Tom is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law as well as a Tutorial Fellow at St Catherine's College, Oxford. He works in legal philosophy, with special interest in questions relating to method and social ontology, as well as the theory of public law.
Tom completed the BA in Jurisprudence and BCL at St Peter's College, Oxford and the DPhil in Law at Balliol College, Oxford. Prior to coming to St Catherine's he was a Research Fellow at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge. Tom has also held visiting positions at New York University School of Law and University of Chicago Law School.
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S000819731900062XThis article revisits the debate about the foundations of judicial review, suggesting that it was conducted under a false premise. According to the standard interpretation of the dispute we must choose between alternatives—either judicial review falls to be justified by the intention of the legislature or else it is justified on the basis of the autonomous law-making power of the judiciary—but, or so I argue, we can only make sense of the full scope of administrative law by denying this binary constraint. Whilst certain aspects of the review of bodies with statutory powers depend upon the authority of Parliament, others find their footing elsewhere, in the capacity of the courts to impose controls of their own making on the administration.DOI: 10.1080/20403313.2017.1385291