Julie Dickson (LLB, Dip. L.P. Glasgow; MA, DPhil Oxon) is Fellow and Senior Law Tutor at Somerville College, and Associate Professor in the Faculty of Law. After completing a D. Phil in Philosophy of Law at Balliol College, Oxford, she held posts at the University of Leicester and University College London before taking up a Fellowship in Law at Somerville College in 2002.
Dr Dickson works mainly in general jurisprudence or philosophy of law, and especially on methodological issues, and her publications on this topic include her book, Evaluation and Legal Theory (2001). She is also interested in theoretical aspects of European Union Law, including the theory of legal systems in the EU context. Dr Dickson teaches Jurisprudence and European Union Law at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels, and is the review articles editor of the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. She also serves on the editorial board of legal philosophy journals, Legal Theory, Law and Philosophy, Transnational Legal Theory and Problema.
Dr Dickson's most recently completed book project - with regard to which she served as both co-editor and contributor - featured some of the best contemporary work combining legal and political philosophy and European Union law. J. Dickson and P. Eleftheriadis (eds.) Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law, was published by Oxford University Press in 2012. Dr Dickson is currently working on a new monograph on the methodology of Legal Philosophy, under contract with Oxford University Press, working title: Elucidating Law: The Philosophy of Legal Philosophy.
- Questions concerning the aims and aspirations, criteria of success and even proper delineation of the subject matter of theories of law, have given rise to some of the most intractable and contentious debates in contemporary legal philosophy. In this article, I outline my vision of the remit and character of legal philosophy, with particular emphasis on the methodological approach with which I am most concerned in my own work, and which I refer to here as indirectly evaluative legal philosophy (IELP). I do so partly in response to some vehement criticisms of, and, in my view, significant mischaracterisations of, IELP and cognate approaches to theorising about law, which feature in some recent jurisprudential debates. My position, which I am in the process of developing in depth in a new monograph, supports a pluralistic methodological outlook which emphasises disciplinary and sub-disciplinary complementarity as an alternative to the febrile adversarialism sometimes afflicting our discipline. For, in my view, ours is a broad church, and all theoretical accounts able to illuminate and help us understand any aspect of laws variegated and complex character are (to invoke a Scottish saying) welcome in the main body o the kirk.DOI: 10.1080/20414005.2015.1120022ISBN: 0199675503ISBN: 9780199588770This article is concerned with whether the concept of a legal system - long a centrepiece of state-based legal theories is a useful conceptual tool in theorising the contemporary European Union and its legal relations with its Member States. The focus lies particularly with EU Directives, and with what the character and operation of this distinctive type of EU norm can tell us a regards the existence of and relations between legal systems in the EU. I argue for the view that the EU is comprised of distinct but interacting legal systems at EU and national level, and claim that the character and operation of directives supports this view. Throughout the discussion I try to bring the conceptual tools of analytical legal philosophy to bear on puzzles generated by EU law and its relations with national law, in order to show that a sound analysis of aspects of the EU can benefit from abstract legal philosophical reflection, and vice versa.ISBN: 1468-0386ISBN: 0167-5249ISBN: 9780754677086ISBN: 2007-4387DOI: 10.1093/ojls/gql032ISBN: 1464-3820This article was commissioned by the then editor of the IVR Encyclopaedia of legal philosophy. The article surveys and critically evaluates "descriptive" approaches to legal theory in light of recent challenges to the possibility and usefulness of this approach to jurisprudenceISBN: ISBN 970-32-3374-0This article was commissioned by the editors of a festschrift volume of essays in honour of Professor Jim Harris' work. It examines and critically assesses Professor Harris' interpretation of the work of Hans Kelsen on the normativity of law.ISBN: 0-19-929096-2ISBN: 1352-3252ISBN: 0-19-927042-2Spanish language edition published by the National Autonomous University of Mexico Press in association with Hart Publishing in 2006, translated by Dr Juan Vega GomezISBN: 1-84113-184-9Fully peer reviewed encyclopaedia article discussing the nature of legal reasoning and, in particular, the role of interpretation and coherence in legal reasoning. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy is an important reference resource for legal philosophers. 10000 words approx.ISBN: 1095-5054
Jurisprudence, Philosophy of Law, European Union Law, Philosophy of European Union Law
Options taughtJurisprudence, European Union Law, Jurisprudence and Political Theory