Roderick Bagshaw

This chapter seeks to illuminate some of the issues that a lawmaker ought to consider when deciding in a particular context whether to design a tort law defence so that it requires the balancing of something on a defendant’s side against something on a claimant’s side, or balancing some public interest against something on the claimant’s side, with that balancing being conducted on the facts of the instant case.

5th edition of this student textbook.

Account of the process that led to the passing of the Animals Act 1971 and its subsequent interpretation.

Fourth edition of this textbook

The principal theme of this chapter is that in pursuing the goal of making English tort law compatible with Convention rights, and the related goal of developing tort law so as to allow it to assist in protecting these rights, we should not lose sight of what makes a good tort duty. Lord Bingham commended the opinion that ‘where a common law duty covers the same ground as a Convention right, it should, so far as practicable, develop in harmony with it’ (Van Colle v. Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police; Smith v. Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] UKHL 50; [2009] 1 AC 225 at [58]). But this chapter aims to unsettle any assumption that such harmony requires the development of tort duties which mirror Convention rights, even in situations where the tort duties will be owed by public bodies. It is more important for newly developed duties to be harmonious with the goals of the law of torts than for them to replicate concepts used by the Strasbourg Court.

Most proponents of a ‘rights-focused account’ of the law of torts argue that not only are there currently no general common law rights to pure economic benefits but there are also good reasons why general common law rights to purely economic benefits should not exist whilst general common law rights to property do, or good reasons why legislators or judges should not in future create or recognise general common law rights to purely economic benefits. The main purpose of this chapter is to evaluate these ‘good reasons’ using three perspectives provided by the ‘edges’ of currently recognised legal rights.

This chapter investigates the concept of ‘cause’ which ought to be used by tort lawyers when making claims such as that Derek’s wrongful behaviour ‘caused’ Trevor to act in some way, in particular in circumstances where we regard Trevor’s action as ‘voluntary’ rather than ‘coerced’. The central issue is whether a tort lawyer’s inquiry into whether Derek’s wrongful behaviour ‘caused’ Trevor to act in some way ought to be the same as an inquiry into whether Derek’s wrongful behaviour ‘caused’ the kettle to boil or the toaster to burn the toast.

This chapter explores the relationship between the capacity of tort law to achieve its goals and the nature of the concepts that are incorporated in the law.

Third edition of McBride and Bagshaw's Textbook on Tort.

Casenote discussing Douglas v Hello! (no 3)

Casenote

Casenote on Transco v Stockport MBC

Chapter in book

Tort Textbook