Judicial Resistance to Democratic Backsliding: The Politics of Constitutional Balancing in Colombia and Mexico

How can courts resist democratic backsliding without provoking political backlash that undermines their authority or effectiveness? This paper develops the concept of "judicial resistance to democratic backsliding," understood as judicial reactions against regime-corrosive measures aimed at protecting institutions engaged in horizontal and vertical accountability. We identify multiple forms of resistance, both on and off the bench, and focus on "constitutional balancing:" judicial interventions that safeguard checks and balances by constraining reforms that alter the distribution of power among state institutions. We theorise variation in constitutional balancing along two dimensions: the degree of doctrinal innovation in judicial reasoning and the intensity of political pressure facing courts. Drawing on the evolution of Colombia’s Constitutional Court and its constitution-substitution doctrine, we show how judges calibrate legal reasoning to political conditions. Under acute pressure, courts may rely on orthodox procedural or doctrinal arguments to minimise backlash, while more permissive contexts allow judges to develop innovative jurisprudential tools that strengthen their capacity to confront future threats. We further probe this framework through cases from Mexico’s Supreme Court, where established precedent enabled successful resistance to executive aggrandisement, while doctrinal underdevelopment constrained judicial responses to the 2024 judicial reform. The comparison demonstrates that effective judicial resistance depends not simply on judicial independence or willingness to confront incumbents, but also on the jurisprudential resources courts accumulate over time. Gradual doctrinal development can therefore provide critical institutional foundations for defending democracy when backsliding intensifies

Ezequiel González Ocantos is Professor of Comparative & Judicial Politics in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford and a Professorial Fellow of Nuffield College. He currently serves as REF2029 Director and, since 2025, as a Delegate at Oxford University Press.

His research focuses on comparative judicial politics, particularly judicial and prosecutorial behaviour in cases involving human rights violations and corruption. He has published several award-winning books on judicial politics, transitional justice, corruption and judicialisation in Latin America. His recent research examines partisanship and political polarisation in Latin America and will appear in the forthcoming book Latin American Polarisations: Factionalism in Changing Party Systems (Oxford University Press).

He received his PhD in Political Science from the University of Notre Dame in 2012 and was awarded the Philip Leverhulme Prize in Politics and International Relations in 2018.