Biography

I am a second-year DPhil student in Legal Philosophy. My thesis question is: when a person A has consented to a person B committing a crime against them, (when) should this consent make a decisive difference in a trial? In other words, (when) should consent be considered a legal justification?

I was mainly trained in continental philosophy (Ecole Normale Supérieure of Paris; Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne), analytical philosophy (EHESS; NYU and Oxford as a visiting student) and French law (Paris X Nanterre). I have also done internships in different jurisdictions (Conseil d'Etat, European Court of Human Rights, Paris Administrative Court, Orléans Appeal Court)

Publications

Recent additions

  • C Degiovanni, 'Retroactivity in mitius and the individuation of norms ' (2021) Droit & Philosophie
    This article received the Price for Young Researcher in Legal Philosophy from the SFPJ (Société Française de Philosophie Juridique, French section of the IVR)
    Lex mitior retro agit. Although the rule of law generally requires laws not to be applied retroactively, most legal systems recognize an exception to the principle: when an act of a type x has been committed at T, and a new law dealing with x is passed at T+1, a judge considering the case at T+2 should apply the new law if and only if it is more lenient than the one that was in force at T. But imagine that the new law modifies the legal regime in more than one point. For example, for a given offense, it makes the maximal sanction harsher and the minimal sanction lighter. Should we consider its leniency "overall"? Or should we consider that this "new law" actually encapsulates several laws (one for serious forms of the offense, one for minor forms), the leniency of which should be evaluated separately? Thus, to interpret the principle "lex mitior", we need to know how to individuate the laws: that is, we need to know what constitutes a complete but unique law. I first show how this problem can arise in concrete cases by focusing on a decision by the European Court of Human Rights, Jidic v. Roumania. I then expose Bentham's theory of individuation and Raz' critique of it. If one accepts Raz' premises, important aspects of Bentham's theory cannot survive his critique. Yet I argue that something remains - a sort of common denominator between the two approaches - which is enough to solve cases such as Jidic.
  • C Degiovanni, '"Quand dire c'est faire, J. L. Austin"' in Jean-François Suratteau (ed), Encyclopédie des Oeuvres Philosophiques (Ellipses 2020) (forthcoming)
    A presentation and analysis of How to do Things with Words, by J.L. Austin.

Journal Article (1)

C Degiovanni, 'Retroactivity in mitius and the individuation of norms ' (2021) Droit & Philosophie
This article received the Price for Young Researcher in Legal Philosophy from the SFPJ (Société Française de Philosophie Juridique, French section of the IVR)
Lex mitior retro agit. Although the rule of law generally requires laws not to be applied retroactively, most legal systems recognize an exception to the principle: when an act of a type x has been committed at T, and a new law dealing with x is passed at T+1, a judge considering the case at T+2 should apply the new law if and only if it is more lenient than the one that was in force at T. But imagine that the new law modifies the legal regime in more than one point. For example, for a given offense, it makes the maximal sanction harsher and the minimal sanction lighter. Should we consider its leniency "overall"? Or should we consider that this "new law" actually encapsulates several laws (one for serious forms of the offense, one for minor forms), the leniency of which should be evaluated separately? Thus, to interpret the principle "lex mitior", we need to know how to individuate the laws: that is, we need to know what constitutes a complete but unique law. I first show how this problem can arise in concrete cases by focusing on a decision by the European Court of Human Rights, Jidic v. Roumania. I then expose Bentham's theory of individuation and Raz' critique of it. If one accepts Raz' premises, important aspects of Bentham's theory cannot survive his critique. Yet I argue that something remains - a sort of common denominator between the two approaches - which is enough to solve cases such as Jidic.

Chapter (1)

C Degiovanni, '"Quand dire c'est faire, J. L. Austin"' in Jean-François Suratteau (ed), Encyclopédie des Oeuvres Philosophiques (Ellipses 2020) (forthcoming)
A presentation and analysis of How to do Things with Words, by J.L. Austin.

Research Interests

In addition to my DPhil topic, I am particularly interested in the following subjects: 

1 – Philosophical differences/similarities between common law and civil law.

2 - Freedom of speech (I am part of the Egalibex research group).

3 - Bringing together "continental philosophy" and "analytical philosophy".

Please do get in touch if any of these topics is of interest to you!

Research projects