Introduction

This article shall attempt to analyze the general rules and principles governing unfair commercial competition in Ethiopia. The elucidations shall be made against a modest background of legal as well as economic doctrinal analysis. In so doing, attempt shall be made to analyse the concept of unfair competition, situations of unfair competition, remedies available to victims of unfair competition, and other issues arising thereof. As a caveat, it should be borne in mind that although unfair commercial competition falls within the proper province of unfair trade practices, which also includes anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominance, and other miscellaneous conducts, this article does not deal with all aspects of unfair trade practices and as such shall be limited to a critical examination of unfair competition.

I. The Need for Unfair Competition Law

It is a fundamental tenet of economic liberalism which, albeit an exceedingly broad doctrine, very roughly refers to “the view that the best economic order is a free market”, that competition is desirable and necessary. Underlying this is the belief that robust competition between commercial rivals keeps prices low, quality high, and provides overall economic efficiency. Competition law rests upon the premise that

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healthy competition is good both for traders and for consumers. In other words, if traders compete on a level playing field, they will flourish, and consumers are more likely to pay lower prices, and get better quality and more choice.

The order contained in a free market was first recognized by Adam Smith. Smith, in his groundbreaking work *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776), discovered the unintended concurrence between individual pursuit of self-interest and public interest as the most remarkable feature of a competitive market economy. In one of the most famous passages of all economics, he contended that notwithstanding the fact that every trader “intends only his own security, only his own gain,…he is led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.” Therefore, for him, an ideal market economy is one in which all goods and services are voluntarily exchanged for money at market prices. However, no economy, in the real world, actually conforms totally to the idealized world of the smoothly functioning invisible hand. Rather, every market economy experiences failures. In particular, markets fail to provide an efficient allocation of resources in the presence of imperfect competition. To combat these conditions, most governments regulate business behavior by enacting competition laws whereby they *inter alia* control the price of basic goods or utilities, prohibit anti-competitive actions such as price fixing and agreeing to divide up markets, and proscribe acts of unfair competition.

Robert Nelson has recognized that the virtues of the market mechanism are fully realized only when “there is a clear limit to self-interest.” Elaborating on this proviso, he writes:

The pursuit of self-interest should not exceed to various forms of opportunism, such as cheating, lying, and other types of deception, misrepresentation, and corruption within the marketplace…Francis Fukuyama comments that “the ability to cooperate socially is dependent on prior habits, traditions, and norms, which themselves serve to structure the market.” As a result, the very ability of a society to maintain “a successful market economy…is codetermined by the prior factor of social capital.” Experience has shown that “a healthy capitalist economy is one in which there will be sufficient social capital in the underlying society to permit businesses, corporations, networks, and the like to be self-organizing.” This social capital is found in such things as attitudes of trust, commitments to honest behavior, respect for property rights, and—perhaps most important in many societies—the bonds of social cohesion that allow for effective collective action (including the maintenance of the market institution itself).

Against this background, we shall attempt to consider the chief objectives which the

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2 In order to avoid verbosity, the term “traders” throughout the text of this article is deliberately used to include business organizations.


4 Quoted in ibid, p30

5 Supra at n.3, p.35

law of unfair competition aspires to realize. One major purpose of unfair competition law is to assure that competition is fairly and properly carried on. The rules against unfair competition aim at securing fair competition for traders through the preservation of goodwill. The second chief aim of the rules against unfair competition is to safeguard consumers’ interest. The first purpose seems direct and self-evident whilst the second would appear to be indirect and remote. The key to understanding this is to grasp the presumption behind the second objective, i.e. that goodwill and consumers’ interests, however divergent, are related. Thus, a certain consumer, who is a habitual customer of a given trader, has a legitimate interest in the preservation of, what Economists call, ‘taste’ through ‘product differentiation’, which in turn can only be achieved through the preservation of the trader’s goodwill, precisely because, in the eyes of the consumer, it is only this trader who can market products or services of his taste. In marketing, product differentiation is the process of distinguishing a product offering from others, to make it more attractive to a particular market. Product differentiation refers to such variations within a product class that (some) consumers view as imperfect substitutes. This involves differentiating it from other competitors’ products. This is why consumer goods are made available in a variety of styles and brands. For the trader, differentiation is a source of competitive advantage. Besides, product differentiation - in quality, packaging, design, color, and style - has an important impact on consumer choice. Thus, the consumers’ interest consists in their right not to be deceived, misled, confused, or wronged as to the business, products/services, or commercial activities of the trader whom they look up to and continue to patronize. In the words of Frauke Henning-Bodewig, “consumer protection is one of the most important objectives of modern unfair competition law.”

Commenting on the evolution the jurisprudence of trademark protection, Besen and Raskind also write “[T]he legal theory of protection was…to prevent a second entrant from unfairly appropriating the value of a successful trademark, service mark, or trade dress. Thus, the protection of trademarks has evolved as a form of indirect protection of the consumer by insuring that purchasing decisions are based on marks that properly identify the product and its source.”

The danger of unfair competition from the viewpoint of traders consists in the erosion or loss of their goodwill. The harm that a competitor does to his rival through unfair competition, in effect, is to cut down or take away his clientele. However, each and every act of taking away a trader’s clients does not amount to an act of unfair competition. This is so, because such clients may be taken away by virtue of honest and proper competition. A case in point is a competitor taking away a good portion of his rival’s clientele by offering a product or service of better quality.

Yet, there are other trade practices that aim at taking away a competitor’s clients and thereby cutting down the goodwill, which are presumed to be unfair and improper.

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and, as such, are prohibited by law. In this sense, commerce is like a game in which competitors must play by the rules, which are the rules against unfair competition.  

The law of unfair competition is primarily comprised of torts that cause an economic injury to a business, through a deceptive or wrongful business practice. In the words of Everett Goldberg, “Unfair competition is a particular type of extra-contractual liability. …Unfair competition is a type of liability based upon fault.” Therefore, unfair competition, as a species of extra-contractual liability, can be broken down into two categories: on the one hand, commercial unfair competition and on the other, civil unfair competition. The definition of commercial unfair competition in Art.133 of the Commercial Code has been supplemented recently by Trade Practice Proclamation No. 329/2003. Besides supplementing the Commercial Code’s definitional provision of unfair commercial competition, the Trade Practice Proclamation broadens its scope of protection. It prohibits four categories of unfair trade practices:

- anti-competitive practices,
- unfair competition,
- abuse of dominance, and
- miscellaneous

Generally, unfair trade practices which may affect trade within Ethiopia are prohibited by the Commercial Code, the Civil Code, Trade Practice Proclamation, Trademarks Registration and Protection Proclamation, and the Criminal Code. However, since the scope of this article is limited to the second category of unfair trade practices known as “unfair competition”, no attempt shall be made to treat the remaining three categories.

II. The Nexus between Business, Goodwill, and Unfair Competition Law

Article 124 of the Commercial Code defines business as “an incorporeal movable consisting of all movable property brought together and organised for the purpose of carrying out any of the commercial activities specified in Art.5 of this Code.” (Italics mine.) Thus, the ultimate essence or quality of any business, as can be gathered from the above definitional provision, is its incorporeality irrespective of the existence of corporeal elements. The importance of the incorporeal elements figures in prominently under Article 127, which stipulates:

(1) A business consists mainly of a goodwill.

A business may consist of other incorporeal elements such as:

(a) the trade-name;
(b) the special designation under which the trade is carried on;
(c) the right to lease the premises in which the trade is carried on;
(d) patents or copyrights;
(e) such special rights as attach to the business itself and not to the trader. (Emphasis added)

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11 Ibid., p.139
According to Art. 128, the corporeal elements that make up a business include equipments and goods. Therefore, what transpires from Chapter 2, of Title 4, of Book I of the Commercial Code is the fact that immovables, i.e. the business premises and the land on which the premises has been erected, had been excluded from the ambit of the definition of the elements of a business. Of course, a naïve and shallow-minded person will find it odd to see that only one aspect of the immovables, namely the right to the lease of the premises\textsuperscript{12}, was incorporated in the enumeration of the elements a business. The oddity, none the less, will wither away no sooner than he realizes the lease right’s inextricable link with the goodwill of the business.

In a nutshell, the term “business” embraces tangible and intangible assets, including tools, equipments, raw materials, goods in stock, good will, trade name, trade mark, patent, copyright, and the right to lease of the premises. But, immovable properties cannot form part of the business (\textit{fonds de commerce}). Hence, the land or buildings which form of the business premises and the fixtures on such premises are no part of the business, even though they are owned by the trader himself. To a greater degree, the business is regarded as an entity distinct from its constituent elements, as long as the whole is more valuable than the sum of the constituent parts. In this sense, the business is a \textit{res}, thing, or object over which a person can exercise property rights, including ownership, usufruct, and lease\textsuperscript{13}.

In view of the foregoing, what is goodwill, and why is it of enormous value? Why is it that a business is mainly consisted of goodwill? Since the definition of goodwill in Art.130 of the Commercial Code is defective, it is of little help to us. This is so, precisely because it fails to tell us the essence or nature of goodwill. Instead of doing the proper job of a definition, it gives you an extra piece of information concerning its origin and the obvious thing that goodwill has a value. Art. 130, reads:

\begin{quote}
The goodwill results from the creation and operation of a business and \textit{is of a value} which may vary according to the probable or possible relations between a trader and third parties who may require from him goods or services. (Emphasis added.)
\end{quote}

With respect to the origin of goodwill, Art.130 tells you that it “results from the creation and operation of a business.” In my humble opinion, this part of the definition adds nothing up to the stock of knowledge of any academic lawyer, so long as the fact that goodwill originates from the creation and operation of a business has already been made crystal-clear from preceding provisions on elements of business. Goodwill, being the main constituent element of a business, results from the creation of business. The second part of the definition, which says goodwill is of a value, too, adds little to your craving for understanding the essence of goodwill.

\textsuperscript{12} Comm.Code, Art.129
\textsuperscript{13} See Art.125(3), Arts.150-209, Comm.Code
In order to capture full well the very essence of goodwill, I propose to consider the following legal lexical definition of the term as found in the Black’s Law Dictionary:

A business's reputation, patronage, and other intangible assets that are considered when appraising the business, esp. for purchase; the ability to earn income in excess of the income that would be expected from the business viewed as a mere collection of assets. • Because an established business's trademark or servicemark is a symbol of goodwill, trademark infringement is a form of theft of goodwill. By the same token, when a trademark is assigned, the goodwill that it carries is also assigned….

"[Goodwill] is only another name for reputation, credit, honesty, fair name, reliability." … "Good will is to be distinguished from that element of value referred to variously as going-concern value, going value, or going business. Although some courts have stated that the difference is merely technical and that it is unimportant to attempt to separate these intangibles, it is generally held that going-concern value is that which inheres in a plant of an established business."  

In order to gain a head start to appreciate the nexus between goodwill and unfair competition, the reader is advised to peruse the following instances of unfair competition: trademark infringement, dilution of goodwill and trademarks, use of similar trade or firm names, simulation of product packaging or configuration, false advertising, passing off goods for those of another, and theft of trade secrets. Most, if not all, of the examples of unfair competition listed above include a common element: Utilizing someone else's commercial reputation for commercial benefit or 'sailing in their wind'. This commercial reputation or 'wind' is more often than not referred to, in legal parlance, as the 'good will' of a business. This 'good will' or reputation is generally focused in the public's attention in the form of a trademark, trade name, product appearance or configuration, and trade secrets. Accordingly, unfair competition law is nothing but one of the devices designed to protect or preserve the goodwill of a business. As per Art.131, two alternative courses of action have been put at the disposal of a trader in the hope of enabling him to effectively safeguard his goodwill. The first course of action available to such a trader is to bring an unfair competition claim under Art.133 of the Commercial Code. The second is to institute a proceeding based on the legal or contractual prohibitions specified in Art. 30,40,47,55,144,158,159,204 and 205 of the Commercial Code.

For the moment it suffices to say that there is a common thread passing through all instantiations of unfair competition: utilizing or assailing someone else’s commercial reputation for commercial benefit. This commercial reputation, more often than not, is referred to, in legal parlance, as the “goodwill” of a business.

III. Unfair Competition under the Commercial Code

Art.133 sets forth acts of competition that are regarded as unfair:

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(1) Any act of competition *contrary to honest commercial practice* shall constitute a fault.

(2) The following shall be deemed to be acts of unfair competition:
(a) any acts *likely to mislead customers* regarding the undertaking, products or commercial activities of a competitor;
(b) any false statements made in the course of business with a view to *discrediting* the undertaking, products or commercial activities of a competitor.[Emphasis added.]

Art.133 has been modelled upon the Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1833, as amended. Thus, one should not be taken aback if the definition of unfair competition in Art.133 follows closely Art.10bis of the Paris Convention. For the purpose of comparison, the full content of Art.10bis is reproduced below:

(1) The countries of the Union are bound to assure to persons entitled to the benefits of the Union effective protection against unfair competition.
(2) Any act of competition *contrary to honest practices* in industrial or commercial matters constitutes an act of unfair competition.
(3) The following in particular shall be prohibited:
1. all acts of such a nature as to create *confusion* by any means whatever with the establishment, the goods, or the industrial or commercial activities, of a competitor;
2. false allegations in the course of trade of such a nature as to *discredit* the establishment, the goods, or the industrial or commercial activities, of a competitor;
3. indications or allegations the use of which in the course of trade is liable to *mislead the public* as to the nature, the manufacturing process, the characteristics, the suitability for their purpose, or the quantity, of the goods.\(^\text{15}\)

As quick look at the above cited provisions discloses, the definition of unfair competition in Art.133 is substantially the same as the 1\(^{\text{st}}\) and 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) alineas of sub-Arts (2) and (3) of Art.10bis of the Paris Convention.

Implicit in the notion of unfair commercial competition are three ideas encapsulated in the three words: “commercial”, “unfair” and “competition”. The first prerequisite is that the conduct must not be private, social, or political, but must be “commercial”. Recall the definition of a trader and commercial acts under Article 5 of the Commercial Code. The second precondition is that the commercial conduct must be “unfair”. Before we move onto a discussion of the unfairness aspect, a few words are in order about the competition aspect. Competition presupposes the existence of competitors. Competitors are traders who are trying to reach the same customers. In other words, competitors are traders who offer products or services in the same market. Thus, inherent in the idea of competition are three elements: they must be selling similar products, in the same area, and at the same time. Consider the following counterexamples:

(1) A trader who produces coffee beans is not in competition with a trader who grows roses. In economic parlance, the goods or services have to be at least substitutes.

A trader who exports bottled potable water is not in competition with a trader who markets bottled potable water only in Ethiopia.

A trader who ceases to offer products or services for sale or does not yet offer products or services for sale is no longer in competition with a trader who does.

Not everything that is considered as “unfair” in the conduct of commerce falls under the purview of unfair completion law. Rather, there is a broad variety of commercial acts that might be regarded as unfair. To name but a few, it is certainly unfair to enter into price fixing agreements, to market unsafe products, to breach contractual obligations, to spread damaging rumours about competitors, to infringe competitors’ copy right, trademarks, and patent, or to disseminate misleading ads. Nevertheless, which of these fall within the proper province of unfair competition law and which fall within the scope of other areas of law such as Extra-Contractual Liability Law, Intellectual Property Law, Contract Law, or Antitrust Law?

Now let’s turn to a tentative treatment of the unfairness aspect of unfair commercial competition. Article133 gives us two standards whereby we can designate certain acts of commercial competition as unfair. The first, which I may call the general standard, is provided for in sub-art.(1). The second, which might be called the specific standard, is provided for in sub-art(2). The specific standard can further be broken down into two alternative requirements: likelihood of confusion and false discrediting statements.

i. The General Standard

In connection with the scope of these standards, the first, by contrast, is broader than the second in that it is difficult, if not impossible, to figure out, at a given point in time and space(i.e., now and here), all possible situations of unfair competition that it covers. In other words, the scope of activities prohibited by the general standard of unfair competition in sub-art.(1) is wider than the specific acts mentioned in sub-art.(2). As a result, this provision can be construed as a catch-all for all forms of unfair competition falling outside the purview of sub-art.(2). Unfair competition, as defined in sub-art.(1), expresses the idea that a particular act of competition is to be condemned as unfair because it is inconsistent with the community’s currently accepted standards of honest practice. Thus, unfair competition depends upon commercial custom in determining what acts are honest and what are not. By virtue of its flexibility, the general standard requires judges to exercise their discretionary powers. In exercising their judicial discretion, the judges must take into account the peculiarities of each case as well as the historical and cultural context in which the case arises. Therefore, the following discussion shall focus upon the specific standard.

ii. The Specific Standard

A. Misleading Commercial Practices

A confusion analysis has to be made to reach a decision pursuant to sub-art (2) (a) of Art. 133. Any act gives rise to liability if it is “likely to mislead customers”, though it does not create actual confusion. It is sufficient that an act passes the test

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16 GOLDBERG, supra at n. 5, p.135
of likelihood of confusion. One standard example of an act of unfair competition that is likely to mislead or confuse customers is trademark infringement. To prove a claim of unfair competition based upon trademark infringement, it is not necessary to prove actual confusion of specific customers. Proof of the likelihood of confusion in the market circumstances satisfies the requirement, so that similarity between two marks can make the case for unfair competition. Strictly speaking, sub-art.(2)(a) does not grant legal rights in trademarks beyond registration. However, sub-art(2)(a) affords a remedy for unfair competition involving special designations, including trademarks. Unlike trademark infringement claims under the Trademarks Registration and Protection Proclamation, unfair competition claims do not require any registered marks. As a result, sub-art(2)(a) of Art.133 involve all unfair competition claims based upon trademark infringement and extend further to cover other situations of unfair competition.

A likelihood of confusion exists when there is confusion as to the enterprise/undertaking/business, products and services, or commercial activities. More particularly, confusion may occur with respect to any of the following:

- (a) trade-names
- (b) distinguishing marks
- (c) the appearance of a product,
- (d) the presentation, including advertising, of products or services

**B. False Discrediting Statements**

Sub-art.(2)(b) of Art.133 broadens the touchstone of liability for unfair competition by making actionable any false statement that is likely to discredit or compromise the reputation of a business or its activities, when made in a competitive context. A claim of unfair competition under sub-art.(2)(b) requires a showing that a party made misrepresentations in the course of business. The elements an alleged injured party must show to sustain a claim of unfair competition based on false discrediting statements are:

1. a party uses any false statement,
2. in the course of business,
3. to misrepresent the nature, characteristics, qualities or geographic origin of a competitor's undertaking, goods or services.
4. with the purpose of discrediting the establishment, products or services of a competitor.

Typically, situations that fall under sub-art.(2)(b) include, if not limited to, false advertising. Here, it has to be emphasized that any false allegations made, in the course of business, against the person, rather than against his undertaking, products or services, do not fall under sub-art.(2)(b). Such cases may constitute defamation, subject to the fulfillment of the requirements in Arts.2044-2049 of the Civil Code.
IV. The Effect of Unfair Competition

i. Civil

In any event where an act of unfair competition has been committed by one trader against another, the Commercial Code affords the victim remedies. Article 134(1) provides for certain remedies: damages and other orders that are deemed fit to put an end to the unlawful act.\(^\text{17}\) The orders may in turn take the form either of an order for corrective publicity under Art.2120 of the Civil Code or an injunctive order Art.2122 of the Civil Code. Sub-art (2) of Art.133 stipulates:

(2) The court may in particular:
(a) order the publication, at the costs of the unfair competitor, of notices designed to remove the effect of the misleading acts or statements of the unfair competitor to cease this unlawful acts in accordance with Art. 2120 of the Civil Code.
(b) order the unfair competitor to cease this unlawful acts in accordance with Art. 2122 of the Civil Code.

The courts, while entertaining a claim for damages arising from unfair commercial competition, must stick to the rules and principles of the Civil Code governing extra-contractual liability. In the words of Everett F. Goldberg: “Since unfair competition is a species of extra-contractual liability, all the Civil Code provisions on extra-contractual liability dealing with matters not expressly covered in Articles 132-134 are applicable; for example, period of limitation, burden of proof, extent of damages, responsibility of persons or bodies corporate for the acts of others, etc.” \(^\text{18}\)

ii. Criminal

In addition to the civil remedies discussed above, the Ethiopian legal system also affords victims of unfair competition a criminal remedy. Although Article 719 of the Criminal Code defines criminal unfair competition, Articles 720 and 721 also criminalize such specific cases of unfair competition as infringements of intellectual property rights.

Article 719 stipulates:

> Whoever intentionally commits against another an abuse of economic competition by means of direct or any other process contrary to the rules of good faith in business, in particular:
> (a) by discrediting another, his goods or dealings, his activities or business or by making untrue or false statements as to his own goods, dealings, activities or business in order to derive a benefit therefrom against his competitors; or
> (b) by taking measures such as to create confusion with the goods, dealings or products or with the activities or business of another; or
> (c) by using inaccurate or false styles, distinctive signs, marks or professional titles in order to induce a belief as to his particular status or capacity; or

\(^\text{17}\) See Art.155, the Civil Procedure Code.
\(^\text{18}\) GOLDBERG, Supra at n.5, p.140
(d) by granting or offering undue benefits to the servants, agents or assistants of another, in order to induce them to fail in their duties or obligations in their work or to induce them to discover or reveal any secret of manufacture, organization or working; or
(e) by revealing or taking advantage of such secrets obtained or revealed in any other manner contrary to good faith, is punishable, upon complaint, with a fine of not less than one thousand Birr, or simple imprisonment for not less than three months.

V. Unfair Competition under the Trade Practices Proclamation

The Trade Practice Proclamation, which entered into force on 17\textsuperscript{th} of April 2003, contains 31 articles under 4 Parts. Part one, being general, deals with short title, definitions, objective, and scope of application whilst Part two contains rules regulating, as can be gathered from its caption, anticompetitive practices. Part three establishes the Trade Practice Investigation Commission and defines its powers. Part four provides for such miscellaneous matters as indications of prices, labels, power to regulate prices of basic goods, issuing and keeping of receipts, administrative measures and penalties, rule-making powers, repeal, and effective date.

A closer perusal of the above legislation reveals that it prohibits two types of commercial behaviour: anti-competitive and no-competitive behaviours. The former comprises of three categories of acts, viz. anti-competitive agreements, unfair competition, and abuse of dominance while the latter consists of non-compliance with the legal requirements pertaining to indications of prices, labels, price lists of goods and services subject to regulation; conditions of distribution, sales and movement of same; orders for replenishment of stock of same; and the issuance and keeping of receipts.

The proclamation applies to all commercial activities except such “activities that are, according to investment proclamation, exclusively reserved for the Government.” Besides, “[e]nterprises having significant impact on development and designed by the Government to fasten growth and facilitating development” are also excluded and so are “[b]asic goods or services that are subject to price regulation.”\textsuperscript{19}

The declared aim of the Trade Practice Proclamation, in keeping with the free market economic policy of the country, is maximizing economic efficiency and social welfare by promoting competition and regulating anti-competitive practices.\textsuperscript{20} In particular, the proclamation has two objectives: to secure fair competitive process through the prevention and elimination of anti-competitive and unfair trade practices, on the one hand and to safeguard the interests of consumers through the prevention and elimination of any restraints on the efficient supply and distribution of goods and services, on the other.\textsuperscript{21}

In what follows, I shall focus on unfair competition as found in Article 10 of the Trade Practice Proclamation No.329 and leave out the remaining forms of unfair trade

\textsuperscript{19} The Trade Practice Proclamation No.329/2003, Art.4
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid, Preamble
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid, Art.3
practices untreated, as they fall beyond the scope of this paper. Here, again, it has to be borne in mind, as a caveat, that the scope of activities prohibited by sub-Art.(1) is broader than the specific acts enumerated in sub-Art.(2), though the list in the latter is more elaborate and lengthier than its counterpart in the Commercial Code. Article 10 of the Proclamation defines unfair competition as:

1) Any act or practice, in the course of commercial activities, that aims at eliminating competitors through different methods shall be deemed to be an act of unfair competition.

2) The following activities, in particular, shall be deemed to be acts of unfair competition.
   (a) Any act that causes, or is likely to cause, confusion with respect to another enterprise or its activities, in particular, the products or services offered by such enterprise;
   (b) Any act that damages, or is likely to damage the goodwill or reputation of another enterprise falsely;
   (c) Any act that misleads or is likely to mislead the public with respect to an enterprise or its activities, in particular, the products or services offered by such enterprise;
   (d) Any act of disclosure, acquisition or use of information without the consent of the rightful holder of that information in a manner contrary to honest commercial practice;
   (e) Any false or unjustifiable allegation that discredits, or is likely to discredit with respect to another enterprise or its activities, in particular the products or services offered by such enterprise;
   (f) Any act that directly or indirectly restricts, impedes or weakens the competitive production and distribution of any commercial good or the rendering of any service;
   (g) Any act that restricts or debar the timely or economic means of producing or distributing any good or rendering of any service;
   (h) The importation of any goods from any foreign country into Ethiopia at a price less than the actual market price or wholesale price of such goods in the principal markets of the country of their production with the intent to destroy or injure the production of such goods in Ethiopia or to restrict or monopolize any part of trade in such goods;
   (i) Trading in any manner in goods imported into Ethiopia for humanitarian purpose without authorization by the Ministry. (Emphasis added.)

22 An anonymous assessor of this article disagrees with the present author on this score. The assessor contends that “The focus of article 10 of the Trade Practice Proclamation is the creation and protection of the competition process (See article 10 with the spirit of the whole of the proclamation). The focus of article 133 of the Commercial Code was the protection of property of a trader: the goodwill (See article 133 with articles 131, 132 and the spirit of the section in which it exists: Arts 130-134). That is why article 133 of the code was i) framed in the way extra-contractual liability laws are framed and ii) modelled following the Paris Convention for Protection of Industrial Property (by considering goodwill as one type of industrial property). That is also why article 10 of the proclamation goes beyond and is not framed in the way what is included in article 133 of the commercial code is framed. Doesn't this make the difference between article 10 of the proclamation and article 133 of the code more fundamental than what the above conclusions say? Isn't the Unfair Competition rule of the proclamation more comprehensive by spirit than the 'Goodwill protection Section' of the Commercial Code? And shouldn't articles 130-134 of the Code be read into the proclamation for consistency - to complete what is not clearly stated in the proclamation: the handling of the extra-contractual liability for protection of goodwill which may be consequent to the anti-competitive actions - than the vice-versa. Distinction should also be made among competition, extra-contractual liability and intellectual property laws though the three laws may complement each other.
In connection with the definition of unfair competition in Art.10 of Proclamation No.329/2003, I should say the following by way of commentary. First, it is important to bear in mind that the logical organization of Art.10 is parallel to that of Art.133 of the Commercial Code. Despite the absence of the element of honest commercial practice in sub-art.(1) of Art.10, unlike sub-art.(1) of Art.133, both deploy general standards: likelihood of elimination of competitors in the former and contrariness to honest commercial practice in the latter. In spite of the structural similarity between these two provisions, however, the missing element renders the literal application of Art.10(1) broad and impractical. For example, under a strict interpretation of the provision, although outright unacceptable, a trader who resorts to producing better products, which is an honest method, and thereby eliminates competition would be held to be liable for unfair competition. Also sub-arts.(2) of the two articles consist in specific standards. The difference between these sub-articles lies in the former’s inclusion of such activities as provided for in (d), (f), (g), (h), and (i). Even (d) can be interpreted to fall within sub-art.(1) of Art.133, as the test deployed is the one encapsulated in the phrase “in a manner contrary to honest commercial practice.” In my opinion, the whole of the provisions under sub-art(2) can be reformulated in such a manner as to avoid redundancy, which I suspect has been an outcome of bad legislative draftsmanship. In this regard, my proposal is to merge some of the provisions together.

(a) and (c): Misleading/confusing activities;
(b) and (e): False discrediting statements;
(d): Secret information;
(f) and (g): Restricting, impeding, debarring, or weakening the competitive(efficient) production and distribution of goods and services;
(h): Dumping, and
(i): Trading in humanitarian aid.

With respect to sub-art.(2)(d), it is interesting to note two serious pitfalls. That the information has to be secret is self-evident inasmuch as what is prohibited is the acquisition, disclosure, or use of such information contrary to honest commercial practice. But, what kind of information is considered secret is not clear. Besides, the legislation fails to pin down the nature of the sort of information that it purports to protect. The legislation should have made it explicit that to qualify for protection, a piece of information should not only be secret, but also a trade/industrial secret.\(^23\) The

\(^{23}\) It is instructive to consider, at this point in time, the manner in which other legal systems deal with the same problem. For example, Art.8(2) of the Protection Against Unfair Competition Act of 1998 of Barbados defines the term “secret information” as follows:

“For the purpose of this Act, information shall be considered “secret information” if
(a) it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and assembly of its components, generally known among or readily accessible to persons that normally would have knowledge of or access to the kind of information in question;
(b) it has commercial value because it is a secret; and
(c) the rightful holder has taken responsible steps under the circumstances to keep it secret.”

Cf. Sub-art.(1) of same to see how the law of Barbados attempts to establish the nature of the secret information.

The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, §1(4) (1979), defines trade secret as “information including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by,
point I wish to drive home is that the kind of secret information is different from a trader’s private or social information. It has only to do with the trader’s commercial undertaking, activities, or products and services, including patent and copyright.

Finally, I wish to consider one virtual substantive loophole in the Proclamation, though it is more of academic than of practical interest. This apparent problem would seem to arise from the fact that nowhere in the text of the Proclamation, unlike the Commercial Code, is it provided that a violation of any provisions thereof constitutes a fault. As a result, some students of Ethiopian law may tend to draw, albeit unwarrantable, the conclusion that a judicial remedy is not available for a plaintiff claiming under Art.10 of the Proclamation in the first instance, rather than under Art.133 of the Commercial Code, as long as the only type of remedy mentioned by the Proclamation is administrative measures or/and penalty. Nevertheless, it is submitted here that such a conclusion is a non sequitur. This is so, because there is no question that any infringement of a specific and explicit provision of a law constitutes a civil offence by virtue of Article 2035 of the Civil Code. Hence, a violation of any of the provisions under Article 10 of the Proclamation is a fault and gives rise to an extra-contractual liability.

VI. The Trade Practices Investigation Commission

In 2003, through the enactment of the Trade Practice Proclamation No.329, the House of Peoples’ Representatives created the Trade Practice Investigation Commission and charged it with the duty to prevent and eliminate “…anti-competitive and unfair trade practices [and]…any restraints on the efficient supply and distribution of goods and services.” To this end, the five-member commission, representing the public sector, the private sector, and consumers’ association and being appointed by the Prime Minister upon nomination by the Minister of Trade Industry, is empowered to conduct appropriate investigations and hearings and to take against violators administrative measures and penalties. Sub-art.(2) of Article 15 provides:

(j) The Commission shall have the following powers:
1. to investigate complaints submitted to it by any aggrieved party in violation of the provisions of this Proclamation;
2. to compel any person to submit information and documents necessary for the carrying out of the commission’s duties;

other persons who can obtain value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”

See also Art.39 (1) and (2) of Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights(TRIPS), which reads:

(1) In the course of ensuring effective protection against unfair competition as provided in Art.10bis of the Paris Convention (1967), Members shall protect undisclosed information.…. 
(2) Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing information lawfully within their control from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others without their consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices so long as such information:
(a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and assembly of its components, generally known among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in question;
(b) has commercial value because it is secret; and
(c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret.

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3. to compel witnesses to appear and testify at hearings;
4. to take oaths or affirmations of persons appearing before it, and examine any such persons;
5. to enter by showing the commission’s Id card and search the premises of any undertaking during working hours, in order to obtain information or documents necessary for its investigation;
6. to appoint or employ, upon the approval of minister, experts to undertake professional studies as may be necessary;
7. to take administrative measures or/and give penalty decisions on any complaints submitted to it.
8. The said legislation also requires that in order to execute any decision for administrative measures and penalties, it must be endorsed by the Minister of Trade and Industry which has the discretion to approve, amend, or remand the same.

The Proclamation provides for four distinct kinds of administrative measures. Article 25 stipulates that:

The Commission may impose the following administrative measures, where any person violate the provisions of this Proclamation, Regulations, Public Notice or Directives issued for the implementation of same.
9. Suspend, correct or eliminate the practice in question;
10. Suspend or cancel business license;
11. Take any appropriate measure that enable the victim’s competitive position to be reinstated;
12. Seizure and selling of goods that are subject to price regulations, provided that the proceeds less any selling expense shall be paid to the owner, who in no case shall demand interest or any other payments.

Moreover, the Proclamation imposes fines upon defendants who have been proven to have violated any provision thereof by way of penalty. Article 26 reads:

Without prejudice administrative measures that may be taken pursuant to Article 25 of this Proclamation, the Commission may impose the following penalties where any person violates the provisions of this Proclamation or Regulations, Public Notice or Directives issued for the implementation of the same.
1. Fine upto 10% of the value of the total assets of the violator or 15% of yearly total gross sales of the violator, alternatively.
2. Fine from 5,000.00(five thousands) upto Birr 50,000.00(fifty thousands) where the direct or indirect cooperation of any individual in any prohibited practice is proven.

In addition, the Proclamation, in its Article 27, sets forth factors that the Trade Practice Investigation Commission should take into account while assessing the
amount of fines. As a result, the Commission is expected to take stock of such factors as the extent of the damaged caused, the market share of the violator, the size of the market affected, and the financial status of the violator.

At this point in time, I should draw particular attention to a seemingly procedural lacuna in the Trade Practice Proclamation. In connection with the procedural issue, neither the Civil Procedure Code nor the Proclamation has a rule on pendency which precludes an administrative tribunal from adjudicating a matter brought before it at any time subsequent to the institution of a civil matter in a competent court of law. The Proclamation incorporates a rule on appeal, instead of one on pendency. According to Article 17(1), any party may appeal to the Federal High Court against any administrative measures or/and penalty decisions within 30 days from the date that he was aware of the approval of the execution. Besides, sub-Art.(2) of the same prohibits the Ministry of Trade and Industry from executing any decision before the expiry of the 30 days period. In this connection, I wish to raise the following issues. First, what is the legal ramification of sub-Art.(1) of Article 17? Does it divest Federal First Instance Courts of their jurisdiction to hear and decide unfair competition claims under Article 10 in the first instance? As long as all that the said provision talks about is the appellate power of the Federal High Court and as long as there is no explicit provision prohibiting Federal First Instance Courts from assuming jurisdiction over lawsuits for unfair competition in the first instance, the author contends that Federal First Instance Courts must have competence to adjudicate such matters. If so, at this point, the procedural issue pointed out earlier figures in prominently, viz. if it is the case that both forums, the judiciary and the administrative tribunal, have competence to hear and decide claims for unfair competition in the first instance, will it be fair and expeditious to allow the parties continue litigating in two different forums on the same matter? What if both forums reach inconsistent decisions, say, the civil court decides on the merits that the defendant is not liable whilst the Commission holds him liable? Although there is no prohibition on instituting a legal action in the first instance courts, however, litigants must be encouraged to file their complaints with the Trade Practice Commission first so that they can have a ripe case to take to the competent court if the need arises. In so doing, it is also possible to prevent plaintiffs from availing themselves of the opportunity to harass and vex defendants by instituting judicial and administrative proceedings at the same time. The idea behind these suggestions is driven from practical considerations rather than from normative legal reasoning. Another issue worth considering here is whether the Trade Practice Investigation Commission has the power to award damages. Or, can’t damages be read into sub-art.(3) of Art.25 that provides for the Commission’s power to “[t]ake any appropriate measure that enable the victim’s competitive position to be reinstated”? Can’t this be taken as a golden opportunity to award double damages to victims of unfair competition, as the concept of treble damages is absent from Ethiopian Extra-Contractual Liability Law?

The Trade Practice Investigation Commission has, of course, made its position unambiguously clear on this point. In INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION AGENCY PVT. LTD. CO. AND ALEM INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION AGENCY PVT LTD CO. v. GARAD ENTERPRISE AND SHEMSU HASSEN25, one of the defendants invoked pendency as a defence, stating that the Commission did not have competence to hear and decide the

case, as it had been being entertained, under Civ/F/No.1983, by the Second Division of the Federal First Instance Court at Arada, which adjourned for Hamle 13, 1997 EC to pass judgement. Having framed the said objection as one of its issues, the Commission overruled the objection as long as pendency does not obliterate its jurisdiction and as long as the cause of action does not give rise to a criminal or civil liability for damages.

Conclusion

Unfair competition law consists of enforceable legal rules applicable to commercial tactics and transactions involving traders. The rules against unfair competition usually prohibit commercial tactics and transactions that are anticompetitive in nature and would conflict with consumers' interest. So, the law of unfair competition is primarily comprised of conducts that cause an economic injury to a business, through a deceptive or wrongful business practice.

Although the Trade Practice Proclamation tends to give its readers the impression that it contains the most comprehensive and detailed rules against unfair competition, however, this is far from the truth. It is not an overstatement to say that most of the provisions under sub-art (2) of Art. 10 of the Proclamation are only a few instantiations of the general rule under sub-art (1) of the same, which is parallel to Art.133(1) of the Commercial Code.

One discrepancy existing between Article 133 of the Commercial Code and Article 10 of the Trade Practice Proclamation concerns the standards deployed under the first provision of both articles. A certain competitive tactic or strategy is said to be unfair in pursuance of sub-art.(1) of Article 133 if it is found to be contrary to honest commercial practice. Nevertheless, an act of competition turns out to be unfair in accordance with sub-art.(1) of Article 10 of the Trade Practice Proclamation, provided that it aims at eliminating competitors whatever the mental state of the competitor. The problem posed by the above textual discrepancy looms larger in the face of the Repeals Clause of the Proclamation, which reads: “Any law or practices inconsistent with this proclamation shall be inapplicable with regard to matters provided for in this proclamation.” By virtue of this inconsistency, the provision of sub-Art.(1) of Article 133 would seem to have been superseded by that of sub-Art.(1) of Art.10.

Although the Trade Practice Proclamation would seem to have failed to provide, with clarity and precision, for the kind of relationship that may exist between itself and other laws of the country in general and the Commercial and Civil Codes in particular, the present author has established the intimate relationship between them. First, it is important to remember the inextricable link between the Proclamation and the Extra-Contractual Liability Law as enshrined in the Civil Code. In other words, the notwithstanding the fact that the Proclamation lacks in a provision parallel to Art.132 of the Commercial Code which makes an express cross-reference to Art.2057 of the Civil Code, a violation of any of the provisions under Art. 10 of the Proclamation gives rise to extra-contractual liability by operation of Art.2035 of the Civil Code. Second, its legislative intent has not been made sufficiently explicit, provided that the intention was to make it, for the largest part, a supplement to rather than a replacement of the Commercial Code provisions. Therefore, in keeping with
the plain rule of statutory construction, a correct reading of Art.30 of the Proclamation is that it renders inapplicable “any law or practices inconsistent with this proclamation…with regard to matters provided for [therein].” That is to say, the thrust of the repeal is not so sweeping as to efface all the Commercial Code provisions dealing with unfair competition. As a result, from among Arts.132-134 of the Commercial Code, it is only sub-art(1) of Art.133 which has been shown to be inconsistent with sub-art(1) of Art.10 of the Proclamation and, as such, is abrogated.

A further problem posed by the Trade Practice Proclamation is procedural. The Proclamation does not prohibit the Investigation Commission from adjudicating a matter brought before it at any time subsequent to the institution of a civil suit in a competent court of law. Consequently, it is unlikely that like cases will be treated alike across-the-board, which is an important consideration of justice and fairness, regardless of the question of the kind of forum in which they were heard and decided. Besides, it gives plaintiffs ample opportunity to harass and vex defendants by instituting judicial and administrative proceedings at the same time.