Borrowing a famous term from contemporary philosophy of mind, I suggest here that amongst the many difficult problems of punishment, one stands out for being particularly theoretical, particularly philosophical, and (in a sense to be explained) particularly hard. Admittedly, some of the other practical, less philosophical, and “easier” problems of punishment may be more urgent or may be in some ways more important than the hard problem. They do, in any case, typically receive much more attention (say, from criminologists – though not only from them) than the hard problem. And yet, my ultimate goal is to argue that real progress regarding the solution to almost any of the problems of punishment involves recognizing both the existence and the phenomenological contours of the hard problem. Since skepticism about the very existence of the hard problem is rife, a considerable amount of my discussion concerns different skeptical reactions to my account of the hard problem, trying to show why we should not find them compelling.
Professor Leo Zaibert