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  • P P Craig, 'Miller, the Legislature and the Executive ' in M Sunkin and S Juss (eds), Landmark Cases in Public Law (Hart Publishing 2017)
  • P P Craig, 'Proportionality and Judicial Review: A UK Historical Perspective ' in S Vogenauer and S Weatherill (eds), General Principles of Law, European and Comparative Perspectives (Hart Publishing 2017)
  • P P Craig and M Markakis, 'The Euro Area, its Regulation and Impact on Non-Euro Member States' in P Koutakos and J Snell (eds), The Law of the EU’s Internal Market (Elgar 2017)
  • S R Weatherill, The internal market as a legal concept (OUP 2017)
  • P P Craig, 'Transnational Constitution-Making: The Contribution of the Venice Commission on Law and Democracy ' (2017) 2 UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, and Comparative Law 57
  • P P Craig, Administrative Law (8th Sweet & Maxwell 2016)
  • A Ezrachi and M. E. Stucke, 'Artificial Intelligence & Collusion: When Computers Inhibit Competition' (2016) University of Illinois Law Review
    Winner of the 2016 ‘Concurences’ prize for best article on collusion.
  • P P Craig, 'Brexit: A Drama in Six Acts ' (2016) 41 European Law Review 447
  • S R Weatherill, Cases and Materials on EU Law (12th ed OUP 2016)
  • P P Craig, 'Comitology, Rulemaking and the Lisbon Settlement: Tensions and Strains' in C-F Bergstrom and D Ritleng (eds), Rulemaking by the European Commission, The New System for the Delegation of Powers (Oxford University Press 2016)
  • S R Weatherill, Contract Law of the Internal market (Intersentia 2016)
  • A Ezrachi, EU Competition Law, An Analytical Guide to the Leading Cases (5th edn Hart 2016)
  • P P Craig and M Markakis, 'Gauweiler and the Legality of Outright Monetary Transactions' (2016) 41 European Law Review 1
  • P P Craig, 'Global Networks and Shared Administration' in S Cassese (ed), Global Administrative Law (Edward Elgar 2016)
  • S R Weatherill, Law and Values in the European Union (OUP 2016)
  • P P Craig, 'Limits of Law: Reflections from Private and Public Law' in N Barber, R Ekins and P Yowell (eds), Lord Sumption and the Limits of Law (Hart 2016)
  • S R Weatherill, 'Protecting the Internal Market from the Charter' in S. De Vries, U. Bernitz and S. Weatherill (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as a Binding Instrument: Five Years Old and Growing (Oxford: Hart Publishing/ Bloomsbury/ Institute of European and Comparative Law 2016)
  • P P Craig, 'Responsibility, Voice and Exit: Britain Alone?' in P Birkinshaw and A Biondi (eds), Britain Alone! The Implications and Consequences of United Kingdom Exit from the EU (Wolters Kluwer 2016)
  • A Ezrachi, 'Sponge ' (2016) The Journal of Antitrust Enforcement
    When government officials argue for purity, one would expect raised eyebrows. But few question competition officials who, in speeches in foreign lands, praise the “purity” of competition law. They warn the hosts of polluting competition policy with social, ethical, and moral concerns. They warn of industrial policy, regulation, and rent-seeking. After the hosts provide dinner, the competition officials leave for the airport, where they prepare the same speech for another audience. The hosts will politely agree on the key objectives that competition policy should promote, but beneath this veneer, ill-defined terminology, open-ended goals and differences in enforcement philosophy remain. Differences, in one’s understanding of the ends of competition law often transform into a ‘purity battle’ – the claim that competition analysis has been polluted by some, and that a pure approach, as propagated by others, would deliver better, optimal results. Often, these claims accompany large transactions, state aid, and foreign jurisdictions, possibly threatening the domination of national champions through enforcement of their competition laws. Sometimes these claims will be made by the competition agency. Sometimes by politicians or leading corporations. At times, the true source of the claim – politics, business, law or economics – may be hard to ascertain. This is not to say that purity arguments are without merit. A consensus exists that competition law cannot be all things to all people: a panacea for every policy concern, ranging from labour to the protection of national champions. And yet, the pretence of purity may be misleading as it propagates a mirage of objectivity, clarity and analytical superiority – traits that are not always present. Indeed, competition law is often perceived as a stable discipline. In fact, one is often reminded that competition law must be based on economic considerations and reject external social, or political objectives. This paper argues that this appealing view – which embodies a sense of purity – is merely an illusion. It ignores the ‘sponge-like’ characteristics of the law – its susceptibility to national peculiarities originating in its design and evident in its application and its exposure to intellectual and regulatory capture. While the idea of a stable, predictable and economically-based antitrust discipline is in all of our interests, these traits are not inherent to the law. They are forced onto the sponge in an attempt to ‘discipline’ its natural tendencies, and propagated as reality, to support its legitimacy.