HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR FIRE SAFETY IN BLOCKS OF FLATS

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ABSTRACT

Two years on from the Grenfell Tower fire, it is estimated that maybe as many as 200,000 people in the UK are living in buildings with major fire safety defects. Some of these blocks are wrapped in flammable cladding, as was Grenfell Tower, but many blocks have other fire safety risks, both known and unknown, for which we have only limited data. With only inadequate recourse through private law for most of those affected, can human rights law offer an effective avenue for redress? This paper will illustrate the UK government’s failure to implement an effective regulatory system for the building and refurbishment of high-rise buildings (especially in relation to combustible cladding systems). It will then consider whether this failure constitutes an ongoing violation of Articles 2, 3, 8 and Article 1 Protocol No. 1 ("A1P1") of the European Convention on Human Rights.

INTRODUCTION

“The Grenfell Tower fire represents the greatest loss of life in a residential fire in a century. It shattered the lives of many people and shook the trust of countless more in a system that was intended to ensure the most basic human need of having a decent and safe place to live.”

Building a Safer Future: Proposals for reform of the building safety regulatory system

“Everyone has the right to life and the right to safe, adequate housing, but the residents of Grenfell Tower were tragically let down by public bodies that had a duty to protect them.”

David Isaac, Chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission

*Professor Susan Bright (email: susan.bright@law.ox.ac.uk)  Dr Douglas Maxwell (email: douglas.maxwell@law.ox.ac.uk) We are tremendously grateful for many busy people who have taken time to discuss our ideas with us, steer us in certain directions and away from blind alleys and to read earlier drafts. In particular, we would like to thank Justin Bates (Landmark Chambers), David Sawtell (Lamb Chambers and University of Cambridge), David Elvin QC (Landmark Chambers), and Piers Gardner (Monckton Chambers). All opinions expressed, and any errors are wholly attributable to the authors.


The terrible events of 14th June 2017, when fire ripped up the sides of the 24-storey Grenfell Tower in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, were shocking. As a result of the fire, 72 people died and many more residents were injured and displaced. Attention quickly turned to the recent refurbishment programme and the external cladding that had been installed. It was this cladding that appeared to explain how the devastating fire spread. Soon broader questions were being asked about fire safety: might other buildings be similarly at risk? In turn, this led to a programme of testing to identify other high-rise residential buildings at risk with the same type of aluminium composite material (“ACM”) cladding. Two years on, ACM cladding is now thought to affect 433 high-rise residential buildings. But it has also emerged that the scale of fire-safety risks goes far beyond ACM cladding. There are risks of external fire spread with different types of flammable cladding, as well as with some types of insulation that is used behind the cladding. Further, the risk to life caused by fire is amplified due to inadequate fire doors, cramped and singular exits, poor compartmentalisation and fire breaks, and the lack of effective sprinkler systems. Very recent events show that the focus on “high-rise” is also too restrictive. There is specific government guidance about materials to be used above 18 metres, but in June 2019, shortly before the second anniversary of Grenfell, a fire tore across a shorter block of flats in Barking. The questions that this article explores are whether, adapting the words of David Isaac, public bodies have let down residents in all unsafe housing, and whether there is anything that the residents can do about this by using human rights law.

The impact of these failings on those living in affected blocks is enormous. There is the obvious concern for personal safety – will they get out safely if there is a fire? – and for personal belongings. For flat “owners” there are also enormous financial worries. Flats in England and Wales are bought as (very) long leases, often 999 years, and the wording of these leases will almost always make the leaseholders (the flat owners) liable to pay for any remediation work and interim fire safety measures. These bills can be huge, running into many thousands of pounds, often five figure sums. Failure to pay can lead to forfeiture (loss of the lease and the home), and bankruptcy. There are stories of leaseholders being unable to move, to take up new employment opportunities, or to start a family. In the majority of cases, leaseholders have also been unable to force the building owner (the freeholder) to fix the fire safety issues. The government has repeatedly argued that

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4 M. Smith “Grenfell Cladding Fears for 1,687 Building Facades in the UK” The Mirror (London, 29 January 2019).


7 For this reason, “ownership” is a contested term in this context. A simple explanation of leasehold ownership of flats is available here: https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/housing-after-grenfell/blog/2019/02/part-1-building-owners-and-cladding-problem.


building owners and developers should “do the right thing” and replace flammable cladding and insulation without cost to leaseholders. Some progress has been made, but the majority of buildings remain at risk. Following earlier announcements in May 2018 of £400 million funding being available to facilitate ACM remediation in the social housing sector, the government announced in May 2019 that a similar £200 million fund would be available for private blocks. The hope is that this will speed up remediation, but it is too limited (in amount and scope) to address the extent of the problems. Leaseholders in buildings not covered by this fund are now claiming they are losers in the “cladding lottery”; and indeed, the toll on leaseholders is stark. A recent mental health survey has reported “a deeply worrying trend of depression, anxiety and suicidal thoughts, as flammable cladding remains attached to their buildings”, with 65.8% of leaseholders’ mental health being “hugely affected”. As this evidence highlights, fire safety fears are affecting leaseholders’ autonomy, mental health, and financial stability.

The victims of the Grenfell Tower fire were, as David Isaac states, let down by public bodies who had a duty to protect them. As the Equality and Human Rights Commission (“EHRC”) and others have claimed, this is a violation of their human rights and the blame ultimately “lies with the authorities”. Establishing violations of the Convention rights for occupiers in other buildings which are now known to have serious fire safety defects, yet where there has been no tragedy, requires us to look at issues a little differently. This paper considers the position of the many thousands of occupiers still living in non-remediated unsafe high-rise buildings.

Part I explains the regulatory landscape for construction and building safety in England and Wales. It demonstrates systematic inadequacies in relation to the current regulatory model for building safety. Part II sets out the application and effect of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), before turning to consider the Convention rights that are engaged by fire safety risks in high-rise blocks. Early understandings of Convention rights tended to focus “not with what a state must do, but with what it must not do; that is, with its obligation to refrain from interfering with the individual’s rights”. Over time, however, the European Court on Human Rights
First, we explain how the state is involved with building safety in England and Wales, and what was known about risks prior to the Grenfell Fire.

I. STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR BUILDING SAFETY

The regulatory landscape for construction and building safety is complex, but the two key mechanisms are the Building Regulations and building control inspection.

Since the Building Act 1984, a “principle-based” regulatory approach has been adopted to building construction. This replaced a system which involved following much more detailed, prescriptive rules. Under the “principle-based” method, the focus is on outcomes, and it is for developers and other professionals to ensure that the outcomes are compliant with these principles. The key provision is contained now in the Building Regulations 2010 where the simple principle in Schedule 1, part B4 provides that “the external walls of a building shall adequately resist the spread of fire over the walls and from one building to another, having regard to the height, use and position of the building.” Building Regulations are supplemented by government guidance in the form of Approved Document B (“ADB”); this illustrates how to meet the requirements of the

18 Önervülde v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 20 [90].
20 What had been 306 pages of Building Regulations was then reduced to 24; P. Apps, “Was the cladding legal”, Inside Housing (London, 23 March 2018); S. Hodkinson, Safe as Houses (Manchester University Press, 2019).
Building Regulations but is non-prescriptive and acknowledges that there are alternative ways of achieving compliance.22

Since Grenfell, there has been controversy over whether the various cladding systems in use, including ACM, comply with the Building Regulations, particularly in relation to how a crucial paragraph of ADB (para 12.7) is interpreted.23 In response to the inquest into the Lakanal House fire the Assistant Deputy Coroner wrote to the then Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government (Eric Pickles MP), setting out that “AB D is a most difficult document to use” and that there remained “uncertainty about the scope of inspections for fire risk assessment purposes which should be undertaken in high rise residential buildings”.24 The response letter from Eric Pickles demonstrates an unwillingness to accept the severity of the ongoing risks combined with a disregard for the opaque nature of the existing regulatory system. To Pickles, “the design of fire protection in buildings is a complex subject and should remain, to some extent, in the realm of professionals.”25 What this response ignores is that, within the profession, there are differing interpretations as to whether or not the wording in para 12.7 - which requires “insulation product, filler material (not including gaskets, sealants and similar) etc.” to be of limited combustibility - covers the “core” which is the filling between the two aluminium panels in ACM. It is this core which can be highly combustible, as Peter Apps wrote in Inside Housing: “[…] the plastic in the middle will burn like solid petrol in the event of a fire”.26 The government, post-Grenfell, has stated that para 12.7 “applies to any element of the cladding system, including, therefore, the core of the ACM”;27 and therefore to comply with ADB this should only have been used if of “limited combustibility”. Many experts disagree with this reading and, therefore, do not accept that the government’s guidance in para 12.7 required ACM to be of limited combustibility.28 The answer to which interpretation is correct will be critical when it comes to some questions about liability

22 The Building Regulations 2010, Approved Document B.
23 The Building Regulations 2010, Approved Document B, Vol 2:2006 para 12.7 “In a building with a storey 18m or more above ground level any insulation product, filler material (not including gasket, sealants and similar) etc. used in the external wall construction should be of limited combustibility […]”.
and responsibility, and feeds into the question of whether the ACM used on Grenfell Tower itself complied with ADB. For Grenfell, this will not be answered until the second stage of the Inquiry is complete, and this is still some time off. Inside Housing claims that it is the ADB guidance that is “a major – if not the major – part of the reason why ACM is so widely used”.29

A decision on Grenfell will not, however, be determinative of many of the other systems, combining differing types of cladding and insulation and fixing. Industry experts argue that ADB has failed to keep pace with cladding technology; what may have worked for solid products does not work for composites with extremely flammable interiors.30 In particular, the requisite test requires only the “surface” of the panel to be fire resistant. There has been less confusion over insulation, which ADB makes clear must be of “limited combustibility”.31 Nonetheless, many buildings have used non-compliant insulation, including Grenfell itself, and this is a clear breach of ADB. Further dangers continue to emerge. There is specific government guidance about materials to be used above 18 metres, but in June 2019, shortly before the second anniversary of Grenfell, a fire tore across a shorter block of flats in Barking.32 Eerily reminiscent of Grenfell, it has been reported that worried residents had written to the developer, raising concerns over the building as an “accident waiting to happen”.33

The second stage of building safety is provided by the building control inspection system. Again, this was changed by the Building Act 1984. Prior to this change, building control approval was carried out by local authority inspectors whose job it was to inspect at various intervals during construction and issue a completion certificate when satisfied that the finished building was compliant. Since 1984 it has been possible for this task to be carried out by “approved inspectors” from the private sector.34 There has been much criticism of this system, including from the Hackitt review: as inspectors compete for business they may not want a reputation for critical inspection;35 there is a risk of conflict of interest as private inspectors, such as NHBC (which has a dominant market share), may also be providing the structural warranty for the development; and the process of inspection, whether by approved inspectors or the local authority, is often claimed not to be rigorous.36 Concerns have also been raised about the “self-certification” scheme that was

36 In practice, site checks are unlikely to be able to track each step of construction and inspection is often based heavily on plans and process.
introduced by the government in 2002, which allows individuals and businesses to self-certify that certain types of work comply with building regulations.\footnote{37} The scale of the fire safety problems that have emerged post Grenfell illustrate that the system as a whole is not working. Even on the government’s (limited) data, there are 433 buildings with flammable external walls. The problem is not confined to ACM. One illustration is provided by the recent Tribunal case, Re St Francis Tower.\footnote{38} A fire strategy report available to the Tribunal concluded that the “risk to life is intolerable”, with serious breaches in fire compartmentation, non-compliant fire doors, the cladding used (a type of High Pressure Laminate – “HPL”) if ignited “has the ability to produce two-thirds more heat than petrol”, and there were problems with the fire detection and AOV (automatic opening vent) systems.\footnote{39} Further, it seems that “the building has no Building Regulation sign off”. This catalogue of failures is “staggering” in the words of the Tribunal.\footnote{40} Another illustration is the case of Zagora Management Ltd v Zurich Insurance Pte: this involved two blocks of flats found to be seriously defective.\footnote{41} The Building regulations final certificates were issued when the development was “far from being fully completed” and included flats yet to be built. When the Fire Service inspected, they found the site was not compliant with ADB, and had multiple and important fire safety failings.\footnote{42} The testing programme established immediately after Grenfell was only for ACM cladding, which is clearly too narrow to identify all risks to life. A wide range of metal composite materials (“MCM”) faced with material such as zinc, copper, and stainless steel have been found (like ACM) to have combustible materials in their filler or core.\footnote{43} Industry sources told Inside Housing that up to 80\% of HPL cladding systems on high-rises use a highly combustible plastic foam insulation, and the majority of panels are a much lower fire standard.\footnote{44} The same expert has said that, beyond ACM, there should be four different tests carried out.\footnote{45}

The sheer number and complexity of the fire safety problems emerging means that it is evident that fire safety issues cannot be fixed overnight.\footnote{46} A number of measures have therefore been taken to ensure residents are (supposedly) “safe tonight”. These “mitigating” or “interim”

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\footnote{38} RG Securities (No. 2) Ltd v Leaseholders of St Francis Tower (20 December 2018) CAM/42UD/LDC/2018/0015.

\footnote{39} RG Securities (No. 2) Ltd v Leaseholders of St Francis Tower (20 December 2018) CAM/42UD/LDC/2018/0015 para. 7.

\footnote{40} RG Securities (No. 2) Ltd v Leaseholders of St Francis Tower (20 December 2018) CAM/42UD/LDC/2018/0015 para. 25.

\footnote{41} Zagora Management Limited v Zurich Insurance Pte (2019) EWHC 140 (TCC).


measures include making sure signage is correct, fire equipment is functioning, and sometimes alarm systems have been installed or upgraded. The main measure, however, is to require fire marshals to patrol buildings 24/7, the so-called waking watch. This is because buildings intended to be operated on a “stay put” policy – you stay in your flat if there is a fire – have had to move to a “get out” (evacuate) policy post-Grenfell because the flammable cladding creates a risk of unrestricted fire spread. Many have expressed reservations about how effective these measures are. The National Fire Chiefs Council Guidance makes clear that mitigating measures are “second-best” and that the change to a simultaneous evacuation strategy should be “temporary … until the failings have been rectified” and “must not be permanent”. Several prohibition orders have already been issued which require occupiers to move out of buildings that are considered unsafe to live in. For example, Liverpool City Council issued a prohibition order on the Fox Street development in the city due to several “serious construction issues” and fire risks. There are doubts about how effective the interim measures are and as it is thought that this effectiveness will diminish over time it may be that more prohibition notes will be issued if there is no remediation.

Even before the Grenfell disaster the government knew, or ought to have known, of the risks posed by the use of combustible cladding as there had been multiple warnings. Inside Housing has uncovered minutes that show the government received warning about the inappropriateness of the standards being used and that this was resulting in the use of ACM. It also refers to several fires overseas that gave clear indication that ACM was unsafe (Dubai at the end of 2015, ...
Melbourne 2014, and France 2012), as well are fires in the UK (Garnock Court, 1999, Lakanal House 2009, Shirley Towers 2010, Shepherds Courts 2016 and Coolmoyne House, Belfast 2017).55 The 1999 Inquiry into the Garnock Court fire concluded that cladding systems should be “entirely non-combustible” or proven as safe through full-scale testing.56 Regulations were changed in Scotland in 2005 to require external wall cladding to be non-combustible,57 but there was no change in England even after repeated requests for a review of building regulations after the Lakanal House fire.58 Thus, to argue that Grenfell was a one off event is to ignore over twenty years of cladding fires in the UK and around the world. In an open letter to James Brokenshire MP, Rebecca Hilsenrath from the Equality and Human Rights Commission wrote “that prior to the fire at Grenfell Tower, there was a long-standing and systemic breach of the right to life.”59

It is clear from this section that the government’s building safety system was not functioning to ensure fire safety in high-rise residential buildings. The Barking fire shows that even lower buildings can also be at serious risk.60 The Regulations and guidance are not clear, there is too much room for doubt that can be exploited or misunderstood by building professionals. Buildings are being signed off on the basis of surprisingly little oversight and, seemingly, sometimes not signed off at all and yet still occupied. As Dame Judith Hackitt scathingly concluded in May 2018:

“The current system of building regulations and fire safety is not fit for purpose and … a change in culture is required to support the delivery of buildings that are safe, both now and in the future. The system failure identified in the interim report has allowed a culture of indifference to perpetuate.”61

A system, of course, that has been created by the UK government.

In the next section, we look at how state responsibility is played out in human rights law.

II. CONVENTION RIGHTS

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The Human Rights Act 1998 (‘HRA’) requires public authorities to act in a manner that is compatible with the “Convention rights” set out in section 1 with reference to rights contained in the ECHR. It also requires domestic courts to interpret legislation so far as possible in a manner that is compliant with the ECHR, and empowers courts to award damages where Convention rights have been violated. The ECHR must be interpreted “in the light of its object and purpose”. Central to this is the doctrine of “effectiveness”, also known as “innovative interpretation”, which requires courts to give the fullest weight and effect to the underlying purpose of protecting human rights. The underlying justification for the doctrine of effectiveness is that member states cannot protect Convention rights simply by inactivity but under certain circumstances are required to undertake positive actions to protect rights, even if this requires expenditure. In determining whether positive obligations exist or not, the Court has to have regard to the fair balance that must be struck between the competing interests of the individual and the broader community.

Various Convention rights are in play in the context of dangerously defective high-rise buildings whose faults are attributable to the systemic failures of the regulatory framework: Article 2, Article 3, Article 8 and A1P1, all of which have been interpreted by domestic courts and the Strasbourg Court to impose both positive and negative obligations upon member states. In the next few sections we will consider the application and effect of these Convention rights when applied in the context of buildings with fire safety issues.

**Article 2**

“I feel as though I could burn alive at any minute. I live in constant fear, my physical and mental health has taken a huge impact. My financial situation is unbearable, I cannot sell my property or re-mortgage. I am stuck in a nightmare”.

Anonymous Leaseholder cited in the House of Commons

For the thousands trapped living in unsafe high-rise buildings one avenue for redress may be found in Article 2 of the ECHR. This provides that “everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law”. The right to life is one of the most fundamental provisions of the ECHR, enshrining a basic value

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62 HRA s. 6.
63 HRA s. 3(1).
64 HRA s.8.
67 Marckx v Belgium (1979-80) 2 EHRR330 [31]; Øvseydiz v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 20 [143-146].
69 HC Deb. 29 April 2019 Vol. 659 Col. 88 (Rushanara Ali MP).
of democratic societies, and it has a special position in the hierarchy of values. Article 2 does not solely concern deaths resulting from the use of force by agents of the state but includes a positive substantive obligation on states to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within their jurisdiction. This applies to any activity, public or private, in which the right to life may be at stake. This duty to protect life has two angles: a “big picture” general duty with a focus on the state’s obligation as overseer under which the state must institute and maintain an effective system of deterrence against the threat to life, as well as an “operational” duty which can require public bodies to take preventive measures where there is a known and specific risk. Where a violation of the substantive positive obligation in Article 2 is established, compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage are in principle possible as part of the range of redress available.

In practice, litigation involving Article 2 often arises within common fact patterns. The Strasbourg and domestic jurisprudence show that the operational duty arises to protect persons from a real and immediate risk of losing their life where those people are under the state’s control (such as in prison, or hospital) or the state has assumed responsibility for the regulatory system which poses a risk to life. The standard demanded for the performance of the operational duty is one of reasonableness, which includes consideration of the circumstances of the case, the ease or difficulty of taking precautions and the resources available. While the state has an obligation to ensure a safe regulatory system, such as the provision for securing high professional standards among health professionals and the protection of the lives of patients, matters such as errors of professional judgment or negligent coordination would not be sufficient to engage Article 2.

The positive duty to protect life is not, however, confined to past fact patterns and it would, according to Lord Brown, be absurd to conclude that just because a particular issue has not previously been resolved by the ECtHR jurisprudence means that it cannot be decided by domestic courts. So it does not matter that there has been no previous case law applying the positive obligation to situations involving high-rise fire safety. Indeed, as we show below, the principles underlying Article 2 case law support the contention that the systemic regulatory failures that allowed residents only to discover, post Grenfell, that their un-remediated homes are unsafe, constitutes an “ongoing” violation of the state’s duties under Article 2.

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74 Ölçlüyıldız v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 20 [90].
75 Ölçlüyıldız v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 20 [89].
76 Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Trust [2012] UKSC 2 [15-25].
77 TP v United Kingdom (2002) 34 EHRR 2 [107].
79 Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust [2012] UKSC 2 [112].
**Substantive Duty**

The general, big picture, duty requires states “to put in place a legislative and administrative framework designed to provide effective deterrence against threats to the right to life”. The ECtHR has held that this may include, for example, the duty to put in place regulations compelling hospitals to adopt appropriate measures for the protection of their patients’ lives, or regulations governing dangerous industrial activities. In the Supreme Court decision of Smith v Ministry of Defence Lord Mance noted that for the big picture duty to be engaged in the particular context of dangerous activities the state “must govern the licensing, setting up, operation, security and supervision of the activity and must make it compulsory for all concerned to take practical measures to ensure the effective protection of citizens whose lives might be endangered by the inherent risks”. By analogy, this means it is engaged in the fire safety context where the state has assumed responsibility by creating the system affecting construction and fire health and safety through the Building Regulations, and the building control inspection system.

The focus is upon the regulatory framework, not on whether there may have been failings in particular cases. In a discussion of medical negligence, it was emphasised that “the [Strasbourg] Court would normally find a substantive violation of Article 2 only if the relevant regulatory framework failed to ensure proper protection of a patient’s life”; if there have been errors in particular cases this will not lead to a breach of the state’s positive obligation under Article 2. On the other hand, while it will usually be private parties (architects, building surveyors, developers etc.) who have designed and built a block of flats, and often a private approved inspector who has signed it off, this does not absolve the state from responsibility. It was clearly expressed in Wos v Poland that “the exercise of state powers which affects Convention rights and freedoms raises an issue of state responsibility” regardless of any delegation to private actors. As such, the ongoing risk of life posed by these buildings engages the state’s big picture duty under Article 2.

The problem any claim under Article 2 will have to overcome is that it may be difficult to demonstrate that the ongoing violation of Article 2 is attributable to “systematic or structural dysfunction” and is not merely an “error”. Human error, including negligent error, is inherent in any institution or regulated industry. In the context of soldiers not being equipped with the correct phones in a conflict zone, the Court of Appeal in R (Long) v Secretary of State of Defence observed that it would be unrealistic to expect the state to be “liable to protect the lives of soldiers which is

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81 Önerüldüz v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 20 [90].
82 Smith v Ministry of Defence [2013] UKSC 41 [105] (citing Önerüldüz v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 20 [89-90]).
84 Wos v Poland (2007) 45 EHRR 28 (in the context of administering a compensation scheme). See also: Assanidze v Georgia (2004) 39 EHRR 32 [116]: “The Convention does not merely oblige the higher authorities of the Contracting states themselves to respect the rights and freedoms it embodies; it also has the consequence that, in order to secure the enjoyment of those rights and freedoms, those authorities must prevent or remedy any breach at subordinate levels. The higher authorities of the state are under a duty to require their subordinates to comply with the Convention and cannot shelter behind their inability to ensure that it is respected.” See also: A Mowbray: ‘One of the most prevalent types of positive obligation is the duty upon states to take reasonable measures to protect individuals from infringement of their Convention rights by other private persons.’; A Mowbray The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights’ (Hart Publishing, 2004) p.225.
broken whenever such an error is made by an individual soldier which increases or fails to mitigate a risk to the lives of other soldiers.” As such, individuals living in unsafe blocks will have to demonstrate that the fire safety defects in their buildings are caused not by, for example, a building error or a “concatenation of unfortunate events” but rather by a failure to “ensure through a system of rules and through sufficient control that the risk is reduced to a reasonable minimum.”

**Operational Duty**

The operational element of the duty requires authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual or group whose life is at risk. This can require some very practical measures to be taken, but must not “impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities.” Although this limb was developed in particular contexts, such as protecting prisoners from fellow prisoners, the courts are willing to expand the circumstances in which the duty is owed. Further, as Baroness Hale has noted, the ECtHR has a tendency “to state the principle in very broad terms, without defining precisely the circumstances in which it will apply.” In Önerüldiz v Turkey a number of the applicant’s close relatives were killed when a methane explosion in a nearby refuse tip caused a landslide which engulfed the applicant’s house. The Grand Chamber found a violation of Article 2 as the state had failed to take steps to prevent the explosion. In finding a violation, the Grand Chamber gave decisive weight to the fact that the tip was, from the beginning, operating in breach of the relevant technical standards and the risk of explosion had been known for some considerable time before. Indeed, it was “impossible” for the state departments responsible for managing the tip not to have known of the risk. As such, it was apparent that the state knew or ought to have known that there was a real and immediate risk to life. Further, a solution was available (installing a gas extraction system) that would not divert the state’s resources to an excessive degree.

A number of distinguishing features between Önerüldiz and the fire safety context discussed in Part I of this article mean that it is not directly analogous. In Önerüldiz the refuse tip was owned and operated by public bodies unlike (apart from social housing blocks) the complex matrix of primarily private actors in the fire safety and cladding scandal. Further, Önerüldiz was decided in the context of it involving dangerous activities and it is artificial to argue that the risk to life in high-rise buildings arises as a result of a dangerous activity. Further, whereas there was a known breach of standards in Önerüldiz there is a lively debate about whether some forms of construction

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86 R (Long) v Secretary of State of Defence [2015] EWCA Civ 770 [74].
87 R (Long) v Secretary of State of Defence [2015] EWCA Civ 770 [17].
88 Stoyanov v Bulgaria App No 42980/04 (ECtHR, 9 October 2010) [61].
90 Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust [2012] UKSC 2 [96].
91 Önerüldiz v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 20.
92 Önerüldiz v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 20 [98-100].
93 Önerüldiz v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 20 [101].
95 Önerüldiz v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 20 [9].
\textit{did} breach Building Regulations. The ongoing cladding scandal is also somewhat different from \textit{Budayeva v Russia} where the ECtHR appears to have given significant weight to the fact that there was no ambiguity about the scope or the timing of the work that needed to be performed and the government gave no reasons why no such steps were taken.\textsuperscript{96} Not all fire safety risks have yet been identified as testing has, to date, only been required in ACM buildings, and there remain uncertainties about what work needs to be done for some blocks.\textsuperscript{97}

Further, although ACM buildings (and other blocks with fire safety defects) are at risk in general there is generally no knowledge of a particular and heightened danger of an actual outbreak of fire at any individual site. This leads on to the questions as to what level of knowledge of risk is required, at what point in time the requisite knowledge arises, and whether the level of harm is relevant. In \textit{Osman v United Kingdom}, the Strasbourg Court emphasised that the question is not whether there is gross negligence or wilful disregard of the duty to protect life but it is sufficient to “show that the authorities did not do all that could be reasonably expected of them to avoid a real and immediate risk to life of which they have or ought to have knowledge”.\textsuperscript{98} In \textit{Osman} itself, there was found to be insufficient knowledge of an immediate risk to life. A schoolteacher who had formed an unhealthy attachment to a teenage pupil shot the boy and his father, injuring the boy, killing the father. The police were aware of various threats but on the facts that Court held that did not know that the lives of the Osman family were at “real and immediate risk”.\textsuperscript{99} Case law on the “operational duty” suggests that there needs to be specific knowledge of risk in order for there to be liability, and the result in \textit{Osman} suggests that this may be hard to establish. It is, however, important to see this as intertwined within the general positive duty to protect life. In the context of fire safety, it is the failure to establish a regulatory framework consistent with the first limb that has created the risk to life that triggers the operational duty. The scale of possible harm also appears relevant, as in \textit{Budayeva v Russia} the ECtHR gave significant weight to the fact that any mudslide was capable of “devastating consequences.”\textsuperscript{100} This, of course, is equally true in the context of any fire in a high-rise building with flammable cladding or a related fire safety risk. As the last twenty years have unequivocally demonstrated, any fire in such a context is capable of \textit{devastating consequences}. The government’s own amended guidance to the Housing Act 2004 notes that an uncontrolled fire in high-rise buildings with ACM cladding could cause severe health effects that are “life-changing or life threatening”.\textsuperscript{101}

Given what is now known about the fire safety regulatory framework, there is an overwhelmingly strong case for arguing that Article 2 has been violated. It is clear that the government is fully aware of the known risk to life posed by combustible cladding post Grenfell and has implemented piecemeal measures and provided some funding for social and private housing remediation. These

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\textsuperscript{96} \textit{Budayeva v Russia} (2014) 59 EHRR 2 [149].

\textsuperscript{97} Although it would be perverse to argue that because the Government has not conducted testing it can therefore claim it has no knowledge of risk, as this would be a deliberate closing of its eyes.

\textsuperscript{98} \textit{Osman v United Kingdom} (2000) 29 EHRR 245.


\textsuperscript{100} \textit{Budayeva v Russia} (2014) 59 EHRR 2 [148].

\textsuperscript{101} \textit{Secretary of State for Housing, Communities & Local Government “Housing Health and Safety Rating Systems Operating Guidance”} (HC 1774) para. 8.01; S. Bright “Local Authorities Have Teeth” (3 December 2019) \textit{Housing After Grenfell Blog} <\url{https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/housing-after-grenfell/blog/2018/12/local-authorities-have-teeth}> accessed 29 May 2019.
interim measures highlight that the government has knowledge of the potential risks, but also demonstrate a determination to limit its exposure to the costs of remediation and to distance itself from any responsibility for a problem that was known about long before Grenfell. Local authorities and central government do have a certain level of discretion when determining how to resolve the challenges posed by flammable cladding. However, as long as the risk to life remains real, public authorities cannot successfully argue that the use of interim measures discharge their positive obligations under Article 2.

Reasonableness and the Margin of Appreciation

The standard demanded for the performance of the operational duty is one of reasonableness which includes consideration of the circumstances of the case, the ease or difficulty of taking precautions, and the resources available.\textsuperscript{102} Central to this consideration is what is referred to as the margin of appreciation that recognises that the relevant authority should have some discretion when determining the appropriate course of action.\textsuperscript{103} The response of the UK government may be to argue that remediating defective buildings is not its responsibility and also that it would impose an impossible and disproportionate burden.\textsuperscript{104} We are, however, focussing only on defects that engage the positive obligation to preserve life under Article 2, not broader problems with defective or sub-standard housing.\textsuperscript{105} Even so, the scale of identifiable risks could be enormous. A recent news report by The Sunday Times states that up to 196,000 people in 82,000 flats (68,000 of them privately owned) could be in danger. The total bill for fixing the problem could be £1.4bn, of which £1.2bn is for private blocks (six times more than the government has pledged for this sector).\textsuperscript{106} Further, for the government to pay for remediation will inevitably take funding from other priorities; for example, concerns were expressed when it was revealed that the funding for the remediation of unsafe cladding on social housing was the result of money being moved from an existing fund for affordable homes.\textsuperscript{107}

\textit{Summing up Article 2}

\textsuperscript{102} Officer L, Re [2007] UKHL 36.

\textsuperscript{103} \textit{Casey v United Kingdom} (1991) 13 EHRR 622.

\textsuperscript{104} Where would ‘remediation’ stop? The Chartered Institute of Housing estimated for England an immediate £10 billion repair backlog, with an additional £10 billion needed to modernise homes lacking central heating and double glazing (33) Chartered Institute of Housing and Graham Moody Associates, Council Housing – Financing the Future – Final Report (Coventry: CIH, 1998). There is, however, a crucial distinction between defects that provide an immediate risk to life, engaging Article 2, and other repair needs.

\textsuperscript{105} The problem of defective or sub-standard housing in the UK remains a persistent problem. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper. For more information see, United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ (14 July 2016) UN Doc E/C.12/GBR/CO/6, para 49 where the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights described the lack of available, affordable, accessible, and adequate housing in the UK as a “persistent critical situation”. The number of homes categorised as unfit for human habitation is alarming – the most up to date figures show that 19% of homes in England and Wales do not comply with the Decent Homes Standard. The Homes (Fitness for Human Habitation) Act 2018 is an attempt to redress this problem. For guidance see, G. Peaker “Fitness for Habitation – a thumbnail guide” (21 December 2018) \textit{Nearly Legal} <https://nearlylegal.co.uk/2018/12/fitness-for-habitation-a-thumbnail-guide/> accessed 11 June 2019.


There will be all sorts of arguments to be had about whether there is an actionable breach of Article 2 in particular instances, but without doubt, the UK government has assumed the responsibility of creating and operating a regulatory system to ensure buildings are constructed well and are safe. As demonstrated in Part I, the adopted system has failed catastrophically.\(^\text{108}\) There has been no reform to Building Regulations notwithstanding calls for change long before Grenfell. In addition, the government was aware of the risks posed by unsafe cladding and other defects but it was only in response to the public outcry following Grenfell that interim measures were implemented. The mitigating measures remain inadequate due to their limited scope and the as yet untested use of interim safety measures such as the “waking watch”. In *Budayeva v Russia*, while having regard to the authorities’ wide margin of appreciation in matters where the state is required to take positive action, the ECtHR noted that it must “consider whether the government envisaged other solutions to ensure the safety of the local population.”\(^\text{109}\) To do this, the ECtHR requested the Russian government to provide information on the regulatory framework, land-planning policies and specific safety measures implemented at the material time for deterring natural hazards. The ECtHR concluded that the interim measures intended to stop mud-slides were not adequately maintained.\(^\text{110}\) In an analogous manner, the safety measures instituted by the UK government in relation to fire safety at the material time have not removed real and imminent risk to the lives of thousands of individuals living in unsafe blocks. The adequacy of the regulatory framework in relation to the particular situation of Grenfell will be determined in Stage 2 of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, but the available evidence already demonstrates that the UK government persists in its ongoing failure to do everything within its powers to remedy the risk to life for other sites.\(^\text{111}\)

**Article 8**

“I’m having to choose between homelessness and bankruptcy”.\(^\text{112}\)

Ritu Saha, Leaseholder at Northpoint, Bromley

“The financial stress and feeling unsafe in my own home is taking a huge toll on our lives—we are also getting married in two months and this huge cladding bill has overridden everything. We want to move so we can start a family but are unable to as the flat is not sellable, and we can’t raise a family in such a flammable building.”\(^\text{113}\)

Anonymous Leaseholder cited in the House of Commons

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\(^{109}\) *Budayeva v Russia* (2014) 59 EHRR 2 [156].

\(^{110}\) *Budayeva v Russia* (2014) 59 EHRR 2 [156].


\(^{113}\) HC Deb. 29 April 2019 Vol. 659 Col. 88 (Rushanara Ali MP).
Article 8 provides that: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”114 Like Article 2, the courts have recognised that Article 8 entails positive obligations.115 In Botta v Italy the ECtHR held that the positive obligation under Article 8 arises where there is a “direct and immediate link between the measures sought by an applicant and the latter’s private and/or family life.”116 In the context of dangerous activities there is often an overlap between interference with Articles 2 and 8.117 Although the boundaries between the state’s positive and negative obligations under Article 8 do not lend themselves to precise definition, the applicable principles are similar. In both contexts, regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole.118

While the cladding scandal has resulted in residents in high-rise buildings having to make difficult decisions about whether to remain, Article 8 does not recognise a right to be provided with a home. Nor does the jurisprudence of the ECtHR acknowledge such a right.119 What Article 8 adds to the analysis is that it provides a framework for taking account of the broader impacts of fire safety on the lives of those anxious about their personal safety and financial security.120 The notion of “private life” is underpinned by the primacy of personal autonomy and quality of life.121 Significantly this includes both physical and mental effects.122 In addition to the mental health impacts, some occupiers have reported having put plans to raise a family on hold, being unable to take up new employment opportunities, feeling “trapped” in a property that they cannot sell, being fearful of bankruptcy or losing their homes.123 These fall within the focus of Article 8 which recognises the “right to establish and to develop relationships with other human beings, especially in the emotional field for the development and fulfilsments of one’s own personality,”124 the importance of physical and moral integrity,125 as part of private life; personal autonomy; and the importance of protecting “security, identity and lifestyle”.126 For those buildings where remediation has begun individuals living in unsafe blocks are complaining about noise from drills and other equipment, high levels of dust, loss of light, general disruption, and cold while the cladding is removed – all things that can be recognised within Article 8.127

114 ECHR Article 8.
115 Marxes v Belgium (1979-80) 2 EHRR 330 [31]; Arrey v Ireland (1979-80) 2 EHRR 305.
116 Botta v Italy (1998) 26 EHRR 241 [34].
117 Budayeva v Russia (2014) 59 EHRR2 [133].
118 Hristozov v Bulgaria App No. 47039/11 and 358/12 (ECtHR, 3 November 2012) [117].
120 Niemietz v Germany (1993) 16 EHRR 97 [29-33]; Hatton v United Kingdom (2002) 34 EHRR 1 [107].
121 Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 18 [90].
122 Budayeva v Russia (2007) 45 EHRR 10 [69].
125 X and Y v Netherlands (1986) 8 EHRR 235.
127 Merino Gomez v Spain (2005) 41 EHRR 40 (noise from bars and nightclubs); Dos v Hungary (2013) 57 EHRR 12 (noise and vibration from heavy traffic).
Article 3

“I genuinely believe nothing will be done until we have a second tragedy in a private block [...] I feel constantly stressed, anxious, depressed, lost, abandoned and devastated by something that cannot be my responsibility.”

Anonymous Testimony Collected by the UK Cladding Action Group

Under Article 3: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Article 3, requires states to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, including such ill-treatment administered by private individuals. These measures should provide effective protection, in particular, of children and other vulnerable persons, and include reasonable steps to prevent ill-treatment of which the authorities had or ought to have had knowledge. Only particularly serious violations will come within Article 3 and assessing this is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, its duration, its physical and mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim. The impact must be serious and cause “either actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering” but can include a feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority. Residents will face a significant evidential hurdle to satisfy any court that the necessary tests of proximity, knowledge and reasonableness in relation to Article 3 are satisfied. In practice those who have experienced mental suffering, anguish and feelings of inferiority may be best to focus on Article 8.

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (A1P1)

A1P1 may bring a further dimension to the discussion. It protects against interferences with the “peaceful enjoyment of possessions”, often referred to as the right to property. The ECtHR has taken an “autonomous” approach to the meaning of “possession” to denote an object of economic value. Again, A1P1 does not depend merely on the state’s duty not to interfere, but may require positive measures of protection, particularly where there is a direct link between the measures an applicant may legitimately expect from the authorities and his effective enjoyment of their possessions. Whereas the other Articles focus more directly on the person, A1P1 may provide a lens through which financial loss to leaseholders could be accommodated. The inability to sell a

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129 ECHR Article 3.
133 Kudla v Poland (2002) 35 EHRR 11 [92].
135 ECHR Article 1 Protocol No. 1.
137 Budayeva v Russia (2014) 59 EHRR 2 [172]; Önerüldüz v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 20 [133].
flat in a building with no remediation plans has led to some suggesting that these flats are worthless, and certainly many flats will have suffered a dramatic loss in value and even those that are eventually remediated may suffer from long-term loss in value due to stigma.

At first sight, there is intuitive merit to the notion that leaseholders have been subject to an interference with their property and have been forced to bear an “individual and excessive” burden. The difficulty for leaseholders, however, will be showing that there has been an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions, deprivation of possessions, or controls on the use of those possessions. Any claim under A1P1 faces the difficulty that (unless there has been a refurbishment project since purchase) the “possession” (the flat itself and the property right) has not changed; the risk was always there, even though it is only in the aftermath of the Grenfell that the defects have been identified. Merely identifying or becoming aware of problems that result in a diminution in value is unlikely to constitute an interference under A1P1.

There may, however, be a potential A1P1 case if occupiers are required to move out following service of a prohibition notice; there will then be an “interference”, “control of use” or perhaps even a de facto deprivation. Even if an individual has retained legal title, the ECtHR has recognised that there can be a de facto expropriation. For example, when further investigating the realities of the situation, leaseholders will have lost all meaningful use of their leasehold interest.

**Preliminary Conclusions**

Although the fire safety and cladding scandal engages Articles 2, 3, and 8 and A1P1, the strongest claim is probably based around Article 2. There exists a “real” and “imminent” threat to life, and the government has tacitly accepted the risk through the implementation of interim safety measures after Grenfell. Further, as noted above, while the Minister for Housing, Kit Malthouse MP has stated that his “primary concern is to make sure that every resident is safe tonight”, serious questions remain unanswered as to the effectiveness of interim measures such as the use of a “waking watch”. Given what is now known about fire safety regulatory framework, there is a strong case for arguing that Article 2 has been violated. This view is supported by the Equality and Human Rights Commission and several other commentators. It may also be the case that where residents have suffered particular personal harm the right to a private life and autonomy under Article 8 is also being violated (and in extreme cases, this may even amount to inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3).

138 Sperrung & Lönnroth (1983) 5 EHRR 35 [61].
139 R (British American Tobacco UK Ltd) v Secretary of State for Health [2016] EWCA Civ 1182 [93].
141 See, Nencheva v Bulgaria App. No. 48609/06 (ECtHR, 18 June 2013) [121-123 the Bulgarian State was held to be in breach of its obligations under Article 2 for not having taken sufficiently prompt action to ensure effective and sufficient protection of the lives of young people in a social care home. The ECtHR gave decisive weight to the fact that the authorities had been made aware of the dangerous living conditions.
The final section considers some of the difficulties there will be, however, in turning these arguments into actionable and successful claims.

III. MAKING RIGHTS REAL

Turning an alleged violation of human rights into a justiciable claim is not straightforward even though individuals living in unsafe blocks should easily cross the threshold of having to show that they are victims under the HRA and ECHR. Many reported cases in relation to Article 2 follow events or tragedies that have already occurred, and which caused serious physical harm. When lives have been lost, courts can more easily identify specific harm and establish a causal link between the harm sustained and the alleged failure. In both the domestic courts and ECtHR, successful applicants tend to be those who focus on claims for damages; in these cases, applicants argue that the state has failed in its duty. This kind of claim is, perhaps, more apt for those who were victims of Grenfell.

This section will consider other potential avenues of redress for individuals living in unsafe blocks. The first looks at whether it is possible to challenge public ‘acts’, such as policy announcements or decisions to exercise, or not, public powers. The second explores whether the failure to comply with the operational duty to protect life in the context of fire safety gives rise to a claim.

Trigger Event

If the government makes some policy announcement or takes a decision, this may provide a moment (that we call a “trigger event”), that can be challenged for compliance with public law and human rights. Interested parties often bring challenges to government announcements, public policy and legislation. So, for example, the charity Client Earth has brought three successful judicial review claims against the government in order to challenge published Air Quality Plans for a failure to comply with its legal obligations. Another example can be observed in the “right to rent” litigation. The right to rent scheme (as it became known) was piloted in the West Midlands and required private landlords to check the immigration status of all tenants. The government decision to roll out the scheme nationwide was (successfully) challenged by the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants on the grounds that this was incompatible with the ECHR and irrational.

Adopting this approach, it may be that a declaration can be sought by occupiers or other interested parties (perhaps the UK Cladding Action Group or Tower Blocks UK) that, pursuant to s.4 of the

144 HRA s.7(1); ECHR Article 34.
145 For example, in Önerüyildız v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 20 a methane explosion at a rubbish tip in Ümraniye buried 10 dwellings and the applicant lost 9 members of his family. In Budayeva v Russia (2014) 59 EHRR 2 a series of mudslides hit the residential town of Tyrynaus (Тырныауз) causing 8 fatalities. Further, significant damage to property was reported with one of the mudslides destroying part of a nine-story block of flats with directly resulted in 4 of the casualties.
146 R. (on the application of ClientEarth) v Secretary of State for Food, Environment and Rural Affairs (No. 3) [2018] EWHC 315 (Admin).
147 R. (on the application of Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWHC 452 (Admin) (This decision is currently being appealed). For a response to this decision see, R. Ekins “The High Court’s ‘right to rent’ decision is a travesty” The Spectator (2 March 2019) <https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2019/03/the-high-courts-right-to-rent-decision-is-a-travesty/> accessed 9 June 2019.
HRA, a particular act or inaction of a public body is incompatible with the ECHR.\(^{148}\) One trigger event could be the recent government announcement that £200 million will be made available to remove and replace unsafe cladding from around 170 privately owned high-rise buildings.\(^{149}\) The intention was that this funding would “unblock progress in remediating private sector high-rise residential buildings” by motivating hitherto recalcitrant freeholders to undertake remediation in the knowledge that it will be paid for.\(^{150}\) While this announcement received a significant amount of media attention, it left many important issues unanswered and it is the limitations in its scope and clarity that may provide a reason for challenge.\(^{151}\) For example: what if a freeholder (or management company) still fails to initiate the necessary remediation work? Neither occupiers nor leaseholders can do the work themselves as they do not have powers over the “common parts” of the building which is the area in which the majority of safety remediation, including cladding, has to take place. Nor do occupiers or leaseholders have power to compel freeholders to do the work, and the powers that local authorities have to enforce fire safety remediation are fraught with uncertainty and complexity.\(^{152}\) The announcement has also resulted in a “cladding lottery” in which buildings with “Grenfell style” ACM cladding will be able to access funds (although only for ACM remediation, not for other fire safety defects that are already known or are discovered when the cladding is removed), but hundreds more buildings clad in similar, but crucially different, flammable cladding will not qualify for funding.\(^{153}\) Thousands more buildings are currently being tested, and new fire safety defects are emerging as more intrusive fire risk assessments are being undertaken.\(^{154}\) The £200m cladding fund is limited to remediation of ACM cladding and the statement makes clear that it “will not be repeated in other circumstances.”\(^{155}\) The announcement is, therefore, too narrow in scope to address the human rights violations of individuals living in unsafe blocks with non-ACM fire-safety defects, it may also turn out to be too little in financial terms to rectify all ACM buildings, and it fails to address the fundamental question of who will ensure that remediation takes place.

It is not only the central government that may be subject to public law challenges. Local authorities may also be vulnerable to challenge. They do, for example, have powers under the Housing Act 2004 (“HA 2004”) to take enforcement action if there is unsafe cladding, or there are other fire

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148 HRA s.4.


153 For example, at the 10 storeys at Northpoint, in Bromley, as well as polyethylene-filled ACM, the tower block has two other types of material that tests have deemed flammable: high-pressure laminate (HPL) and aluminium window panels with bonded insulation. (M. Lee, T. Calver and J. Ungod-Thomas “Grenfell two years on: the true scale of the cladding scandal revealed” The Sunday Times (London, 9 June 2019) p.14).


hazards. Following Grenfell, the Housing, Health and Safety Rating System (“HHSRS”) was amended to make it clear the local authorities have the power to assess the outside of buildings for fire hazards. Under the HA 2004 local authorities have duties to inspect if they have reason to consider it would be appropriate to see if there are any category 1 or category 2 hazards. If a category 1 hazard is found, then the local authority has a duty to take appropriate enforcement action. If occupants request the local authority to take action, and they refuse, this refusal decision may provide a trigger event that can be challenged. In practice, leaseholders may be unlikely to go down this route as the risk for them is that if enforcement action is taken, and the building is remediated by the freeholder, the costs will simply be passed onto them. This would not be true, however, of other occupiers, such as tenants who are not exposed in any meaningful way to cost recovery.

**Systems Failure**

An alternative argument is that the state has failed in its duty to implement appropriate systems to protect life, whether at the big picture level or at the individual level where an operational duty to protect in a specific context has arisen. This kind of claim can be pursued by occupiers either by way of a declaration that the regulatory framework fails to protect life and/or by a claim for damages. The declaration route would focus on the argument that there is an ongoing risk to life as a direct result of a systemic failure, the failure being the defects with the building regulations and building control inspection frameworks that were discussed earlier. It was this kind of claim that was being pursued in the case of R. (on the application of Mrs Pearl Scarfe) v HMP Woodhill. Garnham J considered a challenge against HMP Woodhill on the grounds that the prison had failed to comply with its Article 2 duty to protect prisoners from suicide. In that particular case the remedy sought was a declaration. The reason why the claim did not succeed was because there had been individual errors rather than a system failure. Garnham J observed that, while individual error may give rise to claims for damages (for example for vicarious liability), such an error would not justify a declaration of incompatibility under Article 2. By contrast, in the context of high-rise residential buildings the regulatory framework as a whole has failed.

In addition, where there are known fire safety problems in particular buildings there are specific risks to life that may be thought of also as operational failures: the “system” has failed to provide a framework that ensures safe construction, and once buildings have undergone fire risk assessments that identify a risk to life this triggers the operational duty. Unless remediation occurs,

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160 R (on the application of Mrs Pearl Scarfe) v HMP Woodhill [2017] EWHC 1194 (Admin).

161 R (on the application of Mrs Pearl Scarfe) v HMP Woodhill [2017] EWHC 1194 (Admin) [48].
or there are mitigating measures that remove the risk to life, there is an operational failure, and this may justify an award of damages in the particular circumstances of an individual case.

These kinds of claims are quite different from what Garnham J was referring to when he discussed individual errors, although in certain contexts it may be difficult to determine the dividing line between a systemic or framework failure, operational failures, and mere errors. After all, as the Master of the Rolls noted, all system or framework errors are made by human beings. What occupiers must therefore identify is “a failure to provide an effective system of rules, guidance and control within which individuals are to operate in a particular context”. This is to be contrasted with an error which involves “an individual’s failure to operate properly within the system provided by the state”, which would not violate Article 2. An error might be, for example, where cladding fails, due to it being incorrectly installed, and kills a resident. This building error does not constitute a violation of Article 2, but could involve private law claims against the builder.

These operational duties may be placed not only on central government but also on other public bodies where they have a responsibility for the particular site. As public bodies both local authorities and some housing associations have responsibilities under the HRA, and this means that they will also have positive obligations, including the operational duty, in relation to their own housing stock. Once a fire risk is known, the operational duty will apply to them, and they do, as building owners, have the power to remediate and fix the problem. If they choose to take lesser measures, such as hiring a waking watch, it is questionable as to whether this will be enough to discharge their duties, although as many local councils are notoriously cash-strapped, this may factor into the whether their response is reasonable in the circumstances.

Applying all this to fire safety in high-rise buildings is far from straightforward. At a simple level, it could be said that once the fire spread risks became known following earlier fires and emerging industry awareness of the dangers then a failure to ban the use of combustible cladding and to require the installation of sprinklers is, in itself, a regulatory failure. But the legal analysis will undoubtedly be complicated by differences between industry experts on what does and does not involve a breach of ADB, or the building regulations themselves. In defence of the state, some may argue that the guidance is clear: the Building Regulations specify that the “external walls of a building shall adequately resist the spread of fire”. True. But the very fact that this principle-based system fails to lay down clear rules on what is and is not permissible, and leaves wriggle-room for different interpretations, is surely not fit for purpose. In some cases, there is a clear breach of building regulations, as appears to have occurred in Re St Francis Tower, Ipswich. The particular issue before the Tribunal involved consultation on proposed service charges, but they were provided with evidence about the state of the building and refer to a “staggering” catalogue of fire safety failures, including the building being lived in even though there appears to have been no building control sign off. It may be argued that this case, and other situations like it, involve “human error” – a developer using the wrong product, a builder using poor construction methods,
an inspector not paying close enough attention etc. However, given the widespread problems identified in Part I, it is clear that the real and imminent risk to life caused by fire in high-rise buildings is attributable to structural and systemic failures.

**Limits of Bringing a Claim**

The two most important objectives for leaseholders will be: to make the property safe (which is important for all occupiers, not only leaseholders), and to avoid having to pay the cost of remediation works and interim measures. The government’s funding announcements (the social and private ACM remediation funds) were intended to help with both. By providing funding, it hoped this would push previously stubborn freeholders to make buildings safe. The particular policy response chosen by the government to the ACM problem sought to achieve remediation without merely transferring the financial burden onto leaseholders. The positive obligation on the government under Article 2 is to set up and maintain a regulatory system that preserves life, but does not, however, speak directly to the question of who pays. For all of those living in non-ACM blocks or with mixed ACM and other defects, the government funding announcements will do nothing either to make them safe or save them from massive costs. For these people, bringing a claim arguing that there is an ongoing breach of the operative duty or using the policy announcement (or refusal to carry out a HHSRS inspection in the case of local authorities) as a trigger event for a human rights challenge may require the government (or local authority) to re-think. But what it has to re-think is how to protect life and to respect private and family life. Given that the only feasible way forward the government saw in relation to ACM buildings was to provide a fund for remediation, it may be that a similar route has to be provided for other fire safety defects. What human rights arguments less easily play into is that leaseholders should be given financial support. So for those flat owners whose freeholders have already decided to remediate and who are now finding chunky service charge demands coming through the mail, it will be a much more difficult case to argue that human rights law can provide further redress.

Even if the claimant can establish breach of their human rights, the court is not bound to grant a remedy. The remedies are discretionary and, whilst a court will usually grant an appropriate remedy if the claimant establishes that the state has acted unlawfully, there are cases where the courts may decline. Where the court finds that an act of the public authority is unlawful under the HRA, it may grant such relief or remedy (or make such order) to afford “just satisfaction”. The primary concern in human rights cases should be to end the violation of Convention rights. As such, the courts have viewed damages as a “last resort”: the HRA is “not a tort statute”.

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166 Civil Procedure Rules 1998/3132 Rule 54.1; 54.1.10.

167 ECHR Article 41; HRA s.6(1); s.8(1); and s.8(2); Lord Woolf *et al*, *De Smith’s Judicial Review 8th Edition* (Sweet & Maxwell, 2018) para. 13-054.


169 *OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v Russia* (2014) 59 EHRR SE12 [21] and [51] It should be noted the original application was for €90 billion. This means that the ECtHR’s conception of “just satisfaction” was significantly less than the applicants originally sought.
There will be all the usual challenges entailed with any form of litigation. It is very time-consuming, it requires commitment and effort; it is stressful and emotional. In addition, there are questions about how it would be funded, especially as many individuals living in unsafe blocks are already financially stretched. There are, however, new ways of trying to fund legal actions, in particular, crowdfunding is becoming common. The website *crowd justice*, for example, has raised over £10 million to fund legal expenses for over 500 different causes. It is also possible for interest groups to represent claimants in human rights actions. For example, in 2017, the charity *Inquest* intervened in an ultimately unsuccessful challenge under Article 2 in *R (on the application of Mrs Pearl Scarfe) v HMP Woodhill*.

Where claimants have no private interest in the outcome of the case and the issues raised are of general public importance it may be possible to shield them from costs by applying for a Protective Costs Order which, if granted, could require the defendant to meet the costs of both parties.

**CONCLUSION**

It is clear that “something” must be done about fire safety in blocks of flats. But unless the government is held to account, it is hard to see how this is going to happen. It is submitted that there is an ongoing violation of the human rights of individuals living in unsafe blocks. While victims in other contexts have yet to use Article 2 as a pro-active remedy, it has the potential to be used positively. As Lord Brown observed, “[n]obody has ever suggested that, merely because a particular question which arises under the Convention has not yet been specifically resolved by the Strasbourg jurisprudence, domestic courts cannot determine it”. To be practical and effective, the state’s positive duty must be understood in a way that actively protects life. This reflects the teleological and evolutionary approach to interpretation of the ECHR. To date, the limited case law on Article 2 has proved it to be a clumsy tool, identifying gross and disproportionate violations only after tragedies have occurred. Instead of compelling states to act in the interest of protecting society, Article 2 has been used to assign blame in the hope of lessons being learned for the future. This restricted use of the right to life stems from the difficulty of proving that tragedies (actual and potential) are attributable to the state’s administrative and regulatory failures. Is the evidence gleaned from the case of Grenfell and connected fires enough to prove that there is a real and imminent risk to life from construction defects? We argue that it is.

Individuals living in unsafe blocks live in fear of their lives, despite interim measures, and for leaseholders, there are also massive worries about the costs of these temporary measures and longer-term remediation. With only limited possibilities for redress in private law, the only avenue available for many occupiers is through the realisation of their Convention rights and the hope of obtaining remedies through the HRA. There is considerable (and growing) evidence that our government continues to act in a way that is incompatible with its substantive and procedural positive obligations under Article 2. Potential violations of Articles 3 and 8 further implicate the

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170 *R (on the application of Mrs Pearl Scarfe) v HMP Woodhill* [2017] EWHC 1194 (Admin).

171 Civil Procedure Rules 1998/3132 Rule 44.3(2); *R (Corner House Research) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry* [2005] EWCA Civ 192 [74].

172 *Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Foundation Trust* [2012] UKSC 2 [112].
government. While Grenfell Tower painfully exposed the risk of fire in high-rise buildings, the system that allowed this to happen is, by and large, still in place, with only inadequate, piecemeal reforms being offered. The defects found in Grenfell Tower, and the culture that propagated them, were not unique: they have been found in hundreds (and potentially thousands) of buildings throughout the UK. It will be a long, costly, and emotionally-draining road for residents so long as the government continues to fail to act. To avoid exacerbating the plight of people living in high-rise blocks, it is time for the government to act to ensure that everyone is safe tonight. Change should preclude tragedy.