Sandra Fredman FBA, QC (hon)

The interpretation of human rights inevitably requires value judgements. But if the power of interpretation and limitation of human rights is left to elected legislators on the basis of majority voting, perpetual minorities may be perpetually subordinated. But leaving judges to make the final decision flies in the face of the basic principle that all fundamental decisions in society should be taken by the people themselves. Prisoners’ voting rights throw the dilemma into particularly sharp relief. Should an elected legislature have the final say on removing the fundamental right to vote from a section of the population, particularly one which is deeply unpopular and which politicians have no natural interest in defending? The most promising way out of this dilemma is to move away from a polarisation between courts and legislatures, and instead regard both as contributing to a democratic resolution of human rights disputes. An increasingly influential stream of thought characterises the relationship as one of dialogue. Rather than courts having the final say, judicial decisions provoke a response from the legislature. In this paper, I aim to go beyond a dialogic model and propose one based on deliberative democracy. Drawing on the distinction between interest bargaining and value-based or deliberative decisions, I argue that human rights can only be properly addressed within a democracy through deliberative means. In other words, the power of the principle should constitute the reason for adopting it, rather than the power of those whose interests it serves. Otherwise, those without political power risk perpetual subordination, undermining the raison d’être of human rights protection. It is here that the courts are in a position to make a unique contribution to the democratic resolution of human rights issues. I argue that courts should ensure that human rights decisions are indeed taken deliberatively within the constraints set by the human rights themselves. I call this a ‘bounded deliberative’ approach. The final section applies these principles to prisoners’ voting rights cases in South Africa and the UK.

Poverty is increasingly a human rights issue. The aim of this paper is to consider what role the right to equality can and should play in relation to poverty. It draws on the experience in Britain, Canada, the US and South Africa to develop several ways in which equality could function in relation to poverty. It concludes that while the right to equality can make a valuable contribution to apsects of pvoerty based on misrecognition and oscial exclusion, it has not yet been sufficiently developed to address distributive inequalities in its own right.

This paper examines the traditional dichotomy between measures addressing socio-economic inequalities and those aimed at inequality based on status, such as race, gender, disability or sexual orientation. Using the conceptual framework of recognition and redistribution developed by Nancy Fraser and others, I argue that it is no longer tenable to keep the two spheres separate. Constructing a concept of socio-economic equality without considering the implications for status-based inequality can be damaging and ineffective. Conversely, status-based measures are limited by their inability to mobilise the redistributive measures necessary to make real equality of opportunity and genuine choice possible. The paper begins by examining the interaction between socio-economic and status-based equality. I then sketch out a multi-dimensional notion of substantive equality which attempts to create a synthesis between the aims of both spheres. In the final part, I make some very tentative suggestions as to how the interpenetration can be more meaningfully captured in legal frameworks.

This paper assesses the emergence of a new proactive model to achieve gender equality, and compares it with the more established complaints led model based on individual rights. While transcending many of the weaknesses of the individual complaints model, the proactive model ains ambiguous in many crucial respects, particularly as to its objectives, its use of participation, and how compliance is to be achieved. The paper aims to shed more light on these key aspects by drawing on the experiences of such models in Canada, Northern Ireland,Britain, and the EU itself. This demonstrates that the location of proactive strategies on the borderline between law and politics makes them highly dependent on political will. The key challenge is therefore to ensure that proactive strategies are based on a ecognition that equality is a fundamental right, not a discretion, without reverting to individualised complaints mechanisms with all their inbuilt weaknesses. I conclude by considering how wemight achieve a fundamental and non-derogable core of rights within a proactive model

How has the right to equality in the UK been shaped by its roots in labour law, and, conversely, in what ways has the newly acquired human rights regime influenced labour law? A close analysis of some of the major equality cases in the highest courts in the UK and in the ECtHR since 2010 reveals two main arenas of contestation. The first concerns the rights-holder, and the corresponding duty-bearer. Labour law’s preoccupation with the employment relationship is challenged by the basic premise of human rights, namely that human rights inhere in everyone, simply by virtue of their humanity. On the other hand, the human rights regime generally assumes that it is only the state that is bound, leaving the obligations of the private employer in limbo. Yet it is into the interstices of all these settled relationships that the most vulnerable fall, and it is here that the right to equality should have the most traction. The second major cause of friction concerns the role of justification. Whereas under Article 14, the proportionality analysis is integrated into the definition of discrimination, the anti-discrimination statutes have built up a rigid divide between discrimination that can be justified and discrimination that cannot. This divide is under increasing pressure, particularly with the introduction of additional protected characteristics such as religion, age and disability.

While social welfare rights have traditionally been based on a male breadwinner model, more recent measures have seen women as the main vehicle for poverty alleviation and therefore the subject of social welfare rights. This chapter aims to create a framework of substantive gender equality which can be used specifically to engender social welfare rights, using Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes as an example of how this might work. A truly gendered perspective means that a welfare programme should address all four dimensions of a four dimensional framework of substantive equality. It must focus on alleviating gender-based disadvantage as well as poverty per se. It must address the specifically gendered stigmatic and prejudicial consequences for women. It must ensure the voices of the women are clearly heard and taken into account. Finally, it must ultimately address the structural causes of inequality rather than either requiring women to conform to the male norm, or cementing gender-based stereotypes of caring roles. At the same time, a gender perspective should not obscure the reality of poverty for both men and women. The answer is not to shift responsibility to women, but to universalise the burden through state provision of services. Real substantive equality is most likely to be achieved, not through making women bear the burden of breaking the inter-generational cycle of poverty, but through universal, free access to good quality state schools, health clinics and other essential services.

This chapter examines the notion of a positive right to security. I argue that the right arises from a deeper understanding of human freedom, one which does not simply prevent interference in free choice but instead seeks actively to remove constraints on choice. The right to security is a right not just to non-interference but to state action, that aims to protect the individual from risks to the person, whether caused by fellow citizens, poverty or the state itself.

This chapter assesses existing discrimination paradigms and their applicability to disability discrimination.It argues that a possible way forward lies in a duty to promote equality based on social rights.

A critical analysis of third way ideology in the field of labour law.

A critical examination of the meaning of age discrimination and an exploration of possible legislative frameworks to implement age discrimination legislation.