Abstract: I argue that public-reason (PR) political philosophy, in all its many different versions, should be rejected. I show that PR theorists cannot motivate their ‘reasonable person’ idealizations consistently with their underlying intuitions and that non-idealizing versions of PR theory face insurmountable difficulties. Also, I rely on more general discussions of reasons for action and for belief to discuss the thought that in order to be legitimate a political principle must be such that all have reason to endorse, as well as the thought that there is something objectionably "private" in the reasons for action of an agent who relies – in the political sphere – on the moral views that seem to her to be correct. I argue that political philosophers should not see themselves as arbiters who do not enter the arena of “private” political disagreements. Rather, they should acknowledge that all there is is the arena and should join non-philosophers in fighting for the good and the just. Nonetheless, even if PR accounts are, as I argue, deeply and importantly mistaken, they still respond to a genuine normative concern. I make this point by noting that even if the kind of accessibility or publicity or consensus or convergence that PR theorists are after is not to be had, still it would be good to have it. I conclude by suggesting a way to accommodate this underlying intuition without endorsing PR.