



'In-betweens': Institutions of Accountability Workshop

22-23 April 2015

Aim: Establishing and fostering contacts with potential collaborators in a future research program

DAY ONE

08.30 – 9.00	Coffee & Croissants and Registration	
9.00 – 9.30	Introduction <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Introduction Round (introduce your neighbour)• Introduction to the in-betweens, aims of the workshop	Sofie and other Inbetweeners
9.30- 10:00	What do we talk of when we talk about accountability? Mark Bovens, 20 min Discussion, 10 min	Moderator: Arne Tostensen
10.00– 12.00 (2h)	Stream 1: Institutional arrangements I <i>What are the structural conditions that would have to be in place for these institutions to function effectively?</i> Intro Arne (concept note) – 10 min Effectiveness of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) of Bangladesh - Sk. Tawfique M. Haque – 20 min Citizens' Trust in Anti-Corruption Agencies: Bangladesh and Nepal Compared - Ishtiaq Jamil, Steinar Askvik, and H. M. Baniamin – 20 min An analysis on the role of Institutional arrangement and Administrative culture in the functionality of Anti-Corruption Agencies in Sub-Saharan Africa. An empirical evidence from Kenya - Gedion Onyango - 20 min Discussant: 10 min General discussion: 40 min	Moderator: Per Læg Reid Discussant: Tek Nath Dhakal
12.00– 13.00	Lunch	
13.00 – 14.50 (2 h)	Stream 1: Institutional arrangements II Rethinking the Role of National Institutions in Ethiopia: the Human Rights Commission and the Ombudsman - Solomon M. Gofie – 20 min	Moderator: Ishtiaq Jamil Discussant: Jeff Thindwa

Trusting the middle-man: impact and legitimacy of ombudsmen in Europe - Naomi Creutzfeldt - 20 min

The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: National Human Rights Ombudsman Institutions as Non-Judicial Remedies- Linda Reif 20 min

Discussant: 10 min

General Discussion: 30 min

14.50-15.00

Coffee

15.00 – 16.50

Stream 2: International standardisation I

Moderator: Aranzazu Guillan Montero

(1h50)

How does international standardisation and cooperation influence the working of national accountability institutions?

Discussant: Linda Reif

Intro Hugo, 10 min

Institutional Logics and Professional Identities: A Case of Public Auditors in Sub-Saharan Africa - James Hathaway, 20 min

Isomorphism or Contingency: What ways are ACAs going? - Sofie Schuette, 20 min

Standardization and diffusion: The case of standards for national human rights institutions - Hugo Stokke, 20 min

Discussant: 10 min

General discussion: 30 min

18.30

Meeting at Fløybanen Station

19.00- 21.00

Workshop dinner on Mt Fløyen

DAY TWO

9.00 – 9.30

Reflections on day 1

Moderator: Sofie Schuette

- Summary 10 min, James
- Comments from Mark 20 min

9.30- 10.10

Stream 3: Responsiveness and effectiveness

Moderator: Jeff Thindwa

(50 min)

How responsive and effective are inbetweens in addressing public accountability concerns and secondly, are they in a position to decisively effect public policy?

Discussant: Arne Tostensen

Intro Arantxa – 10 min

Legitimacy of Supreme Audit Institutions. A comparative study on how auditees in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Estonia perceive their SAIs legitimacy. - Kristin Reichborn-Kjennerud – 20 min

The political economy of citizen engagement with Supreme

	Audit Institutions: Implications for audit responsiveness and effectiveness, Aranzazu Guillan Montero 20 min	
10.10-10.30	Coffee	
10.30 -12.00	Advancing citizen engagement in Paraguay: the Comptrollers' General approach to participatory instruments and strategies - Carolina Cornejo 20 min	
(1h30)	From Openness to Real Accountability: Why We Need to Think about Accountability Ecosystems -Brendan Halloran 20 min	
	Discussant: 20 min	
	General discussion: 30 min	
12.00 - 13.00	Lunch	
13.00– 14.30	Stream 2: International standardisation II	Moderator: Hugo Stokke
(1h30)	Pressure for performance in public sector accountability - a study of developing countries and emerging economies - André Loozekoot 20 min	Discussant: Mark Bovens
	Anchoring Horizontal in Vertical Mechanisms of Public Accountability - Joseph Corkin 20 min	
	Discussant: 10 min	
	General discussion: 30 min	
14.30- 15.00	Ways forward: grant and publication opportunities	Facilitator: Aranzazu Guillan Montero
15.30– 16.30	Panel: Measuring Accountability	(open to public)
(1h20)	Institutions of Accountability: Measuring their output, performance and impact - Elin Bergmann 15 min	Moderator: Steinar Asvik
	Mark Bovens 15 min	Discussant: Jesper Johnson
	Discussant: 10 min	
	Q&A 20 min	
16.30-16.40	Closing and drinks	

Abstracts in order of agenda

Effectiveness of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) of Bangladesh:

Institutional and Political Dimensions

Sk. Tawfique M. Haque and Shehreen Amin Monami

This paper analyzes the possible influence and impacts of different political and institutional factors on the effectiveness of National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) of Bangladesh. The NHRC serves as the national human rights watchdog, advocating for and monitoring implementation of state obligations to protection and the fulfillment of the rights of Bangladeshi citizens. It is supposed to address specific human rights complaints through investigation, mediation, conciliation and more broadly, through raising public awareness. As provided in the Paris Principles to be truly independent, a national human rights institution needs to be: a) established by a distinct law or legislation; b) financially solvent and able to act independently with respect to budget and expenditures; c) autonomous of any state agency or entity in carrying out its administrative functions. These institutional and political parameters have been used in this paper to measure the effectiveness of the NHRC. The commission undertook quite a few initiatives in last two years (2012-13) for the protection and promotion of human rights. Its role was mostly limited to awareness raising activities like providing trainings, organizing seminars and workshops and conducting research. With regard to the protection of human rights, activities of the NHRC were largely limited to writing letters to relevant government authorities. The case studies used in this paper show that the NHRC did not perform affectively in accomplishing one of its critical mandates: fact-finding of human rights violations. The chairperson of the commission paid solidarity visits to places of gross human rights violation. However, systematic and institutional level fact finding missions, with clear guidelines and expertise are not evident. The commission lacks an effective institutional framework and adequate human resources to unleash the potential of national institution like this. Moreover the political influence in case of selecting commission members, lack of cooperation from the executive bodies specifically law enforcing agencies, accepting complaints with partisan mindset were the major challenging factors of the commission.

Dr. Sk. Tawfique M. Haque is the Director and Associate Professor of Public Policy and Governance (PPG) program under Department of Political Science and Sociology of North South University, Bangladesh. His areas of academic and research interest include governance theories in Hinduism and Islam, local governance, globalization, organization behavior and international trade. Dr. Haque has published edited books, book chapters and research papers in international and national peer reviewed journals in the field of administrative culture, models of governance, institutional accountability, local civil society, women empowerment and development management.

Shehreen Amin Bhuiyan is working as a Research Associate at Public Policy and Governance (PPG) program of Department of Political Science and Sociology of North South University, Bangladesh. Her research interest covers higher education policy, public governance, gender sensitivity in public and private organization, gender equity and new public management.

Citizens' Trust in Anti-Corruption Agencies: Bangladesh and Nepal Compared

Ishtiaq Jamil, Steinar Askvik, and H. M. Baniamin (UiB)

Citizens' trust in public institutions is an indication of citizen's respect for a particular institution and that it is performing according to normative rules. This enhances legitimacy and greater acceptance among people. This paper analyzes citizens' trust in anti-corruption agencies in Bangladesh and Nepal. The data are derived from trust surveys carried out in 2008(Nepal) and 2009 (Bangladesh), and 2014 (Nepal and Bangladesh). If trust increases between these two time periods, it is a sign of greater legitimacy of this institution in society. That means the agencies are delivering and performing and as such have earned citizens' confidence. In contrast, if the opposite is true then we would observe a declining trust in this institutions and that these institutions are not performing or achieving the objectives they have been created for, viz. checking corruption and misappropriation of public property for personal gain. Increased trust is also an indication of the process of institution building.

Our hypotheses is that the anti-corruption agency in Nepal will have greater independence and less political interference because of its constitutional embodiment in comparison to Bangladesh where it is an executive body and as such has been made inactive by political interference. Also due to the equality of power sharing in Nepal, no single party has managed to form a majority government. This means that the government's influence on this constitutional body is curtailed and the anti-corruption agency can act more independently of political authorities. On the other hand Bangladesh is dominated by a single party majority of an authoritarian nature which has impeded this body's independence and makes it act according to political signals. Our survey data will provide an opportunity to examine trends in the popular trust of the two anti-corruption agencies in question. In addition we can also map to what extent such trends in trust are linked to how various groups perceive corruption in the public and private sectors of Nepal and Bangladesh.

Hasan Muhammad Baniamin is a PhD candidate at the Department of Administration and Organization Theory in the University of Bergen. His current research work is about institutional performance and trust with particular focus on three South Asian countries (Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh). He has a number journal articles, book chapters, working papers and books. His publications cover different areas which include e-governance, corruption/public service ethics, migration, national ID card, poverty, public sector training, local governance and public financial management, higher education, millennium development goals etc.

An analysis on the role of Institutional arrangement and Administrative culture in the functionality of Anti-Corruption Agencies in Sub-Saharan Africa. An empirical evidence from Kenya

(Gedion Onyango, PhD Fellow, School of Government, University of the Western Cape, SA)

This paper aims to examine the role of institutional arrangement and the influences of the existing administrative culture (formal and informal or practical norms) on the functionality of Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs) in regard to the implementation of anti-corruption policies in an African context. This is a topic which hitherto has been under-researched in sub-Saharan Africa as evidenced by the fact that a variety of studies on corruption have failed to shed light on how appropriate anti-corruption policies may be designed and implemented. In particular, in regard to the ACA's efforts in creating and enforcing codes of conduct and parameters of accountability in the expenditure of public funds and management of resources. Reflective of this, this paper seeks to empirically analyse how the institutional positioning of ACA and the general administrative culture in the Kenyan public sector affects implementation of anti-corruption strategies in the country. Thus by adopting an approach which combines elements of cultural institutionalism, regime type and organizational theory, the paper aims to go beyond the institutional positioning of ACA and regime type arguments to also establish the influences of administrative culture on the implementation of anti-corruption strategies in sub-Saharan African context.

Rethinking the Role of National Institutions in Ethiopia: the Human Rights Commission and the Ombudsman

Solomon M. Gofie, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Addis Ababa University

This is a study on National Institutions/ NIs in Ethiopia and it attempts to explore the role of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission/EHRC and the Institution of the Ombudsman/ IO, from the perspectives of the people in different parts of Ethiopia concerning the effectiveness and responsiveness of public institutions in general and the national institutions in particular. General observations, in fact, indicate that these institutions in Ethiopia have been attempting to deal with complaints of citizens regarding violations of human rights, lack of respect of the rule of law, lack of responsiveness of public institutions, and questions regarding accountability of state officials at various levels. Understandably, these institutions were formed and they have assumed their respective roles in a challenging political setting and therefore their situations have to be assessed not only against international norms and standards such as the Paris Principles, but they should also be examined by looking into their circumstances in specific context in Ethiopia. In other words, experiences of individuals and societal groups in their relationships with state institutions in Ethiopia provide an immediate context in undertaking a study on the role of these institutions.

Therefore, the study while recognizing the role of national institutions in promoting and protecting human rights, in strengthening the rule of law, in complementing efforts aimed at institutionalizing accountability, the effectiveness and responsiveness of these institutions is decidedly affected by the current forms of state-

society relations in Ethiopia. This paper explains this state of affairs on the basis of empirical study conducted by the writer in Ethiopia.

Solomon Mebrie M. Gofie is currently Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Addis Ababa University in Ethiopia, where he also served as the Chair of the Department (2009-2011). Human rights, state-society relations, transnational involvement in the Horn of Africa the politics of elections, conflict analysis and peace building, citizenship and political communities in the Horn of Africa, migration and transnationalism. He taught courses in political theory, international relations, international law and organizations, human rights, African politics, and research methodology. His PhD is in Political Science, University of Manchester, United Kingdom and holds MA in Human Rights from the University of Oslo, Norway, and his BA was in Political Science and International Relations with minor in public Administration, from Addis Ababa University.

Trusting the middle-man: impact and legitimacy of ombudsmen in Europe

Naomi Creutzfeldt (Wolfson, Oxford)

To measure responsiveness and effectiveness of an accountability institution can be approached from many angles. I choose an empirical bottom-up approach to look at ombudsman intuitions in Europe. The following questions guide my study: What makes people trust institutions and what guides their attitudes towards informal pathways to resolve complaints?

The data was collected over 6 months, in 14 different ombudsman schemes (public and private) in Germany, UK and France. The dataset is a rich mixture of consumer satisfaction surveys and interviews. The findings reveal what factors contribute to peoples trust in institutions and how they vary according to country as well as according to specific sectors (ex. telecoms, financial services, public authority), in public and private settings. Citizens using a public sector ombudsman to complain about the accountability of a public body are seeking an apology and hoping for systemic change; consumers complaining through a private sector ombudsman are more focuses on their individual dispute and are seeking a 'quick fix'. This has a significant effect on people's expectations towards an trust in an ombudsman institution. This research is timely, especially for private sector ombudsmen (ADR) as the consumer ADR directive 2013/11/EU has to be implemented by June 2015 in all the EU member states.

Dr Naomi Creutzfeldt is an ESRC Research Fellow at the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies at the University of Oxford. Since 2010 Naomi is working with Prof Christopher Hodges as part of the Research Programme in European and Comparative Civil Justice Systems, specializing on Alternative Dispute Resolution for consumers in Europe. Since October 2013 Naomi is conducting a three year ESRC funded project on: Trusting the middle-man: impact and legitimacy of Ombudsmen in Europe. <http://www.law.ox.ac.uk/projects/Ombudsmen>. Naomi is a member of the Law and Society Association (USA), the Socio-Legal Studies Association (UK) and an individual associate member of the Ombudsman Association. Naomi is a member of the executive committee of the SLSA, and on the steering committee of the Foundation for Law, Justice and Society at Wolfson College, and a Fellow of Wolfson College. Naomi is also an ADR group Accredited Civil & Commercial Mediator.

The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: National Human Rights Ombudsman Institutions as Non-Judicial Remedies

Linda C. Reif, CN Professor of International Trade

The UN human rights system has responded to the negative impact of business on human rights through the development of a soft law framework. In 2011, the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Guiding Principles) were endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council. The Guiding Principles implement the 2008 "Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework (Ruggie report). They rest on a 3-pillar foundation. Pillar 1 is the state's duty to protect against human rights abuse by third parties, including businesses. Pillar 2 is the corporate responsibility to respect human rights. Pillar 3 addresses the need to improve access by victims to effective judicial and non-judicial remedies for business-related human rights abuse. The Guiding Principles commentary states that national human rights institutions (NHRIs) "have a particularly important role to play" as non-judicial remedies. NHRIs are "in-between" accountability institutions. As a result, they also fall within states' duties under Pillar 1. The UN places emphasis on those NHRIs that have ICC (International Coordinating

Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights) A-status accreditation, denoting their full compliance with the Paris Principles. Only national-level human rights commissions/institutes and national-level human rights ombudsman institutions with broad human rights promotion and protection mandates obtain ICC A-status NHRI accreditation.

This paper will address the roles and abilities of national human rights ombudsman institutions in implementing the Guiding Principles under Pillars 1 and 3. Case studies of a few human rights ombudsman institutions that have the requisite legal frameworks and strong operating practices to increase accountability under Pillars 1 and 3 will be provided. However, these are exceptional bodies given the current institutional landscape. This paper will also explore the barriers that many human rights ombudsman institutions encounter in trying to implement the Guiding Principles and promote state and corporate accountability. For example, many human rights ombudsman institutions cannot investigate private sector conduct, some do not have explicit human rights promotion mandates and others have circumscribed promotional roles. Alternatives for improving the role of national human rights ombudsman institutions as accountability mechanisms under Pillars 1 and 3 will be canvassed.

Institutional Logics and Professional Identities: A Case of Public Auditors in Sub-Saharan Africa

James Hathaway (UiB)

My paper is a case study at the Office of Auditor General of Zambia (OAGZ). It draws on data from a recent fact-finding trip at the OAGZ and builds toward a PhD project on institution building within supreme audit institutions (SAIs) in Sub-Saharan Africa. Since 2003, the OAGZ has undertaken organizational reforms as part of a development project in cooperation with donors from the North. From the data collected so far, it seems that there have been significant formal and informal changes at the OAGZ, which came as a result of international collaborations. The OAGZ has adopted professional standards via international collaborations with INTOSAI, AFROSAI-E, and the Office of Auditor General Norway. At the same time, there have been changes in ways officers interact with each other and with their environment – respondents have described this change as moving from an organization that is secretive, closed, and rigid to one that is open, flexible, and competitive. I am looking at these changes as shifts in institutional logics, which can be described as the socially constructed processes, values, assumptions, and beliefs that provide meaning and shape individual action. As a starting point, I use an existing typology of two institutional logics the legalistic-bureaucratic logic and the managerial logic, as well theories relevant to the Sub-Saharan context such as patrimonialism and the economy of affection. Data shows there has been a shift toward a managerial logic as a result of institutional entrepreneurship. These findings are preliminary, based on field notes from two weeks of qualitative research. As the research project develops, it will add to the development literature related to SAIs as well as to literature on institutional theory, since it takes perspectives that are often used in the North and applies them to the study of organizational change in the South.

The dynamics of diffusion of organizations of accountability:

Would international standards make anti-corruption agencies more effective?

Sofie Schuette (U4/CMI)

This paper constitutes the nucleus of a grant application to systematically and empirically investigate the spread of anti-corruption authorities, their design and powers and what effect these factors have on their effectiveness. Embedded in a broader study of diffusion and standardization of in-between institutions of accountability, comparisons will be sought with the dynamics of the standardization of human rights commissions, ombud commissions and supreme audit institutions. The objectives of the project are (1) to systematize and enrich the evidence base about the diffusion of in-between institutions of accountability; (2) to further develop the theory on diffusion and standardization, drawing on new institutionalism, international relations, and what has been labelled Scandinavian institutionalism; and (3) to provide policy recommendations on what kind of standardization approaches can help these institutions fulfil their mandates better.

Sofie Arjon Schütte is a program advisor at the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre/Chr. Michelsen Institute, where she conducts and commissions research, provides policy advice, and delivers training for U4 partners and broader audiences. She leads U4's thematic work on the justice sector and anticorruption agencies. She

previously worked as an advisor to the Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia (UNDP) and as an integrated expert for the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission in Jakarta. Sofie holds a Masters degree in Southeast Asian Studies, Business & Economics, and Sociology from the University of Passau, Germany. In 2012, she completed her PhD on the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission at the University of Melbourne, Australia.

Standardization and diffusion: The case of standards for national human rights institutions

Hugo Stokke (CMI)

Human rights as a legal topic is highly standardized both at global and regional levels. In addition to the global legal treaties, there are regional treaties which are binding on states. National human rights institutions (NHRIs) are types of in-between agencies, created by individual states, yet designed to keep a watchful eye on state performance. Their mandate may vary considerably from state to state and in some cases there are institutions at the subnational, even municipal levels. Standardization is a typical example of soft law, as the so-called Paris Principles are not binding on states, yet may have an important role in assessing the legitimacy and in evaluating the performance of states. The purpose is to have a close look at the Principles and to see how they have been diffused to all parts of the world and to draw lessons from their applications to national human rights institutions. In particular we are interested in following discussions in fora for NHRIs globally and regionally to get a view on how standardization has worked for NHRIs and whether there is a sense of maintaining or reforming the applicable standards, drawing on experiences over the last decades.

Hugo Stokke is a political scientist focusing on human rights research. He is currently engaged in work on international organisations with a focus on the ILO and on national human rights institutions and ombud institutions as accountability mechanisms. Recent published work include human rights in EU foreign policy, human rights in development policy, child rights in Kenya, indigenous rights in Norway and multiculturalism in the Nordic countries.

Legitimacy of Supreme Audit Institutions. A comparative study on how auditees in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Estonia perceive their SAIs legitimacy.

Kristin Reichborn-Kjennerud (Senior Researcher Department of Public Management, Oslo and Akershus University College of Applied Sciences)

Research on legitimacy demonstrates how organizations must live up to accountability standards to be acknowledged and included in the social categories they strive for. Worldwide models constructed and propagated through global cultural and associational processes are highly rationalized and legitimate and provide such accountability standards. These world models also include standards for good governance to secure accountability. Standards of Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) proscribed by the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions can be categorized within these models for good governance. Major stakeholders use relevant accountability standards to assess organizations that belong to specific social categories. The SAIs most important stakeholders are the parliament, the "people"/the media and the audited civil servants, which is the social group most familiar with the SAIs role and work.

In this paper we look at the audited civil servants perception of their SAIs. These stakeholders know the accountability standards of the SAIs well. At the same time they are held to account and may have interest in opposing the SAIs criticism. How auditees acknowledges the SAIs work might both be an indicator of different administrative cultures but also an indicator of the quality and strategy of the SAI in question.

We use data from 645 different audited civil servants in Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Estonia and Finland to analyze and explain to what extent the SAIs are perceived as a legitimate institution by one of their most important stakeholders.

Logistic regression analysis demonstrates that Estonia is conceived as less legitimate by their auditees than the Nordic countries. Tendencies to conduct compliance audit over audits emphasizing results or activities also reduces legitimacy. Sensitivity to the auditees own considerations about audit topics, the quality of performance audit reports and their ability to contribute to actual change in the audited organization contributed positively to the SAIs legitimacy

Kristin Reichborn-Kjennerud holds a postdoctoral position at the Oslo and Akershus University College. The project is comparative and studies the influence of performance audit on politics and public administration in the Nordic countries. In the project process also other countries and research questions pertaining to accountability have been added (Estonia, Spain, Italy and Uganda). Kristin is a PhD from the University of Bergen. In her PhD she explored how the Norwegian Supreme Audit Institution influenced the civil servants.

The political economy of citizen engagement with Supreme Audit Institutions: Implications for audit responsiveness and effectiveness

Aranzazu Guillan Montero (U4/CMI)

Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) have increasingly adopted transparency and participatory mechanisms. Engagement with citizens and other stakeholders, it is hoped, will improve SAIs' ability to communicate with the public, be responsive to citizen demands, and enhance the effectiveness and impact of audit institutions. At the national level, SAIs increasingly encourage the adoption of citizen engagement practices in the appointment of authorities and throughout the audit cycle. They aim to take advantage of increased citizen engagement to identify areas of mismanagement and corruption, produce information on government performance that is relevant to citizens, and overcome some of the obstacles that inhibit SAIs role thereby contributing to the implementation of audit recommendations.

A stocktaking of 32 SAIs from around the world (Guillan Montero 2014) shows significant innovation in the adoption of engagement practices, but also reveals that SAIs' engagement strategies are very different and face real implementation challenges. This paper explores the political economy of the development of SAIs' mechanisms for citizen engagement. Through a comparative analysis of country cases (Costa Rica, Philippines, Korea), the paper will trace the development of citizen engagement strategies. It will examine how SAIs in these countries have made significant efforts to adopt policies and mechanisms that encourage the disclosure of information and the involvement of citizens in the audit process. These cases help understand how and why do improvements in SAIs transparency and participation come about and are sustained, outlining some of the key factors and causal mechanisms that contribute to improved SAIs responsiveness and eventually effectiveness. The paper complements ongoing research by the author to map the outcomes of citizen engagement with SAIs and understand the conditions under which these practices might lead to improved public accountability.

Advancing citizen engagement in Paraguay: the Comptrollers' General approach to participatory instruments and strategies

Carolina Cornejo (Fortalecimiento de las Instituciones Democráticas)

The agenda on citizen engagement in public oversight has come a long way along the past decade. International normative instruments have brought supreme audit institutions to the front stage, acknowledging that their mandate as horizontal accountability agencies is not restricted to fiscal surveillance and to curbing corruption, but that they can also contribute to good governance and to improving the lives of citizens. Hence, global standards addressing SAI-citizen engagement (namely, ISSAI N° 20, 21, and 12) have paved the way for increased collaboration with citizens.

In this scenario, Latin America is regarded as the region where participatory policies are more widespread (OECD, 2014), though not homogeneously distributed among national SAIs. This paper will examine the case of the Paraguayan Comptroller's General (CGR, for its acronym in Spanish). Since 2008, the CGR has set in practice innovative mechanisms to raise social awareness and promote citizens' active commitment with transparency and public accountability. Channels for filing citizen complaints, accountability fairs, citizen watchdogs, and thematic workshops with specialized NGOs are some of the instruments the CGR has been handling through its Department of Citizen Control.

Based on the Paraguayan experience, this paper will broadly explore the citizen engagement mechanisms developed by the CGR and examine the determinants which may have played a significant role in the decision to embark on participatory initiatives, as well as the challenges faced along the process. In an effort to assess the political economy of citizen engagement, we foresee that analyzing the key factors which may influence policy implementation can help extract some lessons of potential value to other accountability institutions envisioning increased interaction with the citizenry.

Finally, it is important to note that research for this paper included: revision of projects and annual reports by the CGR -among other institutional publications-; relevant literature on the subject, as well as interviews with CGR officials, representatives from donor agencies that supported projects concerning citizen engagement by the CGR, and representatives from civil society organizations that have been involved in -and addressed by- participatory mechanisms implemented by the CGR.

Carolina Cornejo is Project Coordinator on Oversight Institutions at the Civil Association for Equality and Justice (ACIJ), a non-profit organization aimed at defending disadvantaged groups and strengthening democracy in Argentina. Since 2010, Carolina has been managing the implementation of the TPA Initiative, a Latin American network that seeks to strengthen public control systems through articulation between horizontal accountability institutions and citizens. She has been conducting research, writing reports and publishing articles on policies and mechanisms implemented by regional Supreme Audit Institutions to promote transparency and civic participation. To continually encourage and deepen debate, she has presented in regional meetings and international forums, and assisted in the development of capacity building programs for SAIs. Carolina holds a degree in Political Science from the University of Buenos Aires and is a M.A. candidate in Development Management and Policy (Georgetown University).

From Openness to Real Accountability: Why We Need to Think about Accountability Ecosystems

Brendan Halloran (Program Officer, Impact and Learning, Transparency and Accountability Initiative)

This paper will explore 'accountability ecosystems' as a conceptual framework for addressing transparency and accountability in the context of the current enthusiasm for 'openness'. The transparency and accountability community is moving away from 'silver bullet' solutions towards a greater appreciation of context and interest in 'strategic' and 'politically informed' approaches. This paper will explore why a more systematic perspective on accountability challenges is necessary and how such an approach can provide a framework for bringing together emerging insights. Accountability ecosystems include actors, institutions, processes and contextual features that shape government responsiveness and accountability. This paper will discuss how approaches to strengthening accountability institutions and processes must go beyond simple 'supply and demand' and 'short and long routes to accountability' dichotomies, or assumptions about the relationships between transparency, citizen engagement and accountability. Instead, a systems approach prioritizes both horizontal and vertical integration and linking pro-accountability actors into broader coalitions, a necessary complement to the current focus on open government and open data.

This paper will integrate elements of 'thinking and working politically' and 'strategic' efforts to address accountability into an 'accountability ecosystems' framework. Both of these strands share an emphasis on political analysis, contextually-sensitive tactics, reflective learning, and flexibility and adaptation, and are characterized by diverse, mutually-reinforcing and vertically-integrated campaigns and strategies. Thinking systematically about strengthening accountability institutions and processes provides an analytical framework for leveraging of multiple efforts (including external funding, support and initiatives) to address the range of relevant components of government responsiveness and accountability necessary to effectively and sustainably improve specific service delivery and rights protections. This paper will explore how understanding the accountability system allows pro-reform actors to better target opportunities for greater long-term impact, beyond a simplistic focus on 'scaling up'.

Brendan Halloran is a Program Officer for Impact and Learning at the Transparency and Accountability Initiative. Brendan's work aims to support practitioners, funders and researchers to increase and use their learning about where, when and how transparency and accountability initiatives succeed (and don't). Brendan coordinates TALEARN, a community of practice involving individuals from these different groups, all working on transparency and accountability work from all around the world, who want to come together to engage and learn from each other. Brendan is also involved supporting, interpreting and disseminating new research and other learning efforts around transparency and accountability issues. Prior to joining the Transparency and Accountability Initiative, Brendan spent five years in Guatemala researching and working on governance issues.

Pressure for performance in public sector accountability - a study of developing countries and emerging economies

André Loozekoot, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (policy coordinator) & Erasmus University Rotterdam (PhD student)

Some governments are more accountable than others. Accountable governments reduce the space for abuse of power and strengthen a democracy. The objective of this paper is to understand which institutional pressures can explain the performance of key accountability mechanisms: The financial committees of parliament and the Supreme Audit Institute.

There are high levels of similarity in public management reforms. In general, when institutions become more similar, this can be explained by isomorphic theory, and in particular institutional isomorphism. In this paper 'isomorphic pressures' are studied and translated into regression models for the parliamentary budget committee, the public accounts committee and the supreme audit institute.

The empirical results show that isomorphic pressures can offer some explanation for the performance. Parliamentary committees of finance get positive pressures from regional economic networks and more fiscal transparency in the country. Corruption is a negative pressure on the parliamentary budget committee, associated with systems of clientelism in the public sector. Robust pressures for SAIs come from active participation in professional networks like INTOSAI and the countervailing power of women in accountability mechanisms.

Andre Loozekoot (1970) studied Development Economics and Environmental Economics at Wageningen University (The Netherlands). He worked as an economist for Oxfam International in West-Africa and the Horn of Africa (1999-2002) and held several positions at the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including postings in Burkina-Faso (1996 – 1999), Zambia (2006-2008) and at the Dutch team for the UN climate negotiations (2010 – 2014). Andre is currently governance advisor and coordinator of the annual planning cycle at the Financial and Economic Affairs Department of the Ministry. Since 2010 he combines his interests in economic governance, change management and Africa in a PhD research called: "Public financial accountability to parliament and supreme audit institutes in Sub-Sahara Africa" at the department of Public Administration of Erasmus University Rotterdam (The Netherlands).

Anchoring Horizontal in Vertical Mechanisms of Public Accountability

Joseph Corkin, Middlesex University, London

As regulatory problems assume increasingly complex, cross-border dimensions, regulation increasingly happens beyond state institutions and their legitimating frameworks. Regulatory power is not then always specifically (constitutionally) enabled, traceable back along an unbroken chain of formal (legal) delegations to an elected hierarchy that stands in for an absent people, to discern and articulate their inchoate concerns and diffuse interests, to define the public good and then to transmit that good along the chain. Instead, the public good is increasingly defined at those locations where regulatory power is really exercised, frequently in collaboration with those who are subject to that regulation and have become its co-producers. We need then new ways of understanding how this dispersed regulatory power is, and is not, rendered publically accountable. The paper starts from the insight that if regulation happens less within and through distinct actors and more between them – as they cooperate and compete in ever denser constellations – we might re-think accountability in relational terms; as more the result of horizontal interaction than of the quality of any particular (vertical) links back to any particular locus of democratically legitimated power. All involved are locked into relations of interdependence and mutual constraint, thereby opening up new channels for direct participation. The paper uses this horizontal-vertical distinction conceptually to explore the "in between" institutions that organise these modes of public accountability and normatively to critically evaluate their legitimacy, which it argues will depend always on a subtle blend of the two. The challenge is to anchor horizontal accountabilities, and their functional (particularly reflexive and experimental) benefits, in vertical accountabilities back to elected hierarchies capable of supplying the necessary political impulse, thereby allowing for the democratic renewal of diffused regulatory power. The paper considers the particular "in between" institution of the Transnational Regulatory Network, through which national regulators increasingly interact with direct counterparts in neighbouring jurisdictions. These networks are supposed to institutionalise mutual learning, enabling an open-ended, recursive exploration of differing solutions to shared regulatory problems, in which national regulators

pool information, experiences, knowledge and ideas, jointly reconceptualise common problems and goals, discover new ones, and compare results, frequently leading to regulatory emulation. They have also stretched lines of vertical accountability.

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Institutions of Accountability: Measuring their output, performance and impact

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Since the mid-1990s, international organizations have been supporting the creation Anti-corruption Authorities (ACAs) to address the problem of corruption, leading to a mushrooming of these agencies worldwide. Two decades later, ACAs are still struggling to show a significant impact of their activities on corruption, and, as a consequence, their status as an effective tool for combatting corruption has been questioned. The most significant challenge has been how to accurately measure their performance and in turn their impact. Although the majority of ACAs has established a basic monitoring and evaluation system, identifying indicators that capture not only their outputs, but also their performance and impact has proved extremely difficult. This paper aims at filling this gap in ACAs' measurement by building on the results of the "ACA initiative". This initiative has collected information on performance since 2010 through surveys reaching more than 60 ACAs worldwide. This information has allowed for a systematized analysis of the indicators currently in use. Insights from the survey responses have also informed the design of in-depth case studies looking at ACAs' performance. These studies have further helped practitioners identify potential indicators to measure performance and impact.

Building on the emerging results from the surveys and the case studies, the objective of this paper is to contribute to the discussion on the measurement challenge by analyzing current practice and highlighting innovative examples of performance and impact indicators. The paper distinguishes among the different indicators that can be used to track outputs, performance, impact and, efficiency, often referred to as service standards. In addition, it proposes new indicators that ACAs' should consider to more accurately capture their progress and achievements.

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