Ian Loader is Professor of Criminology and Professorial Fellow of All Souls College. Ian arrived in Oxford in July 2005 having previously taught at Keele University and the University of Edinburgh, from where he also obtained his PhD in 1993. He is a Fellow of the Royal Society for the Arts.
Ian is the author of six books, the most recent of which Public Criminology? was published by Routledge in 2010 (with Richard Sparks) and has been translated into Mandarin. He has also edited six volumes, including Justice and Penal Reform (with Barry Goldson, Steve Farrall and Anita Dockley, Routledge, 2016), Democratic Theory and Mass Incarceration (with Albert Dzur and Richard Sparks, Oxford UP, 2016) and The SAGE Handbook of Global Policing (with Ben Bradford, Bea Jauregui and Jonny Steinberg, 2016). Ian has also published theoretical and empirical papers on policing, private security, public sensibilities towards crime, penal policy and culture, the politics of crime control, and the public roles of criminology.
Ian is currently working on a project – termed A Better Politics of Crime - concerned with different dimensions of the relationship between crime control and democratic politics. The first strand of work on this project was brought together in Public Criminology? The next key stage will be a monograph with the working title of Ideologies and Crime Control which is in the early stages of preparation. He also continues to research and write on policing and private security.
Ian is Editor-in-Chief of the Howard Journal of Crime and Justice. He has previously served on the Editorial boards of the British Journal of Criminology and Theoretical Criminology.
Ian has written columns for The Guardian and from time to time makes other contributions to public debate about crime and justice. He was a member of the Commission on English Prisons Today from 2007-2009, and from 2011-2013 was a member of the Independent Commission on the Future of Policing and part of the Editorial team which produced the Commission's Report. Ian is an Associate Fellow of the Institute for Public Policy Research.
Ian is a Mid-Career Fellow of the Independent Social Research Foundation and on leave during 2016-2017.
- DOI: 10.1177/1477370815615624This article draws upon two different ethnographic studies – one based in Sweden, the other in the United Kingdom – to explore how private security officers working in an ambiguous and stigmatized industry construct and repair their self-esteem. While the concept of ‘dirty work’ (Hughes 1951) has been applied to public police officers, an examination of private security officers as dirty workers remains undeveloped. Along with describing instances of taint designation and management, we find that the occupational culture of security officers enhances self-esteem by infusing security work with a sense of purpose. As members of a tainted occupation, security officers employ a range of strategies to deflect scorn and reframe their work as important and necessary.DOI: 10.1111/rego.12109How can we better align private security with the public interest? This question has met with two answers in the literature on private security regulation, one seeking to cleanse the market of deviant sellers, the other to communalize the market through the empowerment of buyers. Both models of regulation are premised upon a limited neoclassical economic conception of how market transactions map onto the public interest. This article makes the case for a new model of regulation, one that seeks to civilize private security. Drawing upon the insights of economic sociology, our model regards the market for security as a moral economy in which commodity and non-commodity values jostle and collide. On this basis, we propose a regulatory architecture where buyers and sellers are cast not only as economic actors but also as moral actors, in the process revealing new avenues through which to encompass private security within the democratic promise of security.DOI: 10.1080/17440572.2016.1169926DOI: 10.1007/s11572-014-9318-1For over a century the so-called Peelian principles have been central to the self-understanding of Anglo-American policing. But these principles are the product of modern state-building and speak only partially to the challenges of urban policing today. In fact, they stand in the way of clear thinking and better practice. In this paper, I argue that these principles ought to be radically recast and put to work in new ways. The argument proceeds as follows. First, I recover and outline the current Peelian principles and argue that they lack the specificity, sufficiency and status required in order to do real work in the governance of policing. Secondly, I make the case for principles both as a regulative ideal guiding our aspirations for what policing can become and as a means of regulating police work in the here-and-now. I then develop a revised set of principles and indicate, in conclusion, how they can guide the formation of trust-producing and democracy-enhancing practices of civic policing.In this chapter we revisit and extend discussion about the relation of the police to the key political concepts of crime and order using the case of the police power of stop and search/frisk. We select this power as a case study because its exercise is laden with implications for how we understand the overarching purpose of the police and seek to control and govern police work. Using evidence on the social and spatial distribution of stop and search from several jurisdictions, we contest two legitimating fictions about this power that it is a tool of crime detection and that it can be subject to effective legal regulation. The evidence, we argue, suggests that stop and search is about control and the assertion of order and the effort to do this implicates not only fighting crime but also regulating and disciplining populations based on who they are, not how they behave. Given this, we argue, stop and search is best understood as an aspect of The Police Power recently theorized by Markus Dubber (2005) a potentially limitless, uncontrollable, extra-legal power to do what is necessary to monitor and control marginal populations. In conclusion, we spell out the regulatory implications of understanding stop and search in these terms.In the paper, we use data from an English study of security consumption, and recent work in the cultural sociology of markets, to illustrate the way in which moral and social commitments shape and often constrain decisions about how, or indeed whether, individuals and organizations enter markets for protection. Three main claims are proffered. We suggest, firstly, that the purchase of security commodities is a mundane, non-conspicuous mode of consumption that typically exists outside of the paraphernalia of consumer culture a form of grudge spending. Secondly, we demonstrate that security consumption is weighed against other commitments that individuals and organizations have and is often kept in check by these competing considerations. We find, thirdly, that the prospect of consuming security prompts people to consider the relations that obtain between security objects and other things that they morally or aesthetically value, and to reflect on what the buying and selling of security signals about the condition and likely futures of their society. These points are illustrated using the examples of organisational consumption and gated communities. In respect of each case, we tease out the evaluative judgments that condition and constrain the purchase of security amongst organisations and individuals and argue that they open up some important but neglected questions to do with the moral economy of security.In this paper, we describe and make sense of the reception of a novel security good: namely, the personal GPS tracking device. There is nothing new about tracking. Electronic monitoring is an established technology with many taken-for-granted uses. Against this backdrop, we focus on a particular juncture in the social life of tracking, the moment at which personal trackers were novel goods in the early stages of being brought to market and promoted as protective devices. Using data generated in a wider study of security consumption, our concern is to understand how this extension of tracking technology into everyday routines and social relations was received by its intended consumers and users. How do potential buyers or users of these novel protective devices respond to this novel security object? What is seductive or repulsive about keeping track of those for whom one has a duty or relationship of care? How do new tracking technologies intersect with challenge, reshape or get pushed back by existing social practices and norms, most obviously around questions of risk, responsibility, trust, autonomy and privacy? This paper sets out to answer these questions and to consider what the reception of this novel commodity can tell us about the meaning and future of security.In this paper we draw upon our recent research into security consumption to answer two questions: First, under what conditions do people experience the buying and selling of security goods and services as morally troubling? Second, what are the theoretical implications of understanding private security as, in certain respects, tainted trade? We begin by drawing on two bodies of work on morality and markets (one found in political theory, the other in cultural sociology) in order to develop what we call a moral economy of security. We then use this theoretical resource to conduct an anatomy of the modes of ambivalence and unease that the trade in security generates. Three categories organize the analysis: blocked exchange, corrosive exchange, and intangible exchange. In conclusion, we briefly spell out the wider significance of our claim that the buying and selling of security is a morally charged and contested practice of governance.Why do certain security goods become banal (while others do not)? Under what conditions does banality occur and with what effects? In this paper we answer these questions by examining the story of closed circuit television cameras (CCTV) in Britain. We consider the lessons to be learned from CCTVs rapid but puzzling - transformation from novelty to ubiquity, and what the banal properties of CCTV tell us about the social meanings of surveillance and security. We begin by revisiting and reinterpreting the historical process through which camera surveillance has diffused across the British landscape, focussing on the key developments that encoded CCTV in certain dominant meanings (around its effectiveness, for example) and pulled the cultural rug out from under alternative or oppositional discourses. Drawing upon interviews with those who produce and consume CCTV, we tease out and discuss the family of meanings that can lead one justifiably to describe CCTV as a banal good. We then examine some frontiers of this process and consider whether novel forms of camera surveillance (such as domestic CCTV systems) may press up against the limits of banality in ways that risk unsettling security practices whose social value and utility have come to be taken for granted. In conclusion, we reflect on some wider implications of banal security and its limits.ISBN: 0007-0955ISBN: 9781849463003The private security industry is often represented and typically represents itself as an expanding business, confident of its place in the world and sure of its ability to meet a rising demand for security. But closer inspection of the ways in which industry players talk about its past, present and future suggests that this self-promotion is accompanied by unease about the industrys condition and legitimacy. In this paper, we analyse the self-understandings of those who sell security as revealed in interviews conducted with key industry players and in a range of trade materials in order to highlight and dissect the constitutive elements of this ambivalence. This analysis begins by describing the reputational problems that are currently thought to beset the industry and the underlying fears about its status and worth that these difficulties disclose. We then examine how security players seek to legitimate the industry using various narratives of professionalization. Four such narratives are identified regulation, education, association and borrowing each of which seeks to justify private security and enhance the industrys social worth. What is striking about these legitimation claims is that they tend not to justify the selling of security in market terms. In conclusion we ask why this is the case and suggest that market justifications are closed-off by a moral ambivalence that attaches to an industry trading in products which cannot guarantee to deliver the condition that its consumers crave.ISBN: 1362-4806How does our understanding of private security alter if we treat security consumption as consumption? In this paper, we set out the parameters of a project which strives theoretically and empirically to do just this. We begin with a reminder that private security necessarily entails acts of buying and selling, and by indicating how the sociology of consumption may illuminate this central but overlooked fact about the phenomenon. We then develop a framework for investigating security consumption. This focuses attention on individual acts of shopping; practices of organizational security that individuals indirectly consume; and social and political arrangements that may prompt the consumption of, or themselves be consumed by, security. This way of seeing, we contend, calls for greater comparative enquiry into the conditions under which markets for security commodities flourish or founder, and close analysis of the social meanings and trajectories of different security goods. By way of illustration we focus on four such categories of good those we term commonplace, failed, novel and securitized. The overarching claim of the paper is that the study of private security currently stands in need of greater conceptual and empirical scrutiny of what is going on when security is consumed.ISBN: 1362-4806ISBN: 0070-1998ISBN: 978-0-415-44550-4In this paper, I set out a framework for investigating the relationship between contemporary consumer desires and practices and public demands for security and punishment. In so doing, I argue that punishment-centred public responses to crime, social disorder and terrorist threats (what has been termed penal excess) are today bound up with other, widespread social practices of excess. The paper takes the form of a reconstruction and critique of contemporary securitarian obsessions and proceeds as follows: I begin with a discussion of how the concept of excess (and its close cousins) has been and might potentially be applied to the social analysis of crime and crime control. I then make a case for understanding demands for security and punishment as an appetite and examine how the coupling of such appetites with identity, the market and the state can give rise to excessive, punitive, insecurity-reproducing penal practices. I conclude with some brief reflections on the end of excess both in terms of its corrosive, self-defeating effects and how one may seek to moderate or counteract them.ISBN: 978-0-521-69159-8DOI: 10.1093/bjc/azi091ISBN: 1464-3529DOI: 10.1177/0002716206286723ISBN: 1552-3349ISBN: 0-19-829906-0
Policing and security; penal policy and culture; public sensibilities towards crime, order and justice; crime control and democratic politics; criminology and social and political theory.
Options taughtCriminology and Criminal Justice