ISBN: 9780199680832
  • P P Craig, 'Judicial Power, the Judicial Power Project and the UK' (2017) University of Queensland Law Journal 355
  • P P Craig, 'Judicial Review of Questions of Law: A Comparative Perspective ' in S Rose-Ackerman and P Lindseth (eds), Comparative Administrative Law (Edward Elgar 2017)
  • TAO Endicott, 'Lawful Power' (2017) 15 New Zealand Journal of Public and International Law 1
  • TAO Endicott, 'Lord Reed's Dissent in Gina Miller's Case and the Principles of our Constitution' (2017) 8 UK Supreme Court Yearbook 259
    Lord Reed’s convincing dissent in R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5 shows that the majority decision belongs to a long tradition of landmarks in constitutional adjudication (including the Case of Proclamations (1611) 12 Co Rep 74) for which there was no legal authority. I argue that such decisions are best understood as exercises of a judicial constituent power – that is, a power to make new constitutional rules. And then, the problem with the majority reasons in Miller is not that there was no legal authority for what the Court decided; it is that the novel decision depended on the idea that there was a constitutional need, in the interests of responsible government, for the judges to require legislation to authorize the triggering of art 50 of the Treaty of European Union. As Lord Reed implied and as Lord Carnwath explained, there was no such need.
    ISBN: 9781911250166
  • P P Craig, 'Miller, Structural Constitutional Review and the Limits of Prerogative Power' (2017) Public Law 48
  • P P Craig, 'Miller, the Legislature and the Executive ' in M Sunkin and S Juss (eds), Landmark Cases in Public Law (Hart Publishing 2017)
  • H Eidenmüller, 'Negotiating and Mediating Brexit' (2017) 2016 Pepperdine Law Review 39
  • H Eidenmüller (ed), Negotiating Brexit (Hart 2017)
  • JA Armour and Horst Eidenmueller (eds), Negotiating Brexit (Beck/Hart 2017)
    Brexit is on its way. By mid 2019, the UK will no longer be a member of the European Union and its new relationship with the EU will be have taken shape. Getting to that point will involve complex negotiations untangling legal, economic and political issues. This volume brings together leading commentators to examine three crucial questions on the risk, the negotiating framework and the process.
    ISBN: 9781509919987
  • R Ekins, 'Objects of Interpretation' (2017) 32 Constitutional Commentary 1
  • H Eidenmüller, 'Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) und Consumer ADR: Ein Plädoyer für die Online-Verbraucher(schieds)gerichtsbarkeit' in (ed), Bitburger Gespräche – Jahrbuch 2016: Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit und private Justiz: Rechtspolitische Herausforderungen (C H Beck 2017)
  • R Widdershoven and P P Craig, 'Pertinent Issues of Judicial Accountability in EU Shared Enforcement ' in M Scholten and M Luchtmann (eds), Law Enforcement by EU Authorities, Implications for Political and Judicial Accountability (Edward Elgar 2017)
  • S R Weatherill, Principles and Practice in EU Sports Law (Oxford University Press 2017)
    ISBN: 978-0-19-879365-6
  • P P Craig, 'Process: Brexit and the Anatomy of Article 50 ' in F Fabbrini (ed), The Law & Politics of Brexit (Oxford University Press 2017)
  • P P Craig, 'Proportionality and Judicial Review: A UK Historical Perspective ' in S Vogenauer and S Weatherill (eds), General Principles of Law, European and Comparative Perspectives (Hart Publishing 2017)
  • G Dinwoodie and M Richardson, 'Publicity Right, Personality Right, or Just Confusion?' in M Richardson and S Ricketson (eds), Research Handbook on Intellectual Property in Media and Entertainment (Edward Elgar 2017)
    There is little consensus internationally as to whether and how the law should respond when celebrities find themselves subjected to unwanted public discussions of their private lives in the media (increasingly on a global basis online), and when their personal attributes are referenced without their consent in certain kinds of advertising and trade. A number of commentators have characterized such intrusions on a celebrity’s personal dignity or autonomy as simply falling among the minor inconveniences of being a celebrity, insufficient to warrant legal protection given important social values such as freedom of speech and cultural pluralism. The lack of consensus is reflected in the uncertain shifting legal lines drawn around celebrity protection, especially in common law jurisdictions which, unlike many civil law jurisdictions, do not adhere to the idea of a full-scale personality right. In this chapter, we canvass the diverse devices that the common law courts have deployed to deal with the grant of celebrity rights. We note and support the messy multivalence we find recognised in common law approaches given the range of dynamic interests that are at play. Such heterogeneity of values might also be relevant to the curtailment of celebrity rights. Thus, we equally support a flexible approach to the limitations, defences and other points at which discretion may be exercised by judges to find a balance between the interests/rights that may be claimed for celebrities (human and otherwise) in controlling the uses of their personal attributes in advertising and trade, and the countervailing interests/rights that others may seek to maintain including in freedom of speech and cultural pluralism.
  • J Adams-Prassl, 'Reconsidering the Notion of “Employer” in the Era of the Fissured Workplace in the UK: Should Labour Law Responsibilities Exceed the Boundaries of the Legal Entity?' (2017) 95 Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations 81
    Also published in H Nakakubo and T Araki (eds), Reconsidering the Notion of “Employer” in the Era of Fissured Workplace: Should Labour Law Responsibilities Exceed the Boundary of the Legal Entity? (JILPT Report No. 15/2016) 73-94.
  • P P Craig, Herwig Hofmann, Jens-Peter Schneider and Jacques Ziller, ReNEUAL Model Rules on EU Administrative Procedure (Oxford University Press 2017)
  • L Enriques, 'Società per azioni' (2017) X Giuffrè Editore Enciclopedia del diritto. Annali. 958
  • AE Ezrachi, 'Sponge ' (2017) The Journal of Antitrust Enforcement
    When government officials argue for purity, one would expect raised eyebrows. But few question competition officials who, in speeches in foreign lands, praise the “purity” of competition law. They warn the hosts of polluting competition policy with social, ethical, and moral concerns. They warn of industrial policy, regulation, and rent-seeking. After the hosts provide dinner, the competition officials leave for the airport, where they prepare the same speech for another audience. The hosts will politely agree on the key objectives that competition policy should promote, but beneath this veneer, ill-defined terminology, open-ended goals and differences in enforcement philosophy remain. Differences, in one’s understanding of the ends of competition law often transform into a ‘purity battle’ – the claim that competition analysis has been polluted by some, and that a pure approach, as propagated by others, would deliver better, optimal results. Often, these claims accompany large transactions, state aid, and foreign jurisdictions, possibly threatening the domination of national champions through enforcement of their competition laws. Sometimes these claims will be made by the competition agency. Sometimes by politicians or leading corporations. At times, the true source of the claim – politics, business, law or economics – may be hard to ascertain. This is not to say that purity arguments are without merit. A consensus exists that competition law cannot be all things to all people: a panacea for every policy concern, ranging from labour to the protection of national champions. And yet, the pretence of purity may be misleading as it propagates a mirage of objectivity, clarity and analytical superiority – traits that are not always present. Indeed, competition law is often perceived as a stable discipline. In fact, one is often reminded that competition law must be based on economic considerations and reject external social, or political objectives. This paper argues that this appealing view – which embodies a sense of purity – is merely an illusion. It ignores the ‘sponge-like’ characteristics of the law – its susceptibility to national peculiarities originating in its design and evident in its application and its exposure to intellectual and regulatory capture. While the idea of a stable, predictable and economically-based antitrust discipline is in all of our interests, these traits are not inherent to the law. They are forced onto the sponge in an attempt to ‘discipline’ its natural tendencies, and propagated as reality, to support its legitimacy.