Luca Enriques

This chapter describes the experience with activist institutional investors in an apparently unfavorable corporate environment (Italy), commonly depicted as one of concentrated ownership, notoriously inadequate legal protection for minority shareholders and an apparent disregard for their interests by controlling shareholders. We document a non-negligible volume of “core” active institutional investment, together with some idiosyncratic forms of activism (the appointment of “minority” directors on the boards of Italian listed companies). We attempt to evaluate whether what we see is genuine shareholder-value oriented activism or a strategy to engage in a privileged relationship with controlling shareholders, in order to share in private benefits of control extraction. We find no sufficient evidence to support a “dark side” view of shareholder activism, at least as a general explanation. Instead, we provide recent anecdotal evidence of initiatives effectively aimed to curb the extraction of private benefits by dominant shareholders.

After a crisis, broad and sweeping reforms are enacted to restore trust. Following the 2007-2008 Great Financial Crisis, the European Union has engaged in an ambitious overhaul of banking regulation. One of its centrepieces, the 2013 Fourth Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV), tackles, amongst other things, the perceived pre-crisis failings in the governance of banks. We focus on the provisions that are aimed at reshaping bank boards’ composition, functioning, and their members’ liabilities, and argue that they are unlikely to improve bank boards’ effectiveness or prevent excessive risk-taking. We criticize some of them for mandating solutions, like board diversity and the separation of chairman and CEO, that may be good for some banks but are bad for others, in the absence of any convincing argument that their overall effect is positive. We also criticize enhanced board liability by showing that it may increase the risk of herd behaviour and lead to more serious harm in the event of managerial mistakes. We also highlight that the push towards unfriendly boards may negatively affect board dynamics and make boards as dysfunctional as when the CEO dominates them. We further argue that limits on directorships and diversity requirements will worsen the shortage of bank directors, while requirements for induction and training and board evaluation exercises will more likely lead to tick-the-box exercises than under the current situation in which they are just best practices. We conclude that European policymakers and supervisors should avoid using a heavy hand, respectively, when issuing rules implementing CRD IV provisions with regard to bank boards and when enforcing them.

This paper provides a legal and policy analysis of transactions between a corporation and one of its ‘related parties’. It first highlights the reasons why related party transactions (RPTs) are so common around the world. Next, it better identifies the phenomenon as a specific form of potentially abusive behaviour by dominant shareholders and managers, i.e., as an instrument for tunneling, asking why many jurisdictions provide for specific regulations on RPTs in addition to general rules or standards on tunneling. Then, it describes the main legal tools available to prevent corporate agents from diverting value from the corporation via RPTs. Further, it provides a (partially) critical assessment of the measures put forth by the European Commission to harmonise rules on RPTs within the EU, based on the previous analysis of individual legal tools. Finally, it shows that no regulation of RPTs (or tunneling) can succeed in preventing minority shareholder expropriation in the absence of sophisticated enforcement actors (specialised courts and/or active and committed securities regulators) and non-legal supporting institutions, like independent financial media and anti-tunneling social norms.