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The H.L.A. Hart Memorial Lecture 21 May 2013

Professor Will Kymlicka, Professor of Philosophy, Queen’s University, Canada will give this year's H.L.A […]

Korsgaard to give Hart Lecture 2012

Christine Korsgaard (Harvard) will deliver the H.L.A […]

Discussion Groups

These self-sustaining groups are an essential part of the life of our graduate school. They are organised in some cases by graduate students and in others by Faculty members and meet regularly during term, typically over a sandwich lunch, when one of the group presents work in progress or introduces a discussion of a particular issue or new case. They may also encompass guest speakers from the faculty and beyond.

Jurisprudence Discussion Group

Publications

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Journal Articles

2014

J Dickson, 'Estado del arte de la filosofía del derecho' (2014) 36 Doxa: Cuadernos de Filosofía del Derecho (forthcoming)

P Eleftheriadis, 'Legality and Reciprocity: A Discussion of Lon Fuller’s The Morality of Law' (2014) 9 Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 1

TAO Endicott, 'Arbitrariness' (2014) Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence [...]

In order to identify the form of arbitrariness that is relevant to the rule of law, I discuss a Supreme Court of India decision and a Supreme Court of Canada decision in which judges held that other public authorities had acted arbitrarily. I also discuss Jeremy Bentham’s work on the rule of law, and his notion that the interpretive power of judges is itself an arbitrary power. I argue that the interpretive role of judges is not necessarily hostile to the rule of law, but that there is a standing tension between the two. In the decisions under discussion, the Canadian and Indian judges used their doctrines of arbitrariness to reallocate power to themselves, without any resulting enhancement in the rule of law.


ISBN: 0841-8209

TAO Endicott, 'Interpretation and Indeterminacy' (2014) Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies, forthcoming

M Köpcke Tinturé, 'Methodology in Marmor's "Philosophy of Law"' (2014) Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies (forthcoming)

G Lamond, 'Analogical Reasoning in the Common Law' (2014) 34 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (forthcoming) [...]

Analogical reasoning is a pervasive feature of the common law, yet its structure and rational force is much disputed by legal theorists, some of whom are sceptical that it has any rational force at all. This paper argues that part of the explanation for these disagreements lies in there being not one form of analogical reasoning in the common law, but three: classificatory analogies, close analogies, and distant analogies. These three differ in their functions and rationale. Classificatory analogies involve the use of decided cases to help characterize novel fact situations, and are justified by the rule of law ideal of minimizing the dependence of judicial decisions on the individual views of decision-makers. Close analogies are used to help resolve unsettled issues by reliance on decisions from other branches of the same legal doctrine. They complement the doctrine of precedent, and rest on similar considerations. Distant analogies are also used to help resolve unsettled issues, but by reference to decisions from other legal doctrines. They are the most susceptible to sceptical critique: although they can serve to maintain coherence in the law, they deserve a more modest role in legal reasoning than they are often given.


ISBN: 1464-3820

G Lamond, 'Legal Sources, the Rule of Recognition, and Customary Law' (2014) 59 American Journal of Jurisprudence (forthcoming) [...]

DOI: 10.1093/ajj/auu005

A perennial puzzle about source-based law such as precedent is what makes sources legally binding. One of the most influential answers to this puzzle is provided by Hart’s rule of recognition. According to Hart, the sources of law are accepted as binding by the officials of a legal system, and this collective social practice of officials provides the foundations for a legal system. According to Hart, the rule of recognition differs fundamentally from other legal rules in three ways: (1) the grounds on which it is accepted; (2) the basis for its system-membership; and (3) its mode of existence. This paper argues that (1) is mistaken, and that (2) and (3) do not in fact make the rule of recognition fundamentally different to other legal rules in the way that Hart supposed. Instead, the rule of recognition is a form of customary law in foro whose existence is practice-dependent, but which is nonetheless legally binding and legally valid as other laws are. The foundations of a legal system do not lie in the acceptance of the ultimate sources of law, but in the acceptance of the system as a whole.


ISBN: 2049-6494

G Lamond, 'Legal Systems and the Rule of Recognition' (2014) Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies (forthcoming)

2013

John Gardner, 'Reasons and Abilities: Some Preliminaries' (2013) 58 American Journal of Jurisprudence 63 [...]

This paper takes some first steps in a study of the thesis that “ought” implies “can.” Considerable attention is given to the proper interpretation of the thesis, including the interpretation of “ought,” the interpretation of “can,” and the interpretation of “implies.” Having chosen a particular interpretation of the thesis to work on—in some ways its broadest interpretation—the paper tries to bring out some considerations that bear on its truth or falsity. After an excursion into the general theory of value, this paper finds it false. The paper concludes with the suggestion that part of its allure comes of confusion with another thesis, namely the thesis that “ought to try” implies “can succeed.” Suitably qualified, this last thesis is true, and the false thesis that “ought” implies “can” basks in the reflected glory. Left for another day are narrower interpretations of “ought” implies “can” which may protect it against my objections.


L Green, 'Should Law Improve Morality?' (2013) 7 Criminal Law and Philosophy 473 [...]

DOI: 10.1007/s11572-013-9248-3

Lawyers and philosophers have long debated whether law should enforce social morality. This paper explores whether law should improve social morality. It explains how this might be possible, and what sort of obstacles, factual and moral, there are to doing so. It concludes with an example: our law should attempt to improve our social morality of sexual conduct.


ISBN: 1871-9791

M Köpcke Tinturé, 'Concept and Purpose in Legal Theory: How to "Reclaim" Fuller' (2013) 58 American Journal of Jurisprudence 75

2012

P Eleftheriadis, 'A Right to Health Care' (2012) 40 Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 268

P Eleftheriadis, 'Descriptive Jurisprudence' (2012) 5 Problema 117

John Gardner, 'Corrective Justice, Corrected' (2012) 12 Diritto & Questioni Pubbliche 9

John Gardner, 'In Defence of Offences and Defences' (2012) 4 Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 110

John Gardner, 'Torts and Other Wrongs' (2012) 39 Florida State University Law Review 43

John Gardner, 'Wrongdoing by Results: Moore\'s Experiential Argument' (2012) 18 Legal Theory 459 [...]

Michael Moore and I agree about the moral importance of how our actions turn out. We even agree about some of the arguments that establish that moral importance. In Causation and Responsibility, however, Moore foregrounds one argument that I do not find persuasive, or even helpful. In fact I doubt whether it even qualifies as an argument. He calls it the �experiential argument�. In this comment I attempt to analyze Moore�s �experiential argument� in some detail and thereby to bring out why it doesn�t help. In the process I raise some problems about the rationality of the emotions, which may be where Moore and I part company. We both believe that emotions should be taken more seriously by moral philosophy. But apparently we have radically different views about what this means.


ISBN: 1352-3252

L Green, 'Jurisprudence for Foxes' (2012) 3 Transnational Legal Theory 150 [...]

DOI: doi:10.5235/TLT.3.2.150

This paper contests Brian Simpson's claim that HLA Hart's book, The Concept of Law, is that of a 'hedgehog,' that is, a procrustean and monistic thinker. It is not. Hart's work is pluralist both in its explanatory concepts and in its evaluative background. It is, of course, a philosophical book; but that is not enough to make it monistic. Some conjectures are offered as to why Simpson so badly misunderstood Hart, and as to why analytic legal philosophy is misunderstood, or distrusted, more generally.


2011

J Dickson, 'On Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Some Comments on Brian Leiter’s View of What Jurisprudence Should Become ' (2011) 30 Law and Philosophy 477

P Eleftheriadis, 'Austin and the Electors' (2011) 24 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 441

P Eleftheriadis, 'The Moral Distinctiveness of the European Union' (2011) 9 International Journal of Constitutional Law 695

J M Finnis, 'Equality and Differences' (2011) American Journal of Jurisprudence 17

John Gardner, 'Amartya Sen's The Idea of Justice' (2011) 6 Journal of Law, Philosophy and Culture 241 [...]

An extended critical notice of Amartya Sen's book The Idea of Justice.


ISBN: 1939-7917

John Gardner, 'Can There Be a Written Constitution?' (2011) 1 Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law 162

John Gardner and Timothy Macklem, 'Disibilità umane: su cosa significhi l\'avere accesso a un valore' (2011) 36 Ragion Pratica 9 [...]

DOI: 10.1415/34411

In this essay (published in Italian) we reflect on some general theoretical questions about disability, beginning with some absences of ability that are conventionally classed as disabilities (lack of vision, lack of mobility). We move from there to ask whether those of us who are conventionally classed as non-disabled in fact suffer from disabilities, and in particular whether there are disabilities shared by all humans. We reflect on the idea of the superhero, and also on whether it makes sense to envy the abilities of other species that are not shared by human beings. This leads us into a critique of species-relativism about value. We defend the thesis that all value is value for everything. This draws us into some reflections on the importance of ability and disability, and in particular on the practical importance for rational beings of that which they cannot attain.


ISBN: 1720-2396

John Gardner, 'What is Tort Law For? Part 1: The Place of Corrective Justice' (2011) 30 Law and Philosophy 1 [...]

DOI: 10.1007/s10982-010-9086-6

In this paper I discuss the proposal that the law of torts exists to do justice, more specifically corrective justice, between the parties to a tort case. My aims include clarifying the proposal and defending it against some objections (as well as saving it from some defences that it could do without). Gradually the paper turns to a discussion of the rationale for doing corrective justice. I defend what I call the ‘continuity thesis’ according to which at least part of the rationale for doing corrective justice is to mitigate one’s wrongs, including one’s torts. I try to show how much of the law of torts this thesis helps to explain, but also what it leaves unexplained. In the process I show (what I will discuss in a later companion paper) that ‘corrective justice’ cannot be a complete answer to the question of what tort law is for.


ISBN: 0167-5249

L Green, 'Sex-Neutral Marriage' (2011) 64 Current Legal Problems 1 [...]

DOI: 10.1093/clp/cur014

A different-sex marriage need not be a marriage between heterosexuals, and a same-sex marriage need not be a marriage between homosexuals. This shows how little the law of marriage cares about the sexuality of parties to a marriage; it does not show that sex-restricted marriage laws do not discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation. They do. Neither does the law care much about sex, let alone possibly procreative sex, within marriage. The voidability of a different-sex marriage on grounds of non-consummation does not show otherwise. The formation of a valid marriage was always a matter of consent, not coitus. But what should happen to the doctrine of non-consummation in a sex-neutral marriage regime? It is an anachronism that should be abolished.


ISBN: 0070-1998

M Köpcke Tinturé, ' Positive Law's Moral Purpose(s): Towards a New Consensus?' (2011) 56 American Journal of Jurisprudence 183

M Köpcke Tinturé, 'Law, and the Difference Between What is Claimed and What is Done' (2011) 8 Journal of Catholic Social Thought 255

2010

P Eleftheriadis, 'Human Rights as Legal Rights' (2010) 1 Transnational Legal Theory 371

P Eleftheriadis, 'Introduction: On Reading Law as a Moral Idea' (2010) 1 Jurisprudence

P Eleftheriadis, 'Law and Sovereignty' (2010) 29 Law and Philosophy 535 [...]

How is it possible that the idea of sovereignty still features in law and legal philosophy? Sovereignty is normally taken to refer to absolute power. Yet modern law assumes that power is exercised by officials constrained by legal rules and the rule of law. This essay argues that a closer look at sovereignty and law shows that the first impression is correct: law and sovereignty are mutually exclusive. Philosophically speaking, sovereignty is and has always been incompatible with the rule of law and with constitutional law itself. Sovereignty and constitutional government are mutually exclusive.


ISBN: 0167-5249

P Eleftheriadis, 'On Rights and Responsibilities' [2010] Public Law 31 [...]

The UK Government’s Green Paper Rights and Responsibilities: Developing our Constitutional Framework, outlines a new proposal for a British Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, which may replace the Human Rights Act as the main constitutional statement of human rights in the United Kingdom. The Green Paper does not address squarely the role that rights play in protecting liberty. It does not deal with the modern literature on justice, liberty and democracy. The failures are surprising, given the significance of what is being proposed. The experience of modern constitutional law teaches us that we need strong and independent judges and clear public laws, if rights are to be effective. The Green Paper fails to do justice to this long tradition. By making our rights conditional on someone’s (and mainly the government’s) view of our own virtue, the government’s proposal, at least as it stands today, threatens to undermine some of the most central safeguards of liberty.


P Eleftheriadis, 'Pluralism and Integrity' (2010) Ratio Juris 365 [...]

One of the theoretical developments associated with the law of the European Union has been the flourishing of legal and constitutional theories that extol the virtues of pluralism. Pluralism in constitutional theory is offered in particular as a novel argument for the denial of unity within a framework of constitutional government. This essay argues that pluralism fails to respect the value of integrity. It also shows that at least one pluralist theory seeks to overcome the incoherence of pluralism by implicitly endorsing monism. The coherence of European legal reasoning will be best preserved, if we consider that both the national legal order and the international (or European) such order endorse a sophisticated view of their own limits.


ISBN: 0952-1917

P Eleftheriadis, 'The Law of Laws' (2010) 1 Transnational Legal Theory 597

P Eleftheriadis, 'The Structure of European Union Law' (2010) 12 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 121

J M Finnis, 'Law as Idea, Ideal and Duty: A Comment on Simmonds, Law as a Moral Idea' (2010) 1 Jurisprudence 247

John Gardner, 'Hart on Legality, Justice, and Morality' (2010) 1 Jurisprudence 253 [...]

DOI: 10.5235/204033210793524276

In this comment on Nigel Simmonds' book Law as a Moral Ideal, I take issue with Simmonds' interpretation of the work of H.L.A. Hart. I attempt to provide textual support for the view that Hart did find necessary connections - many of them - between law and morality. The bulk of the comment is devoted to exploring just one indirect necessary connection between law and morality that Hart may have noticed in The Concept of Law, viz. the connection from law to legality, from legality to justice, and from justice to morality. I find Hart surprisingly ambivalent about the last link in this chain, but do not find in this ambivalence any solace for Simmonds.


ISBN: 2040-3313

John Gardner, 'Justification under Authority' (2010) 23 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 71 [...]

In this paper I discuss and reply to Malcolm Thorburn's important article 'Justifications, Powers, and Authority', Yale Law Journal 117 (2008), 1070. My discussion raises a wide range of conceptual and doctrinal questions about Thorburn's account of justification defences, and about the theory of justfication defences more generally. The paper also trespasses on some broader questions about the nature of law and its relationship to morality.


ISBN: 0841-8209

L Green, 'Two Worries about Respect for Persons' (2010) 120 Ethics 212

M Köpcke Tinturé, 'Law Does Things Differently' (2010) 55 American Journal of Jurisprudence 201

G Lamond, 'Persuasive Authority in the Law' (2010) 17 The Harvard Review of Philosophy 16 [...]

This article discusses the nature of persuasive authorities in the common law, and argues that many of them are best understood in terms of their (being regarded) as having theoretical rather than practical authorities for the courts that cite them. The contrast between theoretical and practical authority is examined at length in order to support the view that the treatment of many persuasive authorities by courts is more consistent with this view. Finally, it is argued that if persuasive authorities are best understood as theoretical authorities, this raises difficulties for both positivistic and interpretivist theories of law.


ISBN: 1062-6239

2009

P Eleftheriadis, 'Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Constitution' (2009) Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence

P Eleftheriadis, 'The Universality of Rights' (2009) Indian Journal of Constitutional Law [...]

This essay argues that the universality claim is a claim concerning two different domains: first, the domain of the political and, second, the domain of foreign policy. The domain of the political gives us a theory of political rights as we find them in Rawls' Political Liberalism. The domain of foreign policy gives us a theory of human rights as we find them in Rawls' Law of Peoples. Both are distinct from a third domain, that of the moral relations of persons, where rights also are seen to have a bearing. We have therefore political rights, human rights, and moral rights. Only the first two enjoy universality. The distinction between the moral, the political and the international domains is crucial to the success of the claim to universality.


J M Finnis, 'Does Free Exercise of Religion Deserve Constitutional Mention?' (2009) 54 American Journal of Jurisprudence 41 [...]

Surveys a number of influential constitutional provisions about freedom of religion, and argues that the recent literature (Dworkin; Eisgruber and Sager) contending that there is intrinsically nothing relevantly special about religion is mistaken.


J M Finnis, 'HLA Hart: A Twentieth Century Oxford Political Philosopher' (2009) 54 American Journal of Jurisprudence 161 [...]

Discusses Hart's Life, his contribution to the philosophy of law and social science and descriptive/explanatory political theory, and argues that his theory of the proper functions of law, in Law, Liberty and Morality, is misconceived (like Devlin's) because attending only to positive morality, which is substantially irrelevant to the issue.


John Gardner, 'The Logic of Excuses and the Rationality of Emotions' (2009) 43 Journal of Value Inquiry 315

L Green, 'Filosofia del derecho general' (2009) 3 Problema: anuario de filosofia y teoria del derecho 289 [...]

Spanish translation of 'General Jurisprudence: a 25th Anniversary Essay'. Translated by Enrique Rodriguez Trujano & Pedro A. Villarreal Lizarraga.


N E Stavropoulos, 'The Relevance of Coercion: Some Preliminaries' (2009) 22 Ratio Juris 339 [...]

Many philosophers take the view that, while coercion is a prominent and enduring feature of legal practice, its existence does not reflect a deep, constitutive property of law and therefore coercion plays at best a very limited role in the explanation of law's nature. This view has become more or less the orthodoxy in modern jurisprudence. I argue that an interesting and plausible possible role for coercion in the explanation of law is untouched by the arguments in support of the orthodox view. Since my main purpose is to clear the ground for the alternative, I spell out the orthodox view in some detail. I then briefly sketch the alternative. Finally, I turn to Jules Coleman's discussion of the alternative.


ISBN: 1467-9337

2008

J Dickson, 'How Many Legal Systems? Some Puzzles Regarding the Identity Conditions of, and Relations Between, Legal Systems in the European Union' (2008) 2 Problema 9

J M Finnis, 'Grounds of Law and Legal Theory: A Response' (2008) 13 Legal Theory 315

J M Finnis, 'Marriage: A Basic and Exigent Good' (2008) 91 The Monist 396

John Gardner, 'Moore on Complicity and Causality' (2008) 156 University of Pennsylvania Law Review PENNumbra 432

John Gardner, 'Simply in Virtue of Being Human: the Whos and Whys of Human Rights' (2008) 2 Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 [...]

In this paper I raise some questions about the familiar claim, recently reiterated by James Griffin, that human rights are rights that humans have 'simply in virtue of being human'. I ask, in particular, how we are to read the words 'simply in virtue of'. Are we speaking of who has the rights (A has them if and only if he or she is human) or why they have the rights (A has them because and only because he or she is human)? Griffin brings the two readings together, as two sides of the same coin. He offers a (more or less) universalistic case for (more or less) universalistic rights. I try to show how the two readings can be driven apart, how the universality of human rights need not be undermined merely by there being no adequate universalistic case for them. On the strength of this discussion I suggest an inversion of the relationship that is often thought to hold between human rights and human dignity. In a way our rights give us our dignity, not vice versa. And in a way this helps to make the case for the universality of human rights.


ISBN: 1559-3061

L Green, 'Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and Morals' (2008) 83 New York University Law Review 1035 [...]

This article seeks to clarify and assess HLA Hart's famous claim that legal positivism somehow involves a “separation of law and morals.” The paper contends that Hart's “separability thesis” should not be confused with the “social thesis,” with the “sources thesis,” or with a methodological thesis about jurisprudence. In contrast to all of these, Hart's separability thesis denies the existence of any necessary (conceptual) connections between law and morality. But that thesis is false: there are many necessary connections between law and morality, some of them conceptually significant. Among them is an important negative connection: law is of its nature morally fallible and morally risky. Lon Fuller emphasized what he called the “internal morality of law,” the “morality that makes law possible”. Hart’s most important message is that there is also an immorality that law makes possible. Law's nature is seen not only in its internal virtues, in legality, but also in its internal vices, in legalism.


ISBN: 0028-7881

2007

J Dickson, 'Is the Rule of Recognition Really a Conventional Rule?' (2007) 27(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 373

P Eleftheriadis, 'The Idea of a European Constitution' (2007) 27(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1

J M Finnis, 'Religion and State: Some Main Issues and Sources' (2007) 51 American Journal of Jurisprudence 107 [...]

This philosophical, non-theological article argues that the default position for public reason in a just political community is that some religion may be true and it matters substantially for individual wellbeing and that community's common good that individuals be both (i) free from coercion in their inquiries about what is true about the transcendent source and point of everything, and in putting into practice what they believe they have discovered through such inquiries, and (ii) encouraged in such inquiries and religious practice.Coercion and/or discouragament by government and law or by private individuals or groups, is justifiable only when required for public order, that is, the rights of others, public peace and public morality.Religions which do not accept that there is such a right to religious liberty are a standing threat to public order and can, in principle, be justly discriminated against and their faithful adherents kept at a distance from our territory.Existing UK laws and judgments which discriminate in this way are in principle justified.


ISBN: 0658995

John Gardner, 'Complicity and Causality' (2007) 1 Criminal Law and Philosophy 127

John Gardner, 'Nearly Natural Law' (2007) 52 American Journal of Jurisprudence 1

L Green, 'The Duty to Govern' (2007) 13 Legal Theory 165

G Lamond, 'Precedent' (2007) 2 Philosophy Compass 699 [...]

DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007

Precedent is a central feature of legal practice, requiring courts to follow decisions reached in earlier cases, thereby transforming the decisions in individual cases into a source of law. This article examines two major questions associated with precedent: (a) how to characterise the way that precedent operates as a source of law; and (b) how to justify the requirement that courts follow earlier decisions regardless of the merits of those decisions. Precedents are often thought to create general legal rules, but it is controversial whether this is the best way to understand their role in legal reasoning. Equally, it is unclear that the most common justifications for precedent unequivocally vindicate the practice.


2006

John Gardner and T Macklem, 'Value, Interest, and Well-Being' (2006) 18 Utilitas 362

L Green, 'Men in the Place of Women, from Butler to Little Sisters' (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1

J Raz, 'The Trouble with Particularism (Dancy's Version)' (2006) 115 Mind 99

2005

J M Finnis, 'Helping Enact Unjust Laws Without Complicity in Injustice' (2005) 49 American Journal of Jurisprudence 15646 [...]

Deploys an analysis of the relation between legal materials such as statutes and the propositions of law that those materials make true in order to show what are and are not the implications of moral teaching against supporting legislative proposals to permit acts that a state cannot justly permit.


ISBN: 0065-8995

J M Finnis, 'Self-referential (or Peformative) Inconsistency: its significance for truth' (2005) 78 Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 13 [...]

Performatively inconsistent, self-refuting propositions are not logically incoherent, or meaningless in themselves, or semantically paradoxical (such as “This sentence is false.”). Rather, because they have a definite reference, they are false because they are inconsistent with the facts that are given in and by any assertionof them. Thus they are not in themselves self-refuting, but to try to assert any of them is self-refuting. To show why this is so, one must show that performative inconsistency depends on the “implicit commitments” of the interlocutor. For example, what is entailed by “someone asserts that p” depends on what is meant by “assert.” As the concept of “implicit commitment” suggests, an assertion can beperformatively inconsistent only if it is located in a universe of rational discourse and is treated as an authentic contribution to such discourse. Thus sceptical arguments that aim to deny that knowledge is not a good are performatively self-refuting,for in asserting that p, one also asserts that one accepts (believes) that p is true. Itis absurd and self-contradictory to assert “p” if the assertion could imply “p, butin asserting this, I don’t care whether p is true or not.”


J M Finnis, 'The Thing I am': Personal Identity in Aquinas and Shakespeare' (2005) 22 Social Philosophy & Policy 250 [...]

Analyses, with illustrative reference to Aquinas and Shakespeare, the four irreducibly distinct kinds of explanation of personal identity, which yield four basic senses of "personal identity" and kinds of way in which one is or can be the same though partly different. Special topics include marriage, humiliation, repentance, and decay.


ISBN: 02650525

L Green, 'General Jurisprudence: a 25th Anniversary Essay' (2005) 25(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 565

L Green, 'Three Themes from Raz' (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 503

J Raz, 'Instrumental Rationality - A Reprise' (2005) 1 Journal for Ethics and Social Philosophy

J Raz, 'Interview: Legal Theory, Liberalism, Value Incommensurability, Equality and Authority.' (2005) 8 Imprints: egalitarian theory and practice 195

J Raz, 'The Myth of Instrumental Rationality' (2005) 1 Journal for Ethics and Social Philosophy

2004

J Dickson, 'Methodology in Jurisprudence: a critical survey' (2004) 10(3) Legal Theory 117

J Raz, 'Incorporation by Law' (2004) 10 Legal Thoery 1

J Raz, 'The Role of Well-Being' (2004) 18 Philosophical Perspectives

2003

J Dickson, 'The Central Questions of Legal Philosophy' (2003) 56 Current Legal Problems 63

P Eleftheriadis, 'Cosmopolitan Law' (2003) 9(2) European Law Journal 241

L Green, 'Civil Disobedience and Academic Freedom' (2003) 41 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 380

L Green, 'Strategy and Fundamental Legal Rules' (2003) American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Law and Philosophy 69

J Raz, 'About Morality and the Nature of Law' (2003) 48 The Anerican Journal of Jurisprudence 1

J Raz, 'Legal Principles and the Limits of the Law' (2003) Insonomia Doxa

J Raz, 'Liberalism in an Age of Conflict' (2003) Oblicza Liberalizmu 87 [...]

Interview with Beata Polanowska


J Raz, 'Numbers, With and Without Contractualism' (2003) 16 Ratio 346

2002

J Raz, 'Filosofia e pratica della liberta' (2002) 15 (37) Iride 475

2001

P Eleftheriadis, 'The European Constitution and Cosmopolitan Ideals' (2001) 7 The Columbia Journal of European Law 21

John Gardner, 'Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths' (2001) 46 American Journal of Jurisprudence 199

G Lamond, 'Coercion and the Nature of Law' (2001) 7(1) Legal Theory 35 [...]

DOI: 10.1017/S1352325201071026

The main focus of the article is upon two major lines of argument that attempt to establish a link between law and coercion: one based upon the law's efficacy; the other upon the law's normativity. It argues that the claim that law is necessarily coercive because it must be efficacious is mistaken--not necessarily on sociological or psychological grounds, but because it identifies law with the preconditions for its existence. On the other hand, the argument that law's normativity is inherently linked to coercion contains an important truth--not because coercion is necessary to account for normativity, but because the scope of law's claim to authority encompasses the right to authorize the use of coercion.


ISBN: 1469-8048

J Raz, 'On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries.' (2001) 2 Anuario de Derechos Humanos, nueva epoca

2000

L Green, 'Pornographies' (2000) 8 Journal of Political Philosophy 27

G Lamond, 'The Coerciveness of Law' (2000) 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 39 [...]

DOI: 10.1093/ojls/20.1.39

One of the central features associated with law is its coerciveness. A major source of our interest in law's coerciveness is that the use of coercion is thought to require moral justification - hence the liberal interest in the harm principle. This article seeks to contribute to the debate about the justifiable grounds for legal coercion by clarifying the ways in which law is coercive and demonstrating that coerciveness is a highly complex phenomenon. It argues that the legal authorization of physical force and sanctions, rather than the existence of enforcement institutions, is the appropriate focus for these enquiries. It considers the appropriate methodology for understanding the nature of coercion and goes on to argue that there are a group of nested conceptions of coercion which perform different roles in different contexts. The differences between these conceptions help to account for some of the disagreements over law's coerciveness. There is also an important contrast between laws which aim to coerce and those which merely have a coercive effect. All of these internal distinctions within coercion matter because they have considerable significance for the justification of coercive legal measures. Finally, it is argued that sanctions are neither necessary for the law to be coercive, nor always sufficient.


ISBN: 0143-6503

J Raz, 'Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective' (2000) 13 Altera [...]

Romanian translation by Maria Albert.


J Raz, 'On the Socratic Maxim' (2000) 73 Notre Dame Law Review 1797

J Raz, 'Principle of Equality (german translation)' (2000) Gleichheit oder Rerechtigkeit

1998

P Eleftheriadis, 'Begging the Constitutional Question' (1998) 36 Journal of Common Market Studies 255

L Green, 'Rights of Exit' (1998) 4 Legal Theory 165

L Green, 'The Functions of Law' (1998) 12 Cogito 117

J Raz, 'Multiculturalism' (1998) 11 Ratio Juris

1997

L Green, 'The Concept of Law Revisited' (1997) 94 Michigan Law Review 1687

1996

P Eleftheriadis, 'The Analysis of Property Rights' (1996) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies

J Raz, 'Liberalism in an Age of Conflict' (1996) 2 & 3 Odra 5 [...]

Interview by Beata Polanowska


1994

P Eleftheriadis, 'Unfreedom in a Laissez Faire State' (1994) 80 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 168

L Green, 'Les minorites internes et leurs droits' (1994) 4 Lekton 81

1993

P Eleftheriadis, 'Freedom as a Fact ' (1993) 56 Modern Law Review 897

1991

L Green, 'Freedom of Expression and Choice of Language' (1991) 13 Law and Policy 215

L Green, 'Two Views of Collective Rights' (1991) Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 315

1989

L Green, 'Law, Legitimacy and Consent' (1989) Southern California Law Review 795

J Raz, 'Liberalism, Skepticism and Democracy' (1989) 74 Iowa Law Review 761

1988

L Green, 'Kant's Liberalism: A Reply to Rolf George' (1988) 27 Dialogue 207

L Green, 'Un-American Liberalism: Raz's Morality of Freedom' (1988) 38 University of Toronto Law Journal 317

1987

L Green, 'The Political Content of Legal Theory' (1987) 17 Philosophy of the Social Sciences 1

1986

L Green, 'Law's Rule' (1986) 24 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1023

1985

L Green, 'Authority and Convention' (1985) 35 Philosophical Quarterly 329

L Green, 'Legality and Community' (1985) 5 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies

L Green, 'Support for the System' (1985) 15 British Journal of Political Science 127

L Green, 'What is a Dictator?' (1985) 45 Analysis 125

1984

L Green, 'The Techniques and Limits of Law' (1984) 9 Queen's Law Journal 328

J Raz, 'The Obligation to Obey: Revision and Tradition' (1984) 1 Notre Dame Journal of Law Ethics & Public Policy 139

1983

L Green, 'Dictators and Democracies' (1983) 43 Analysis 58

L Green, 'Law, Co-ordination and the Common Good' (1983) 3 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 299

1982

J Raz, 'Liberalism, Autonomy and the Politics of Neutral Concern' (1982) 7 Midwest Studies in Philosophy 89

1978

J Raz, 'Principles of Equality' (1978) Mind 321

1972

J Raz, 'Legal Principles and the Limits of the Law' (1972) 81 Yale Law Journal 823

0

J Raz, 'Liberalism, Skepticism and Democracy' Polis (Romania) [...]

Translation


Books

2013

TAO Endicott, La Generalità del Diritto (Valeria Bortolotti trans, Mucchi Editore 2013) [...]

Translation into Italian of 'The Generality of Law' in Luís Duarte Almeida, Andrea Dolcetti, James Edwards (eds), Reading The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press 2013). With a new Preface on H.L.A.Hart and Jurisprudence in Oxford.


ISBN: 978-88-7000-614-8

L Green, The Authority of the State (Chinese Edition) (China University of Political Science and Law Press 2013) [...]

This is a Chinese translation, by Singgui Mao, of the corrected 1990 edition of The Authority of the State (Oxford University Press).

ISBN: 7562046468

2012

J Dickson and P Eleftheriadis (eds), Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law (Oxford University Press 2012)

John Gardner, Law as a Leap of Faith: Essays on Law in General (Oxford University Press 2012) [...]

1: Law as a Leap of Faith (first published 2000) 2: Legal Positivism: 5 1/2 Myths (2001) 3: Some Types of Law (2007) 4: Can There be a Written Constitution? (2011) 5: How Law Claims, What Law Claims (2012) 6: Nearly Natural Law (2007) 7: The Legality of Law (2004) 8: On the Supposed Formality of the Rule of Law (previously unpublished) 9: Hart on Legality, Justice, and Morality (2011) 10. The Virtue of Justice and the Character of Law (2000) 11: Law in General (previously unpublished) The eligible chapters for REF2014 are 4, 5, 8, 9, 11.


ISBN: 978-0-19-969555-3

2011

J M Finnis, Human Rights and Common Good (Oxford University Press 2011) [...]

Volume 3 of Collected Essays of John Finnis 22 published and unpublished essays with a 16-page Introduction, on the general theory of human rights; justice and punishment; war and justice; autonomy, euthanasia and justice; autonomy, IVF, abortion and justice; and marriage, justice and the common good


J M Finnis, Intention and Identity (Oxford University Press 2011)

J M Finnis, Philosophy of Law (Oxford University Press 2011) [...]

Volume 4 of The Collected Essays of John Finnis 22 published and unpublished essays plus a 16-page Introduction, on foundations of law's authority; theories and theorists of law; legal reasoning; and the two senses of 'legal system'


J M Finnis, Reason in Action (Oxford University Press 2011) [...]

19 published and unpublished essays with an Introduction of 15 pages on the nature and foundations of practical reason and associated legally relevant topics


ISBN: 978-0-19-958005=7

2008

P Eleftheriadis, Legal Rights (Oxford University Press 2008)

2007

John Gardner, Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law (OUP 2007) [...]

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239351.001.0001

This is a collection of essays, some of which were first published before 2001 (pp. 1-56, 91-140, 201-238). In addition pages 155-176 were written with Timothy Macklem (50:50). Original versions of essays have been left intact to provide context for a newly-written concluding chapter, ‘Reply to Critics’, pp. 321-378.


ISBN: 978-0-19-923935-1

J Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (Jiangsu People's Press (China) 2007) [...]

Translation


2006

J Dickson, Evaluación en la teoría del derecho (Spanish language edition of Evaluation and Legal Theory, UNAM Press, México,D.F. 2006)

J Raz, The Authority of Law (UNAM (Spain) 2006)

J Raz, The Morality of Freedom (UNAM (Spain) 2006)

2005

J M Finnis, O Racji Publicznej [On 'Public Reason'] (Ius et Lex, Warsaw 2005) [...]

Texts in Polish (translated) and English of public lecture, contrasting sound with Rawlsian senses of "public reason".


ISBN: 83p60077-07-X

J Raz, The Authority of Law (Law Press of Beijing 2005)

J Raz, The Concept of a Legal System (Bulgarian translation 2005) [...]

Chinese, Spanish and Portuguese translations forthcoming.


2004

J Raz, Value, Respect and Attachment (Martins Fontes Editora Lda San Paolo 2004) [...]

Translation


J Raz, Value, Respect and Attachment ( 2004) [...]

Translation


2003

J Raz, Value, Respect and Attachment (Edizioni Diabasis 2003) [...]

Translation


2001

J Dickson, Evaluation and Legal Theory (Hart Publishing 2001) [...]

Spanish language edition published by the National Autonomous University of Mexico Press in association with Hart Publishing in 2006, translated by Dr Juan Vega Gomez


ISBN: 1-84113-184-9

J Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (Editorial Gedisa (Spain) 2001) [...]

Translation


J Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Ukranian translation 2001)

J Raz, The Morality of Freedon (Madris (Latvia) 2001)

2000

J Raz, The Authority of Law (ABC Publishing, Warsaw 2000)

1999

P Eleftheriadis, Constitutionalism and Political Values: The Normative Presuppositions of Constitutional Law [In Greek] (Sakkoulas, Athens 1999)

1994

J Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford University Press 1994)

1990

L Green, The Authority of the State (Clarendon Press 1990)

1986

J Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford University Press (2nd Edition) 1986)

1980

J Raz, The Concept of a Legal System (Oxford University Press 1980)

1979

J Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford University Press 1979)

0

J Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (CID Mentenegro 0) [...]

Translation


J Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Arnoldo Mondadori Editore SpA, Milan 0)

Chapters

2014

S Douglas-Scott, 'Brave new world? The challenges of transnational law and legal pluralism to contemporary legal theory' in Richard Nobels and David Schiff (eds), Law, Society and Community: Socio-Legal Essays in Honour of Roger Cotterrell (Ashgate 2014)

P Eleftheriadis, 'Democracy in the Eurozone' in WG Ringe & P Huber (eds), Legal Challenges Arising out of the Global Financial Crisis: Bail-outs, the Euro, and Regulation (Hart Publishing 2014) [...]

DOI: http://www.hartpub.co.uk/BookDetails.aspx?ISBN=9781849464390

In December 2012 Four Presidents of the European Union (of the European Council, the Commission, the Central Bank and the Eurogroup) issued a paper outlining steps for a ‘genuine monetary union’ promising among others better democratic accountability for its institutions. This essay asks if an entity like the European Union - and the Eurozone within it - can indeed become democratic. I distinguish between two approaches to democracy, first as collective self-government or, second, as set of egalitarian institutions. The essay argues that the German Federal Constitutional Court supports the first theory and for that reason is very cautious of the idea of bringing democracy to the European Union. The collective view believes that without a single people, there cannot be self-government. The second theory accepts the primacy of domestic democracy but allows, by contrast, for international institutions of democratic accountability that support domestic democracy. I offer some arguments for this view and conclude that the four Presidents are not mistaken in endorsing the ambition of democratic accountability for the Eurozone. The European Union is a union of peoples. A union of this kind can become more democratic without seeking to become a democracy.


ISBN: 9781849464390

M Köpcke Tinturé, 'Legal Validity: Law's Craftsmanship of Rights' in Gregoire Webber, Paul Yowell (eds), Legislated Rights ( 2014) (forthcoming)

2013

J Dickson, 'Law and Its Theory: a Question of Priorities' in R P George and J Keown (eds), Reason, Morality and Law: the Jurisprudence of John Finnis (Oxford University Press 2013)

P Eleftheriadis, 'Global Rights and the Sanctity of Life' in Glenn Cohen (ed), The Globalization of Health Care (Oxford University Press 2013)

P Eleftheriadis, 'Hart on Sovereignty' in Andrea Dolcetti, Luís Duarte d’Almeida and James Edwards (eds), Reading HLA Hart's 'The Concept of Law' (Hart Publishing 2013)

TAO Endicott, 'The Irony of Law' in John Keown and Robert P George (eds), Reason, Morality, and Law: The Philosophy of John Finnis (Oxford University Press 2013) [...]

John Finnis says that central cases of the concepts of social theory fully instantiate values that are instantiated in more-or-less watered-down ways in peripheral cases. I argue that the central case of a concept essential to social theory may excel in some specific good or in some specific ill, or in neither, or in both. As for law, the central cases of a legal system, or of a law, do indeed involve goods that Finnis ascribes to them; the central cases also involve certain ills. That is the irony of law. It secures essential goods for a community, and also (and, in fact, by the same token) it incurs certain ills that are necessarily involved in its specific techniques for securing those goods. I conclude by pointing out a resulting tension over a legal system’s regulation of the validity of its own legal norms.


ISBN: 978-0-19-967550-0

John Gardner and James Edwards, 'Criminal Law' in Hugh LaFollette (ed), International Encyclopedia of Ethics (Wiley-Blackwell 2013)

John Gardner, 'Criminals in Uniform' in R.A. Duff, Lindsay Farmer, S.E. Marshall, Massimo Renzo, and Victor Tadros (eds), The Constitution of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2013)

John Gardner, 'Finnis on Justice' in John Keown and Robert P. George (eds), Reason, Morality, and the Law: The Philosophy of John Finnis (Oxford University Press 2013)

L Green, 'Sex-Neutral Marriage' in J Feinberg, J Coleman, and C Kutz (eds), Philosophy of Law (Cengage Learning 2013) (forthcoming)

T Khaitan, 'Prelude to a Theory of Discrimination Law' in Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Discrimination Law (Oxford University Press 2013) [...]

This paper engages with George Rutherglen's pessimistic view of the possibility of theorising about discrimination law. Part I will deal with the claim that discrimination law lacks internal coherence, that there is no common thread running through all the norms that together constitute the body of law we call ‘discrimination law.’ I will show that this it is possible to identify four conditions which are individually necessary and cumulatively sufficient for characterising a norm as a norm of discrimination law: the norm should have some connection with a ground that divides all persons between two or more groups, at least one of whose members must be significantly more disadvantaged in relation to members of another group defined by the same ground; and the norm must be designed to distribute the direct substantive benefits or burdens in question to some, but not all, members of a protected group. The second aspect of Rutherglen’s paper, which I will uncover in Part II, is based on an important assumption that the proper role of legal theory is to determine the outcome of adjudication in hard cases. I will show that this assumption — arising from Rutherglen’s commitment to the interpretive jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin — is the main reason for his pessimistic conclusions regarding theoretical possibilities in discrimination law. I will also show that theorists who do not share this commitment — and perhaps even those who do — need not share Rutherglen’s pessimism. These two — relatively independent — parts together constitute a prelude to a theory of discrimination law. The findings in Part I, if true, impose important constraints on any theoretical enterprise relating to discrimination law. Part II, on the other hand, highlights the numerous possibilities that lie beyond these minimal constraints.


ISBN: 978-0-19-966431-3

M Köpcke Tinturé, 'Finnis on Legal and Moral Obligation' in John Keown, Robert George (eds), Reason, Morality, and Law: The Jurisprudence of John Finnis (Oxford University Press 2013)

G Lamond, 'The Rule of Recognition and the Foundations of a Legal System' in Andrea Dolcetti, Luís Duarte d’Almeida and James Edwards (eds), Reading HLA Hart's 'The Concept of Law' (Hart Publishing 2013)

2012

J Dickson and P Eleftheriaidis, 'Introduction: The Puzzles of European Union Law' in J Dickson & P Eleftheriadis (eds), Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law (Oxford University Press 2012)

J Dickson, 'Legal Positivism: Contemporary Debates' in Andrei Marmor (ed), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law (Routledge 2012)

J Dickson, 'The Idea of a Legal System: Between the Real and the Ideal' in N Walker (ed), MacCormick's Scotland (Edinburgh University Press 2012)

J Dickson, 'Towards a Theory of European Union Legal Systems' in J Dickson & P Eleftheriadis (eds), Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law (Oxford University Press 2012)

P Eleftheriadis, 'Austin and the Electors' in Michael Freeman & Patricia Mindus (eds), The Legacy of John Austin's Jurisprudence (Springer 2012)

P Eleftheriadis, 'Citizenship and Obligation' in Julie Dickson and Pavlos Eleftheriadis (eds), Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law (Oxford University Press 2012)

Julie Dickson and P Eleftheriadis, 'Introduction: The Puzzles of European Union Law' in Julie Dickson & Pavlos Eleftheriadis (eds), Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law (Oxford University Press 2012)

J M Finnis, 'Natural Law Theory: Its Past and Its Present' in Andrei Marmor (ed), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law (Routledge 2012)

John Gardner, 'Ashworth on Principles' in Julian Roberts and Lucia Zedner (eds), Principles and Values in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: Essays in Honour of Andrew Ashworth (Oxford University Press 2012)

John Gardner, 'How Law Claims, What Law Claims' in Matthias Klatt (ed), Institutionalized Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy (Oxford University Press 2012)

L Green, 'Introduction to the Concept of Law' in The Concept of Law, 3rd Edition (Oxford University Press 2012)

L Green, 'Obscenity without Borders' in F Tanguay-Renaud and J Stribopolous (eds), Rethinking Criminal Law Theory ( 2012)

L Green, 'The Nature of Limited Government ' in R George and J Keown (eds), Reason, Morality, and the Law: The Jurisprudence of John Finnis (Oxford Univiersity Press 2012)

G Lamond, 'The Rule of Law' in Andrei Marmor (ed), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law (Routledge 2012) [...]

The central argument of this paper is that the rule of law is an ideal concerned with the conditions that are necessary for the law to succeed in governing a community. The influential views of Fuller and Raz which ground the ideal in the conditions necessary for the law to exist at all (Fuller) or for the law to be capable of guiding behaviour (Raz) are discussed and criticised. Four conditions are highlighted as part of the rule of law: (1) the law is effective; (2) the state is governed by and governs through law; (3) individual laws can be jointly and severally obeyed; and finally (4) those other legal and social arrangements whose primary rationale is to serve conditions (1)–(3). Condition (4) accounts for the significance of such arrangements as an independent legal profession. Condition (4) also helps to explain both the attraction of regarding other political ideals such as democracy and human rights as aspects of the rule of law, since their existence helps promote the other conditions, and the reasons for excluding them from the rule of law itself, since their primary rationale is not to ensure that the law succeeds in governing the community. Finally, it is argued that the rationale for the rule of law lies in the value of a law governed community. The rule of law itself, however, is not always morally valuable: not because it is purely of instrumental value, but because it is an inherently mixed-value good.


ISBN: 978-0415878180

N E Stavropoulos, 'Obligations and the Legal Point of View' in A. Marmor (ed), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law (Routledge 2012) [...]

It's uncontroversial that politics shapes the law. The tough question is how exactly that works: which kinds of political action have a law-shaping effect and how they produce that effect. Consider the enactment of a statute. A. Which precise aspect of the action is relevant to the legal impact of the enactment (the change in legal rights and obligations that obtains without further such action)? B. Why - what gives some aspect of the action its legal relevance? Analogous questions also arise in connection with the explanation of some other phenomena, including making a promise, decision or request - actions or attitudes which are generally understood to result in some distinctive obligations or to have some other distinctive normative significance or impact, or at least to be capable of so doing. The relevant theoretical choices are posed particularly clearly in these domains, so I explore them in some detail in relation to promising.


ISBN: 0415878187

2011

J M Finnis, 'Law, Universality, and Social Identity' in John Finnis (ed), Intention and Identity: Collected Essays of John Finnis, volume 2 (Oxford University Press 2011) [...]

How should we understand Aquinas’s thesis that laws are universal propositions of practical reason? And should we accept the popular modern claim that to prefer one set of forms of human character, relationship, and conduct to certain others, and consequently to restrict the conduct of persons with those other preferences, is wrongfully to deny those persons’ equality of entitlement to concern and respect, and/or to insult them? Answering the first question involves showing how legal norms transcend the intentions of their makers, draw upon considerations of ‘natural reason’, and depend for their subsisting on the subsisting of the community whose norms they are. The conditions for the community’s subsisting turn out to depend, in turn, on aspects of the public good the upholding of which is an intention which absolves those who act upon it from Dworkin’s charges that they are flouting equality of respect and Raz’s charges that they are insulting those whose conduct those actions bear upon. Multiculturalism will often be a menace to public good, justice, and peace.


John Gardner, 'Relations of Responsibility' in Rowan Cruft, Matthew Kramer and Mark Reiff (eds), Crime, Punishment, and Responsibility: The Jurisprudence of Antony Duff (Oxford University Press 2011)

2010

P Eleftheriadis, 'Art and Moral Dilemmas' in Johannes Odenthal and Elina Kountouri (eds), Kalliopi Lemos: A Sculptural Trilogy About Europe’s Fragile Borders (Göttingen: Steidl 2010) [...]

In the last three years the artist Kalliopi Lemos has constructed three large sculptures consisting mainly of boats used by illegal immigrants to cross from Turkey into Greece. These boats were discarded on the island of Chios, where Lemos discovered them. She exhibited these three sculptures in public settings in Athens, Istanbul and Berlin, with the respective titles: Crossing, Round Voyage and Crossroads. What is the meaning of this work? In this essay (which will form part of a forthcoming book on this trilogy, alongside essays by Arthur Danto and Thomas Pogge) Pavlos Eleftheriadis argues that art does not seek to resolve moral dilemmas, such as the dilemma posed by the competing claims of justice made by the illegal immigrants and the neediest of our own society. The power of art is in reminding us (in a way that does not deploy philosophical arguments but is equally or more persuasive) of the profound importance of our moral responsibility towards everyone.


ISBN: 978-3-86930-052-8

John Gardner, 'Ethics and Law' in John Skorupski (ed), The Routledge Companion to Ethics (Routledge 2010)

L Green, 'El Positivismo y la inseparabilidad del derecho y la moral' in M.E. Orellana Benada (ed), Causas Perdidas: ensayos de filosofia juridica, politica y moral (Catalonia 2010)

L Green, 'General Jurisprudence' in Michael Giudice, Wil Waluchow, and Maksymilian del Mar (eds), The Methodology of Legal Theory, vol. I (Ashgate 2010)

L Green, 'Law as a Means' in P Cane (ed), The Hart-Fuller Debate in the Twenty-First Century (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2010)

G Lamond, 'Coercion' in Dennis Patterson (ed), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (2nd edition) (Wiley-Blackwell 2010) [...]

DOI: 10.1002/9781444320114.ch46

This article provides an overview of the key philosophical issues raised by the nature of coercion. It distinguishes two methods of coercion (physical force and ‘rational’ compulsion–paradigmatically by threats); and distinguishes coercion as a means of making someone act from coercion as a means affecting the normative position of the coerced party (‘duress’). It surveys analyses of what makes a proposal a threat, whether offers can be coercive, and why rational compulsion is per se morally problematic (if it is). It suggests that while all forms of rational compulsion have a common core, the conditions for duress depend on additional situation specific features (e.g. duress as a criminal law defence versus duress as a vitiating factor in agreements or marriage). It goes on to consider the sense(s) in which law can be regarded as coercive, and whether coercion is a necessary feature of law.


ISBN: 9781405170062

2009

J Dickson, 'Is Bad Law Still Law? Is Bad Law Really Law?' in Maksymilian Del Mar and Zenon Bankowski (eds), Law as Institutional Normative Order (Ashgate 2009)

J M Finnis, 'On Hart\'s Ways: Law as Reason and as Fact' in Matthew Kramer, Claire Grant (eds), The Legacy of HLA Hart: Legal, Political and Moral Philosophy (Oxford University Press 2009)

2008

John Gardner, 'Hart and Feinberg on Responsibility' in Matthew Kramer, Claire Grant, Ben Colburn and Antony Hatzistavrou (eds), The Legacy of H.L.A. Hart (Oxford University Press 2008)

John Gardner, 'Introduction' in H L A Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, Second Edition (Oxford University Press 2008)

L Green, 'On Being Tolerated' in M Kramer, C Grant, B Colborn, A Hatzistavrou (eds), The Legacy of HLA Hart: Legal, Political, and Moral Philosophy (Oxford University Press 2008) [...]

Why is it that toleration can be uncomfortable for the tolerated? And how should tolerators respond to that discomfort? This paper argues that properly directed toleration can be deficient in its scope, grounds or spirit. That explains some of the discomfort in being tolerated. Beyond this, the occasions for toleration¿the existence of a power to prevent and of an adverse judgment¿can also make toleration sting. The paper then explores and rejects two familiar suggestions about how one should respond to this discomfort: with acceptance or recognition of the tolerated. It is proposed instead that toleration should be supplemented by understanding. The nature and importance of this attitude are assessed.


ISBN: 978-0-19-954289-5

2007

John Gardner, 'Some Types of Law' in D Edlin (ed), Common Law Theory (Cambridge University Press 2007)

L Green, 'Sexuality, Authenticity and Modernity' in J Feinberg & J Coleman (eds), Philosophy of Law, 8th Edition (Cengage Publishing 2007)

L Green, 'Who Believes in Political Obligation?' in Shinggui Mao trans (ed), Political Obligation: Justifying and Refuting (Nanjing: Jiangsu People's Publishing House 2007) [...]

(Paper in Chinese): It is often supposed that most people believe they have a duty to obey the law. Examining empirical work by Tom Tyler and others, I show that the evidence offered for this proposition does not in fact support it. Existing surveys are all consistent with only much weaker popular attitudes to law. Suggestions are made about an appropriate test for this belief.

2006

J Dickson, 'Interpreting Normativity' in Properties of Law: Essays in Honour of Jim Harris (OUP 2006) [...]

This article was commissioned by the editors of a festschrift volume of essays in honour of Professor Jim Harris' work. It examines and critically assesses Professor Harris' interpretation of the work of Hans Kelsen on the normativity of law.


ISBN: 0-19-929096-2

John Gardner, 'Law's Aim in Law's Empire' in Scott Hershovitz (ed), Exploring Law's Empire (Oxford University Press 2006)

J Raz, 'Incorporation by Law' in Philosophy of Law: Critical Concepts in Philosophy. (Routledge 2006)

2005

TAO Endicott, 'The Value of Vagueness' in Vijay K. Bhatia, Jan Engberg, Maurizio Gotti and Dorothee Heller (eds), Vagueness in Normative Texts (Peter Lang 2005) [...]

The rule of law requires vague regulation in every legal system. The rule of law stands against arbitrary government and against anarchy, and vague rules are essential techniques to oppose both arbitrary government and anarchy. A general refusal to use vague rules would lead to anarchy because some forms of regulation cannot be performed at all by the use of precise rules. And precision, even when it is possible, can itself lead to arbitrary government.


ISBN: 3-03910-653-8

J M Finnis, 'Restricting legalised abortion is not intrinsically unjust' in Helen Watt (ed), Cooperation, Complicity and Consent, (Linacre Centre, London 2005) [...]

Employs a jurisprudential analysis of laws (or rules of law) as propositions distinct from the legislative or other statements by which they are enacted or otherwise laid down, in order to show that laws creating new legal restrictions on the permissibility of abortion do not involve their makers or supporters in approval of or complicity in making the law of the state permit the abortions left unprohibited by the new restrictions,


ISBN: 906561108

J M Finnis, 'The Thing I am': Personal Identity in Aquinas & Shakespeare' in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller & Jeffrey Paul (eds), Personal Identity (Cambridge UP, Cambridge & New York 2005) [...]

Analyses, with illustrative reference to Aquinas and Shakespeare, the four irreducibly distinct kinds of explanation of personal identity, which yield four basic senses of "personal identity" and kinds of way in which one is or can be the same though partly different. Special topics include marriage, humiliation, repentance, and decay.


ISBN: 521617677

John Gardner, 'Backwards and Forwards with Tort Law' in J Keim-Campbell, M O'Rourke and D Shier (eds), Law and Social Justice (MIT Press 2005)

J Raz, 'Numbers, With and Without Contractualism' in P. Stratton-Lake (ed), On What We Owe to Each Other (Blackwell Publishing 2005)

J Raz, 'The Force of Numbers' in Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures of 2003 (Cambridge University Press 2005)

2004

J Raz, 'Personal Practical Conflicts' in P.Baumnaa & M. Betzler (eds), Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays. (Cambridge University Press 2004)

2003

TAO Endicott, 'Raz on Gaps—The Surprising Part' in Thomas Pogge, Lukas Meyer, and Stanley Paulson (eds), Rights, Culture, and the Law — Essays After Joseph Raz (OUP 2003) [...]

I address some implications of Joseph Raz’s ‘sources thesis’- the claim that the existence and content of any law ‘can be identified by reference to social facts alone, without resort to any evaluative argument’. By the sources thesis, there is a gap in the law whenever the law appeals to moral considerations. But contrary to Raz’s conclusions, I argue that gaps in the law do not necessarily confer discretion on judges. A legal requirement to apply moral considerations does give courts discretion, but only because (and to the extent that) moral considerations are vague.


ISBN: 0-19-924825-7

J M Finnis, 'Natural Law and the Re-making of Boundaries' in Allen Buchanan and Margaret Moore (eds), States, Nations, and Boundaries (Cambridge University Press 2003) [...]

essay on the justice of making and maintaining boundaries, and of forcibly overthrowing unjust (e.g. some pre-"colonial", "native") rulers.


ISBN: 521819717

J Raz, 'Comments and Responses' in L.H. Meyer, S.L. Paulson & T.W. Pogge. (eds), Rights, Culture, and the Law: Themes from the Legal and Political Philosophy of Joseph Raz (Oxford University Press 2003)

2002

L Green, 'Law and Obligations' in J. Coleman and S. Shapiro (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (OUP 2002)

J Raz, 'On Frankfurt's Explanation of Respect for People' in S Buss & L. Overton (eds), Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt (MIT Press 2002)

J Raz, 'The practice of Value' in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values ( 2002)

2001

John Gardner, 'Obligations and Outcomes in the Law of Torts' in P Cane and J Gardner (eds), Relating to Responsibility: Essays for Tony Honoré (Hart Publishing 2001) [...]

(pre-publication version)


ISBN: 1841132101

L Green, 'Pluralism, Social Conflict, and Tolerance' in A Soeteman (ed), Pluralism and Law (Springer 2001)

2000

J Raz, 'Autonomy, Toleration, and the Harm Principle' in R. Frost (ed), Toleranz (Campus Verlag, Frankfurt 2000) [...]

Translation


J Raz, 'Chapter 9' in Angelika Krebs (ed), Gleichheit oder Gerechtigkeit (Suhrkamp 2000)

J Raz, 'Notes on Value and Objectivity' in B. Leiter (ed), Objectivity in Law and Morals. (Cambridge University Press 2000)

J Raz, 'The Truth in Particularism' in B. Hooker & M. Little (eds), Moral Particularism (Oxford University Press 2000)

1999

L Green, 'Sexuality, Authenticity, and Morality' in J Feniberg and J Coleman (eds), Philosophy of Law, 5th Ed. (Wadsworth 1999)

L Green, 'Who Believes in Political Obligation?' in W Edmundson (ed), The Duty to Obey the Law (Rowman and Littlefield 1999)

1998

L Green, 'Authority' in E Craig (ed), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Routledge 1998)

L Green, 'Pornographizing, Subordinating, and Silencing' in R Post (ed), Censorship and Silencing: Practices of Cultural Regulation (Getty Research Institute 1998)

J Raz, 'On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries.' in L. Alexander (ed), Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations (Cambrdige University Press 1998)

1997

L Green, 'Freedom of Expression and Choice of Language' in E Soifer (ed), Ethical Issues: Perspectives for Canadians (Broadview Press 1997)

1996

L Green, 'Who Believes in Political Obligation?' in J Narveson & JT Sanders (eds), For and Against the State (Rowman and Littlefied 1996)

G Lamond, 'Coercion, Threats, and the Puzzle of Blackmail' in A.P. Simester and A.T.H. Smith (eds), Harm and Culpability ( 1996) [...]

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198260578.001.0001

This paper discusses the puzzle of blackmail, i.e. the way in which the threat of an otherwise legally permissible action can in some cases constitute blackmail. It argues that the key to understanding blackmail is in terms of coercion and threats, and the effect such threats have on the validity of a victim’s consent. The nature of coercion and of coercive threats is considered in detail to support the thesis that threats are prima facie impermissible, though often justified all-things-considered. The puzzle of blackmail arises due to the fact that the law rarely has regard to an agent’s motives in acting, whereas this is the focus of the puzzling cases.


ISBN: 0198260571

J Raz, 'Intention in Interpretation' in R.P. George (ed), The Autonomy of Law (The Autonomy of Law, ed. R.P. George 1996)

1995

L Green, 'Internal Minorities and their Rights' in W Kymlicka (ed), Rights of Cultural Minorities (Oxford University Press 1995)

1994

L Green, 'Freedom of Expression and Choice of Language' in WJ Waluchow (ed), Free Expression: Essays in Law and Philosophy (Oxford University Press 1994)

L Green, 'Internal Minorities and their Rights' in J Baker (ed), Group Rights (University of Toronto Press 1994)

1993

L Green, 'Concepts of Equity in Taxation' in A Maslove (ed), Fairness in Taxation: Exploring the Principles (University of Toronto Press 1993)

J Raz, 'Multiculturalism: A Liberal perspective' in N.J.H. Huls & H.D. Stout (eds), Recht in een multiculturele samenleving (W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink - Zwole 1993)

1990

L Green, 'Consent and Community' in P Harris (ed), On Political Obligation (Routledge 1990)

L Green, 'Legal Ethics: Sociology and Morality' in D MacNiven (ed), Moral Expertise ( 1990)

1989

L Green, 'Associative Obligations and the State' in L Green and A Hutchinson (eds), Law and the Community: The End of Invidualism? (Carswell 1989)

1987

J Raz, 'Autonomy, Toleration, and the Harm Principle' in R. Gavison (ed), Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy (OUP 1987)

0

J Raz, 'About Morality and the Nature of Law' in K. Himma & B. Bix (eds), Law and Morality (Ashgate Publishing 0)

J Raz, 'Liberalism, Autonomy and the Politics of Neutral Concern' in J. Kis (ed), Contemporary Political Philosophy (CEU Press 0) [...]

also in Bulgarian, Czech, Lithuanian, Latvian, Ukranian, Georgian and Belorussian translations.


J Raz, 'Liberalism, Autonomy and the Politics of Neutral Concern' in Ying Qi (ed), Liberal Neutrality and Its Critics (Jiangsu People's Publishing House, Nanjin 0) [...]

Translation


Edited books

2013

L Duarte d'Almeida, J Gardner and L Green (eds), Kelsen Revisited: New Essays on the Pure Theory of Law (Hart Publishing 2013) [...]

Forty years after his death, Hans Kelsen (1881-1973) remains one of the most discussed and influential legal philosophers of our time. This collection of new essays takes Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law as a stimulus, aiming to move forward the debate on several central issues in contemporary jurisprudence. The essays in Part I address legal validity, the normativity of law, and Kelsen's famous but puzzling idea of a legal system's 'basic norm'. Part II engages with the difficult issues raised by the social realities of law and the actual practices of legal officials. Part III focuses on conceptual features of legal systems and the logical structure of legal norms. All the essays were written for this volume by internationally renowned scholars from seven countries. Also included, in English translation, is an important polemical essay by Kelsen himself.


ISBN: 9781849464567

L Green and B Leiter (eds), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law (Oxford University Press 2013)

2012

P Eleftheriadis and Julie Dickson (eds), Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law (Oxford University Press 2012)

2011

L Green and B Leiter (eds), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law (Oxford University Press 2011)

1989

L Green and Allan C. Hutchinson (eds), Law and the Community: The End of Individualism? (Carswell 1989)

Internet Publications

2014

N. W. Barber, 'Invisible Hand Systems, Authority, and Law' (2014) Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper

2013

P Eleftheriadis, 'Democratic Accountability for a Monetary Union' (2013) London: UCL European Institute

L Green, 'Should Law Improve Morality?' (2013) 73/2013 Oxford Legal Research Paper Series [...]

Legal theorists have long debated whether law should enforce social morality. This paper explores a different problem: should law (try to) improve social morality? I argue that it should. First, against conceptual and empirical doubts, I argue that it is possible for law to improve morality. Second, against certain moral objections, I argue that it is often proper for law to try to improve it. Third, I offer an example: law should try to improve our social morality of sex, by trying to re-shape what we regard as valid consent to sexual activity. Along the way, the ideas of H. L. A. Hart and Patrick Devlin are examined, as are the empirical and policy claims of Paul Robinson and his collaborators. A revised version of the paper is to appear in Criminal Law and Philosophy.


L Green, 'The Morality in Law' (2013) 12/2013 Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper [...]

This paper tests the claim, made by H.L.A. Hart, that nothing is a legal system that fails to include certain obligations familiar in morality . This ‘minimum content’ thesis was rejected by Hans Kelsen, among others. Hart’s arguments for the minimum content thesis are unsound; but the thesis is correct and a different defense of it is offered. Two general worries about the thesis are then addressed. Brian Leiter argues that, since law is an artefact, it has no essential properties at all and, a fortiori, no essential content. This is shown to involve several errors. Others argue that Hart’s view about the relation between law and morality is not a theoretical thesis at all: it is the practical thesis that we should try to improve law by improving the concept of law. It is shown that this is not a possible interpretation of any of Hart’s arguments: ‘normative positivism’ has no Hartian foundations.


2012

N. W. Barber, 'The Significance of the Common Understanding in Legal Theory' (2012) Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper

L Green, 'Jurisprudence for Foxes' (2012) Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper [...]

This paper contests Brian Simpson's claim that HLA Hart's book, The Concept of Law, is that of a 'hedgehog,' that is, a monistic thinker. It is not. Hart's work is pluralist both in its explanatory concepts and in its evaluative background. Some conjectures are offered as to why Simpson so misunderstood Hart, and as to why analytic legal philosophy is misunderstood, or distrusted, more generally.


L Green, 'The Nature of Limited Government' (2012) Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper [...]

This paper explores moral limits on state action: their sources, character, and stringency. It explains what is special about the liberal tradition: there must be a protected sphere of action, and governments must respect legality. It argues, against Patrick Devlin, that the possible absence of absolute moral reasons against intrusion in a sphere is consistent with justified absolute positive limits on government intrusion. It argues, against John Finnis, that the fact that some associations (e.g. churches or marriages or universities) have intrinsically valuable ‘common goods’ does not entitle them to immunity from government regulation. It concludes by suggesting why certain ‘natural law’ moralities have been considered unreasonably intrusive, for they neglect the significance of moral fallibility for limited government.


L Green, 'What is Freedom For?' (2012) Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper [...]

Two conceptions of the value of political freedom are popular. According to one, freedom serves autonomy, creating one’s own path through life. According to the other, freedom serves authenticity, keeping faith with an identity one did not choose. This paper bridges the gap between these views in several ways. It shows that autonomy embraces some of the unchosen aspects of life that authenticity stresses, and that authenticity is consistent with scope for choice within an unchosen identity. It is also shows that both views share a stake in a neglected value, self-knowledge. Partisans of authenticity cannot keep faith with their identity if they do not know what it truly is. Partisans of autonomy cannot choose a path in life without knowing what the options are for them, and these options can be affected instrumentally and constitutively by their identity, which they therefore have a stake in knowing. Of course, there can be more than one sound argument in favor of freedom. But contrary to what many suppose, autonomy and authenticity are complementary, not competing, in making that case. The differences between them are matters of nuance and degree.


2010

P Eleftheriadis, 'Human Rights for Liberals' (2010) 3 Global Justice: Theory, Practice, Rhetoric 42 [...]

James Griffin’s rich and elegant study, On Human Rights (Oxford, 2008), is a superbly accomplished book. Its range is impressive. It offers a discussion of the general status of values, a general theory of rights, concrete accounts of the right to welfare, the right to privacy, the right to life, the link with democracy and the idea of group rights, among other things. At every stage we are treated to a clear, rigorous and elegant discussion full of broad learning and penetrating judgment, which readers of Griffin’s earlier books have perhaps learned to expect. Yet, the view of human rights that Griffin defends is strangely narrow and unfamiliar in that it is not connected to any political or legal framework.


ISBN: ISSN: 1835-6842

L Green, 'Because Everyone Thinks So: Hume on Authority and Common Opinion' (2010) Oxford Legal Research Paper Series [...]

Many legal and political philosophers think that common attitudes to authority impose powerful constraints on justification. In particular, they often think sceptical theories are objectionably inconsistent with the common view that everyone has a duty to obey the law. The most influential argument of this sort is due to David Hume, and it is his version that is here tested. The paper argues that common opinion lacks is less probative than Hume thinks, and that his related objections to consent theory fail. There is no reason to think our common views of political authority are as Hume, and many others, think there are. There is no reason to exempt widely-held common views about moral matters from scrutiny in light of the genesis of those views. There is reason to think that, in politics as in religion, what Hume called 'superstitions' are quite common.


L Green, 'The Germ of Justice' (2010) Oxford Legal Research Papers [...]

This paper addresses the perennial question of the relationship between law and justice. HLA Hart argued that ‘we have, in the bare notion of applying a general rule of law, the germ, at least, of justice.’ If true, this establishes a necessary connection between law and morality. That is no objection, for the so-called ‘separability thesis’ is anyway false. But the ‘germ-of-justice’ thesis is also false. Justice is a matter of the correct allocation of benefits and burdens among people. Contrary to what Hart and others think, there is not necessarily any injustice in failing to apply a valid legal rule, not even an ‘administrative’ injustice. It is readily conceded that ‘formal justice’ is not enough in law, that we also need ‘substantive justice’. This too is a mistake. Formal justice is not insufficient; it is incoherent--all justice is substantive. Might constant rule-application do justice by promoting impartiality? Not necessarily. It depends on the content of the rules and on the nature of the of the adjudicator’s prejudices. There is nonetheless a weak connection between law and justice. Every legal system has courts whose job it is to aim at justice: they must decide not only whether plaintiff deserves a remedy, or whether the prosecution is entitled to a conviction, but also whether these should be ordered in the face of a claim to the contrary. Courts have an allocative job to do. This does not show that they must achieve justice, or even a minimum of justice. Nor does it show that justice is the first virtue of legal institutions. The connection between law and justice is real, but modest. Justice is a necessary aim of a necessary legal institution.


2009

J M Finnis, 'Marriage: A Basic and Exigent Good' (2009) Notre Dame Legal Studies Paper No 09-13 [...]

Same as Monist article of same title


L Green, 'Law and the Causes of Judicial Decisions' (2009) 14/2009 Oxford Legal Research Paper Series 1 [...]

This paper tests Brian Leiter's claim that the American legal realists were proto-naturalists in legal philosophy and were thus immune to objections based on claims that they offered defective analyses of legal concepts. It disputes Leiter's account of the core claim of realist thought, and reaffirms the view that some of them were indeed engaged in, or presupposed, conceptual work of a kind familiar to analytic jurisprudence. It explains how those who did not intend to offer conceptual analyses nonetheless made conceptual errors. It offers a fresh account of the basis of the realists scepticism, here deploying the idea of 'permissive sources' of law. The paper concludes with reflections on the preconditions and prospects for 'naturalizing' jurisprudence, suggesting that Hans Kelsen was correct to think that such efforts will either fail, or will simply change the subject.


2006

J Dickson, 'Descriptive Legal Theory' (2006) IVR Encyclopaedia of Jurisprudence, Legal Theory and Philosophy of Law [...]

This article was commissioned by the then editor of the IVR Encyclopaedia of legal philosophy. The article surveys and critically evaluates "descriptive" approaches to legal theory in light of recent challenges to the possibility and usefulness of this approach to jurisprudence


2003

L Green, 'Legal Obligation and Authority' (2003) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [...]

Whatever else they do, all legal systems recognize, create, vary and enforce obligations. This is no accident: obligations are central to the social role of law and explaining them is necessary to an understanding of law's authority and, therefore, its nature. Not only are there obligations in the law, there are also obligations to the law. Historically, most philosophers agreed that these include a moral obligation to obey, or what is usually called “political obligation.” Voluntarists maintained that this requires something like a voluntary subjection to law's rule, for example, through consent. Non-voluntarists denied this, insisting that the value of a just and effective legal system is itself sufficient to validate law's claims. Both lines of argument have recently come under intense scrutiny, and some philosophers now deny that law is entitled to all the authority it claims for itself, even when the legal system is legitimate and reasonably just. On this view there are legal obligations that some of law's subjects have no moral obligation to perform.


L Green, 'Legal Positivism' (2003) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [...]

Legal positivism is the thesis that the existence and content of law depends on social facts and not on its merits. The English jurist John Austin (1790-1859) formulated it thus: “The existence of law is one thing; its merit and demerit another. Whether it be or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry.” (1832, p. 157) The positivist thesis does not say that law's merits are unintelligible, unimportant, or peripheral to the philosophy of law. It says that they do not determine whether laws or legal systems exist. Whether a society has a legal system depends on the presence of certain structures of governance, not on the extent to which it satisfies ideals of justice, democracy, or the rule of law. What laws are in force in that system depends on what social standards its officials recognize as authoritative; for example, legislative enactments, judicial decisions, or social customs. The fact that a policy would be just, wise, efficient, or prudent is never sufficient reason for thinking that it is actually the law, and the fact that it is unjust, unwise, inefficient or imprudent is never sufficient reason for doubting it. According to positivism, law is a matter of what has been posited (ordered, decided, practiced, tolerated, etc.); as we might say in a more modern idiom, positivism is the view that law is a social construction. Austin thought the thesis “simple and glaring.” While it is probably the dominant view among analytically inclined philosophers of law, it is also the subject of competing interpretations together with persistent criticisms and misunderstandings.


2001

J Dickson, 'Interpretation and Coherence in Legal Reasoning' (2001) (Fall 2001 Edition, revised June 2005 and September 2009) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed. - E. Zalta) [...]

Fully peer reviewed encyclopaedia article discussing the nature of legal reasoning and, in particular, the role of interpretation and coherence in legal reasoning. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy is an important reference resource for legal philosophers. 10000 words approx.


ISBN: 1095-5054

Reviews

2013

P Eleftheriadis, 'Book Review of Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis' (2013) Times Hihger Education Supplement

2002

TAO Endicott, 'Rules and Reasoning: Essays in Honour of Fred Schauer, Ed. Linda Meyer, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999)' (2002) 43 Philosophical Books 71 [...]

DOI: 10.1111/1468-0149.00252

Book review


ISBN: 0031-8051

1999

J Dickson, 'Legal Positivism and Moral Scepticism: An Unholy Alliance?' (1999) 28 Anglo-American Law Review 243

Courses

The courses we offer in this field are:

Undergraduate

FHS (Phase II)

The degree is awarded on the basis of nine final examinations at the end of the three-year course (or four years in the case of Law with Law Studies in Europe) and (for students who began the course in October 2011 or later) an essay in Jurisprudence written over the summer vacation at the end of the second year. Note: the Jurisprudence exam at the end of the third year is correspondingly shorter. This phase of the Final Honour School includes the third term of the first year, and all three terms of the second year.

Jurisprudence New Syllabus

(applies to those in FHS yr 1 or 2 in 2012-13)

Jurisprudence is one of the compulsory standard subjects within the Final Honour School syllabus. It is, however, taught and examined in a distinctive way (see below).

Jurisprudence, in the sense relevant to this subject, is the philosophy of law. In studying it you will learn to reflect in a disciplined and critical way on the nature, role, and importance, of legal systems, legal reasoning, and legal institutions, often using examples from other parts of your law studies. By choosing a suitable ‘mini-option’ (see below) you could also examine the philosophy of a particular area of law such as criminal law or tort law.

Teaching:

In the second year of the Final Honour School your Jurisprudence teaching will be as follows:

  1. Core topics: . You will have six tutorials covering some core topics in philosophy of law,
    in the traditional way.
  2. Mini option: You will then choose a mini-option from a list that the teaching group will
    provide. The mini-options will be taught in classes and you will not necessarily be taught by the same person who was your tutor for the core topics.

There will be a more restricted range of core topics than in the past. This is to make room for the mini-options. Authoritative guidance on the range of topics in the core will be issued early in MT 2012, together with an indicative list of mini-options. You will choose your mini-option from a finalized list in HT or TT of your second year, when you are studying Jurisprudence (all Jurisprudence tutorials take place in HT and/or TT of the second year).


Assessment:

  1. Core topics: Your Jurisprudence unseen written examination (at the end of your final year) will take a new form. Instead of our traditional finals paper taking three hours and requiring you to answer three out of sixteen questions, your finals paper will take two hours and will require you to answer two out of ten questions. This examination paper will cover only core topics on the tutorial syllabus. Sample examination papers in the new format will be published during MT2012, together with explanatory notes.
  2. Mini option: Your mini-option will be examined by an essay that you must write in your own time during the summer vacation at the end of your second year (this applies to Law with Law Studies in Europe students too). You will be provided near the end of TT with a list of questions arising from your mini-option and you will choose one to answer. The essay writing will be unsupervised. However guidance on what is expected will be given, including one or more classes on how to write an essay for assesssment.

Jurisprudence Old Syllabus

(applies to those in FHS yr 3 or 4 in 2012-13 and to DLS students)

Jurisprudence is one of the compulsory standard subjects within the Final Honour School syllabus. The subject affords an opportunity to reflect in a disciplined and critical way on the structure and functions of law and legal institutions and systems, on the nature of legal reasoning and discourse, and/or on the connections between law and morality and/or between law and other human relationships and characteristics. In some places it would be called theory of law or philosophy of law.

The content of the course is therefore deliberately broad and flexible. College tutors offer widely differing ranges of topics and reading lists, and the examination therefore makes full allowance for the diversity of approaches and materials. (Knowing that the examiners change only incrementally the range of issues from which questions are drawn, and the kinds of questions posed, tutors have an eye to former examination papers in designing their reading lists).

For many years the examination has comprised sixteen questions from which candidates are invited to choose any three. While general, the questions are typically precise and pointed. What is looked for is the ability to bring closely to bear on them the student’s own thought, with appropriate reference both to books or articles within the domain and to other legal subjects studied by the candidate.

Past papers, handouts, suggestions, and other suporting material for the course can be found on the Jurisprudence website

FHS - Final Year (Phase III)

The degree is awarded on the basis of nine final examinations at the end of the three-year course (or four years in the case of Law with Law Studies in Europe) and (for students who began the course in October 2011 or later) an essay in Jurisprudence written over the summer vacation at the end of the second year. Note: the Jurisprudence exam at the end of the third year is correspondingly shorter. This phase of the Final Honour School includes the first and second term of the final year; the Final Examinations are taken in the third term of the final year.

Moral and Political Philosophy

The aim of this course is to provide an introduction to the fundamental questions of moral philosophy and some central issues in political philosophy. The course is divided into two parts: Part A covering the nature of moral philosophy, and Part B dealing with the topics in political philosophy.

Part A takes a philosophical perspective on fundamental questions about the nature of morality. It asks whether moral values are (or can be) ‘objective’, or whether they are simply ‘subjective’ or ‘relative’, and what reason(s) we have (if any) to be moral. Part A also examines three of the most prominent approaches to the nature of morality—-consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics. Finally, it raises questions about our relationship to morality: Do we really have the freedom to choose whether or not to act in the morally right way? Does morality always provide us with a permissible course of action?

Part B examines some central topics in political philosophy, namely, democracy, liberty, equality and justice.

Diploma in Legal Studies

Jurisprudence Old Syllabus

(applies to those in FHS yr 3 or 4 in 2012-13 and to DLS students)

Jurisprudence is one of the compulsory standard subjects within the Final Honour School syllabus. The subject affords an opportunity to reflect in a disciplined and critical way on the structure and functions of law and legal institutions and systems, on the nature of legal reasoning and discourse, and/or on the connections between law and morality and/or between law and other human relationships and characteristics. In some places it would be called theory of law or philosophy of law.

The content of the course is therefore deliberately broad and flexible. College tutors offer widely differing ranges of topics and reading lists, and the examination therefore makes full allowance for the diversity of approaches and materials. (Knowing that the examiners change only incrementally the range of issues from which questions are drawn, and the kinds of questions posed, tutors have an eye to former examination papers in designing their reading lists).

For many years the examination has comprised sixteen questions from which candidates are invited to choose any three. While general, the questions are typically precise and pointed. What is looked for is the ability to bring closely to bear on them the student’s own thought, with appropriate reference both to books or articles within the domain and to other legal subjects studied by the candidate.

Past papers, handouts, suggestions, and other suporting material for the course can be found on the Jurisprudence website

Postgraduate

BCL

Our taught postgraduate programme, designed to serve outstanding law students from common-law backgrounds

Constitutional Theory

Theory of the nature, authority and legitimacy of constitutions. Topics include the historical origins and development of constitutional concepts; methods of separating the powers of governmental agencies; the ideal of the rule of law; institutional consequences of theories of democracy; the structure and function of legislatures and techniques for limiting their powers; the role of courts in review of legislation and executive action; the structure and operation of executive agencies; the framing and interpretation of written constitutions; the role of citizens and institutions in times of constitutional emergency; the nature and appropriate constitutional protection of basic rights; federalism and the constitutional implications of multiculturalism.

Jurisprudence and Political Theory

Students taking Jurisprudence and Political Theory have the opportunity to participate in wide-ranging but analytically precise discussions of the presuppositions and methods of legal, political and therefore also, to some extent, moral philosophy, and of related social theories in their bearing on the institutions, norms and methods of legal systems. The syllabus covers the concepts of law, legal system, legal right and legal obligation; the nature of adjudication and judicial discretion; the range and limits of law as a means of social control; the individual’s moral duty to obey the law; the individual’s moral rights against his or her government; and the justification of political (including judicial) authority. Much of, for example, Dworkin’s Law’s Empire, Raz’s The Morality of Freedom, and Finnis’s Aquinas was earlier presented and discussed in this course’s seminars, which provide a good context for critical testing of advanced work-in-progress. The seminars do not necessarily cover all of the topics mentioned in the syllabus, and of those covered some may be covered in much greater depth than others. Nevertheless the syllabus gives a good general indication of the field to which the seminars and the eventual list of examination essay topics relate.

The course is a philosophy course, and in that sense is a specialist rathar than a generalist pursuit. Through it students may expect to develop some of the skills and dispositions of professional philosophers. An acquaintance with some undergraduate-level jurisprudence is presupposed; those who enter on this course without having formally studied jurisprudence should prepare themselves by a careful reading of at least some of the following (or comparable) works: Hart, The Concept of Law, Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously or Law’s Empire, Raz, The Authority of Law, or Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights. But this list should not lead anyone to think that, in the course itself, the topics to be discussed are narrowly ‘jurisprudential’ or that the authors to be read are narrowly ‘Oxford’. Students with an Oxford Jurisprudence background, and others, could well prepare for the course by careful reading of (for example) Rawls, A Theory of Justice or Political Liberalism, Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Nagel, Equality and Partiality, Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, or Walzer, Spheres of Justice.

Seminars specifically designed for students on this course are convened by Dr J Dickson, Professor T A O Endicott, Dr P Eleftheriadis, Professor J M Finnis, Professor A M Honore, Professor J Gardner, Professor L Green, and Dr N Stavropoulos. However, those taking the paper are also encouraged to participate in seminars taking place elsewhere in the university, particularly in some of those advertised on the Philosophy Lecture List. The same holds for lectures. Those who are not conversant with the basics of political philosophy, in particular, should consider whether to attend lectures on the undergraduate courses in Ethics (see the Philosophy Lecture List) and the Theory of Politics (see the Politics Lecture List). Lectures from the undergraduate Jurisprudence course in the Law Faculty would also help those who need to be more familiar with the basics of legal philosophy.

This course is among those supported with detailed material on the Legal Philosophy in Oxford website

Four tutorials will be provided in HT, usually in groups of two or three. These are arranged by the teaching group and neither students nor college tutors need take any steps to organise them.

Philosophical Foundations of the Common Law

This course explores the principles which may be thought to underlie each of the three areas it is concerned with – contract, tort, and the criminal law – and the relations between them.

Do notions such as causation, intention and foresight, which figure in all three areas, lend them doctrinal unity, or do these branches of the law represent different (complementary or conflicting) principles? For example: can one or other of them be understood as embodying principles of corrective justice, while the others are based on considerations of distributive justice? Does the law, in these areas, reflect moral concerns, or pursue efficiency or some other goal, or is it the case that no underlying principles can be discerned? Does the law make sense only in the light of certain assumptions about the nature of persons (e.g. that they are rational choosers, that they are autonomous beings)? These are some of the issues explored in this course.

The course presupposes knowledge of the basic doctrines of contract, tort, and criminal law. While some philosophical background might be helpful, it is not essential.

The main teaching is by seminars. At least two but not necessarily all three of the areas identified in the syllabus (criminal law, torts, contracts) are covered in depth in any given academic year. Up to four tutorials are also provided, and these are arranged centrally via the seminars. The course is among those supported with detailed material on the Faculty's Jurisprudence website

MJur

Our taught postgraduate programme, designed to serve outstanding law students from civil law backgrounds.

Constitutional Theory

Theory of the nature, authority and legitimacy of constitutions. Topics include the historical origins and development of constitutional concepts; methods of separating the powers of governmental agencies; the ideal of the rule of law; institutional consequences of theories of democracy; the structure and function of legislatures and techniques for limiting their powers; the role of courts in review of legislation and executive action; the structure and operation of executive agencies; the framing and interpretation of written constitutions; the role of citizens and institutions in times of constitutional emergency; the nature and appropriate constitutional protection of basic rights; federalism and the constitutional implications of multiculturalism.

Jurisprudence and Political Theory

Students taking Jurisprudence and Political Theory have the opportunity to participate in wide-ranging but analytically precise discussions of the presuppositions and methods of legal, political and therefore also, to some extent, moral philosophy, and of related social theories in their bearing on the institutions, norms and methods of legal systems. The syllabus covers the concepts of law, legal system, legal right and legal obligation; the nature of adjudication and judicial discretion; the range and limits of law as a means of social control; the individual’s moral duty to obey the law; the individual’s moral rights against his or her government; and the justification of political (including judicial) authority. Much of, for example, Dworkin’s Law’s Empire, Raz’s The Morality of Freedom, and Finnis’s Aquinas was earlier presented and discussed in this course’s seminars, which provide a good context for critical testing of advanced work-in-progress. The seminars do not necessarily cover all of the topics mentioned in the syllabus, and of those covered some may be covered in much greater depth than others. Nevertheless the syllabus gives a good general indication of the field to which the seminars and the eventual list of examination essay topics relate.

The course is a philosophy course, and in that sense is a specialist rathar than a generalist pursuit. Through it students may expect to develop some of the skills and dispositions of professional philosophers. An acquaintance with some undergraduate-level jurisprudence is presupposed; those who enter on this course without having formally studied jurisprudence should prepare themselves by a careful reading of at least some of the following (or comparable) works: Hart, The Concept of Law, Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously or Law’s Empire, Raz, The Authority of Law, or Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights. But this list should not lead anyone to think that, in the course itself, the topics to be discussed are narrowly ‘jurisprudential’ or that the authors to be read are narrowly ‘Oxford’. Students with an Oxford Jurisprudence background, and others, could well prepare for the course by careful reading of (for example) Rawls, A Theory of Justice or Political Liberalism, Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Nagel, Equality and Partiality, Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, or Walzer, Spheres of Justice.

Seminars specifically designed for students on this course are convened by Dr J Dickson, Professor T A O Endicott, Dr P Eleftheriadis, Professor J M Finnis, Professor A M Honore, Professor J Gardner, Professor L Green, and Dr N Stavropoulos. However, those taking the paper are also encouraged to participate in seminars taking place elsewhere in the university, particularly in some of those advertised on the Philosophy Lecture List. The same holds for lectures. Those who are not conversant with the basics of political philosophy, in particular, should consider whether to attend lectures on the undergraduate courses in Ethics (see the Philosophy Lecture List) and the Theory of Politics (see the Politics Lecture List). Lectures from the undergraduate Jurisprudence course in the Law Faculty would also help those who need to be more familiar with the basics of legal philosophy.

This course is among those supported with detailed material on the Legal Philosophy in Oxford website

Four tutorials will be provided in HT, usually in groups of two or three. These are arranged by the teaching group and neither students nor college tutors need take any steps to organise them.

Philosophical Foundations of the Common Law

This course explores the principles which may be thought to underlie each of the three areas it is concerned with – contract, tort, and the criminal law – and the relations between them.

Do notions such as causation, intention and foresight, which figure in all three areas, lend them doctrinal unity, or do these branches of the law represent different (complementary or conflicting) principles? For example: can one or other of them be understood as embodying principles of corrective justice, while the others are based on considerations of distributive justice? Does the law, in these areas, reflect moral concerns, or pursue efficiency or some other goal, or is it the case that no underlying principles can be discerned? Does the law make sense only in the light of certain assumptions about the nature of persons (e.g. that they are rational choosers, that they are autonomous beings)? These are some of the issues explored in this course.

The course presupposes knowledge of the basic doctrines of contract, tort, and criminal law. While some philosophical background might be helpful, it is not essential.

The main teaching is by seminars. At least two but not necessarily all three of the areas identified in the syllabus (criminal law, torts, contracts) are covered in depth in any given academic year. Up to four tutorials are also provided, and these are arranged centrally via the seminars. The course is among those supported with detailed material on the Faculty's Jurisprudence website


People

Philosophy of Law teaching is organized by a Subject Group convened by:

John Gardner: Professor of Jurisprudence

in conjunction with:

Nicholas Bamforth: CUF in Law
Nicholas Barber: Associate Professor of Constitutional Law
Alan Bogg: Professor of Labour Law
Mindy Chen-Wishart: Reader in Contract Law
Hugh Collins: Vinerian Professor
Paul Cowie: Stipendiary Lecturer in Law at St Hilda's College
Julie Dickson: Fellow and Senior Law Tutor, Somerville College & Associate Professor of Law, Faculty of Law.
Sionaidh Douglas-Scott: Professor of European and Human Rights Law
Richard Ekins: Associate Professor of Law; Tutorial Fellow
Pavlos Eleftheriadis: Associate Professor of Law
Timothy Endicott: Dean of the Faculty and Professor of Legal Philosophy
Denis Galligan: Professor of Socio-Legal Studies
Imogen Goold: Associate Professor of Law
James Goudkamp: Associate Professor of Law
Kate Greasley: Stowell Junior Research Fellow in Law
Leslie Green: Professor of the Philosophy of Law
Noam Gur: Shaw Foundation Fellow in Law, Lincoln College
Aileen Kavanagh: Reader in Law
Tarunabh Khaitan: Associate Professor of Law
Dori Kimel: Reader in Legal Philosophy
Maris Köpcke Tinturé: Fellow and Tutor in Law, Worcester College & Lecturer in Law, Brasenose College
Grant Lamond: University Lecturer in Legal Philosophy
Ambrose Lee: Leverhulme Trust Early Career Fellow
Peter Mirfield: CUF Lecturer
Guido Rossi: College Lecturer in Law
Edwin Simpson: Associate Professor of Law
Nicos Stavropoulos: Associate Professor of Legal Theory
Shlomit Wallerstein: Associate Professor of Law
Rebecca Williams: Associate Professor of Law
Alison Young: Associate Professor of Law
Paul Yowell: Associate Professor of Law
Lucia Zedner: Professor of Criminal Justice

assisted by:

Andrea Dolcetti: DPhil Law student
Jesse Wall: DPhil Law student

Also working in this field, but not involved in its teaching programme:

Mikolaj Barczentewicz: MPhil Law student
Joanna Bell: DPhil Law student
David Frydrych: DPhil Law student
Sam Kukathas: DPhil Law student
Chris McConnachie: DPhil Law student
Joseph Raz: Emeritus Research Professor


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