Wolf-Georg Ringe

There is also an online version of the Handbook at http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198743682.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780198743682.

Regulatory arbitrage in financial markets refers to a number of strategies that market participants use to avoid the reach of regulation, in particular by virtue of shifting trading abroad or else relocating activities or operations of financial institutions to other jurisdictions. Where this happens, such arbitrage can trigger regulatory competition between jurisdictions that may respond to the relocation of financial services (or threats to relocate) by moderating their regulatory standards. This paper develops a framework for the assessment of both phenomena in the context of financial regulation and assesses their merits. I argue that regulatory competition has many advantages over alternative global approaches, notably international harmonization of regulation, by offering a dynamic process for the discovery of efficient regulatory standards. However, the risk is that countries lower their standards solely to attract businesses and thereby impose externalities on the worldwide financial market by undermining financial stability as a global public good. Policymakers worldwide are experimenting with remedies to respond to the phenomenon. I introduce the importance of an effective special resolution regime for financial institutions to the discussion. I argue that, within limits, a credible, worldwide resolution scheme can effectively contribute to reducing the dilemma. Its main benefit would be to tackle the problem of financial stability caused by systemically important financial institutions’ excessive risk-taking. If such risk-taking would be judged by market discipline instead of posing a risk to global financial stability, the main downside of regulatory competition could be restrained. Within the boundaries of such a system, competition could then operate and contribute to a market-led design of financial regulation. Wolf-Georg Ringe (2016), "Regulatory Competition in Global Financial Markets — The Case for a Special Resolution Regime", Annals of Corporate Governance: Vol. 1: No. 3, pp 175-247. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/109.00000011

The project of creating a Banking Union is designed to overcome the fatal link between sovereigns and their banks in the Eurozone. As part of this project, political agreement for a common supervision framework and a common resolution scheme has been reached with difficulty. However, the resolution framework is weak, underfunded and exhibits some serious flaws. Further, Member States’ disagreements appear to rule out a federalized deposit insurance scheme, commonly regarded as the necessary third pillar of a successful Banking Union. This paper argues for an organizational and capital structure substitute for these two shortcomings that can minimize the systemic distress costs of the failure of a large financial institution. We borrow from the approach the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has devised in the implementation of the “Orderly Liquidation Authority” under the Dodd Frank Act. The FDIC’s experience teaches us three important lessons: first, systemically important institutions need to have in their liability structure sufficient unsecured (or otherwise subordinated) term debt so that in the event of bank failure, the conversion of debt into equity will be sufficient to absorb asset losses without impairing deposits and other short term credit; second, the organizational structure of the financial institution needs to permit such a debt conversion without putting core financial constituents through a bankruptcy, and third, a federal funding mechanism deployable at the discretion of the resolution authority must be available to supply liquidity to a reorganizing bank. On these conditions, a viable and realistic Banking Union would be within reach—and the resolution of global financial institutions would be greatly facilitated, not least in a transatlantic perspective.

This paper argues that the work of the European Banking Union remains incomplete in one important respect, the structural re-organization of large European financial firms that would make “resolution” of a systemically important financial firm a credible alternative to bail-out or some other sort of taxpayer assistance. A holding company structure in which the public parent holds unsecured term debt sufficient to cover losses at an operating financial subsidiary would facilitate a “Single Point of Entry” resolution procedure that would minimize knock-on effects from the failure of a systemically important financial institution. Resolution through such a structure would minimize run risk from short term creditors and minimize destructive ring-fencing by national regulators. Although structural reform in the EU could be achieved by supervisory implementation of the “living wills” requirement for effective resolution or irresistible incentives through capital charges, it would be best obtained through addition to the EU’s Proposed Structural Measures Regulation now under consideration.

The economic case for the recent proposal on a European ‘Capital Markets Union’ is obvious. However, the name is more symbolic than real, and the substance falls short of proposing a fully unified capital market across the EU. This short paper identifies several shortcomings of the project. In particular, the unclear methodological approach of the CMU project, and the lack of a clear commitment to a European enforcement or institutional mechanism weaken the benefits of the overall concept. Instead, the merits of the proposal lie in its political importance: above all, the CMU project is an attempt to repair the relationship with the UK and to win back support from the City of London for the European Single Market. As such, the project as a whole is certainly laudable, and it might turn out to be the right step at the right time.

German corporate governance and corporate law are currently undergoing a major change. The old “Deutschland AG”, a nationwide network of firms, banks, and directors, is eroding, ownership is diffusing and the shareholder body is becoming more international than ever. This paper presents new data to support this development and explores the consequences in governance and in law that have been taken or that need to be drawn from this finding. Consistent with market-based theoretical accounts on corporate law, it finds that the changes currently underway are mainly a response to global market pressure: German banks divested their equity stakes mainly as a consequence of increased international competition. The paper extends the model of market-led change by two important observations: first, market pressure is not the only driver of legal change, but the law itself in this case contributed to facilitating competition. Notably, a taxation law reform enabled and accelerated the competition process already underway. Legal rules and market competition may thus be understood as not operating in isolation, but as forces that can be working in dialog. Secondly, the paper highlights the importance of ownership structure as an important intermediate condition in the logical order between market competition and legal change.

“Poison puts” are contractual clauses in debt arrangements that work similar to poison pills – they are triggered on a certain pre-defined moment and allow the debtholder to claim repayment of the debt, much to the disadvantage of the company. This provides a chilling effect on shareholder activism and potential takeover bids. Recent Delaware case-law suggests that the most extreme, ‘dead hand’ version of such clauses might violate directors’ fiduciary duties. This short article develops some initial thoughts on the phenomenon and evaluates how the new poison pills would be handled under European takeover and corporate law.

The volume traces back to a symposium held at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg and offers a broad comparative analysis of company and capital markets law in Germany and the Nordic states. It details the special elements of company law in Scandinavia that developed amid the twin forces of innovative experimentation and the drive for harmonization, contrasting them with the distinctive features of German company law. Further contributions deal with the newly created entrepreneur company in Germany and Denmark, as well as the role of shareholders and boards in public companies. It also contains detailed analyses of the law of company groups in Germany and the Nordic states. the volume is further rounded out with contributions on capital markets law and takeover law, including issues involving acting in concert, ownership disclosure and the interaction between the legislator and the takeover panel in Sweden.

The global financial and economic crisis which started in 2008 has had devastating effects around the globe. It has caused a rethinking in different areas of law, and posed new challenges to regulators and private actors alike. One of the emerging issues is the apparent eclipse of boundaries between different legal disciplines: financial and corporate lawyers have to learn how public law instruments can complement their traditional governance tools; conversely, public lawyers have had to come to understand the specificities of the financial markets they intend to regulate. While commentary on financial regulation and the global financial crisis abounds, it tends to remain within disciplinary boundaries. This volume not only brings together scholarship from different areas of law (constitutional and administrative law, EU law, financial law and regulation), but also from a variety of backgrounds (academia, practice, policy-making) and a number of different jurisdictions. The volume illustrates how interdisciplinary scholarship belongs at the centre of any discussion of the economic crisis, and indeed regulation theory more generally. This is a timely exploration of cutting-edge issues of financial regulation.

The law of assignments is one of the most controversial areas of European contract law. In recent scholarship - and in political reality - attempts have been made to (i) harmonise private international law rules and to (ii) reach agreement on substantive rules. This contribution evaluates the conceptual underpinnings of both approaches and proposes a way forward to create an effective framework for assignments in Europe.

This paper explores the benefit of using menu structures for regulatory purposes in private law. Menus have been used rarely by regulators and lawmakers in the past. Insofar as they are used, they address situations where market participants have relatively heterogeneous preferences, where the subject matter of regulation itself is heterogeneous, or where a political consensus appears difficult. This paper addresses a number of benefits that reach beyond the traditional perception of menu lawmaking. Benefiting from insights from economics and behavioural science, several benefits can be identified that exploit the full potential of menu lamaking. Central to these benefits is the notion of endowment effect (or status quo bias) involved with traditional default rules: where the law provides just one default rule, market participants will mostly stick to this rule out of pure convenience. This means that simple default rules are frequently inappropriate to identify the preference of market participants. This problem can be overcome by using menus, giving consumers a choice between different options, each of which is endorsed by the authority and impartiality of the parliamentary lawmaker. But menus have many other advantages than traditional black-or-white legal rules.

The rules on assignment and transfer of rights and obligations are currently outside the scope of the proposed CESL. In contrast, the original DCFR from 2009 includes a chapter on these issues. Questions outside the scope of CESL are left to be solved by the ‘domestic’ provisions of the national law that is applicable under the relevant conflict-of-laws provisions. This paper is part of the larger CFR Context research project and explores interactions of the system of assignment of receivables under a future European contract instrument with both English and German national laws. This concerns above all other areas of law, for example the rules that apply upon the insolvency of one of the parties (in particular that of the assignor) and the rules on public policy. Key differences between the jurisdictions include, inter alia, the proprietary aspects of the assignor’s insolvency where the assignor is paid by the debtor, the priority rule for competing assignments, and the effects of a non-assignment clause. Here, the choice of the optional instrument rather than either English or German law will lead to diverging results and may therefore prejudice any of the parties involved.

Negative risk-decoupling, otherwise known as empty voting, is a popular strategy amongst hedge funds and other activist investors. In short, it is the attempt to decouple the economic risk from the share’s ownership position, retaining in particular the voting right without risk. This paper uses three perspectives to analyse the problems created by negative risk-decoupling: an agency costs approach, an analysis of information costs, and a perspective from corporate finance. It shows how risk-decoupling is a type of market behaviour that creates significant costs for market participants, in particular existing shareholders and potential investors. The paper then develops regulatory responses, envisaged particularly for EU level lawmaking, but also raises underlying issues on a more general level. Whilst several proposed regulatory tools are rejected, the paper prefers a solution that uses continuous transparency as the cornerstone. In addition, it suggests that in certain individual cases, national regulators should be empowered to suspend activists’ voting rights. The paper concludes by offering a concrete legislative proposal, amending the European Transparency Directive.

This paper discusses new data on regulatory competition in European company law and the impact of national law reforms, using the example of English company law forms being used by German start-ups. Since 1999, entrepreneurs have been allowed to select foreign legal forms to govern their affairs. The data show that English limited companies have been very popular with German entrepreneurs in the first years of the last decade, but also document a sharp decline from early 2006 onwards. This decline casts doubt over the claim that the German company law reform from November 2008 had ‘successfully fought off’ the use of foreign company forms. Moreover, by contrasting the German data with the corresponding developments in Austria, the paper further demonstrates that the latter jurisdiction sees a similar decline without having reformed its company law. Instead of exclusively relying on law reform as the causal reason for declining foreign incorporation numbers, the paper offers a number of alternative or complementary explanations for the striking developments. The findings are important for our understanding of (defensive) regulatory competition and successful lawmaking.

The recent conflict between Canadian telecommunications provider Telus and US-based hedge fund Mason Capital is the most recent illustration of ‘empty voting’ – a strategy whereby activist investors eliminate their risk exposure to shares in target companies to pursue idiosyncratic motives. As courts are struggling to find adequate solutions, regulators worldwide are called upon to provide reliable tools to this threat to shareholder voting.

This paper re-evaluates the corporate governance concept of ‘board independence’ against the disappointing experiences during the 2007-08 financial crisis. Independent or outside directors had long been seen as an essential tool to improve the monitoring role of the board. Yet the crisis revealed that they did not prevent firms’ excessive risk-taking; further, these directors sometimes showed serious deficits in understanding the business they were supposed to control, and remained passive in addressing structural problems. A closer look reveals that under the surface of seemingly unanimous consensus about board independence in Western jurisdictions, a surprising disharmony prevails about the justification, extent and purpose of independence requirements. These considerations lead me to question the benefits of the current system. Instead, this paper proposes a new, ‘functional’ concept of board independence. This would redefine independence to include those directors that are independent of the firm’s controller, but at the same time it would require them to be more accountable to (minority) shareholders.

The German Federal Supreme Court held in a recent decision that secondary proceedings according to Article 3(2) of the European Insolvency Regulation cannot be initiated where the debtor only has assets in a particular country. The requirements for an “establishment” go beyond this and require an economic activity with a “minimum of organisation and certain stability”. This decision stands in conformity with the leading academic comment and other case-law. Nevertheless, the decision is a good opportunity to stress the importance of secondary proceedings and their function to protect local creditors. This is particularly true where the secondary proceedings are initiated (as here) in the context of a cross-border transfer of the “centre of main interests” (COMI) of the debtor. The ongoing review of the European Insolvency Regulation should respond to this problem in one of the regulatory options provided.

The rules on assignment and transfer of rights and obligations are currently outside the scope of the proposed CESL. In contrast, the original DCFR from 2009 includes a chapter on these issues. Questions outside the scope of CESL are left to be solved by the ‘domestic’ provisions of the national law that is applicable under the relevant conflict-of-laws provisions. This paper is part of the larger CFR Context research project and explores interactions of the system of assignment of receivables under a future European contract instrument with both English and German national laws. This concerns above all other areas of law, for example the rules that apply upon the insolvency of one of the parties (in particular that of the assignor) and the rules on public policy. Key differences between the jurisdictions include, inter alia, the proprietary aspects of the assignor’s insolvency where the assignor is paid by the debtor, the priority rule for competing assignments, and the effects of a non-assignment clause. Here, the choice of the optional instrument rather than either English or German law will lead to diverging results and may therefore prejudice any of the parties involved.

In capital markets around the world, calls for greater transparency regarding holdings of cash-settled equity derivatives (in particular Contracts for Difference, CfDs) have arisen due to the increased use of CfDs to gain control or to influence the management of prominent companies on all major European stock exchanges. They have been used in this manner due to an emerging practice that permits a CfD holder to capture the shares to which the CfD arrangement relates (without entering into any further express or implied agreements to do so), thereby acquiring a de facto control position in the target company. The UK was among the first countries to extend its shareholder disclosure regime to cover CfDs. Positions above the trigger threshold of 3 per cent must be disclosed as if they were shares enti-tling the holder to voting rights in the target company. Two alternatives were considered when pre-paring this new regulation: firstly, a general disclosure obligation of all economic long positions and secondly, a safe harbour regulation with exemptions from the requirement to disclose certain CfD transactions. Ultimately, the first option was preferred, yet not on the basis of its own merits but be-cause the safe harbour alternative was considered too complicated and difficult to enforce. This paper evaluates disclosure regulation of cash-settled equity derivatives and assesses the ef-fectiveness and suitability of the disclosure regulation under chapter 5 of Disclosure and Transparency Rules (DTR) in the UK with comparison to the relevant US rules and case law. We argue that the UK made the wrong choice of disclosure regime for CfDs. It fundamentally misunderstood the nature of the underlying problem relating to CfDs. As this article explains, the key problem related to CfDs is not the economic interest which CfDs convey per se, but rather the hedging structures that market participants have developed to facilitate the use of CfDs to acquire control of companies by stealth. This particular mischief would have been better targeted by an intentions-based disclosure regulation requiring disclosure of CfD positions only in cases where the CfD holder intends to launch a takeover or to otherwise influence the target company’s strategy and operations. Instead, the UK market is saddled with a general disclosure obligation with only very limited exceptions. This disclosure obligation is too wide in scope, places an undue burden on market partici-pants and ultimately acts as a deterrent to CfD transactions. This article argues that the UK should move away from the current general disclosure obligation towards intentions-based disclosure to re-move the current fetter on the CfD market, while still tackling the underlying mischief.

Eine richtungsweisende Detailfrage schlägt derzeit im deutschen Zivilrecht große Wellen: Wie ist der Erfüllungsort für den Nacherfüllungsanspruch im Rahmen der kaufrechtlichen Gewährleistung zu bestimmen? Darüber herrscht auch zehn Jahre nach Inkrafttreten des Schuldrechtsmodernisierungsgesetzes und trotz eines im letzten Jahr ergangenen BGH-Urteils (NJW 2011, 2278) noch immer Unklarheit. Der vorliegende Beitrag spricht sich dafür aus, den Erfüllungsort des Nacherfüllungsanspruchs grundsätzlich am gewöhnlichen Aufenthalt des Käufers anzusiedeln, davon ungeachtet jedoch privatautonom abweichende Vereinbarungen zuzulassen. Eine derartige Regelung würde die Kosten der Nacherfüllung reduzieren und somit dem hypothetischen Parteiwillen insgesamt am besten entsprechen.

Das Werk behandelt - sehr praxisorientiert und zugleich wissenschaftlich fundiert - die im täglichen Rechtsverkehr mit England auftretenden Fragen. Dazu gehören z. B. die Besonderheiten des englischen Vertragsrechts, Warenkauf, Arbeitsrecht, Gesellschaftsrecht, Insolvenzrecht, Wettbewerbsrecht, internationales Zivilprozess- und Privatrecht einschließlich Schiedsverfahrensrecht u.v.m. Das Buch ist nicht nur für Geschäftsverbindungen mit England eine unerlässliche Hilfe. Da englisches (Handels-)Recht in vielen wirtschaftlich bedeutenden Ländern zur Anwendung kommt, genießt es Weltgeltung. Zudem wird im internationalen Handelsverkehr sehr häufig ein englischer Gerichtsstand oder Schiedsort und englisches Recht als "neutrales Recht" vereinbart, wenn sich die Parteien nicht auf das Recht einer der Vertragsparteien einigen können.

Collective litigation against issuer fraud appears increasingly in an international context. In times of financial crises, this brings one question into the centre of attention which had not been discussed exhaustively before: In the situation of a securities liability towards investors in an international context, which is the applicable law to the liability claim? The harmonisation of private international law rules in Europe gives rise to new reflections on the problem of international issuer liability. In the United States, on the other hand, the Supreme Court has just ruled for the first time on matters relating to the international application of the US securities regulation thereby overruling the settled case-law of decades. This paper understands the role of issuer liability in a broader context as a ‘corporate governance’ device and, from this starting point, develops a new approach to the legal problem of cross-border securities class actions.

The case-law of the European Court of Justice in the field of company law has repeatedly touched on the question of abuse, most notably in the situation where a company was set up in a Member State only to do business exclusively in another. Starting with the landmark case of Centros in 1999, the Court has repeatedly stressed that it employs a liberal approach towards abuse in this field. According to the Court, making use of the disparities of different legal standards when setting up a company is not abuse, but explicit use of the freedom of establishment. This paper analyses the Court’s approach towards abusive behaviour in company law and assesses the impact that the leading cases since 1999 have had both on business behaviour in the EU and on the national law-makers who have responded to the opening of the markets. It is shown that the Court has provoked a sizeable entrepreneurial migration from various countries towards the UK. This in turn has led to regulatory competition, in that other Member States in continental Europe have been forced to adapt their company law to make it more attractive for businesses. It is argued that at least so far, the (limited) competition between Member States has been beneficial and has reduced both registration time and costs. Questions remain as to the relevance of any comparison with the United States and the future developments for corporate re-incorporations.

The integration of the European capital markets makes progress and has led both issuers and investors being active on various markets on both sides of the Atlantic. In times of financial crises, this brings one question into the centre of attention which had not been discussed exhaustively before: In the situation of a securities liability towards investors in an international context, which is the applicable law to the liability claim? The harmonisation of private international law rules in Europe gives rise to new reflections on the problem of international issuer liability. In the United States, on the other hand, the Supreme Court has just granted certiorari in a ‘foreign-cubed’ securi-ties class action case and will thus rule for the first time on matters relating to the inter-national application of the US securities regulation soon. This paper understands the role of issuer liability in a broader context as a ‘corporate governance’ device and, from this starting point, develops a new approach to the legal problem of cross-border securities liability.

European corporate law has enjoyed a renaissance in the past decade. Fifteen years ago, this would have seemed most implausible. In the mid-1990s, the early integration strategy of seeking to harmonise substantive company law seemed to have been stalled by the need to reconcile fundamental differences in approaches to corporate governance. Little was happening, and the grand vision of the early pioneers appeared more dream than ambition. Yet since then, a combination of adventurous decisions by the Court of Justice, innovative approaches to legislation by the Commission, and disastrous crises in capital markets has produced a headlong rush of reform activity. The volume and pace of change has been such that few have had time to digest it: not least policymakers, with the consequence that the developments have not always been well coordinated. The recent 2007/08 financial crisis has yet again thrown many - quite fundamental - issues into question. In this article, we offer an overview that puts the most significant developments of this decade into context, alongside each other and the changing patterns of corporate structure in European countries.

The financial crisis has brought about a revival of state protectionism across the globe. Most Western leaders have made a virtue of big government and state intervention; bail-outs and Sovereign Wealth Funds have been among the first responses to the economic contraction. Company law rules are one of the instruments frequently used to restrict or to discourage integration or to deter foreign investment. Examples for the new protectionism can be seen in a wide range of legislative and regulatory measures, for instance state measures preventing foreign takeovers, 'golden shares' or laws on foreign direct investment targeting Sovereign Wealth Funds, mainly from Asia. This book presents timely research by a number of company law and EU law experts into this field of law. The chapters cover a broad range of topics, spanning from takeovers/mergers over the one share-one vote debate through to the foreclosure of markets against Sovereign Wealth Funds.

In the wake of the economic crisis of 2008/09 the debate about the desirability of control-enhancing mechanisms that deviate from the traditional one-share-one-vote standard has been reinvigorated. This debate can be seen in the discourse of policy makers and academics that advocate the introduction of multiple voting rights in an attempt to curb the short-termism that is perceived by many to have provided the prevalent business incentive prior to the financial crisis. Alongside such discourse there buds a renaissance in the use of golden shares, in the hope, inter alia, of protecting European industries against Sovereign Wealth Funds from the Middle and Far East. Most of these proposals appear to be ill-advised. In the continental European context, they would reinforce the existing blockholder-dominated share structures to the detriment of minority shareholders. But even in the UK, where the possible introduction of deviations from OSOV has been advanced, these suggestions have to be greeted with reservations. The current discussion seems to leave well-established legal and economic ground actively to support protectionist market forces.

Il existe un conflit entre les objectifs de l’UE visant à établir un marché intérieur intégré et à assurer son bon fonctionnement et les ambitions de (certains) E´ tats membres à stimuler les champions nationaux ou à maintenir le contrôle économique national dans les entreprises (anciennement) publiques. Ces derniers temps, en raison de la crise financière mondiale, les dirigeants européens ont fait une vertu de l’intervention étatique ; sortir d’affaire les fonds souverains fait partie des premières réponses à la contraction économique. La crise a revivifié l’ancien outil protectionniste, qui était censé être surmonté dans l’UE. Le renouveau du protectionnisme peut être vu dans un large éventail de mesures législatives et réglementaires : mesures empêchant les rachats étrangers incluant l’octroi d’aides d’E´tat ou de droits spéciaux dans les sociétés privatisées, les « golden shares », qui conduisent à restreindre le marché européen du contrôle des entreprises privées et des investissements directs. Sans doute, des outils du droit société comme les droits de vote multiples ou d’autres mécanismes de renforcement de contrôle peuvent également être réanimés pour poursuivre les objectifs nationalistes. Cette contribution reprend certains des aspects du débat sur « une action – une voix » (OSOV) à l’aune de la crise financière et ses craintes protectionnistes.

This report seeks to examine how to avoid distortions of competition which may result from the use of public, rather than private, capital or which may result from differences in Member States’ definitions of public interest goals and in the instruments employed to attain such goals. It aims to discover for what purposes the state may intervene in the market economy and how. In so far as such intervention is by the State investing capital into a commercial enterprise in accordance with national company law, it seeks to ascertain whether the EU Treaty permits, restricts or prevents the same.

Die weltweite Integration der Kapitalmärkte hat dazu geführt, dass sowohl deutsche Unternehmen als auch Anleger heutzutage auf vielen Märkten dies- und jenseits des Atlantiks aktiv sind. Gerade in Zeiten der Finanzmarktkrise stellt sich oftmals die Frage, nach welchem Haftungs-recht sich die Schadensersatzansprüche etwaig geschädigter Anleger richten. Die Vereinheitlichung des internationalen Privatrechts in Europa bietet Anlass, die Frage nach dem internationalen Kapitalmarkthaftungsrecht neu und umfassend zu behandeln. Der vorliegende Beitrag begreift die Kapitalmarkthaftung im größeren Kontext der Unternehmenssteuerung („Corporate Governance“) und entwickelt daraus einen eigenen Ansatz zur Anknüpfung der Haftungsansprüche. Auf dieser Grundlage ist eine Anknüpfung der kapitalmarkthaftungsrechtlichen Vorschriften an die Rechtsordnung des Gesellschaftsstatuts eine rechtsdogmatisch und -politisch vorzugswürdige Einordnung.

The VW case is the latest in the series of "golden shares" cases. Whilst the previous cases concerned special rights the State was granted, the VW law provided provisions that applied equally to all shareholders. The ECJ was therefore tempted to open the assessment of general rules of company law and their compatibility with the free movement of capital. However, the Court ultimately refrained from delivering a clear statement.

Comment on Advocate General Maduro's opinion in case C-210/06 (Cartesio) on the possibility to transfer a company's head office across the border.

Annotated guide on the European Company Statute

In honor of his retirement from the Max-Planck-Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg, this commemorative publication is dedicated by his students to Klaus J Hopt, one of the worldwide leading experts on commercial law and author of many significant pieces of work, especially in the fields of trade, corporate and banking law.

One of the key features of the new Europe-wide legal form "European Company" ("Societas Europaea" or "SE") is the possibility of transferring the company’s seat from one Member State to another without having to be wound up or to re-register. As this possibility does not exist for companies formed under national law, the formation of an SE will often present the only possibility for companies to transfer their incorporation and corporate headquarters between Member States. This is a big advantage and a milestone towards the European Internal Market. However, some doubts remain as to the practicability of the system. The mandatory linkage of the head office to the registered office within the same Member State according to Article 7 of the SE Regulation is very problematic and, in light of recent ECJ decisions such as Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art, may violate EC primary legislation. Why should companies that are formed under national law be allowed to have the head office in a Member State different from their registration state, while an SE—as an instrument of Community law and a symbol of the Internal Market—is not? Furthermore, the detailed procedural rules laid down in the Regulation are sometimes overprotective and may significantly reduce the attractiveness of the SE’s mobility. It is argued that Article 7 of the SE Regulation is secondary law that itself is inconsistent with the (primary) EC Treaty. Furthermore, the Member States also tend to be overprotective when enacting safeguard measures for the benefit of creditors, minority shareholders and employees. Here again, freedom of establishment does not allow protectionist measures that contravene the gist of the SE’s mobility.

article on the Überseering case and international jurisdiction issues

With the introduction of the new legal form of the European Company Statute ('Societas Europaea') at the end of 2004, European Community lawmakers have created an instrument which enables large European firms to choose a corporate structure which is based on the same standards in all of the European Community. One special advantage of this new legal form is the simplification of cross-border restructuring, in particular the transfer of the corporation's registered office to another country. However, the statutory provisions for this transfer are relatively restrictive and do take the creditors' and shareholders' request for protection into consideration. The book studies the extent to which these newly-created regulations for the transfer of a European Company’s seat comply with the requirements of an authentic legal form of European Community law, and in particular whether or not they are compatible with the basic freedoms stipulated in the EC Treaty.